




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


John Carter Brown.



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Not a Rich

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OR EXPEDITIONS

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WITH A

Commentary on a Littoral WAR.

*Sapientiam sibi adimunt, qui sine ullo judicio inventa Majorum probant,
et ab aliis pecudum more ducuntur.*

LACTANTIUS de Origine Erroris, L. 2. C. 8.

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
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TO THE
PRINCE of WALES.

SIR,



IR WALTER RALEIGH in
his famous History of the
World ^a informs us, he had
once wrote a Treatise on the Art of
War by Sea, for the Lord HENRY
Prince of WALES: But the loss of
that brave and amiable Prince pre-
vented his publishing it. A Subject,

^a Part 1. Book
5. Chap. 1.
Sect. 7.

A he

Walter Raleigh

ii DEDICATION.

he says, and seems to speak it with surprize, never treated on before by either Ancients or Moderns. Since that Period of Time, this Country has been involved in several great Naval Wars, has made more than Seventy Conjunct Expeditions, and is, at this Instant, confessedly the greatest Maritime Power in the World.

How much greater then would his astonishment be, was he alive again in this Age, after an Interval of near an Hundred and Fifty Years, to find the Subject still only by himself attempted!

To come, however, as near as possible, to what appeared to him so useful in those Days, and must to every

DEDICATION. iii

every one not less necessary in these;
 I have ventured (tho' a Soldier) to
 publish to the World a Treatise,
 partly of a Naval kind; that is,
 Expeditions carried on jointly by the
 Fleet and Army, with a Commen-
 tary on a Littoral War, which in its
 Nature partakes of both Sea and
 Land: and as Sir WALTER thought
 the Greatness and Utility of the
 Matter deserved the Attention of
 the Prince of WALES; the Simi-
 larity of Subjects has encouraged me
 likewise, after his Example, to lay
 before Your ROYAL HIGHNESS the
 following Sheets. In doing which,
 I cannot but think myself fortunate
 in comparison to that great Man,
 who by an unlucky Event was stopt

iv DEDICATION.

short in the midst of his Design ;
when I have been able so far at
least to crown my Work with Suc-
cess, as to have it in my Power to
hope for your ROYAL HIGHNESS'S
Approbation, as the Fruits of my
Labour.

I am, with the utmost Respect,

Your ROYAL HIGHNESS'S

Most Devoted,

Most Obedient, and

Most Humble Servant,

Thomas More Molyneux.

[v]

T O T H E

R E A D E R.

THERE can be no Necessity for giving a long Thread of Reasoning, for the publishing to the World these Sheets: The Times argue for them, in a more convincing Manner, than any thing that can be alledged in writing by Way of Excuse. This Preface is directed to the candid Reader; to give him to understand, that as the Work before him, which enters the World under the Denomination of Conjunct Expeditions, is the first of the Kind that ever yet appeared; and might it be supposed, that some Advantages were to be reaped from the Utility of a Treatise of this Sort, the sooner it made its Appearance, (the critical Conjunction of Affairs considered) the better; it must naturally occur, the Shortness of Time allotted for the Performance of so large a Work, as well as the Novelty of the Subject, plead for the Incorrectness, and its making its public Entry in so imperfect a Dress, which upon the Perusal we find it.

To make the first Part, which is the History of the Expeditions, the more enter-

vi To the R E A D E R.

tertainings, we have endeavoured, as much as the Nature of the Subject will admit, to carry on a Kind of Chain from one Expedition to another, notwithstanding the great Intervals of Time, which frequently from the Course of Things happened. To answer this Purpose the better, the Words Conjunct Expedition are not supposed here to be so strictly defined, as to shut out any Operations that have been jointly transacted by the Fleet and Army, consequently are of a Conjunct Nature: For the same Reason, here are not only given the Conjunct Expeditions that have been undertaken by Great Britain, from the Descent of Cæsar to the Affair of Rochfort inclusive, with the last three Descents on the Coast of France; but Mention is made of those also which have been attempted, as well as actually put in Execution, in the above Period of Time, by the Enemies of Great Britain, against the Dominions belonging to the British Crown.

The Expeditions to the End of King George I. his Reign, are taken chiefly out of Mr. Campbell's Naval History; and for the Reader's Satisfaction, we have given the Historians and Memoir Writers, from whence they are originally taken.

The Expeditions of the present Reign, we compiled from general History, and authentic Papers. We must beg to declare, that

To the R E A D E R. vii

that as we had no Motive, but the public Service, that engaged us to undertake a Work of this Sort; so we have suffered our Pen to be biaſſed by no ſiniſter End. We have endeavoured, with the ſtricteſt Uprightneſs and Truth, to adhere to our principal Deſign, which was to give a fair impartial Account of the Expeditions in the firſt Part of the Work; that our Readers may form a good Judgement themſelves of the Nature, as well as the general Imperfection of the preſent Methods purſued to carry them into Execution. It is natural to ſuppoſe, by having the Hiſtory of the Expeditions firſt before them, they will alſo be more capable of making a truer Deciſion on the Remarks and Obſervations, as well as the new System, which is (with great Submiſſion to our Superiors) offered in the ſecond Part, which we call a Commentary on a Littoral War. It muſt alſo occur to every ſenſible Perſon, that the many groſs Miſcarriages that will be ſeen in this Treatiſe, muſt proceed in a more extraordinary Degree from bad Management; therefore, an Attempt to point out the Faults, though they ſhould reflect a little upon the Authors, ought not to be looked upon as Perſonal. And ſhould it in general appear, that the Army have been more deficient on their Part, than the Navy; and the Laſh of Censure

con-

viii To the R E A D E R.

consequently fall heavier upon them ; we must beg to exonerate ourselves from any evil Opinion that may be conceived, of the Intention with which we dared to bring so much to light. The Reader is here intreated to believe, we never entertained a View, of being thought (as Feuquiere was by his Countrymen) the Aristarchus, and sometimes the Zoilus of Generals : Nor have we any of the like Ambition, to be reckoned the bravest Man of our Country, (as it was humorously said of him) because he slept every Night amidst an hundred thousand Enemies ^a.

^a Voltaire's
Age Lewis
XIV. vol. I. p.
269.

We wish it may be received in the same good Mood it was wrote ; which was with an humble Hope of lessening, in our future Conjunct Enterprises, the Effusion of British Blood ; by sending our Armaments more prepared with Terror for the Enemy, Safety to those who compose them, Satisfaction and a better Prospect, not only of their Return, but Success, to their Friends they leave behind.

CON-



CONJUNCT EXPEDITIONS.

PART I.

CHAP. I.



THE great and wise Creator from his peculiar Grace, hath distinguish'd Mankind above all his other Creatures, by enduing them with the Gift of Reason. This inestimable Blessing is not given us to be prostituted or licentiously used ; nor are we to bury in darkness the noblest Ornament about us ; it is given us to search quietly, impartially, and freely after the Truth of hidden and doubtful Things ; to discern right from wrong ; to investigate (not inscrutable Mysteries, but) the Knowledge of what comes within the Sphere of Man. He who denies himself this Privilege, is born a Slave, the most abject of Slaves ; for he deprives himself even of the liberty of thinking ; he submits wholly to a mental Bondage, and sooner than venture to reason for himself, follows implicitly the Dictates of others, tho' they appear ever so absurd. Custom, our second Nature, has render'd to some this Slavery of the Mind easy ; though to others more insufferable than real Manacles and Fetters. For our parts we have given free liberty to our

B

Thoughts ;

CONJUNCT EXPEDITIONS. Part 1.

Thoughts; we shall take another liberty, to declare them as freely, which the following Sheets will show.

The high Expectations which naturally transport every well-wisher to his Country, upon the news of a British Armada being sail'd, is not at all surprizing; nor is the general Dejection to be wonder'd at, which for many Years has been almost the sure Consequence of an unsuccessful Return. Custom has made it nothing extraordinary to see such sudden alternate Sensations spread over those Nations: Our Naval Histories tell us what wonderful Things have been done, even with little Boats, with an handful of bold and cunning Men. Whoever peruses the Lives of the American Buccaneers, will be still surprized with more extraordinary Instances; and should they consider their Actions without the Motive, must think and say, What might not be expected from Britain's Royal Navy riding (as it does) paramount of the Seas, capable too of transporting an Army sufficient to command the Enemy's Shores?

Our Conjunct Armaments go out freighted with good Wishes, Blessings, and Huzza's; these they soon disburthen, and have too often come home loaded with Reproaches, Sorrow, and Disappointments. We call ourselves the Neptunes of the Sea, without knowing how, in many particulars, to sway the Trident. It was the ill Success of the Rochfort Expedition, that put us upon considering, what it is our Conjunct Armaments owe their Miscarriages to; and upon looking back upon those of these last hundred and fifty Years, we are convinced without mentioning Rochfort, that it is for the generality, no local, temporal, accidental, but some general and fundamental Cause. A Cause, a little Reflection tells us, must be an Insufficiency in this amphibious kind of Warfare; not proceeding from Dullness, Inactivity, or want of Capacity in our Leaders; but from their having had their Attention, War after War, too much dazzled with the glare and sound of large Armies and continental Campaigns.

The empty Parade of our Rochfort Armament, we have said, first put us upon considering it: The Perusal of our Naval History hath inclined us since to believe it; and our late melancholy Misfortune in the Bay of St. Cass, hath confirmed us in the same.

The

The Fashion of the World, which with Mankind is so prevalent, hath hurried us into Absurdities; to imitate in our military Operations, Nations who in comparison to Britain's Fleets have scarce a little Squadron in their Harbours, much more one that dares face them on the Sea; yet we have followed the Example of these Nations on the Continent, by allotting too great a Proportion of Troops for inland continental Campaigns; by which for the generality, though we have made many Conjunct Expeditions, they have most of them been starved. But this is not the worst Part of it; for when this has been the Method of carrying on our former Wars; the Littoral War where our Fleet and Army act together, hath ever been in so low esteem, that no one hath applied himself sufficiently to that sort of Study, to explore its real Virtues. For though it has been considered as the least, we shall endeavour to prove in these Sheets, that when they are united, they carry with them the most formidable Power.

The Inference we would draw from this, is, that the Insufficiency abovementioned must be the Offspring, we will not say of continental Campaigns, but of the little Regard, the low Plight and want of System in the conducting our Conjunct Armaments. People are not to be blamed for employing their chief Study in Things which Experience hath taught them, are almost sure to be practised most, and carry with them the greatest Eclat. Nor are they more culpable for neglecting such Things, which from Experience likewise they learn, there is a great Probability of their never being called upon to practise. These then in some measure are the Causes and Sources of the Misfortunes of Britain's Conjunct Expeditions. It is an Ignorance and an Insufficiency that renders us (when by accident we are called upon) unfit to act in this Sphere.

We are bewildered, 'tis true, not in a Wood, but in a Deluge of Waters, which drowns our Senses; and before we recover them, so as to fix our Anchor of Understanding, the Opportunity is lost, and the Expedition frustrated.

We must tell our Countrymen, that a Military, Naval, Littoral War, when wisely prepared and discreetly conducted, is a terrible Sort of War. Happy for that People who are Sovereigns enough of the Sea to

CONJUNCT EXPEDITIONS: Part I

put it in Execution ! For it comes like Thunder and Lightning to some unprepared Part of the World.

However, before we begin to comment or discover our own Thoughts and Inventions, it may not be improper first to give our Readers a general cursory View of the Conjunct Expeditions that have been made by these Kingdoms ; by which they will be more able of forming a Judgement of the Use they are of, the Improvements they are subject to, as well as what we shall offer ourselves, which we hope will come under the above Denomination. We must at the same time make our Readers to understand ; that tho' this general View will oblige us to descend gradually through the Reigns of our Kings and Queens ; we are not writing the History of those Reigns, or the Naval History of these Kingdoms ; therefore shall pass from one Conjunct Expedition to another, without mentioning the great Naval Engagements, or even giving Reasons why these Armaments were made ; all which have been wrote before by abler Pens than ours, and would be breaking through the Bounds we have prescribed ourselves, and swelling our Book to too great a Size. We write it chiefly for the Use of the Army, for two Reasons ; because we belong to the Army ourselves ; and a more material Reason, is, (we are sorry to say) because in these Conjunct Enterprises, for the generality, the Army have been more deficient in the performing their Part, than the Navy : However, there has already been a Reason assigned for this, which in some measure excuses it. In this View we shall pass over as briefly as possible, Expeditions that give us little or no Light ; and dwell longer upon those that are more useful and material to our Purpose.

Wherefore we shall not detain our Readers with the Invasions made by the Romans ; except those by Julius Cæsar, who was the first of the Romans that made an impression of this Sort against the Britons. His first Expedition ^a was with a Fleet of eighty Ships, and a few Gallies, on board of which he embarked two Legions ^b. He attempted to land on the opposite Coast of Kent, where he found a British Army ready to receive him ; who performed their Parts so well, that even those Roman Veterans were astonished, and contrary to their usual Custom, betrayed a dislike to Fighting: whence ^c we may justly infer, that this was not the first Time the Bri-

^a A. A. C. 52.

^b Hist. Britan.

lib. 4. cap. 1.

Vit. Hist. lib. 4.

Cæf. de bel.

Gal. lib. 5.

^c Camp. Naval

Hist. vol. 1.

Chap. I. CONJUNCT EXPEDITIONS.

5

tons had to do with Invaders. The Emperor^d Julian,^d Vit. Hist. a Writer of distinguished Parts, introduces Julius as Cæf. ib. leaping from his Ship to encourage his Soldiers; but Cæsar tells us it was the Standard-bearer of the tenth Legion, who by this Action, encouraged the Army to gain the Shore; from which, with much difficulty they drove the British Inhabitants.^e After this, Cæsar encamped^e Cæf. de bel. Gal. lib. 4. cap. on Barham-Downs, where he waited for a Supply; in²⁵ Hist. Brit. lib. 4. cap. 5. which, meeting with some Disappointment, the Britons again gave him Battle, and, as he owns, were repulsed with Difficulty enough; insomuch that when he had repaired his Fleet, he judged it the wisest thing he could do, to return to Gaul; this he accordingly did, embarking his Forces at Midnight.^f Cæsar, however, made^f De bel. Gal. lib. 5. a second Expedition to Britain, with a Navy consisting of 800 Sail, on board of which he embarked a numerous Army. He landed again in Kent^g without meeting any^g A. A. C. 51. Resistance; the Britons being astonished at the Sight of ten times the Force with which they had before contended. The Romans marched as far as the River Stoure, where in a little Time the British Monarch Caswallan, engaged them with a formidable Army. The Romans forced their Enemies to retreat; but in the Evening the Britons boldly attacked the Roman Camp; and when they found themselves unable to keep it, charged quite through the Forces appointed to defend it, and recovered their Fastnesses. Cæsar marching forwards towards the Thames, Caswallan caused the Ford where he was to pass, to be stuck full of sharp Stakes, remaining with his Army on the opposite Shore, in order to have taken Advantage of that Confusion, this Contrivance must have made; but the Design was betray'd; and Cæsar passed a little higher. The Place, however, retains the Name of Coway Stakes, near Oatlands^h. Caswallan as^h Hist. Britan. lib. 4. cap. 8, well as some of the British Princes afterwards submitted upon Terms to Cæsar. The Romans after having beenⁱ 11. Vit. Hist. here about 480 Years or thereabouts, left this island, and^{lib. 4. Cæf. de bel. Gal. lib. 5.} the Britons to their own Fortunes. The next Naval Expedition of any Note, was that of Aurelius Ambrosius the Second Son of Constantine King of the Britons. Ambrosius when a Child, had fled to Britanyⁱ, and up-ⁱ A. D. 438. on Invitation to prosecute his Claim to the Crown, got together a good Fleet, and embarking therein ten thou-

* A. D. 481. sand Men, landed at Totness^k. This British King fought several Battles, and supported by his Valour his sinking Country^l.

* Pauli Diaconi
Hist. miscel.

We don't find any thing remarkable to our Purpose of the Saxon Kings, till we come to Alfred, who was particularly skilful in maritime Affairs; and as we have authentic Memoirs of his Reign, one cannot but be amazed at the Sagacity he discovered in providing a kind of Ships of a new Construction, devised by himself, of which we shall speak more largely in another Place. There were indeed in several Reigns before Alfred's, frequent Invasions by the Danes, which we don't mention, as they give us little or no Light with regard to Conjunct Expeditions.

Edward succeeded his Father Alfred; he drew together 100 Sail of Ships upon the Coast of Kent, where he successfully engaged a new Invasion of the Danes, having killed Eric their King before in Battle; he forced the greatest Part of their Fleet on Shore; and then landing himself, defeated their forces in a bloody Battle. In a short time after these good Fortunes, he died; and was succeeded by his Brother Ethelstan; who falling out with Constantine King of Scotland, invaded the Country with a Royal Army, and wasted its Coasts with a mighty Fleet, which brought Constantine to a Submission much against his Will. As soon as Ethelstan was retired, the Scots began to intrigue with the Britons on one Side, and Anlaff whom most of our Historians stile King of Ireland, but who in reality was a Danish Prince. In consequence of these Negotiations, the Britons with a great Army joined the whole Force of the Scots; Anlaff coming at the same time with a more numerous Fleet than had ever been seen in the Northern Seas. Ethelstan, instead of being dejected at such powerful Enemies, resolved to attack them both at Sea and Land; which he accordingly performed with equal Success and Vigour. In this Battle there fell five Kings and seven Danish Chiefs^m.

^m A. D. 938.

ⁿ A. D. 941.

^o Gul. Malinesbury, de gest. reg. an. lib. 2. c. 7.

^p Speed's Chronicle, p. 369.

^q A. D. 957.

Ethelstan was succeeded by his Brother Edmundⁿ, who left the Crown to his Brother Edred^o. And after him his Nephew Edwy stepped into the Throne^p.

But the next Prince of any consequence to our Purpose, was his Brother^q Edgar, very justly stiled the Great.

From his first ascending the Throne, he demonstrated him-
self

self the Heir of Alfred and Ethelstan. As to his Fleet, all Writers agree that it was far superior to any of his Predecessors, as well as much more powerful than those of all the European Powers put together. These Ships he divided into three Fleets, each of twelve hundred Sail, and kept them constantly stationed; one on the East, another on the West, and the third on the North coast of the Kingdom: However, the only Expeditions that Edgar used to employ his Fleets in, were round his own Kingdom; which he did to see if they answered the Ends he intended them; and for the Oddity we shall mention them. Every Year after Easter, he went on board the Fleet stationed on the Eastern Coast; and, sailing West, he looked into every Creek and Bay, and scoured all the Channels from the Thames Mouth, to the Land's-end in Cornwall. Then, quitting these Ships, he went on board the Western Fleet, with which, steering his course to the Northward, he did the like, not only to the English and Scotch Coast, but also to those of Ireland, and the Hebrides, which lie between them and Britain; then meeting the Northern Fleet, he sailed in it to the Thames Mouth. Thus surrounding the Island every Summer, he rendered any Invasion impracticable, kept his Sailors in continual Practice, and effectually asserted his Sovereignty over the Sea. Several prædatory Expeditions were set a-foot against this Kingdom, during the Time of the Saxon Kings Edward, Ethelred, and Edmund Ironside, Successors to Edgar, which are not worth mentioning here. Nor do we find many Instances to our Purpose worth detaining our Readers, during the Time of the Danes, of whom Swain was the first. Canutus, who succeeded him in 1027, sailed with a Fleet of fifty Ships with English Forces on board to Norway, out of which having driven Olaff, who had set himself up for King, Canutus the next Year returned into England. Two Years after he invaded Scotland both by Land and Sea, and obliged that King to submit to his Terms. Harold who succeeded Canutus, did not long survive him. Nor do we find any thing to our Purpose in the following Reigns of Hardiknute and Edward the Confessor, more than in the Time of the latter, some pyratrical doings on the Coasts of his Dominions. Upon the Death of this King, Harold the Son of the Earl of Godwin

^r Hen. Huntingdon, Hist. lib. 5.—Rog. Hoveden. Annal. p. 426, 427. Alured. Beverlac. lib. 2.

^r Pontan. Hist. Dan. lib. 5. Gul. Malmesbur. de gest. Reg. An. lib. 2. ca. 11. Alured. Bever. Annal. lib. 8. Ran. Higden in Polychron. Chron. Saxon.

seized p. 150—154.

feized the Crown; he was equally allied to the Saxons and Danes. His bad Title to the Crown, raised him many Difficulties. His Brother Tostigo appeared on the Coasts of Yorkshire and Northumberland, with a Fleet of 50 Sail. Earl Edwin encountered him on his landing, defeated his Army, and afterwards destroyed great Part of his Fleet^t. Tostigo escaped with twelve Ships to Scotland, where he was scarce arrived, before he heard of a new Pretender to the Crown his Brother wore. This was Harold Harfagar, that is fair-haired, King of Norway, who set up a Title by Descent, and to support it, put to Sea with a Fleet of 300 Sail, and a numerous Army on board: with him Tostigo joined, and both sailed up the Humber, landed their Forces, and began to direct their march towards York. They totally routed the two great Earls Edward and Morker, in consequence of which, the King of Norway possessed himself of York. King Harold, no way discouraged at this ill news, ordered a Fleet to be fitted out; in the mean Time marched in Person against the Enemy. The King forced Stanford Bridge, ever since stiled Battle-bridge, and attacked the Enemy with such Vigour as forced their Intrenchments, killed both Harold Harfagar and Tostigo on the spot; his Admirals at Sea with like Success beat the Norwegian Fleet, and obliged Olaf the Son of Harold Harfagar to capitulate, and be glad to embark the scattered remains of his Forces on board twenty Vessels; giving up every thing besides, with the Remainder of his Father's Navy, to the Conqueror^u. This was one of the greatest Victories, we find recorded by our Historians. Before Harold's return from performing these great Actions in the North; News was transmittted to him of the Duke of Normandy's, * afterwards William the Conqueror, landing safely at Pevensey in Suffex the 28th of September 1066; the Duke no sooner saw his Troops on Shore, than he burned his Fleet, which he knew was no way able to engage that of the English. So that from the time Swain King of Denmark invaded this Country, which was in the Year 1013, to the Duke of Normandy's Arrival, was 53 Years.

The Normans reigned over this Kingdom about eighty-eight Years, through a Succession of four Kings, which were William, stiled the Conqueror, William Rufus, Henry

^t Chron. Sax. p. 172. Roger Hoved. p. 447. Hen. Hunting. Hist. lib. 6.

Chron. Sax. p. 172. Guliel. Malmesb. de gest. reg. Ang. lib. 2. p. 94. Rog. Hoved. p. 448. Ingulph. Hist. p. 900. * Chroniques de Normandie Ingulph. Hist. Old. Vital, &c.

Chap. I. CONJUNCT EXPEDITIONS.

9

Henry Beauclerk, and Stephen : but as we find nothing in their Reigns very material to our Purpose ; we shall be very short with them. Three Years after the Victory of Hastings, which gave the Duke of Normandy the Crown and Title of Conqueror, the Danes entered the Humber with 240, or as others say, 300 sail^y, and there debarked their Forces about the middle of August, 1069^z ; they were immediately joined by a large Army of English and Scots. The King marched towards them, but finding his Army inferior, he entered into a private Treaty with Osborn, the Danish General, for a large Sum of Money for himself to return home with his Fleet and Army, which he did in the Spring. About this Time, the Sons of the late King Harold came out of Ireland, with a Fleet of 65 Sail, and landed in Somersetshire ; but Ednoth, an old Servant of their Father's, beat their Forces and obliged them to retire^a. In the seventh Year of his Reign, he attacked Scotland, by Sea and Land, to be revenged of King Malcolm, who had constantly assisted all the Disturbers of his Government, and quickly brought him to accept a Peace on the Terms he thought fit to prescribe^b. In the tenth Year of his Reign, the Danes entered into a Conspiracy with some English Lords ; and under the Command of Canutus, the Son of King Swain, a Fleet of 200 Sail came upon the Coast, and even entered the Mouth of the Thames ; but not finding their Confederates in the Posture they expected, they retired to Flanders without undertaking any thing^c.

^y Chron. Sax.
^z A. D. 1068.
Pontanus Hist.
Dan. A. D.
1068.
^z Hist. Angl.
vol. 1. p. 6.

^a Roger Hoveden, p. 450.
^{A. D.} 1069.

^b Chron. Sax.
^{A. D.} 1072.
Alured Beverl.
Annal. lib. 9.

^c Chron. Sax.
p. 183. Henr.
Hunting. book
7. p. 369.

William, surnamed Rufus, succeeded his Father William the Conqueror, and not content with having stepped into the Throne before his elder Brother Robert, in the fourth Year of his Reign invaded Normandy, his Brother's Dukedom, by Sea and Land : but by the Interposition of Friends, their Differences were reconciled^d. The year following the King resolving to be revenged on the Scots, ^e who had invaded his Dominions whilst he was in Normandy, prepared to attack them by Sea and Land. Duke Robert, who was then in England, was to conduct this Expedition ; but the Fleet not being ready till towards Michaelmas, abundance of Ships were lost by Storms on the Scottish Coast ; the Army likewise suffering exceedingly by the Severity of the Weather ;

^d A. D. 1090.
^e A. D. 1091.

ther; upon which Misfortunes, Peace was made with
^f Chron. Sax. Malcolm, King of the Scots ^f. After that there is little
 p. 197. Alured in this Reign, as to Conjunct Expeditions; except in-
 Beverl. lib. 9. vasions of Normandy. Henry surnamed Beauclerk,
 youngest Son of the Conqueror, succeeded Rufus in the
 Throne. Duke Robert, his elder Brother, renewed
 his Pretensions to the English Crown, and in a short
 Time landed safely at Portsmouth with a gallant Ar-
^g A. D. 1101. my ^g. Henry marched directly to Hastings, where when
 Things were on the point of being determined by Arms,
 and a second Battle of Hastings seemed to be the only
 Method of clearing the Royal Title, some great Men
 of the Kingdom interposed, and brought about an Ac-
 commodation between them ^h. The King, however, after
^h Chron. Sax. various Passages into Normandy, determined to make
 p. 209. Mat. an absolute Conquest of it. With this view he rais'd a
 Paris, p. 98. great Army, and a Fleet proportionable, with which he
 Gul. Malmesb. cross'd the Sea ⁱ. In a short Space he conquer'd great
 de gest. Reg. Part of his Brother Robert's Dominions; that stout
 Ang. lib. 5. Prince, whose Spirit was always superior to his Power,
 Alured Beverl. Annal. lib. 9. resolved to hazard all bravely in the Field, rather than
ⁱ A. D. 1106. remain safe in his Person, but stripped of his Dominions;
 full of his generous Resolution, he gave his Brother
 Battle; in which he shew'd all the Courage and Con-
 duct of an experienced Commander; yet in the End
 was routed, taken Prisoner, and from that Time never
 enjoyed neither Land or Liberty more ^k.
^k Chron. Sax. Henry the 1st died the 2d of December, 1135; the
 p. 213, 214. Possession of the vacant Throne was attained by Stephen
 Mat. Paris hist. p. 62. Gul. Earl of Blois, Nephew by his Father's Side to the late
 Malmesbur. &c. King; and by his Mother, Grandson to William the
 Conqueror. In the 3d Year of his Reign, King Stephen
 with a great Fleet, and considerable Army on board,
 invaded Normandy; and though Jeffery, Earl of Anjou,
 the Husband of Maud the Empress, did all he could to
 defend it, yet he rejoined that Dukedom to the English
 Crown. The King's Affairs after this did not go on so
 prosperously. Among other Misfortunes, Robert, Earl
 of Gloucester, crossing over into Normandy, recovered
 it for Maud, to whom he was a Bastard Brother, and
 her Son Henry; and then returning, is recorded to have
 invaded the Northern Parts of the Kingdom with a Fleet
 of

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of fifty-two Sail¹; These are the chief of the Actions¹ relating to Conjunct Expeditions, during the Reigns of the Norman Princes. King Stephen died on the 25th of October, 1154, with whose Decease we will finish the first Chapter.

¹ Gul. Neu-
brigen, lib. 1.
c. 13. Nic. Tri-
vet. Annal. Rob.
of Gloucester's
Chron. p. 460.

C H A P. II.

HENRY the Second, the first Prince of the Royal House of Plantagenet, succeeded Stephen. In the fifth Year of his Reign, he undertook, at a vast Expence, with a great Fleet and potent Army, an Expedition for the recovery of the Earldom of Toulouse, to which the King pretended a Right; but he was not so happy in this as in his other Expeditions; tho' he was so far superior at Sea, that his Enemies durst not contend with him on that Element^m. In the eleventh Year^m of his Reign, he employed both a Fleet and Army against the Welchⁿ. In 1171 he drew together a considerable Army, with which he embarked on board a Fleet of 400 Sail, and passed therewith from Milford-Haven, to Waterford, resuming his grand Design of conquering Ireland, where he landed the 25th of October. The Appearance of so great a Force, and the presence of the King, had such an Effect on this Country, then torn by intestine Divisions, that in a very short Time, the King made this great Conquest without Effusion of Blood^o.

^m Gul. Neu-
brig.
lib. 2. c. 10.
ⁿ A. D. 1165.

Richard the First succeeded King Henry his Father: He was scarce seated on the Throne, before he began to prepare for that great Expedition, on which he had set his Heart; which was to drive the Saracens out of the Holy Land; in which he was to have Philip Augustus, the French King, and other great Princes for his Associates^p. The Articles of Agreement between the two Kings, are recorded at large in our own, and in the French Historians; however when King Richard appeared with his Fleet before the City of Messina, in Sicily, it so much astonished the French King, he from that moment conceiv'd such a jealousy of King Richard, as could never be extinguished. During the stay of our King in this Island, a Difference happened between him and King Tancred, which occasion'd the attacking of Messina,

^o Roger Hov.
Annal. par post
p. 526, 527.
^p Mat. Paris hist.
Ang. p. 126.
^m Gul. Neu-
brig.
lib. 2. c. 26.
ⁿ Nic. Triv. An-
nal. vol 1. p. 57.
^p Mat. Paris
hist. Ang. p. 155
^m Gul. Neu-
brig.
lib. 4. c. 1. Nic.
Trivet. Annal.
vol. 1. p. 97.
Gulfrid de vino
Salvo. Roger
Hov. Annal.
Johan. Brompton.
Rad. de
Diceto. Ran.
Higden. in
Polychron.

⁹ Abrege de
l'histoire de
France, par
Mezeray, tom.
2. p. 595.

Messina, and taking it by the English; which as our Writers say, gave no small umbrage to King Philip; tho' the French Historians affirm, that he abetted King Richard, and had a third part of the Money paid him by King Tancred for his pains^⁹. However that was, it is certain, that this last mentioned Prince did, by a Treaty of Composition, agree to give King Richard sixty thousand Ounces of Gold; Four large Gallies, and fifteen Gallies; by which Accession of Strength, the English Fleet, when the King left Sicily to sail for Cyprus, consisted of thirteen capital Ships of extraordinary Burthen, one hundred and fifty Ships of War, and fifty-three Gallies, besides Vessels of less Size and Tenders. In their Passage to Cyprus, they were sorely shaken by a Tempest, in which several Ships were lost, and a great Number of Men were drowned, among whom were some Persons of very great Distinction. The Ship in which Berengaria, Daughter to the King of Navarre, and who was contracted to King Richard, was, with many other Ladies of great Quality, was very near perishing by their being denied Entrance into one of the Ports of Cyprus, by the tyrannical King of that Island, whose Name was Isaac, and whom most of our Historians grace with the high Title of Emperor. This, with the plundering such Ships as were wrecked upon his Coasts, and making Prisoners of such Persons as escaped drowning, so provoked King Richard, that he made a Descent with all his Forces; and in the Space of fourteen Days reduced the whole Island, taking the King, and his Daughter and Heiress Prisoners. Here he received Guy, formerly King of Jerusalem, with several other Christian Princes in the East, who swore Fealty to him as their Protector; and having left two Governors, with a considerable Body of Troops in Cyprus, he sailed from thence with a much better Fleet than he brought with him; for it consisted of two hundred and fifty-four stout Ships, and upwards of sixty Gallies. In his Passage to Acon, or Ptolemais, he took a huge Vessel of the Saracens, laden with Ammunition and Provision, bound for the same Place, which was then besieged by the Christian Army. The Size of this Ship was so extraordinary, that it very highly deserves Notice. Matthew Paris calls it Dromunda, and tells us, that the Ships of the English

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English Fleet attacked it briskly, tho' it lay like a great floating Castle in the Sea, and was in a Manner impenetrable; at length, however, they boarded and carried it, tho' defended by no less than fifteen hundred Men. Hist. Angl. p. 163. After this Victory the King proceeded to Acon, which he blocked up by Sea; at the same time that his Forces in conjunction with those of other Christian Princes, besieged it by Land; so that at length, chiefly by his Means it was taken, though defended by the whole Strength of the Saracens, under their famous Prince Saladine. The French and English took joint Possession thereof; but King Philip was so sensible of his Glory being eclipsed, by the superior Merit of King Richard, that nothing would satisfy him but returning home, contrary to all the Stipulations he had made with the King of England. To this, King Richard with much ado consented, upon his taking a solemn Oath not to invade any of his Territories, till King Richard himself should be returned forty Days. King Philip left behind him the Duke of Burgundy, with a Body of ten or twelve thousand Men, with Orders to obey King Richard as Captain-General of the Christian Forces in the Holy Land; but with private Instructions, as our Historians surmise, to frustrate, as much as he could, all that King's Undertakings; which, if it be not true, is at least very probable, since that Duke acted as if he really had such Instructions. But notwithstanding this, Richard took Ascalon, Joppa, and other Places, reduced the greatest Part of Syria, beat the Saracens in several Engagements; and if his Confederates had done their Duty as well, would infallibly have retaken Jerusalem, which was the principal Design of the War.

Gul Neubrig.
lib. 4. c. 22.
Mat. Paris.
Roger
Hoveden. Galf.
de vino Salvo.
Mezeray.
A. D. 1191.

But, at length, finding himself envied and betrayed by his Confederates, and having Intelligence, that his Brother John sought to usurp his Dominions at home, he made a Treaty with Saladine, and resigned his Pretensions to the Kingdom of Jerusalem, to his near Kinsman Henry Earl of Champagne.

In the Spring of the Year 1194, the King returned into England, where he began to rectify all the Miscarriages which had happened in his Absence; and, perceiving that nothing could effectually settle his foreign Dominions, but vigorous Measures and a War with the French,

French, whose King acted as perfidiously as ever, he suddenly drew together a considerable Fleet, embarked on board thereof a large Body of Forces, and transporting them into Normandy, quickly disappointed all his potent Enemy's Views; and after five Years War, brought him to think in earnest of Peace ^u.

^u T. Walsingham, Hypodig.
Neutrix. Mat.
Paris. Rog.
Hoved.

* Mat. Paris,
Hist. Angl.
p. 230.

King John succeeded his Brother Richard; and ordered a great Army to be levied, and drew together a prodigious Fleet in the Year 1210, with the intent of curbing the Insolence of some of the Lords Proprietors of Ireland, and put an end to the Devastations committed by the Native Irish (hitherto unsubdued). For this Purpose he * passed from Pembroke in Wales to Ireland, where he landed the 25th of May. The Fame of his coming, and the Appearance of so great a Force as he brought with him, so terrified the Inhabitants of the Sea Coast, and Low Countries, that they immediately came and submitted. On his Arrival at Dublin, twenty of the Irish Chiefs came in, and swore Fealty to him: and having thus performed much in a peaceable Way, he achieved the rest by Force of Arms; reducing the King of Connaught, and taking the Castles of the rebellious Lords.

King John's next Conjunct Expedition, was to the Coast of Flanders; where Philip-Augustus the French King sent the best Part of his Fleet to waste the Coasts of that Country, while himself with a great Army entered it by Land. King John was no sooner informed of this, than he ordered his Navy under the Command of his Brother the Earl of Salisbury, to sail to the Assistance of his Ally the Earl of Flanders^v. He finding part of the French Fleet riding in the Road, and part at Anchor in the Haven of Dam in Flanders, first attacked and destroyed those without; and then, landing his Forces, fell upon the French in the Harbour by Sea and Land; and after an obstinate Dispute took them all; sending home three hundred Sail, well laden with Provisions, to carry the News of the Victory, and setting all the rest on fire. So fortunate was this Prince at Sea.

A. D. 1213.

In February 1214, the King passed the Seas again with a great Army on board a powerful Fleet; and sailed to Rochel, where he landed to recover his Rights. The King was well received, the greatest Part of the Country submitting to him immediately. He went on pro-

prosperously for some time against the French ; but his Fortune changing, and his Allies being beat at the famous Battle of Bovins ^z, he was constrained, about Easter ^z A. D. 1214, the next Year, to agree to a Truce.

Henry the Third, a Child between nine and ten Years of Age, succeeded his Father King John in the Year 1216. This Reign tho' very long, serves chiefly to show to how low a State the Kingdom was reduced. Of which there cannot be a much stronger Instance, than the Armament Prince Edward, with his Brother Edmund, and many Persons of the first Distinction, procured, upon taking the Cross to go against the Saracens ^a. Their Squadron ^a A. D. 1262, consisted of no more than thirteen Ships, on board of which were embarked above a thousand men : and yet, on his coming into the East, the very Fame of Prince Edward drew to him a considerable Force, with which he performed many noble Acts ; insomuch that the Infidels, despairing of any Success against him in the Field, had recourse to a base Assassination ; which likewise failed them ^b. On his Recovery, the Prince finding that ^b Annal. Wav. he should not be able to do any great Service to the Christian Cause in those Parts, settled his Affairs in the best Manner possible, in order to return home. Nic. Trivet. Annal. vol. 1. p. 232. Gal. Rishanger, in cont. Hist. Engl. p. 1007. Hakluyt, vol. 2. p. 36.

Edward the First, surnamed Longshanks, though at his Father's Decease in the Holy Land, was readily and unanimously acknowledged his Successor. He returned to England in the Year 1274. His first Expedition after he was King, was against the Welch ; for Llewelin, a wife and warlike Prince, declined paying Homage to King Edward, and endeavoured to strengthen his Interest, by marrying the Daughter of Simon Mountford, late Earl of Leicester, a determined Enemy of the Royal Family ^c. ^c A. D. 1276, This Lady coming to him by Sea from France was taken by some Ships from the Port of Bristol, and with her Brother brought to the King, who treated her very kindly. In order to put an End to these Disputes, Edward entered Wales with a great Army, and at the same time harrassed the Coast with his Fleet, which brought the proud Llewelin so low, that he yielded to a Peace on very hard Terms ; in consequence of which, however, the King, from a Royal Generosity, sent him his Wife ^d. Not long after, he broke out again with his Brother David, committed such Devastations, that the King ^d Walt. Hemingford. p. 5. Nic. Trivet. Annal. vol. 1. p. 248.

King was obliged to turn on him the whole Force of the Kingdom; and, having slain him in Battle, added Wales to his Dominions, and declaring his Son Edward, just born at Carnarvon, Prince thereof, put an end to the

^e A. D. 1282. British Line ^e.

Upon the War breaking out with France, to secure the Seas the King fitted out three Fleets, well provided with Men and Ammunition; one from Yarmouth, another from Portsmouth, the third had the Care of the Western Coast under a valiant Knight of Ireland ^f. All of these Fleets did good Service. That of Portsmouth about Michaelmas, sailed into the Mouth of the Garonne, and having debarked the Troops on board, took several

^f Nic. Trivet. Annal. vol. 1. p. 279.

^g Walter Hemmingford, vol. 1. p. 56. Nic. Trivet. Annal. vol. 1. p. 280.

^h A. D. 1295.

ⁱ Walter Hemmingford, vol. 1. p. 59. Nic. Trivet. Annal. vol. 1. p. 284.

^j Mezeray, vol. 2. p. 789.

^k Nic. Trivet. Annal. vol. 1. p. 284.

^l id. ibid.

^m A. D. 1296.

ⁿ Walt. Hemmingford, vol. 1. p. 146.

^o A. D. 1297.

Places from the French ^g. Yet the next Year, the French King having hired a great Fleet, stood over to the English Coast, and landing their Troops suddenly near Dover, by the Assistance of Thomas Turberville ^h a Traitor, took the Town and burnt it; but were quickly afterwards forced to fly to their Ships with the Loss of 800 Men ⁱ. In the mean time, the Yarmouth Fleet made a Descent in Normandy, and burnt the Town of Cherbourg, and spoiled a rich Abby ^k. The Portsmouth Squadron also on the Coast of Flanders took fifteen Sail of Merchantmen richly laden, and brought them into Sandwich ^l. To balance this, there happened an unlucky Accident at Berwick ^m, where the English Fleet rashly entering the Harbour, the Scots destroyed four Ships, and the rest with some Difficulty escaped ⁿ. In the twenty-fifth Year of his Reign, King Edward made great Preparations for invading Flanders, and the latter End of August he sailed from Winchelsea with a mighty Fleet, notwithstanding he met with many Interruptions from his Barons and Clergy; he had a Land Army of between fifty and sixty thousand on board, and landed at Sluys in Flanders, on the twenty-seventh of the same Month ^o, where a very unlucky Accident fell out: The Squadron from the Cinque Ports quarrelling with the Yarmouth Mariners, suddenly fell to blows; so that, notwithstanding the King's Interposition, a desperate Engagement followed, wherein twenty Ships of the Yarmouth Squadron were burnt, and most of the Men on board them were lost; and three of the largest Ships in the Navy, one of which had the King's Treasure on board

the Navy, one of which had the King's Treasure on board were driven out to Sea, and with much Difficulty escaped^p. This was an ill beginning, and indeed nothing answerable to the Force employed, was done^p Walt. He- mingford. vol. through the whole Expedition; yet, in one respect they¹ were fortunate; for the French having laid a Scheme to burn the whole English in the Harbour of Dam, it was luckily discovered, and the English Fleet putting to Sea escaped^q. The King finding his Confederates fell from^q Nic. Trivet. Annal. vol. 1. their Promises, and that Things did not answer, return-
ed the next Year to England. P. 305.

Edward the Second, succeeded his Father to the Throne in the Year 1307. Upon a Quarrel with Charles the Fourth of France, he sent Orders to his Admiral to cruize on the French Coasts; particularly to the Con- stable of Dover-Castle, and Warden of the Cinque Ports, who executed his Commands so effectually, that, in a short time, an hundred and twenty Ships belonging to Normandy were brought into the English Ports^r.

Edward the Third, stiled of Windsor, ascended the Throne in his Father's Life-time, and afterwards laid Claim to the Crown of France; and to this Purpose, the King sent the Earl of Derby with a considerable Force, who made themselves Masters of the Isle of Cadfant; upon which, most of the great Cities in Flanders, who were well inclined, declared against the French and in- vited King Edward thither. Th French, however, struck the first blow at Sea; for, having, under colour of sending Relief to the Christians in the Holy-Land, as- sembled a Squadron of large Ships, they sent them over to the English Coasts; where they took and burnt South- ampton; yet in their Retreat, they lost three hundred Men, and the Son of the King of Sicily who commanded them^s.

In 1338 King Edward by the middle of June drew his numerous Army down to the Coast of Suffolk, and at Orewell embarked them on board a Fleet of five hun- dred Sail, with which he passed over to Antwerp; where by the Advice of the Flemings he assumed the Arms and Title of King of France; but while the King spent his Time in Marches and Countermarches, in which, how- ever, he gained some Advantages over the Enemy; the French, and their Allies the Scots, did a great deal of

^r Polydor.

Vergil. lib. 2.

Thom. Wa-

tingham. Hy-

podigm.

Neutrixæ. Me-

zeray.

^s T. Walsing-

ham. Froissard.

J. de Serres.

Mezeray.

^t Thom. Wal-

tingham. The

King in his

Letters to th:

Pope takes

Notice, of the

Ships being

those into the

for the Holy

Land.

Robert de Avesbury, Hist Edwardi, 3. p. 41. Contin. Nic Trivet. et Adam Murimu th. Annal. vol. 2. p. 95. Froissard. T. Walsingham. " A. D. 1339. Mischief on the English Coasts with their Fleet ^u. The Town of Hastings they destroyed, alarmed all the Western Coast, burnt Plymouth and insulted Bristol ^w. all which was owing to the King's employing the greatest Part of his naval Force abroad, and the Remainder in the North to awe the Scots. About this time the Mariners of the Cinque Ports, taking Advantage of a thick Fog, manned out all their small Craft, and ran over to Bulloigne, where they did notable Service; for they not only burnt the lower Town, but destroyed four large Ships, nineteen Gallies, and twenty lesser Vessels, which lay in the Harbour; and consumed the Dock and Arsenal

^x Holingshead's filled with naval Stores ^x.

Chronicle, vol. 2. p. 357.

In the Year 1346, the King resolving once again to attempt the Conquest of France, and to employ therein the utmost Force of his own; for this Purpose, he drew his Navy, consisting of a thousand Ships, to Portsmouth; and shortly after arrived at Southampton with his Army, composed of 2500 Horse, and 30,000 Foot; these he quickly embarked, the Fleet sailing thither for that Purpose, and on the 4th of June he put to Sea, intending to have landed in Guyenne; but being driven back by a Storm on the Coast of Cornwall, and, the French Writers say, put back thither a second Time, he at last determin'd to make a Descent on Normandy, where at la Hogue he safely debarked his Forces, and began very successfully to employ them in reducing the strongest Cities in the Neighbourhood; after which he set Fire and Sword on every side, even to the very Gates of Paris. The French King provoked at so dismal a Sight, as well as with the News, that the Earl of Huntingdon with the English Fleet destroyed all the Coast, almost without resistance; he resolved, contrary to his

usual Policy, to hazard a Battle, which he accordingly did on the 25th of August, and received that remarkable Defeat which will immortalize the little Town of Cressy ^y. After this Victory, the King, on the last day of August, appeared before Calais ^z, and formed a Siege that lasted eleventh Months. He invested that Place regularly by Land, fortify'd his Lines strongly, and within them erected, as Froissard a contemporary Writer tells us, a kind of Town for the Convenience of his Soldiers; wherein were not only Magazines of all

^y Wal. Hemingford, vol. 2. p. 381, Rob. de Avesbur. p. 123 Contin. Nic. Triv. Adam Murimuth Annal. vol. 2. p. 98. Froissard. Tho. Walsingham.

^z A. D. 1347.

all forts, for the service of the War, but vast Warehouses of Wool and Cloth for supplying the Sinews of War, by a constant Trade at two settled Markets; he blocked up the Place at Sea with his Fleet, which consisted of seven hundred and thirty-eight Sail, on board of which were 14,956 Mariners; of these Ships seven hundred Sail belonged to his own Subjects, and thirty-eight to Foreigners. The Garrison of Calais and the Citizens had no other Remedy left, than to submit themselves to the mercy of a provoked Conqueror, which in the most abject manner they sought, and were at the Queen's entreaty spared ^a.

^a Rob. de Avesbury, Hist. de Fran. Mezeray Froissard. Tho. Walsingham, &c.

The next most considerable Expedition to France, was sent upon the following Account. Upon the Death of Philip the French King, his Son John succeeded in the Throne; who in the beginning of his Reign, bestowed the Dutchy of Aquitaine upon the Dauphin; which so provoked King Edward, that he gave it with the like Title to his Son the Prince, and sent him with a small Army of Veteran Troops to maintain his Title. With these Forces, on the 19th of September 1356, he won the famous Battle of Poitiers; in which he took the King of France and his youngest Son Prisoners; with whom towards the close of the Year he landed at Plymouth, from whence he proceeded in Triumph to London ^b. The taking of their King brought

^b Continuat. Nic. Trivet. Adam Murimuth Annal. vol. 2. p. 107. Rob. de Avesbury, 210—252. Anonym. Hist. Edw. 3. c. 56. Mezeray. P. Daniel.

the French Affairs into great Disorder, which was increased through their own Dissentions, and occasioned such a terrible Fluctuation in their Councils, that King Edward thinking himself ill dealt with, in the Negotiations they had set on Foot for the Deliverance of their King, resolved to quicken them, by invading France with a more potent Army than hitherto he had employed against them: And accordingly embarked at Sandwich, on the 24th of October 1359, on board a Fleet of eleven hundred Sail; and the next Day landed his Army on Calais Sands, consisting of near an hundred thousand Men; but not being able to draw the French to a Battle, tho' he could take their great Cities, it was not in his Power to preserve his Conquests; therefore he concluded the Peace of Bretagny, called so from its being signed at that Place, May the 8th, 1360. This Peace lasted as long as the French King lived, but

Charles the Fifth, surnamed the Wise, his Son, no sooner mounted the Throne, but projected the Breach of the late Treaty^d; and upon Pretences summoned the Prince of Wales to answer before his Court of Peers at Paris. The Prince, on receiving this Summons, declared, that he would come to Paris with his Helmet on his Head, and 60,000 Men to witness his Appearance: The French King, who expected such a Return, immediately declared, that the Territories of the King of England, in France, were forfeited for this Contempt; of which Sentence he gave King Edward Notice, by so contemptible a Messenger as a Scullion^e. He did this through the Confidence he had in a Scheme of his own, for invading and destroying England: In order to this, he had been for some Years purchasing Ships all over Europe; so that at length he drew together a prodigious Fleet, on board of which he was preparing to embark a numerous Army, when he had Advice, that the Duke of Lancaster, and the Earl of Warwick, with a considerable Body of English Forces, were landed in the Neighbourhood of Calais, and in full march towards him. This obliged him to abandon his Design, and make use of his Forces to defend his own Country, which they performed indifferently; tho' they were lucky in another Respect, for the Count de St. Pol disappointed a Design the Duke of Lancaster had formed, of burning the whole French Fleet in the Port of Harfleur^f. King Edward, in the mean time, through the means of these unprovoked Hostilities, resumed the Title of King of France; and resolved, as soon as he could, to employ his Forces and his Fleet for the Relief of Touars, which the French were besieging: With this view, he embarked a considerable Body of Troops on board a Fleet of 400 Sail; and to shew the earnest Desire he had of saving so important a Place, he went in Person with the Prince of Wales, the Duke of Lancaster, the Earl of Cambridge, all three his Sons, and many of his Nobility; but all his Endeavours were to no Purpose^g; for embarking the beginning of August, the Fleet was so tossed by contrary Winds, that, after continuing at Sea about nine Weeks, the King found himself obliged to return to England; where as soon as he landed, he dismissed his Army, by which untoward Accident

^d Histoire de France, vol. 1. p. 523. J. de Serres, Mezeray

^e Mezeray, vol. 3. p. 78, 79. Hist. de France, vol. 1. p. 531.

^f Contin. Nic. Trivet. Adam Murimuth. Anal. vol. 2. p. 123. Anonym. Vit. Ed. 3. c. 59. Froissard. Walsingham. Mezeray. P. Daniel.

^g A. D. 1372.

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Accident Touars was lost ^h. The last Expedition in this Reign was to Calais, where King Edward (now grown old himself) sent the Duke of Lancaster with a great Fleet, and a good Army on board ⁱ: At the head of these Forces, the Duke passed through the Heart of France to Bourdeaux, in spite of all the Opposition the French could give him; who made it their Business to harrafs him all they could in his March, though they were determined not to fight ^k.

Richard the Second, stiled of Bourdeaux, the Place where he was born, the Son of the famous Black Prince, succeeded his Grandfather: He was then but eleven Years old. Within six Days after King Edward's Decease, the French King's Fleet, consisting of fifty Sail of stout Ships, infested our Coasts, and a Body of Troops landed in Suffex, by whom the Town of Rye was burnt: This was in the latter End of June, 1377. On the 31st of August they landed in the Isle of Wight, pillaged and burnt most of the Villages therein, and exacted a thousand Pounds of the Inhabitants for not burning the rest; and afterwards passing along the Coast, they landed from time to time, and destroyed Portsmouth, Dartmouth, and Plymouth. If priyate Persons had not interposed, Matters had still gone worse; for though Sir John Arundel drove the French from Southampton with loss, yet they burnt Hastings, and attempted Winchelsea, which was defended by the Abbot of Battel. At Lewes they beat the Prior, with such Troops as he had drawn together, and having killed about an hundred Men, not without considerable loss on their side, they re-embarked their Forces, and returned home ^l.

In 1378, the Duke of Lancaster, with a very numerous Army, and a very potent Fleet, failed to the assistance of the Duke of Bretagne, about Midsummer; and having spent near a Month in a fruitless Siege of the Town of St. Maloe, which he missed taking by his own Negligence and ill Conduct, he returned to England with little Reputation to himself; the French Fleet in the mean time having spoiled the Coasts of Cornwall ^m: In the latter end of the Year 1379, a considerable Reinforcement going to Bretagne, was wreck'd, and a thousand Men at Arms perished. The

^h Cont. Nic. Triv. et Adam Murimuth. Annal. vol. 2. p. 128. Anon. Hist. Edw. 3. c. 60. Both these Writers, however, say, this Expedition was for the relief of Rochel. Froissard. Mezeray. P. Daniel. A. D. 1372. ^k Cont. Nic. Triv. & Adam Murimuth. Annal. vol. 2. p. 129. Froissard, vol. 1. c. 106. Tho. Walsingham.

^l Froissard, vol. 1. c. 327. Mezeray. Daniel.

^m Cont. Nic. Trivet & Adam Murimuth. Annal. vol. 2. p. 144. Walsingham. Stowe Hollingshead, next &c.

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next Year however, new Supplies were sent to Calais, and from thence passed through the Heart of France into Bretagne; where the Duke employed them in the Siege of Nantes, and taking very little Care to supply them with Necessaries, they were, by degrees, reduced to such Misery, that the English Soldiers were glad to return in small Companies through France; not in an hostile way, but begging their Bread; which ought to have put an end to all their inconsiderate Expeditions, that served only to waste the strength of the Nation, and to expose us to Foreigners; for in the mean time, the French Gallies burnt Gravesend, and plundered the whole Kentish Coastⁿ.

ⁿ Cont. Nic.

Triv & Adam
Murimuth.

Annal. vol. 2.

p. 147, 148.

Mezeray, vol.

3. p. 109. Froiss.

fard. Tho Wal-

ingham.

In 1383, a new kind of War broke out. There was at this Time a Schism in the Church of Rome: Urban the Fourth was owned in that City; and Clement the Seventh was acknowledged for Pope at Avignon. As the French had owned Clement, the English were warm on the behalf of Urban; who to serve his own Interest, proclaims a Croisade against his Opponents; and constitutes Henry Nevil, Bishop of Norwich, his General in England. This Prelate knowing the Flemings were then in Arms against their Earl, and that they were naturally inclined to the English, resolved to make use of his Commission, and over-run, if possible, that Country. Passing over with this View to Calais, he there suddenly assembled fifty thousand Foot, and two thousand Horse; with which, and a good Fleet attending, he suddenly fell into Flanders, where he cut to pieces a Body of twelve thousand Men belonging to the Earl; took Dunkirk, Graveling, Mardyke, and other Places, and at length besieged Ypres; his Fleet proceeding with like good Fortune at Sea. But the French King marching with a great Army into Flanders, and the Flemings beginning to fall off, the Bishop was glad to retire; and after all his short-lived Successes, to return with an Handful of Men into England. The next Year the French fitted out several Squadrons to infest the English Coast, in which they were but too successful. The Inhabitants of Portsmouth, however, to shew the martial Spirit of this Nation was not quite extinguished, fitted out a Squadron at their own Expence; which engaging the French with equal Force, took

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took every Ship, and flew all but nine Persons on board them; performing also other gallant Exploits before they returned into Port °.

The last Expedition we have to mention in this Reign, is that of the Duke of Lancaster into Spain. The Duke claimed a Title in Right of his Wife Con-

stantia, to the Crown of Castile. The King of Portugal was in his Interest, and sent into England seven Gallies and eighteen Ships to join the Duke's Fleet, which was a long Time in preparing. At length about Midsummer 1386, he embarked with twenty thousand Men, and the Flower of the English Nobility, himself commanding the Army, and Sir Thomas Piercy the Fleet. The first Exploit they performed was, the relieving Brest, at that Time besieged by the French; by which the Duke gained great Reputation: After this, embarking again with fresh Provisions and some Recruits, they arrived at the Port of Corunna, or as the Sailors call it, the Groin, on the 9th of August, and there safely landed their Forces °.

The King of Portugal behaved like a good Ally; yet the War was not attended with much Success, great Sickness wasting the English Army, and through the Precautions of John, King of Castile, the Country was so destroyed, that a Famine ensued. Presently after, John King of Castile and the Duke entered into a Negotiation, which quickly ended in a Peace^p. After which the Duke, with the remains of his Army, which an eminent French Writer^a says, might amount to about a sixth Part of the Forces he carried abroad, returned into England towards the end of the Year 1389.

We shall finish this Chapter with the Reign of this unfortunate Prince, who was deposed by Authority of Parliament, and ended his Days in Pomfret Castle, in the Year 1401.

° Histoire de France, vol. 2. p. 12. Mezeray vol. 3. p. 125. Stowe. Holingshead. Speed.

^p Froissard. Walsingham. Knighton. Mezeray. P. Daniel.

^a Speed. Holingshead. Mezeray. vol. 3. p. 134.

C H A P. III.

HENRY the Fourth, the Son of the Duke of Lancaster, stiled Henry of Bolingbroke, the Place of his Birth, was crowned the 13th of October

C 4

1399.

1399. In 1403, the King, who was then a Widower married Joan, the Daughter of Charles King of Navarre, and very lately a Widow to John Montford, Duke of Britany; and the Inhabitants of that Dutchy, conceiving an ill Opinion of this Marriage, and being powerful at Sea, they suddenly landed in the West, and burnt Plymouth, at the Time when the King was elsewhere employed^r. This, however, did not remain long unrevenge^d; for the Inhabitants of Plymouth having fitted out a Squadron under William de Wilford, Admiral of the narrow Seas; he first took forty Ships, laden with different Goods, and then burnt the like Number in their Harbours; taking the Towns of Penmarch and St. Matthew, and wasting with Fire and Sword, a great Part of the Coast of Britany^s. Admiral de Castel, who commanded the Enemy's Fleet, in the mean time attempted the Isle of Wight; but failing of Success there, he steer'd for Devonshire, where landing, he briskly attacked Dartmouth, but was defeated by the Country Militia, with the loss of 400 Men killed, and 200 taken; among which, were himself, and two other Persons of Distinction: Yet his Squadron and the Flemings still infested the Coast, took many Ships, and to shew their Hatred to the English, hanged all the Seamen who fell into their Hands^t. The French in the mean time, without any Regard to the Treaty subsisting between the two Crowns, invaded the Dutchy of Guyenne, and sent an Army of twelve thousand Men, with a Fleet of an hundred and forty Sail, to the assistance of Owen Glendour. These Forces they landed safely in Milford-Haven, but the Lord Berkeley, and Henry Pay, who commanded the Squadron of the Cinque Ports, attacked them in that Port; where they took fourteen, and burnt fifteen of the French Vessels; which so affrighted those on board the rest, that soon after they fled home^u. About the same Time the Earl of Kent sailed with a considerable Fleet to the Coast of Flanders, where he cruised for some Time upon the Enemy; the Flemings then being subject to a Prince of the House of France. At last, entering the Port of Sluys, they found four Ships lying at Anchor, took three Genoese Merchantmen of a very large Size, at the Entrance of the Haven, though not with-

^r Tho. Walsingham. Stowe Holinghead.

^s Tho. Walsingham. Stowe Rapin.

^t Walsingham. Montrelet.

^u Walsingham. P. Daniel. Mezeray.

without a gallant Resistance; after which they searched all the Ports on the Norman Coast, and landing in several Places, burnt at least six and thirty Towns, and then with an immense Booty, returned to Rye^w. In ^{w Chron. God-} support of Owen Glendour, the Welch Malecontent, ^{stovian. Chro-} the French sent another Squadron on the Coast of ^{niques de Nor-} Wales, of which only thirty arrived, the rest being ^{mand. Holings-} taken by the English; and a short Time after, the famous Henry Pay surprized the Rochelle Fleet, consisting of 120 Sail of Merchantmen richly laden, and took them every Ship. These Exploits shew, that Trade in those Days was not altogether so inconsiderable a Thing, as by most of our modern Writers we are taught to believe^x.

^x Tho. Walsingham.

In 1408, the Earl of Kent with a strong Fleet effectually scoured the narrow Seas, and when he had cleared our own Coasts, stood over to Britany, where he boldly landed in the little Island of Briehat, and there attacked a Town of the same Name, in which the Privateers had taken shelter; he took it by Storm, and put them all to the Sword; but in this Action himself received a Wound which proved mortal^y. In 1410, an ^y English Fleet of ten Sail, under the Command of Sir Robert Umfreville, went against the Scots; and sailing up the Forth, spoiled the Coasts on both sides, ravaging the Country, and burning all the Ships in their Harbours, and amongst the rest, the largest Ship they had, called the Grand Galliot, in Blackness, carrying off fourteen Ships, and such a vast quantity of Corn, as reduced the Price of that Commodity, which was then very high in England; whence the Admiral obtained the Name of Robert Mendmarket^z.

^y Tho. Walsingham.

^z Stowe, p. 338.

In 1412, the King sent a considerable Force, under the Command of his Son Thomas Duke of Clarence, to the Support of a Faction headed by the Dukes of Berry and Orleans in France. The Duke no sooner arrived in Normandy, than he found that these Princes at whose Request he came, had made a Treaty with the King, so that he had nothing to do but to go home again. The Duke of Clarence, justly enraged at such usage, first ravaged Lower Normandy and Anjou, and then entering the Duchy of Orleans, lived there at Discretion, till such time as the Duke came to an Agree-

Agreement with him, to give him a Sum of Money for the Expences of the Voyage; part of which he paid down, and sent his Brother into England as an Hostage for the rest ^a,

^a Histoire de France, par P. Daniel. Tom 5. 505, 506. Mezeray.

In the Year 1412-13, Henry the Fifth, from his Birth-place called Henry of Monmouth, succeeded his Father; and the War breaking out between England and France, he undertook the absolute Conquest of the whole Realm. To this Purpose, he drew together six thousand Men at Arms, twenty-four thousand Archers, the rest of his Infantry compleating the Army, to at least fifty thousand Men. To transport these Troops with the greater Conveniency, he hired from Holland and Zealand abundance of large Ships, which with those belonging to his own Subjects, rendezvouzed in the Month of August 1415 at Southampton; where the whole Fleet appeared to consist of not less than fifteen hundred Sail. The King embarked this mighty Army, and landed safely in Normandy, without Resist-

^b Chron. God-
froyan, p. 136.

ance ^b. It is remarkable, that though the Constable of France had a very numerous Army, with which he might well have disputed the landing of the English, yet he chose to retire; for which Conduct of his, he was afterwards questioned in a Council of War; but he justified himself, by producing his Orders from Court, directing him not to hazard a Battle on any Terms whatsoever, but to leave the English, if they were so inclined, to waste their Force in long Marches and tedious Sieges ^c. The first Enterprize of Importance undertaken by the King, was the Siege of Harfleur, well fortified, and had in it a numerous Garrison: It was invested both by Land and Sea, and tho' resolutely defended, it was taken at last for want of Relief. By this Siege, the English Army was exceedingly wasted, one half of it being destroyed.

^c Histoire de France, tom. 5. p. 538.

The next Expedition against France, was an Army of twenty thousand Men, which King Henry drew together, for the Relief of Harfleur, which the French were now besieging; he embarked them on board a Fleet of 400 Sail, and sent them under John Duke of Bedford, his Brother, to attack the French Navy; which he did with such Vigour, as entirely defeated them, either taking or sinking 500 Sail; some of them were

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were just returned from making an unsuccessful Attempt upon Southampton, and the Isle of Wight. The French did not continue long after this before Harfleur.

We are now going to shew the last Embarkation made by this great King against France. Henry, who was a more prudent Manager in these Matters than any of his Predecessors, having now sufficient Security for the safe landing of his Troops, in the Spring of the Year began to make mighty Preparations for passing the Sea, with such an Army as might decide the Fate of this Dispute. His Army consisted of twenty-five thousand five hundred and odd Men, part of which were Cavalry. To transport them from Dover, a Navy was prepared of fifteen hundred Ships; of which two were very remarkable; they seem to have been both Admirals, and were equally adorned with Purple Sails, embroidered with the Arms of England and France: One was stiled the King's Chamber, the other his Hall; from whence it plainly appears, that he affected to keep his Court upon the Sea, to make no difference between his Palace and his Ships Royal. They embarked the twenty-eighth of July, and landed in Normandy the first of August^d.

As soon as the Army was safely de-^d Tho. de Elm-
barked, he dismissed his Fleet, keeping only a few small ham. c. 38. Tit.
Vessels for transporting his Artillery. In the space of Liv. p. 31. 33.

two Years he reduced the better part of France to his Obedience, and at last forced the unfortunate Monarch Charles the Sixth to beg a Peace, almost upon any Terms^e, a Thing that none of his Ancestors had been^e Mezeray,
able to accomplish; and which this King chiefly per- Daniel, &c.
formed by aweing his Enemies with Fleets on their Coasts, at the same time that he invaded their Countries by Land; as appears in the large Histories of his Life, and in the English Collections from them published by Godwin, in his History of the Life and Reign of this victorious King, who is said to have built larger and stronger Ships, than any of his Predecessors^f.

Henry the Sixth, stiled Henry of Windsor, from the Place of his Birth, though not a Year old, succeeded his Father in 1422. The King's Affairs in France, after the Death of the Duke of Bedford his Uncle, which happened in 1435, fell into a rapid Decay^g. In the succeeding Year the Duke of Burgundy, in the Month
^f c. xi. of a
Treatise preserved in Hakluyt
entitled, De
politia conser-
vativa maris.
^g Tho. Wal-
singham. Stowe
Holingshead.
of Speed.

of July, laid siege to Calais; and obliged the Duke of York, the Protector, to think of relieving it from England; accordingly he raised a great Army, which he embarked on board a Fleet of five hundred Sail, and landing near Calais, marched directly to fight the Enemy. However the Flemings raised the Siege precipitately, and retired into their own Country, where the Regent with his Army lived at Discretion for some Time, and then returned into England^h.

^h Mezeray. P. Daniel.

By the Year 1457, the French had recovered from the English almost their whole Country; and not content (though it was done in so short a time) they fitted out a Fleet in Normandy, in the Month of August, and made a Descent on the Coast of Kent, and landed eighteen hundred Men two Leagues from Sandwich, whither they had Orders to march by Land, while the Admiral attacked it by Sea. The English, notwithstanding their being surprized, defended themselves with incomparable Valour, and though the Town was burnt and pillaged, it cost a great deal of Bloodⁱ. We find nothing more material to our Purpose in this King's Reign, which was as unfortunate as his Father's was glorious; he being deposed after he had held, though very unsteadily, the English Crown almost thirty-

ⁱ Hist. de France, par P. Daniel, tom. 6. p. 292, &c.

^k Polydor Verg. nine Years^k. lib. 23.

Edward the Fourth, Son of Richard Duke of York, assumed the Crown on the fourth of March, 1460-61. About this Time, the Earl of Kent who was abroad with a stout Navy, scoured all the Coast, and landing in Bretagne with ten thousand Men, took and burnt the Town of Conquet, ravaged the Island of Rhe, and carried off a great Booty^l.

^l Stowe. Rapin questions this Fact, because not taken Notice of by the French Historians, which seems no just Exception, while Bretagne was subject to its own Duke. Campbel Nav. History.

^m Stowe. Holinghead. Speed.

King Edward in the Year 1475, having settled his Affairs at home, thought of revenging himself on the French, for the Trouble they had given him by assisting his Adversaries in England. To this Purpose he passed over with a mighty Army, attended by a Fleet of 500 Sail, with which, in the Month of July, he entered the Road of Calais, where he debarked his Forces^m. When he came to take the Field, however, he did not find that Assistance from his Allies which he expected; therefore though at the beginning he pretended no less than the entire Conquest of France, yet on King Louis the Eleventh

Eleventh desiring to treat of Peace, he was content to enter into a Negotiation, which ended to the Honour of the English Nation, and is stiled the Peace of Amiens^m. In consequence of this Treaty, the King received an annual Pension from France of fifty thousand Crowns, which he looked upon, not without Reason, as a kind of Tribute, and applied a great Part of it to the Repair of his Navy, for which he had always shewed a great Concern; and by keeping Squadrons continually at Sea, held Louis XI. King of France, in continual Terrors; who, to secure his own Peace, distributed annually vast Sums amongst the Privy Council of Englandⁿ.

^mHist. de France par P. Daniel, tom. 6. p. 461, 462, 463.

A War with Scotland gave the King an Opportunity of displaying his Force, by sending a great Army under the Command of his Brother the Duke of Gloucester^o into that Country, and a powerful Fleet upon its Coast; which so terrified the Scots, that they obliged their Prince to accept any Proposals that were made to him^p.

ⁿ Sir Thomas More in his History of Edward 5. A. D. 1482.

King Edward died on the 9th of April 1483, and was succeeded by his Son Edward the Fifth, who rather seemed to succeed; for he never had any thing more than the Shadow of Royalty; and even this did not continue more than the space of ten Weeks, through the Ambition of his Uncle Richard Duke of Gloucester.

^p Drummond. Stowe. Speed.

Richard the Third, Edward the Fourth's Brother, was proclaimed the 22d of June 1483, and crowned the 6th of July following. Richard had not been long on his Throne, before Henry Earl of Richmond, a Descendant by his Mother's Side of the House of Lancaster, began to give him uneasiness; there being a design on foot to place him on the Throne. Henry, after the Battle of Tewksbury, retired into Bretagne, where Francis the Second, then Duke thereof, had at this Time furnished the Earl with a Fleet of fifteen Sail, on board of which were embarked about five thousand Men^q: But King Richard prevented the Earl's landing, by keeping a strong Squadron at Sea, and Guards on all the Coasts; so that when the Earl with his little Fleet approached the Welch Shore, he saw it was impracticable to land; and therefore bore away to Dieppe, where he safely arrived, and from thence

^q Hist. de France, par P. Daniel, tom. 6. p. 600. Argentre Hist. de Bretagne, lib. 12.

^r Argentre Hift thence went by Land into Bretagne ^r. Henry returning de Bretagne, without Succes, found Things very different with re-
ubi supra. Hift. gard to him at the Court of Bretagne, than when he
de France, par left it; therefore he fled immediately to the French
M. Chalons, King Charles the Eighth for Protection, who (the
Tom. 2. p. 226. Mezeray. French Historians say positively) furnished Henry with

^s Hift. de four thousand Men: Father Daniel ^s says, they were
France, Tom. 6 choice Troops; but our English Writers speak of no
p. 602. more than two thousand hired with Money; which the

^t Stowe. Earl borrowed ^t. However, with this insignificant
Holingshead. Force, embarked on board a very scurvy Fleet, the Earl
Speed. ventured to put to Sea again, on the first of August

1485; from the Port of Havre de Grace, and landed at Milford-Haven on the eighth of the same Month, and on the twenty-second of August, followed a decisive Battle near the Town of Bosworth, where King Richard fighting gallantly, was slain with his Sword in his Hand. The Earl of Richmond was crowned on the

Field, with the stile of Henry the Seventh ^v. There is
^v Stowe's An- nothing very material to our Purpose in this King's
nals, p. 419. Reign. He transported indeed a considerable Body of

^w A. D. 1488. Troops to the Assistance of the Duke of Bretagne ^w a-
gainst the French; because he saw that those Expedi-
tions were pleasing to his own People, and served his
own Purposes at the same Time. On the same Prin-
ciples, he threatened an open Rupture with France, for
which he provided a stout Army, and a numerous Fleet;
and yet his real View was not so much attacking the
French King, as drawing Aids from his own Parliament;
which on this Expectation only they were inclined to
give. He transported, however, his Forces to Calais;
took the Field, and having terrified the French, made
such a Peace as satisfied him, and so returned home;

keeping however his Squadrons at Sea ^x. He assisted
^x Stowe. Speed. also the Duke of Burgundy in 1492; against his rebel-
Bacon. lious Subjects. The Flemings had seized the Town
and Harbour of Sluys; the King sent a Squadron of
twelve Sail, which blocked up the Place by Sea, whilst
the Duke of Saxony, in consequence of an Alliance
with the Duke of Burgundy, marched with an Army
into Flanders, and besieged it by Land. The Port was
guarded by two strong Castles, which the Flemings de-
fended with unparalleled Obstinacy; insomuch that
though

though Sir Edward Poynings, who commanded the Fleet, attacked them constantly every Day, for twenty Days together, yet he made no great Impression; till at last, through Accident, the Bridge of Boats by which the Communication between the Castles was preserved, took Fire, whereupon the Besieged were glad to surrender their City to the Duke of Saxony, and their Port and Castles to the English^y. In this Reign, the^y Polyd. Verg. Disputes between the Houses of York and Lancaster ended, the two Houses being united, by Henry's Marriage with Elizabeth, Daughter of Edward the Fourth. P. 584.

C H A P. IV.

HENRY the Eighth ascended the English Throne in the Year 1509, upon the Decease of his Father, which happened on the 22d of April of the same Year. In 1511, he sent fifteen hundred Archers to the Assistance of the King of Arragon and Castile against the Moors. They sailed from Plymouth, escorted by a Squadron of four Royal Ships, and happily landed on the 1st of June in the South of Spain; but as the politic King wanted nothing but their Appearance, they returned again to England, without encountering any other Hazards than those of the Sea^a. The same^z Stowe. Year the King sent a like Aid to the Dutchess of Burgundy, under the Command of Sir Edward Poynings, who returned with more Honour to their native Country^a. Notwithstanding what had so lately happened in Spain, the artful Ferdinand persuaded King Henry to make War with France, and to send a numerous Army by Sea into Biscay, in order to penetrate that Way into the Dutchy of Guyenne, to answer by their Appearance (as before) some end of Ferdinand's. This Expedition had worse Consequences than the former; Sickness having destroyed numbers of the English, they were obliged to return home^b. In August the same Year, there happened a bloody Naval Engagement between the English and French.

In the Month of March 1513, another Royal Fleet put to Sea, which engaging the French on the 25th of April,

Holingshead.
Speed. Herbert
Rapin.

^a Cooper's
Chron. fo. 274.
Stowe's Annals
p. 488, 489.
Herbert. Rapin.

^b L'hist. du
Royaume de
Navarre, p. 62b
Cooper. Stowe.
Herbert.

April, the Admiral the famous Sir Edward Howard was killed. He was succeeded in his Office of Lord High Admiral, by his elder Brother Sir Thomas Howard, who on the first of July in some measure revenged his Brother's Death, by landing in Whitsand Bay, and wasting the adjacent Country, and burning a considerable Town^c.

^c Cooper.

Stowe. Speed.

Herbert. Rapin

In August the King went in Person with a great Army into France, where he made some Conquests, whilst his Admiral wasted the French Coasts, as he also did the next Year; so that the French King was glad to obtain a Peace, upon the Conclusion of which he married Mary, our King's Sister, but did not long out-live his Marriage^d. The King's Absence induced James the Fourth, King of the Scots, to invade England with a mighty Army, supposing he should find it defenceless. But Thomas Earl of Surry soon convinced him of his Mistake, marching towards him with a powerful Army. Sir Thomas Howard returning on the News of this Invasion, landed 5000 Veterans, and made haste to join his Father: And on the 8th of September 1513; was fought the famous Battle of Flodden-field, wherein Sir Thomas Howard commanded the Van-guard; and contributed not a little to that glorious Victory.

^d Mezeray. P.
Daniel. Mr.
Chalon.

In 1522, new Differences arose between Henry and the French King, now Francis the First, and at the Persuasion of the Emperor Charles the Fifth, who was at this Time in England, he sent a numerous Army into France, under the Duke of Suffolk, which did the French infinite Mischief, without doing his Country much good. The Emperor Charles the Fifth joined his Fleet to the English, and as it was evident that many Inconveniencies might arise from the Fleets having several Commanders in chief, Sir Thomas Howard, now Earl of Surry, by special Commission from Henry the Eighth, received the Emperor's Commission to be Admiral also of his Navy, which consisted of 180 tall Ships^e. With the united Fleets, the Admiral sailed over to the Coast of Normandy, and landing some Forces near Cherburg^f; wasted and destroyed the Country; after which they returned. This seems to have been a feint; for in a few Days the Admiral landed again on the Coast of Bretagne a very large Body of Troops, with which

^e Lediard's
Naval Hist.

^f June 13, 1522

he

he took and plundered the Town of Morlaix^g, and ^g July the 1st. having gained an immense Booty, and opened a Passage for the English forces into Champagne and Picardy^h, he returned to Southampton.

^h Cooper.
Stowe Holings-
hed. Speed.
Rapin.

However in 1526, a Peace was concluded with the French King, upon very advantageous Terms, which continued till 1544, when Henry and the Emperor joined against the French, whereupon Sir John Wallop was sent into France, and a considerable Force marched into Scotland, under the Earl of Hertford; Sir John Dudley, Viscount Lisle, wasting the Coast with a great Fleetⁱ. In the midst of the Summer, the Duke of Suffolk entered the French Dominions with a great Army, and laid Siege to Boloigne, which was also

ⁱ P. Daniel.
Mezeray.
Rapin.

block'd up at Sea, by the Admiral Viscount Lisle; who, after the Place was taken, was constituted Governor thereof, the King and his Forces passing from thence into England^k. The next Year the French made several Attempts on the English Coast, with indifferent Success; to revenge which, Viscount Lisle landed in Normandy, and burnt all the adjacent Country^l. In 1546, the French made an unsuccessful Attempt upon Bo-

^k Cooper.
Stowe, Speed.

^l Herbert.
Rapin.

loigne; the Earl of Hertford, and Viscount Lisle, having obliged them either to come to a Battle, or raise the Siege, they chose the latter; and after some unsuccessful Attempts at Sea, a Peace ensued, which lasted as long as the King lived^m.

^m Mezeray. P.
Daniel. Rapin.

Henry the Eighth was succeeded by his Son Edward the Sixth, who was but in the tenth Year of his Age. The first Expedition in this Reign, was fitted out against Scotland, to compel the Marriage of Mary, Queen of Scots to the young King Edwardⁿ. The Duke of Somerset the Protector, and Sir Thomas Seymour his Brother, took a share in this Expedition; the Protector commanded the Land Army, consisting of ten thousand Foot, and six thousand Horse, and a fine Train of Artillery^o: With this also the Fleet fitted out by his Brother's care corresponded; consisting in all of sixty-five Sail, of which thirty-five were Ships of Force, the whole commanded by the Lord Clinton, and Sir William Woodhouse, and arrived before Leith, about the time the English Army penetrated Scotland by Land^p. On the 10th of September 1547, was fought the Battle of

ⁿ Hayward,
Godwin. Rapin.

^o Godwin, p.
214.

^p Keith's Hist.
P. 53.

^a Cooper. Stowe
Speed.
^r Buchanan.
Leslie. Keith.

^f Hayward.
Godwin. Bur-
net.

^s Hayward.
Godwin. Keith

^t Hayward.

^u Strype's Me-
morials, vol. 2.
p. 164.

^w Cooper.
Stowe. Speed.
Hayward.
Godwin.

Musselburgh^a, called by the Scots Writers the Battle of Pinky^r. It was fatal to the Scots, who were so eager to fight and so fool-hardy, as to expose themselves to the Fire of the English Fleet, which galled them extremely. After this Victory, the Protector burnt Edinburgh, and so returned in Triumph^f: The Fleet continued longer in those parts, with a Design, as it appeared, to extirpate entirely the Naval Force of Scotland. The Lord Clinton burnt all the Sea-Ports, with the small Craft that lay in their Harbours, and searched every Creek, and all the Mouths of the Rivers, with such Diligence, that it is said he did not leave one Ship of Force or Burthen in all that Kingdom^s. In 1548, Lord Clinton, the Lord High Admiral, with a very stout Fleet, sailed to the Scotch Coasts, to prevent their repairing their Harbours, and to do what further Mischief he was able. But he was less successful; for though he made two Descents with considerable Forces, yet he was repulsed in both^t. Both Nations having suffered by the War, after two Years concluded a Peace.

In 1549-50, the French, though there was no War, declared, attacked and took some of the Forts of Boloigne^u. They likewise made another Attempt upon the Islands of Jersey and Guernsey, which they invaded with a strong Squadron of Men of War, and two thousand Land Forces. The English Court having Notice of this Attempt, and knowing those Islands to be but indifferently provided, sent thither a small Squadron, under the Command of Commodore Winter, with 800 Men as a Reinforcement, on board a few Transports. At his Arrival, he found the Ports blocked up, and himself under the Necessity either of desisting from his Enterprize, or attacking the French, notwithstanding their Superiority: He, like a brave Man, chose the latter, and executed his Design with such Courage and Conduct, that having killed them near a thousand Men, he obliged the Enemy to embark the rest on board some light Vessels, in which they fled, abandoning their Ships of Force; all which he caused to be set on fire^w.

The Decease of Edward the Sixth happened on the 6th of July 1553, and the 19th of the same Month his Sister Mary was proclaimed Queen in London.

Queen Mary espoused the 25th of July, Philip Prince of

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of Spain, afterwards King Philip II. The Spaniards breaking with the French King Henry II. the Queen and her Council were prevailed to join with the Spaniards. To this Purpose, the Earl of Pembroke passed from hence with a gallant Body of Troops into Flanders, consisting of ten or eleven thousand Men, and had the Honour to contribute greatly to the total Defeat of the French Forces before the Town of St. Quintin. The Scots, however, harrassed in the mean time the Borders at home. Upon this, Sir John Clare was sent with a Fleet of twelve Sail, to annoy the Scots, and to preserve the Iceland Fleet: With this View, he made a Descent on the Island of Kirkway, one of the Orkneys, on the 12th of August 1557; but the next Day the Scots, to the number of 3000, defeated the Forces he had landed, took his Artillery, and to compleat his Misfortune, the Boat in which he fled overset, so that himself with several others were drowned *.

* Strype's Memorials, vol. 34
P. 429.

The War at this time was hot between the French and Spaniards; the former gaining some Advantages. On July the 3d 1558, they attacked Count Egmont, near Gravelin; and the English Squadron cruising in the narrow Seas, hearing the Noise of the Artillery, approached the Field of Battle, which was so close to the Sea-side, that they brought their Guns to bear upon the left Wing of the French, which did such terrible Execution as decided the Fate of the Day, and forced 200 of the Enemy to fly to the English Ships for Quarter. About this time, the Lord Clinton, then High Admiral, put to Sea with a stout Fleet in the Month of July, and landed seven thousand Men in Lower Bretagne; where they took the Town of Conquet, and soon after re-embarked. They were joined in their Return by a Squadron of thirty Sail of Spanish Ships, which induced the Admiral to think of taking Brest; but arriving on the Coast of Bretagne a second time, they found the whole Country in Arms, so that they were constrained to abandon their Enterprize. This was the last Expedition fitted out by Queen Mary, who died the 17th of November 1558.

† Hist. de France par P. Daniel. tom. 8. p. 233. Strype. Stowe. Speed.

Mary was succeeded by her Sister Elizabeth. In the Month of April 1559, Peace was concluded with France. The French immediately were endeavouring

* Keith's Hist. of the Church and State of Scotland, vol. 1. p. 113.

* Keith. Camden. Mezeray. Daniel. Rapin.

* Sir William Monson's Naval Tracts, p. 170.

* Hakluyt, vol. 3. p. 534. Sir Wm. Monson's Naval Tracts, p. 169. Camden Annal. p. 353. Stowe's Annals, p. 709. Holingshed. Speed.

to fix themselves in Scotland; to prevent this, and at the request of the Scots, Queen Elizabeth sent Assistance both by Land and Sea^a. Lord Grey commanded the Land Forces, and Admiral Winter the Fleet; which sailed up the Frith of Forth, blocked up Leith by Sea, whilst the Scotch Army and English Auxiliaries besieged it by Land, and in a very short space forced the French Garrison to capitulate, whereby all the Designs of France on that side were entirely broken^a.

In 1587, the Queen, to delay King Philip the Second's Invasion as much as possible, or if it had been practicable to defeat it, sent a stout Fleet under Sir Francis Drake to Cadiz, where that Admiral performed rather more than could be expected; he forced six Gallies, which were designed to have guarded the Port, to shelter themselves under the Cannon of their Castles; and then burnt an hundred Ships and upwards in the Bay, all of which were laden with Ammunition and Provisions. From thence he sailed to Cape St. Vincent, where he surprized some Forts, and entirely destroyed all the Fishing-Craft in the Neighbourhood. Arriving at the Mouth of the Tago, and understanding that the Marquis of Santa Cruz lay hard by with a Squadron of good Ships, he challenged him to come out and fight; but the Marquis adhering closely to his Master's Orders, chose rather to let Drake burn the Coast, than hazard an Engagement. Sir Francis having done this, steered for the Azores, where he took a large Ship, which added much to his Profit, as his former Exploits had to his Reputation, and so returned in Triumph home^b. Two Years before this Sir Francis sailed to the West-Indies, having the following Captains under his Command; Christopher Carlisle, Martin Frobisher, Francis Knollys, and other Officers of Reputation. In that Expedition, he took the Cities of St. Jago, St. Domingo, Carthagená, and St. Augustin, exceeding even the Expectation of his Friends and the Hopes of the common People; though both were sanguine to the last Degree^c. In 1588, the Spanish Armada sailed, but as they were defeated before they landed, we shall here only speak of its Strength: It consisted of 130 Ships, making 57868 Ton; on board of which, there were 19295 Soldiers, 8450 Marines, 2088 Slaves, with 2630 Pieces of Cannon; besides there was a large Fleet of Tenders, with a pro-

a prodigious Quantity of Arms on board, intended for such as would join them. There were also on board this Fleet 124 Volunteers of Quality, and about 180 Religious Persons of several Orders^d.

The Queen having Intelligence, notwithstanding the Defeat of this Armada, that the Spaniards meditated a second Attempt, resolved, like a wise Princess, to find them some Work at home; and expressed her Royal Intention of assisting Don Antonio, to recover his Kingdom of Portugal^e. For this Purpose, she appointed Sir Francis Drake and Sir John Norris, joint Commanders; they sailed in 1589, with their whole Navy, consisting of 146 Sail^f; to which also the Dutch joined a small Squadron^g. The first Exploit they performed, was landing near Corunna, or the Grovne; which Place they attacked, burnt the adjacent Country, with many Magazines of naval Stores, defeated a great Body of Spaniards, and then re-embarked their Forces, and sailed as they had first designed, for the River of Lisbon^h. On their Arrival before Peniche, the Troops were landed, and the Place quickly surrendered to Don Antonio; from thence Sir John Norris and the Earl of Essex, with the whole Army under their Command, marched by Land towards Lisbon, where they expected to have met the Fleet under the Command of Sir Francis Drake; but he finding it impossible to proceed with safety to her Majesty's Ships, staid at the Castle of Cascais, which Place he took, and also seized 60 Sail belonging to the Hanse Towns, laden with Corn and Ammunition; which with about 150 Pieces of Cannon, were the principal Fruits of this Voyage. In their Passage home, they landed at Vigo, took and plundered it, then returned to England, after having been about ten Weeks abroadⁱ. The Commanders met with a cold Reception in England; Sir John Norris charging Sir Francis Drake with Breach of his Promise; and Sir Francis accusing him of expecting Services that were impracticable from the Fleet. The Disappointments which happened in this Voyage did not discourage the Queen or her Subjects from pursuing the War by Sea, and endeavouring as much as possible to ruin the maritime Force of Spain. For this Purpose, the Earl of Cumberland sailed in the Summer of the Year 1589, with a stout Squadron to the Tercera Islands,

^d Camden.

^e Strype. Rapin.

^f Camden.

^g Stowe. Rapin.

^h Stowe's An-

ⁱ nals, p. 752.

^j Sir Wm. Mon-

^k son's Naval

^l Tracts. Cam-

^m den. Strype.

ⁿ Rapin.

^o Burchet, p.

^p 355.

^q Stowe.

^r Holingshed.

^s Speed. Cam-

^t den. Sir Wm.

^u Monson.

^v Stowe's An-

^w nals, p. 757.

^x Holingshed.

^y Speed. Cam-

^z den. Rapin.

^{aa} The Memoir-

^{ab} Writers ascribe

^{ac} the Miscarriage

^{ad} of this Affair to

^{ae} the variance be-

^{af} tween our

^{ag} Commanders.

^k Stowe.

Holingshead.

Speed Hakluyt

Sir Wm. Mon-
son.

^l Camden.

StoweHolings-

hed. Speed.

Rapin.

^m Sir Wm.

Monson's Na-
val Tracts.

ⁿ Stowe's An-

nals, p. 77¹.

Holingshed.

Speed.

where he did the Spaniards incredible Damage, and obtained considerable Advantages for himself and Friends. The Island of Fayal he reduced, took the City and Castle; forced the Island of Graciosa to a Composition, and took several rich Ships^k. In 1591, the Earl of Cumberland made another Expedition. In 1592, Sir Martin Frobisher, and Sir John Burroughs, infested the Spanish Coast, and did much Mischief. In 1594, the Queen sent a small Squadron to Sea, under the Command of Sir Martin Frobisher, to reduce the Fort of Brest in Bretagne, which the King of Spain had taken, by the Assistance of the Leaguers in France, from King Henry the Fourth. It was strong, and had a numerous Garrison of Spanish Troops. Sir John Norris, with a small English Army, formed the Siege by Land; Sir Martin with only four Men of War, forced an entrance into the Harbour, and having thus blocked up the Place by Sea, landed his Sailors, and in Conjunction with Sir John Norris, stormed the Fort, which though gallantly defended, was taken, but with the loss of a great many brave Men; and amongst them Sir Martin himself, who died of the Wounds he received in that Service. The same Year Sir Francis Drake and Sir John Hawkins sailed on their last Expedition to the West-Indies^l. Their Voyage was not successful, though they did the Spaniards some Mischief at several Places, but nothing of any Consequence. In 1595, the Spaniards, with four Gallies, arrived in Mount's Bay in Cornwall, and landing with all their Men, burnt three little Places^m. To prevent any more Visits of this sort, the Queen undertook to invade the Spanish Dominions, in order to which, a stout Fleet and numerous Army were provided, under the most experienced Officers of those times. The Design of this Expedition was to destroy the Spanish Fleet in the Port of Cadiz, and to make themselves Masters of that rich City. The Force employed was in all not less than 150 Sail, of which 120 were Men of War; seventeen only were the Queen's Ships, the rest were hired and fitted up for this Voyage. On board this Fleet, there were embarked upwards of 7000 Menⁿ. The joint Commanders of this Expedition were the Earl of Essex, and the Lord High Admiral Howard; there was besides a Dutch Squadron of twenty-

twenty-four Ships. On the 1st of June 1596, this Navy sailed from Plymouth for the Coast of Spain, with a fair Wind and the good Wishes of all their Countrymen°. In former Expeditions, great Inconveniencies^{Stowe.} had happened by the Enemy's having early Intelligence; in this they were so happy as to arrive in the sight of^{Holingshed.} Cadiz, on the 20th of the same Month, before they^{Speed.} were either look'd for, or so much as thought of. They^{Hackluyt. Sir Wm. Monson's Nav. Tracts.} found the Town indifferently well fortified and defended by a strong Castle. In the Port were fifty-nine Spanish Ships, many laden with Treasure, and nineteen or twenty Gallies. It was resolved the same Day, in a Council of War, to have landed all their Forces at St. Sebastian's; but when they came to attempt it, that was found impracticable. After this, some time was lost in coming to another Resolution, which was owing to the joint Command; for the Earl of Essex, who was young and warm, affected to dictate; on the other Hand, the Admiral, who had as much Courage, and much more Experience, could not brook being treated in such a Manner. At last it was determined to attack the Ships in the Haven, before any Attempt was made upon the Town. In the Execution of it, some Errors were committed by the English, through too great Heat and Emulation of their Commanders, but others more gross and fatal by the Spaniards; who, when they found themselves compell'd to fly, did it without any precaution, whereby they might have provided for their Safety; for instead of running their Ships ashore under the Town, where they might have been covered by their own Artillery, and where at last their Men might have gone on Shore in safety, they ran them up the Bay, as far from the Enemy as possible, by which means part fell into the Hands of the English, and the rest were burnt*. In the mean time the Earl of Essex landed

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* See the Relation at the End of the first Volume of Hackluyt's Voyages, said to be written by a Person who was in the Expedition: As also a better Copy of the same Relation in Stowe's Annals, p. 771. See likewise Sir William Monson's Account and Observations on this Voyage, in his Tracts, p. 184. See Sir Walter Raleigh's Relation of the Action of Cadiz, published by his Grandson Philip Raleigh, Esq; at the end of an Abridgment of Sir Walter Raleigh's History of the World, 1700. 8vo. Triumphs of Nassau. Purchas's Pilgrim.

CONJUNCT EXPEDITIONS. Part 1.

his Men quietly, the Enemy deserting a strong Fort, from which they might have done him much Mischief; three Regiments also were sent to make themselves Masters of the Bridge, which unites the Island to the Main: this they performed with very small loss, but afterwards quitted again, which gave the Gallies an opportunity of escaping, another Over-sight, for which no Account can be given. The Lord Admiral hearing the Earl was landed, landed also with the remainder of the Forces, doubting much whether his Lordship could have kept the Place. Whilst the two Generals were employed in reducing the City, Sir Walter Raleigh was sent to seize the Ships in the Harbour of Port-Real; to prevent which, the Duke of Medina Sidonia caused them to be set on fire and burnt, whereby twenty millions were buried in the Sea^p. The City and its Forts they possessed a Fortnight, and then it was agreed to sail to Faro in the Kingdom of Algarve, where they found the Place deserted by its Inhabitants, and void of any thing that could become Plunder. In their Return, they looked into the Ports of the Groyne, St. Andero, and St. Sebastian's, but meeting with no Ships, they arrived in England on the 8th of August the same Year.

^p Camden.
Stowe. Speed.
Holingshed.
Hakluyt.
Monson.

In the Year 1597, the Queen sent another Fleet out under the Command of the Earl of Essex, to which the Dutch added ten Men of War^q. They sailed from Plymouth the 7th of August. They used their best Endeavours to perform the first part of their Instructions, which were to burn such Vessels as were in the Harbours of the Groyne and Ferrol, and then intercept the Plate Fleet near the Azores; but finding it impracticable, they thought it expedient to steer for the Islands, which accordingly they did. In this Voyage Sir Walter Raleigh's Ship sprung a Mast, upon which being a little delayed, he received Orders from the Earl of Essex to follow him to Fayal. Raleigh obeyed him, but not finding Essex on his Arrival, and perceiving the People were securing their Goods, and preparing to defend themselves, resolved, by the Advice of his Officers, if the Earl did not arrive in four Days, to attempt the Reduction of the Island, which accordingly he performed; but though he got great Reputation by this Exploit, yet he lost the General's Friendship, so that a Coldness thenceforward pre-

^q Camden.
Stowe Holings-
hed. Speed.
Hakluyt.
Monson.

Chap. 5. CONJUNCT EXPEDITIONS.

41

prevailed, which afterwards increased to open Hatred^r. After Essex's Arrival, they sailed together to Graciosa, which immediately submitted. The Earl resolving to do something of Consequence before he returned, surprized the Town of Villa-Franca, and plundered it; after which he re-embarked his Forces, and prepared for England^s. In 1598, the Earl of Cumberland sailed with a Squadron of eleven Ships to the Canaries, and made a Descent on the Island Lancerota, plundered it, and then proceeded for America; he landed upon the Island of Puerto Rico, and took the Capital with small loss. After which, Diseases spreading among his Soldiers and Seamen, obliged him to return home^t.

In 1601, Sir Richard Lewsin was employed as Admiral in Ireland, where he obliged the Spaniards, who had landed a considerable body of Forces, to withdraw out of the Island^u. The last Expedition fitted out by Queen Elizabeth, was in 1602, and was sent under the Command of the same Admiral and Sir William Monson; they performed as gallant an Exploit at Cerimbra, as any in the whole War; but as it was executed entirely by the Fleet, it does not fall within our Province; nor shall we take Notice of the eminent Services done by private Adventurers in the West-Indies. Wherefore we will finish this Chapter with the Death of Queen Elizabeth, which happened on the 24th of March following.

^r Sir William Monson's Reflections upon this Expedition. The Life of Sir Walter Raleigh before cited. Stowe's Annals. p. 783.

^s See a copious Account of this Expedition, by Sir Arthur Gorges, who was employed therein, in the

4th vol. of Purchas's Pilgrim, p. 1935. Camden.

^t Stowe Holingshed. Speed.

Monson.

Burchet.

^u Sir William Monson's Naval Tracts, p. 197.

C H A P. V.

UPON the Decease of Queen Elizabeth, the King of Scots succeeded peaceably to the English Throne, by the stile of James I. The only Expedition of Consequence during this Reign, was an Attempt upon Algiers; some say at the Request of Count Gondemar, to humble the King of Spain's Foes^w; others, to add Reputation to the Duke of Buckingham, for his Management of naval Affairs at the beginning of his Administration. However, in the Month of October 1620, this Fleet sailed from Plymouth: It consisted of six Men of War and twelve stout Ships hired from the Mer-

^w Camden. Wilson. Rapin. Burchet.

CONJUNCT EXPEDITIONS. Part I.

Merchants. On the 27th of November, they came to an Anchor in Algiers Road, and saluted the Town without receiving a single Gun in answer; however a Negotiation ensued, in which it is hard to say, whether the Turks or the Admiral acted with greater Chicanery. The Turks at last promised to give the Admiral satisfaction to his demands; upon which he sailed to the Spanish Coast, attended with six French Men of War; the Admiral of this Squadron struck to the English Fleet upon the first joining it, which seems to have been the greatest Honour, and perhaps the greatest Advantage that attended this whole Expedition*. It had been well if this Enterprize had ended thus, but after receiving a supply of Provisions from England, it was resolved to make another Attempt upon Algiers in the Spring, and if possible, to burn the Ships in the Mole*. Accordingly in the Month of May, the Fleet left the Coast of Majorca, and on the 21st of the same Month, anchored before Algiers, and began to prepare for the Execution of this Design. Two Ships taken from the Turks, and three Brigantines, were prepared for the Purpose, and seven armed Boats followed to sustain them, in case they were pursued at their coming off. These were likewise furnished with Fire-works to destroy the Ships without the Mole. On the 24th, the Ships advanced with a brisk Gale towards the Mole, but when they were within less than a Musket-shot of the Mole's head, the Wind died away, and it grew so calm they could not enter. However, the Boats and Brigantines finding they were discovered by the Brightness of the Moon, which was then at full, and being informed by a Christian Slave, who swam from the Town, that the Turks had left their Ships unguarded, they resolved to proceed; which they did, but performed little or nothing, and then retired with the loss of six Men. After a Day or two's stay, they put to Sea, and in the Month of June returned to England. Two other Fleets were afterwards sent against them, one under Lord Willoughby, the other under Lord Denbigh; both

* Purchas's Pilgrim, p. 881. See also an Account of this Expedition published by Authority, in 1621.

* See the Relation of this Expedition before referr'd to, which is almost the only authentic Account we have of it; and yet it is an Account only on one side, and was certainly written to justify the undertaking. Campbell's Remark, Nav. Hist.

both of which did so little, that very few of our Historians take any Notice of them^y. Thus ended King James's Conjunct Expeditions.

Upon the Demise of King James I. which happened the 27th of March 1625, his only Son Charles succeeded to the Throne; who, upon a War breaking out with Spain, sent Sir Edward Cecil, the Earls of Essex and Denbigh, with a Fleet of eighty English and Dutch Ships, and ten good Regiments; the Fleet did not sail till October, and then upon no settled Scheme, but were left to the Discretion of Men, who in reality were no fit Judges of such matters; and besides, were divided in opinion among themselves^z. Sir Edward Cecil sailed from Plymouth the 7th of October 1625; but when the Fleet was got some Leagues to Sea, their Ships were separated by a Storm, so that they were many Days before they got together at their appointed Rendezvous off Cape St. Vincent. On the 19th of October, it was resolved in a Council, to attack Cadiz, which they accordingly did on the 22d of the same Month. My Lord Essex stood into the Bay, where he found seventeen good Ships riding under the Town, and eight or ten Gallies; these he bravely attacked, but for want of proper Orders and due Assistance, the Spanish Ships were suffered to retire to Port-Real, where the Lord Marshal Cecil did not think fit to follow them. Then some thousands of Soldiers were landed, and the Fort of Puntall was taken; after which they proceeded to make some Attempts upon the Town. The Soldiers unfortunately becoming Masters of too much Wine, got excessively drunk, and became so careless, that if the Enemy had known, or had been vigilant enough to have taken this Advantage, few of them had returned home. The Fright into which ~~this~~ had put the Officers, engaged them to re-embark their Forces; and then it was agreed to cruize off Cape St. Vincent for the Flota; there the Men grew sickly, and by the strangest Management that ever was heard of (that is, distributing the Sick under pretence of taking better care of them, two in each Ship) the whole Fleet was infected, and to such a degree, as scarce left them hands enough to bring it home. This, however, they performed in December, having done little hurt to the

Enemy,

^y In the Continuation of Stowe's Chronicle, by Howe, there is not a Word of it.

In many Books of the same kind, we are barely told when this Fleet sailed, and when it came back. Campbell.

^z See a copious Account of the Motives to, and Miscarriages in this Voyage, by Sir William Monson, in his Naval Tracts.

^a See the several Accounts of this Voyage in the Authors before cited.

Enemy, and acquired less Honour to themselves^a; all which was foreseen, nay, and foretold too, before the Fleet left England.

On their return, a Charge was exhibited against the General, by the Earl of Essex, and nine other Officers of Distinction; Sir Edward Cecil, who was created Lord Wimbledon for this great Command, justified himself in a long Answer to their Charge. Both Pieces are yet remaining, and serve only to demonstrate that want of Experience and Unanimity, proved the Ruin of this Expedition*. As the War with Spain was chiefly of the Duke of Buckingham's procuring, so now he plunged the King into a War with France. The French laying Siege to Rochelle, the Capital of the Country of Aunis, a considerable City with a good Port for the Trade upon the Ocean in 46 Deg. 10 Min. of Northern Latitude, and 16 Deg. 29 Min. of Eastern Longitude; High-water at 45 Minutes after three †. The Rochellers applied to King Charles; who sent the Earl of Denbigh to their Relief with a Fleet of 30 Sail: but it being so late as October, his Lordship found it impracticable to execute his Commission; and after continuing at Sea some time in hard Weather, returned into Port. Upon this the Rochellers began to suspect the King's Sincerity, whether he intended to assist them or not^b. The Duke of Buckingham, to put the Thing out of Dispute, caused a great Fleet to be drawn together the next Year, and an Army of 7000 Men to be put

^aRushworth.
Frankland.
Rapin.

* Both the Officers Charge, and Lord Wimbledon's Answer, are printed in Lediard's Naval History. The Reader who shall compare these with Sir William Monson's Reflections on this Lord's Conduct, will discern, that he is hardly and unjustly treated. Sir William arraigns him for calling Councils, when he should have been acting; the Officers accuse him for not calling Councils, but acting of his own Head. The Truth seems to be, he had no Notion of a Sea Command, and his Officers no Inclination to obey him. Campbell Nav. Hist.

† Lewis VII. surnamed the Lion, besieged this City in 1224, and the Bishoprick of Maillezais was transferred here by Lewis XIV. in 1649, when he fortified the City with a strong Castle.—As the Remarks in the second Part of this Book relate a great deal to the Conjoint Expeditions made by Great-Britain since the Reign of Queen Elizabeth against France, we shall give from that Time a brief Description of the Places on that Coast, against which Enterprizes have been made.

put on board it; resolving to go himself, as Admiral and Commander in Chief. He sailed from Portsmouth the 27th of June, and landed on the Island of Rhee, a very fertile Island in the Ocean upon the Western Coast of France, towards the Confines of the Province of Poitou, before the City of Rochelle, in the general Government of the Country of Aunis; in 46 Deg. 13 Min. of Northern Latitude, and (the middle of the Island) 16 Deg. 12 Min. of Eastern Longitude; High-water 47 Minutes after three. It is five Leagues long and half a League broad†. The Duke landed his Troops on the last of July, not without strong Opposition from the French Governor, whom he forced to retire, though with some loss. Upon this Occasion the English fell into the same Errors in Conduct, which they had committed in the Cadiz Expedition. The Fort of La Pré, which covered the Landing-place, they neglected; though the French themselves in their Fright had slighted it, so that it might have been taken without any Trouble; and was a Place of so great Consequence, that if it had been in the Hands of the English it would have prevented the French from introducing any Supplies. The French Court was at first exceedingly alarmed; but their Terrors quickly wore away, when they found the Duke had no great Capacity as a Commander, and too much Pride to take Advice. The Town of St. Martin's was quickly taken by the English; and the Duke then invested the Citadel; but gave evident Proofs of his want of military Skill in managing the Siege. At first, he quartered his Troops without entrenching, which at last, however, he was glad to do; then he entered into Conferences with the Governor, and refusing to communicate the Substance of them to his Officers, discouraged his own People, and enabled the French to deceive him by a sham Treaty, during which the Fort received a Supply. The Expectation of Succours from England, with some other Reasons, engaged Buckingham to remain so long in his Camp, that

† There are at present three Places of some Importance here: the first is the Town and City of St. Martin; the second Fort de la Pré, where the Governor resides; and the third Fort Mattrey. It formerly belonged to the Viscounts of Tours, and was taken by Marshal Turenne the 9th of October 1671.

that his Troops were much diminished. At length, on the 6th of November, he made a general Assault; when it appeared the Place was inaccessible, at least to Forces under such Circumstances as his were. Two Days after, he resolved upon a Retreat, which was as ill conducted as the rest of the Expedition. It was made in the sight of an Enemy as strong in Foot, and more numerous in Horse than themselves, over a narrow Causeway, with Salt Pits on each side; yet there was no Precaution taken by erecting a Fort, or throwing up an Entrenchment to cover the Entrance of the Passage; by which the Army was so much exposed, that numbers of brave Men were killed; the best Accounts now extant say, fifty Officers, two thousand Soldiers, and thirty-five Volunteers of Note. With equal shame and loss therefore the Duke concluded this Expedition, embarking his Forces on the 9th of the same Month, and sending the poor Rochellers a Promise, that he would come again to their Relief; which, however he did not live to perform^c.

^c Sir Richard Granville's Journal. Frankland's Annals. Rushworth's Collections. Whitlock's Memorials. Warwick's Memorials.

The King however in 1628, exerted himself to the utmost, in preparing a Naval Force to make good what the Duke of Buckingham had promised the Inhabitants of Rochelle. With this View, a Fleet of fifty Sail was assembled at Plymouth in the Spring, and a large Body of Marines embarked; the Command of it was given to the Earl of Denbigh, who sailed from that Port on the 17th of April; and coming to Anchor in the Road of Rochelle on the 1st of May, on his Arrival, he found twenty sail of the French King's Ships riding before the Harbour; and being much superior in Number and Strength, he sent advice into the Town, that he would sink the French Ships as soon as the Wind came West, and made an higher Flood. About the 8th of May, the Wind and Tide served accordingly, and the Rochellers expected and solicited for that Season of Deliverance; but the Earl without embracing the Opportunity, weighed Anchor and sailed away; suffering four of the French Ships to pursue, as it were, the English Fleet, which arrived at Plymouth on the 26th of May^d.

^d Kennet's Hist. of England, p. 48. Duke of Rohan's Memoirs. Sir Wm. Monson's Naval Tracts. Frankland's Annals.

Notwithstanding these repeated Defeats, the Cries of the Rochellers, and the Clamours of the People were so loud,

loud, that a third Fleet was prepared for the Relief of that City, now by a close Siege reduced to the last Extremity. The Earl of Lindsey was made Admiral; Moreton and Mountjoy Vice and Rear-Admirals; and as an illustrious foreign Writer tells us, his Care and Presence had such an Effect in preparing for this Voyage, that more was dispatched now in ten or twelve days, than in many weeks before during the Duke of Buckingham's life^e. This Expedition, however, was not more fortunate than the former. The Fleet sailed the 8th of September 1628, and arriving before Rochelle, found the Boom raised to block up the entrance of the Port so strong, that though many Attempts were made to break through it, they proved vain; so that the Rochellers were glad to accept of Terms from their own Prince, and surrendered the Place on the 18th of October; the English Fleet looking on, but not able to help them. To compleat their Misfortunes, the very Night after the City was given up, the Sea made such a Breach, as would have opened an Entrance for the largest Ship in the English Fleet*. With this Expedition ended the Operations of the War with France, though a Peace was not made till the succeeding Year^f: From this Time, the French began to affect a maritime Power, and to be extremely uneasy at the growth of the English Shipping, which was the Effect of Cardinal Richlieu's Politicks.

We are now come to the time of the Civil War; in which the chief matters that relate to Conjunct Expeditions, are the taking such Islands by the Parliament's Forces, that held out for the King against them. To this Purpose, Admiral Blake, on his Return to England from driving Prince Rupert (the King's Nephew) from one part of the World to another, had the supreme Power at Sea vested in him, in Conjunction with Dean and Popham, for the Year 1651^g. The first Exploit the Parliament thought of, was the Reduction of the

Islands

^e Duke of Rohan's Memoirs, p. 188. He was the chief of the Huguenots, and here on the Spot.

* Frankland's Annals. Kennet's compleat Hist. of England, vol. 3. p. 49. Warwick's Memoirs.

^f Kennet's compleat Hist. of England, vol. 3. p. 53.

^g Rushworth's Collections. Heath's Chronicle. Life of Blake.

* Richlieu in Imitation of Alexander, laid a Boom cross the Sea, and entered Rochelle like a Conqueror. But had the Sea been a little more turbulent, or the English a little more diligent, Rochelle might have been saved, and Richlieu called rash and inconsiderate. Age of Lewis XIV. by Voltaire, Vol. 1. Chap. 5. p.

Islands of Scilly, which were held for King Charles by Sir John Greenville. Admiral Blake in the Phoenix Frigate, in Conjunction with Sir George Ayscue, with a small Fleet, sailed there in the Month of May; and very quickly performed what they were sent for; the Governor being glad to deliver up his Charge upon honourable Terms, and the Admiral as willing to grant all he could reasonably expect^b. Thence Blake sailed with the Fleet to Jersey, where he arrived in October, and reduced it by the End of the Year, as he did likewise Cornet Castle, which was the only Place held out for the King in Guernsey; and thus secured the Sovereignty of the Sea in this part of the Worldⁱ for the Parliament.

^b The original Articles, aM.S. in Folio, of 2 Sheets, are still preserved in the Library of the Society for propagating the Gospel in Foreign Parts. Camp. Na. Hist. ⁱ Clarendon's Hist. p. 636. Heath's Chron. p. 306. Bates's Hist. of the Troubles, &c.

Sir George Ayscue, after the Reduction of Scilly, having strengthened his Fleet with some Ships, sailed to the West-Indies, in order to reduce some of the Plantations that had declared for the King. On board his Fleet was Colonel Allen, a Gentleman of Barbadoes, who had been sent by such in that Colony and the Leeward Islands, as were well affected to the Parliament, to demand Relief. This Fleet arrived in Carlisle-Bay in Barbadoes, on the 16th of October 1651, and took fourteen Sail of Dutch Ships that were trading there. Francis Lord Willoughby of Parham was Governor of the Island for the King, and shewed so good an Inclination to defend himself, that it was the 17th of December before Admiral Ayscue thought fit to attempt landing, which at last he effected with some loss; Colonel Allen, with between thirty and forty Men, being killed in the Attempt. After his Forces were on Shore, the Governor thought fit to capitulate^j. While he lay at Barbadoes, he sent a few Ships under Captain Dennis to reduce Virginia, which with some trouble he effected. Sir George likewise subdued the Leeward Islands; and having thus thoroughly fulfilled his Commission, he returned into Europe, where he found the Dutch War broke out^k.

^j British Empire in America, vol. 2. p. 18. Heath's Chron. p. 323. Columna Rostrata, p. 98.

^k Heath's Chron. p. 323.

ⁱ Clarendon. Whitlock. Bates's Warwick. Ludlow, &c.

This War between the Parliament and the Dutch affording nothing material to our Purpose, till the Year 1653; and as Oliver Cromwell on the 20th of April of that Year entered the House of Commons, and dissolved the Parliament by Force^l, every Military and

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Naval Action, from this time during the Civil War, may be considered as done by the Order of Cromwell. Some Advantage however the Enemy certainly reaped from this Change in English Affairs; for Van Tromp, the Dutch Admiral, conveyed a great Fleet of Merchantmen to the North, and though our Navy followed him to the height of Aberdeen, it was to no Purpose: He escaped them both going and coming back, which gave him an Opportunity of sailing into the Downs, and battering Dover Castle. This however lasted but a Week, till the approach of the English Fleet^m. Ho^m Heath's Chron. p. 344.

Hostilities between the two States had not continued quite two Years; yet in that Time the English took no less than 1700 Prizes, valued by the Dutch themselves at near six millions sterling. On the contrary, those taken by the Dutch, could not amount to the fourth Part, either in Number or Value. Within that Time, the English were victorious in no less than five general Naval Battles, some of which were of several Days; whereas the Hollanders cannot justly boast of having gained one. As short as this Quarrel was, it brought the Dutch to greater Extremities, than their fourscore Years War with Spainⁿ. Immediately after the Conclusion of the Dutch War, the Protector, Cromwell, in the Summer of the Year 1654, ordered two great Fleets to be provided; one to be commanded by Admiral Blake, the other by Vice-Admiral Penn: Neither of them had any knowledge of what the other was to attempt; so far from it, they knew not perfectly what themselves were to perform^o. Their Orders were to be opened at Sea, and they had no farther Lights given them than were absolutely requisite for making the necessary Preparations. Blake, as soon as all things were ready, put to Sea, and sailed into the Streights; where his Orders were to procure Satisfaction from such Princes and States, as had either insulted the Government, or injur'd the Commerce of England. Before his Departure, it had been industriously given out, that he was to intercept the Duke of Guise, and to protect the Kingdom of Naples from the French: This had the desir'd Effect, it lull'd the Spaniards asleep, and even disposed them to shew the Admiral all possible Civilities; who very probably

ⁿ Verwerd Europa, p. 122.

^o Interest van Holland, p. 34.

^o Basnage Annales des Provinces Unies, vol. 1. p. 335.

^o Clarendon's Hist. p. 673.

Whitlock.
Rapin.

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Heath's
Chron. p. 336.
Vie de Crom-
well, vol. 2. p.
345. Life of
Blake. Bates's
History.

ably had as yet no Suspicion of Cromwell's design to break with that Nation. The first Place he went to, was Leghorn; where he had two Accounts to make up with the Grand Duke; the Prince, when he had understood that not less than a hundred and fifty thousand Pounds were expected of him, was greatly surprized: However it was moderated to sixty thousand Pounds. This Sum there is Reason to believe was actually paid. From thence Blake proceeded to Algiers, where he arrived the 10th of March 1655, and anchored without the Mole; sending an Officer to the Dey, to demand Satisfaction for the Piracies committed on the English, and the Release of all Captives belonging to his Nation. The Dey answered very modestly, that as for the Ships and Slaves, they were now the Property of private Persons, from whom he could not take them with safety to himself; but that he would make it his Care they should be redeemed upon easy Terms, and would make a Treaty with him to prevent any Hostilities being committed for the future. The Admiral left the Port upon this, and sailed to Tunis, where he sent a like Message on Shore; but received a very short Answer, viz. Here are our Castles of Gulletta and Porto Ferino: You may do your worst, we do not fear you. Blake entered the Bay of Porto Ferino, and came within Musket-shot of the Castle and Line, which he played upon so warmly, they were soon in a defenceless Condition. There were then nine Ships in the Road, which the Admiral resolved to burn, and with this View ordered every Captain of his own Ship to man his long Boat with choice Men, and commanded them to enter the Harbour and fire the Ships of Tunis, while he and his Fleet cover'd them from the Castle, by playing continually on it with their Cannon. The Seamen in their Boats boldly assaulted the Pyrates, and burnt all their Ships, with the loss of twenty-five Men killed, and forty-eight wounded. This daring Action spread the Terror of his Name through Africa and Asia, which had long been formidable in Europe. From Tunis Blake went to Tripoli, and concluded a Peace with that Government. Thence he returned to Tunis, and threatening to do farther Execution, the Inhabitants implored his Mercy

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Mercy from their Works, and begged him to grant them a Peace, which he did on Terms glorious for himself and profitable to his Country^a.

^aHeath's Chron.

The other Fleet being also in readiness, and composed of about thirty Ships of War, and a convenient number of Transports; the Protector resolved they should sail in the Month of December 1654. Admiral Penn had the chief Command of this Fleet, and under him were Vice-Admiral Goodson, and Rear-Admiral Blagge. The Commander of the Land Forces was Colonel Venables, who, as well as the Admiral, was secretly in the King's Interest. On this Account, Venables and his Troops, to the Number of 5000, amongst whom many were Royalists, were hurried on board at Portsmouth;

p. 374. 375.
Vie de Crom-
well, vol. 2.
p. 348, 349.

whence he immediately sailed for Barbadoes^r, though little prepared for such an Expedition; that one great End seemed to be, to get rid of them. The Fleet arrived in Carlisle-Bay, on the 29th of January 1655.

^r Clarendon's
Hist. p. 673.
Heath's Chron.
p. 365 Life of
Dr. John Bar-
wick, p. 185.

They staid in the Island of Barbadoes some time, to recruit, and make the necessary Preparations for their intended Descent on the Island of Hispaniola. General Venables found himself deficient in all sorts of Necessaries; and what was worse, Admiral Penn very little inclined to afford him even the assistance that was in his Power^s. From Barbadoes the Fleet sailed on the last of March, to St. Christopher's, where they met with another supply of Volunteers, many having resorted to it before in Barbadoes, from all our Plantations,²

^s Heath's
Chron. Vie de
Cromwell, vol

with the hopes of Plunder from the Spaniards; so that when they embarked for Hispaniola, Venables had under his Command the greatest Body of European Troops that had ever been seen in that part of the World; his Army consisting of very near 10000 Men. Most of these when they left England, did it with a view of making their Fortunes; but were now told that every Penny of their Plunder was to be accounted for. This had like to have thrown them into a general Mutiny; and it was with much difficulty that the Officers pacified them. In this situation things were, when they embarked for Hispaniola^t. They arrived before the City of St. Domingo, and General Venables proposed, that they should sail directly into the Harbour; which however was not agreed to by the Sea Officers, who pro-

^t Heath's
Chron. p. 369;

posed landing at the River Hine; for which Purpose, part of the Squadron was detached under the Command of Vice-Admiral Goodson, who, when at Sea, declared he had not Pilots to conduct the Ships into the Mouth of the River; therefore the Troops were compelled (notwithstanding General Venables protested against it) to land at the West point; from whence they had forty Miles to march through a thick woody Country without any Guide, insomuch that numbers of Men and Horses, through Fatigue, extremity of Heat, and want of Water, were destroyed. After four Days March, the Army came to the Place where they might have been first landed; but by that time the Enemy had drawn together the whole Force of the Island, and had recovered from their first Surprize. Colonel Buller who had landed with his Regiment near Hine River, and had Orders to remain there till the Army joined him, thought fit on the coming of Cox, the Guide, to march away; for want of this Guide the General and his Forces marched ten or twelve Miles out of the Road. Exasperated with these Disappointments, and the Hardships they had undergone; the Regiment of Marines under the Command of Admiral Goodson, mutinied first, and then the Land Troops; so that the General had great Difficulty to prevail on them to ford the River. At last, Colonel Buller and Cox the Guide joined them, and promised to conduct them to a Place where they might be supplied with Water; but this Colonel taking the Liberty of straggling for the sake of Pillage, the Spaniards attacked him, and in one of these Skirmishes, Cox their only Guide was killed; yet the Spaniards were at last repulsed, and pursued within Cannon-shot of the Town^a. In this distressed Condition a Council of War was called; where, after mature deliberation, it was resolved to march to the Harbour, which with much Difficulty they effected. There they staid three or four Days to furnish themselves with Provisions and other Necessaries, and then with a single Mortar-piece marched into the Island again to reduce the Fort. The Van-guard was commanded by Adjutant-General Jackson, who as soon as he was attacked by the Spaniards, ran away, and his Troops after him. The Passage through the Woods being

^a Burchet's
Naval Hist. p.
392.

being very narrow, they pressed on the General's Regiment, who in vain endeavoured to stop them with their Pikes. They likewise disordered Major-General Haines's Regiment, which gave the Enemy, who followed very eagerly, and afforded no quarter, great Advantage; so that the Major-General and the bravest of his Officers, who preferr'd Death before Flight, ended their Days there. At last Venables and Goodson, at the Head of their Regiments, forced the Run-aways into the Wood, obliged the Enemy to retire, and kept their own Ground, notwithstanding the Fire from the Fort was very warm^w. By this Time the Forces were^w Ibid. p. 393. so much fatigued and discouraged, that they could not be brought to play the Mortar. The General, though reduced to a very low condition, caused himself to be led from Place to Place, to encourage them; till fainting at last, he was forced to leave the Care to Major-General Fortescue, who did what he could to revive their Spirits, but to very little Purpose. Soon after, it was resolved, in a Council of War, that since the Enemy had fortified all the Passes, and the whole Army was in the utmost Distress for want of Water, they should march to a Place where they were informed that a supply of that and other Necessaries had been put ashore from the Ships. In this March, the Soldiers followed their Officers, till they found themselves in danger, and then left them; insomuch that the Commissioners owned, by a Letter they wrote to the Governor of Barbadoes, that had not the Enemy been as fearful as their own Men, they might in a very few Days have destroyed the whole Army, and withal, they let him know, that those who had occasioned the greatest Disorder, were those of Barbadoes and St. Christopher's; insomuch that they, the said Commissioners, who were Penn, Winslow and Buller, had resolved to leave the Place, and try what could be done against the Island of Jamaica. Such was the end of this Expedition, after having been on shore from the 14th of April, to the 1st of May, when this Resolution of sailing to Jamaica was taken^w.

^wIbid. ubi supra

The Descent on Jamaica was better managed than that on Hispaniola; for immediately on their landing, which was on the 3d of May, Venables ordered, that if any should be found attempting to run away, the next

Man to him should put him to death ; which if he failed
 7 Burchet's Naval Hist. p. 314. to do, he should be liable to a Court-martial 7. The
 Clarendon. next Day they attacked a Fort, which they carried, and
 Whitlock. were preparing to storm the Town of St. Jago ; but
 Heath's Chron. this the Spanish Inhabitants prevented, by a timely

2 Burchet.
 Whitlock.
 Kennet. Rapin

Treaty ; yet before the General would listen to any Pro-
 positions of Peace, he insisted that a certain Quantity of
 Provisions should be sent them daily, which was punctu-
 ally performed : This gave his Soldiers Strength and
 Spirits, and in a short time, their Negotiations ended in
 a compleat Surrender of the Island to the English 2.

3 Clarendon.
 Whitlock.
 Heath's Chron.
 Kennet. Echard.
 Ludlow.
 Rapin.

b Heath's
 Chron. p. 391.
 Clarendon.
 Burchet.

c Heath's
 Chronicle, as
 before cited.

During all this time, Admiral Blake's Fleet continued
 in the Mediterranean, and was then in the Road to
 Cadiz, where he received the greatest Civilities from the
 Spaniards, till the Blow was struck at Jamaica : Crom-
 well to the best of his Power, carefully concealed his
 Design to make War. When this was known, the
 Spaniards declared immediately against him, and seized
 the Effects of all the English Merchants in their Do-
 minions, to an immense Value 3. The War now being
 broke out between Cromwell and the Spaniards, Blake
 continued to cruize before the Haven of Cadiz and in
 the Streights, till April 1657 ; and having then infor-
 mation of a Plate Fleet, which had put into the Haven
 of Santa Cruz, in the Island of Teneriff, he immedi-
 ately sailed there, arriving before the Town on the 20th of
 April b : Here he found the Flota, consisting of six Gal-
 leons richly laden, and ten other Vessels : The latter lay
 within the Port, with a strong Baricado before them ;
 the Gallions without the Boom, because they drew too
 much Water to lie within it. The Port itself was strong-
 ly fortified, having on the North a large Castle, well
 supplied with Artillery, and seven Forts united by a
 Line of Communication well lined with Musketeers.
 The Spanish Governor thought the Place so secure,
 and his own Dispositions so well made, that when the
 Master of a Dutch Ship desired leave to sail, apprehend-
 ing Blake would presently attack the Ships in the Har-
 bour ; the Spaniard answer'd tartly, Get you gone, if
 you will, and let Blake come if he dares c. The Ad-
 miral, after viewing the Enemy's Preparations, called a
 Council of War, wherein it was resolved, to attempt
 destroying the Enemy's Ships, for it was impossible to
 bring

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bring them off. To this end, he sent Captain Stayner with a Squadron to attack them, who soon forced his Passage into the Bay, while other Frigates played on the Forts and Line, and hindered them from giving the Ships much Disturbance. Stayner's Squadron was quickly supported by Blake and the whole Fleet, who boarded the Spanish Galleons, and in a few Hours made himself Master of them all, and then set them on fire; so that the whole Spanish Fleet was burnt down to the Water's Edge, except two Ships which sunk outright; and then the Wind veering to the S. W. he passed with his Fleet safe out of the Port again, losing in this dangerous Attempt no more than forty-eight Men killed, and having about an hundred and twenty wounded ^d. It was, without question, the boldest Undertaking of its kind that had ever been performed; and the Spaniards, who are romantic enough in their own Conduct, were so much astonished at Blake's, that they quite lost their Spirits, and thenceforward never thought themselves safe, either from Numbers or Fortifications ^e. This was the last Expedition by Sea, and put an end to the Spanish War on that Element, and the Year following Oliver Cromwell died.

^d Clarendon.
Whitlock.
Heath. Bates.
Burchet. Rapin

^e Clarendon's
Hist p. 681.

In 1660, the Restoration was brought about; King Charles the Second landed in Kent, in the Month of May of the same Year*. The first Expedition in this King's Reign, was to Algiers; for the Algerines, and other Piratical States of Barbary taking Advantage of our Confusions, broke the Peace made with Admiral Blake. To remedy this, the Earl of Sandwich came with a Fleet before Algiers, the 29th of July 1661, and sent Captain Spragge with the King's Letter to the Principal Person in the Government: But things not coming to an Accommodation, the Algerines brought over from the Mole-head a Boom to the opposite Corner of the Port; that by the help of this, and many other new Works which they had raised, they might be able to defend themselves from any Attempts that could be

E 4

made

* See the close of the Earl of Clarendon's History, Heath's Chronicle, p. 450. But the best Account is in the Earl of Sandwich's Journal, a M. S. in the Hands of the Honourable Edward Montague, Esq; See also Sir William Lower's Account of this short Voyage. Camp. Nav. Hist.

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made by Sea. The Earl of Sandwich, however, resolved to make a bold Trial to burn the Ships in the Harbour, but the Wind prevented him; so that after much firing on both sides, the Admiral thought fit to sail for Lisbon^f on the 1st of August, leaving Sir John Lawson with a strong Squadron, who, by degrees, forced all these Pyratel States to conclude a Peace with Great Britain. However, the Algerines retaining a strong Opinion of their Fortifications, did not keep it long; upon which the Government sent fresh Orders to Sir John Lawson, to employ Force to bring them to Reason^g.

^fHeath's Chron. p. 500. Earl of Sandwich's Journal.

^gKennet's compleat Hist. Burchett's Leeward, &c.

^hColumna Rotunda, p. 152. see K. Charles II. his Letter to the States General, on the Causes of this War, & Basnage Annales de Provinces Unies, vol. 1. p. 682. 683.

ⁱPhillips's Continuation of Heath's Chronicle, p. 533. De Neuville Hist. de Holland, vol. 3. p. 242.

^kKennet's Compleat Hist. of England. Basnage. De Neuville.

We are now entering upon the second Dutch War; which began from the Jealousies the Dutch conceived of the English becoming their Superiors in Trade. These Sentiments engaged them, especially their East and West-India Companies, to exercise their Power by various Ways in those Parts of the World. It prevailed most to the prejudice of the English Trade^h.

The Duke of York who was Governor of the African Company, sent Sir Robert Holmes with four Frigates to the Coast of Guinea to make Reprisals; this was in 1661. The English and Dutch went on three or four Years in this Manner, taking what they could from each other. These Proceedings were for a great while of a private Nature. The Injuries done to the English were done by the Dutch West-India Company; the Reprisals made by the English, were under the Charter of the African Company; the Crown had neither fitted out Sir Robert Holmes, or given him any Commission. Wherefore the little Enterprizes that were performed at this Time, do not properly come within this Workⁱ. However they grew more serious, for in 1664, Sir Robert Holmes reduced a Dutch Settlement called the New Netherlands, changing the Name afterwards into that of New-York, in Honour of the Duke. Upon this the Dutch sent De Ruyter with a strong Fleet, who made himself Master of Fort Cormantin; and obliged the Governor of the African Company to demolish several of their Forts. From the Coast of Guinea, De Ruyter sailed to Barbadoes; from thence to Montserrat, Nevis and Newfoundland, in which Voyage he did as much Mischief as he could, and so returned to Holland^k.

These Actions exasperated the two Nations; so that War

War was proclaimed by the Dutch in January, and by the English in February 1665. As the great Naval Engagements which happened in this War, between these rival trading Nations, don't fall within the Compass of this Work, the first Affair we have to mention that any ways concerns us, is the coming home of the Dutch Turkey and India Fleet; which chose to take the Northern Route, in hopes of avoiding the English Fleet under the Earl of Sandwich; which Fleet July the 5th, steered from Southwold Bay (into which they put after the Engagement on the 3d of June 1665) for the Coast of Holland; the Design they went upon being partly to take and burn the Fleets abovementioned. But these Fleets having intelligence at Sea, that it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to avoid the English Navy, they took shelter in the Port of Berghen in Norway¹. The Port was pretty easy of Access, and covered only by an old Castle; the Danish Governor promised indeed the Dutch to do for them what he could, and they were willing to contribute as much as in them lay to render him able. In order to this they landed forty-one Pieces of Cannon, which were disposed on a Line before the Fort: Then the Dutch drew another Line cross the Bay, consisting of their largest Ships; in this Posture they waited for the English. It was not long before they appeared; for the Earl of Sandwich, having Advice of their being put into Berghen, had detached Sir Thomas Tyddiman his Rear-admiral with 14 Sail of Men of War, and three Fire-ships to attack them. This he performed with great Courage, though the Wind was against them, and the Enemy made a prodigious Fire from the Castle, the Line, and the Ships; so that at last he was forced to bear out of the Bay, and this he performed without the loss of a Ship, though he had five or six very ill treated*.

¹ Kennet. E-
chard. Burchet.
Rapin.

In the Year 1666, and again in the Month of June, another great Naval Engagement happened; it was fought on four Days successively by the Duke of Albemarle, who was joined on the last Day by Prince Rupert: These were the principal Commanders of the English,

* In order to come as near the Truth as possible, the Dutch Commodore's Letter is compared with one wrote by the Earl of Arlington, Secretary of State. Campbell's Naval History.

^m Basnage Annals des Provinces Unies, vol. 1. p. 783. Le Clerc. De Neuville. Vie de Ruyter. Leven Van Tromp.

glish, as Van Tromp and De Ruyter were of the Dutch. On the 25th of July about Noon, the Fleets having been repaired, another great Naval Engagement was fought; and a clear Victory gained by the English^m; upon which on the 29th of the same Month they steered their Course for the Ulie; but the Wind being contrary, they did not make the Island till the 7th of August. Being then come to an Anchor, Prince Rupert and the Duke of Albemarle received Intelligence; that, notwithstanding there were very rich Store-houses on the Islands, and a large Fleet of Merchantmen lying between them; yet Ulie and Schelling were very indifferently guarded; upon which it was resolved to attack them forthwith †. Upon this, a Council of Flag Officers were called in order to make the necessary Dispositions for this great Attempt. There it was resolved, that 300 Men should be drawn out of each Squadron, two thirds Land and one third Seamen, under nine Captains; and the whole to be executed under the Command of Sir Robert Holmes, Rear-admiral of the Red; with whom went Sir William Jennings, who, in case it was found expedient to attack both Islands at once, was to command one Division. The Ships appointed for this Enterprize were five fourth, three fifth Rates, five Fire-ships, and seven Ketches, as Sir Robert Holmes tells us in his Relation of the Affair *.

On the 8th of July, about seven in the Morning, this Squadron weighed, divided from the rest of the Fleet, and came to Anchor about a League from the Buoys, where they met the Prince's Pleasure-boat called the Fanfan; who had discovered in the Harbour a considerable Fleet of Ships near the Ulie; which proved to be 170 Merchant-ships, the least of which was not less than 200 Tons Burthen, with two Men of War which had lately convoyed near an hundred of the said Ships. The whole were richly laden ‖.

Sir

† The Ulie is an Island from which the Dutch Fleets usually sail to the Baltick; it has the Texel and Schelling on the North.

* This is taken from the Account by Authority; entitled, A true and perfect Narrative of the great Success of a part of his Majesty's Fleet, by their burning 160 Dutch Ships within the Ulie. Of this there is an Extract in Kennet. Camp. Nav. Hist.

‖ If the Reader considers the Number, Burthen, and Trade, in

Sir Robert Holmes considering, that if he should proceed, as his Design was, first to attempt a Descent on the Land, that numerous Fleet might possibly pour in such Numbers of Men, as might render their Success hazardous, resolved to begin with the Ships; accordingly having ordered the Advice and the Hampshire to lie without the Buys, he weighed with the rest of his Fleet; and the Wind being contrary, he returned with great Difficulty into Schelling Road, where the Tyger came to Anchor; and immediately Sir Robert went on board the Fanfan, and hoisted his Flag; upon which the Officers came on board him; and there it was ordered, that the Pembroke which drew the least Water, with the five Fire-ships should fall in amongst the Enemy's Fleet with what Speed they could. Captain Brown with his Fire-ship chose very bravely to lay the biggest Man of War on board, and burnt it downright. Another Fire-ship running up at the same time to the other Man of War, they backing their Sails, escaped the present Execution of the Fire-ship; but so as to run themselves on ground, where the Ship was presently taken by some of the Long-boats and fired. The other three Fire-ships clapped the three great Merchant-men on board, which carried Flags in their Main-tops, and burnt them. This put their Fleet into great Confusion; which Sir Robert Holmes perceiving, made a Signal for all the Officers to come on board again; and presently gave Orders, that Sir William Jennings, with all the Boats that could be spared, should take the Advantage, and fall in, sink, burn, and destroy, all they could; but with a strict Command not to plunder. The Execution was so well followed, each Captain destroying his Share, some twelve, some fifteen Merchant-men, that of the whole Fleet there escaped not above eight or nine Ships; one of which was a Guinea Man of 24 Guns, and three small Privateers; these Ships being driven up into a narrower Corner of the Stream, protected four or five Merchant-men that were a-head of them, where our Boats could not possibly come at them; though

in which these Ships were employed, he will easily discern the Credit due to the subsequent Account of Damages. Camp. Nav. History.

"This Account though even these few were much damaged". The agrees very well with what is said on the same Subject by the Dutch Writers. Campbell's Nav. Hist.

next Day, which was the 10th of August, it was found more expedient to land on the Island of Schelling, than upon Ulie; which was performed by Sir Robert Holmes, with eleven Companies in his Long-boats, which he landed with little or no Opposition. When he came on Shore he left one Company to secure his Boats; and with the other ten marched three Miles up into the Country, to the Capital Town called Brandaris, in which there were upwards of 1000 fine Houses; where keeping five Companies upon the Skirts of the Town, to prevent any Surprise of the Enemy, he sent the other five to set fire to the Place; but finding them a little slow to execute that Order, and fearing they might be tempted to forget themselves in the Pillage, he was himself forced to set fire to some Houses to the Windward, the sooner to dispatch the Work, and hasten the Men away. The Fire burnt with such Violence, that in half an hour's Time most part of the Town was in a bright Flame. This Place was reported by those that were found in it, to have been very rich, and so it appeared by some of the Soldiers Pockets *. This Blow great'y affected the Dutch, who, according to their own Accounts, suffered the loss of near six millions of Guilders; and were we to take the Ships into this Computation, they confess, that they were losers to the amount of eleven millions, or one million one hundred thousand Pounds Sterling †.

By the end of the Year 1666, all Parties began to grow weary of the War; which was certainly opposite to the Interest of Britain and Holland. A Treaty was set on foot at Breda, not only at the desire of the States, but by their express Appointment of Time and Place, in which they were indulged by King Charles, purely to shew the Sincerity of his Intentions. Whilst this Treaty was negotiating, De Wit was resolved to put in Practice a Project of his own; which was to do as much Mischief

* The Burning of the Town of Brandaris, is a little lessened in the Detail given by M. de Neuville in his *Histoire de Hollande*, tom. 3. p. 287.

† Some Writers make the loss sustained by the Dutch still more, viz. 12,000,000 Guilders, or 1,200,000 l. Sterling. Lediard's *Naval History*, p. 387. Rapin diminishes the loss, and the Number of Ships. Campbell's *Nav. Hist.*

Mischief as he could upon the English Coasts^o. Upon the Presumption of the Treaty being nearly concluded, King Charles ordered only two small Squadrons for the Summer Service in 1667^p.

^o Basnage Annales de Provinces Unies, vol. 1. p. 804. De Neuville.

Things however being in a readiness in Holland, the last Resolution was taken for the immediate Execution of De Wit's Project: The Pretence made use of by De Wit, for fitting out a Fleet in the Spring, was, the Mischief which had been done to their Navigation by the Privateers from Scotland. To check them, Admiral Van Ghendt was sent with a considerable Fleet

Wicquefort. Columna Rostrata. Kennet, &c. Kennet. Columna Rostrata. Burchet,

into the Frith, with Orders to burn the Coasts, and recover such Ships as were in those Ports. He appeared before Leith on the 1st of May, and might, had he thought fit, have done a great deal of Mischief; but he contented himself with cannonading Burnt-Island, to very little Purpose. When the English Court received the News of this Proceeding, it confirmed them in the Opinion that there would be no fighting that Year; that this Expedition was purely to quiet the Minds of the People, enough disturbed by their late Losses. But De Wit, in the mean time, had hastily manned out a large Fleet, under the Command of De Ruyter, on board which he intended to have gone in Person; however he was at last content to send Cornelius De Wit his Brother. Care had been taken to provide some old Republican Officers, to command the Troops which were to make a Descent; and these also easily procured Pilots to conduct the Dutch into our Rivers and Ports^q.

^q Philips's Chron. Ludlow's Memoirs. Kennet. Echard. Columna Rostrata. Burchet. Rapin.

The Fleet being ready, sailed over to the English Coast, where it was joined by Van Ghendt, consisting then of 70 Men of War besides Fire-ships. On the 7th of June a Squadron was sent into the River Thames to perform what they had been so long plotting. On the 10th they attacked Sheerness, which was at that time unfinished, and in no State of Defence. Here they found fifteen Iron Guns, and a considerable quantity of Naval Stores. Though the Court had scarce any warning of this Attempt, the Duke of Albemarle, Sir Edward Spragge, and other great Officers, had made all imaginable Provision for the Defence of the River Medway, by sinking Ships in the Passage, throwing a Chain across it, and placing three large Vessels, which had been taken

taken from the Dutch in this War, behind the Chain. The Dutch had the Advantage of a strong Easterly Wind, which encouraged them to endeavour burning our Ships at Chatham, in spite of these Precautions taken to preserve them. It was on the 12th of June they executed this Design; which, however, had miscarried, had not one Captain Brakell, who was a Prisoner on board their Fleet for some Misdemeanor, offered, to wipe out the Memory of his former Mistake, to undertake breaking the Chain, which he gallantly performed *. He also with great Bravery boarded and took one of the English Frigates which guarded the Passage; soon after, the Matthias, the Unity, and the Charles the Fifth, being the Ships which had been taken by the Dutch, were set on Fire. The next Day, the advantage of Wind and Tide continuing, they advanced with six Men of War and five Fire-ships, as high as Upnore Castle; but were so warmly received by Major Scot, who commanded there, and Sir Edward Spragge from the opposite Shore gave them so much Disturbance, that they were quickly obliged to return. However, as they came back, they burnt the Royal Oak, a very fine Ship, and in her Captain Douglass: He had received Orders to defend his Ship, which he did with the utmost Resolution; but having none to retire to, he chose to burn with her, rather than live to be reproached with having deserted his Command. On the 14th they carried off the Hull of the Royal Charles, notwithstanding all the English could do to prevent it; which was what they had principally at Heart. In their return, two Dutch Men of War ran ashore in the Medway, and were burnt; which, with eight Fire-ships consumed in the Action, and 150 Men killed, is all the loss acknowledged by the Dutch Writers; though it is not improbable that they really suffered much more †.

† Basnage Annales de Provinces Unies, vol. 1. p. 804. Le Clerc. De Neuville. Philips. Kennet Echard. Burchet. Columna Rostrata.

De Ruyter, highly pleased with what he had performed, left Admiral Van Nes with part of his Fleet in the Mouth of the Thames, and sailed with the rest into Portsmouth, in hopes of burning the Ships there. Failing in this Design, he sailed Westward to Torbay, where he was like-

* These Facts are taken from the several Accounts in their Histories and our own, and particularly from the Relations laid before the House of Commons of this whole Affair. Camp. Na. Hist.

likewise repulsed. Then he returned to the Mouth of the Thames, and with twenty-five Sail came as high as the Hope; where our Squadron lay, under the Command of Sir Edward Spragge. This consisted of eighteen Sail; yet the Admiral not being on board when the Enemy began the Attack, we suffered at first from their Fire-ships; but Sir Edward repaired with great Diligence to his Command, and being joined by Sir Joseph Jordan with a few small Ships, quickly forced the Dutch to retire. The like Success attended their Attack on Land-guard Fort, which was performed by 1600 Men, commanded by Colonel Doleman, a Republican, under the Fire of the whole Fleet: But Governor Darrel, an old Cavalier, beat them off with great loss. On the 23d, Van Nefs sailed again up the River as far as the Hope, where he engaged Sir Edward Spragge, who had with him five Frigates, and seventeen Fire-ships: This proved a very sharp Action at least between the Fire-ships, of which the Dutch Writers themselves confess they spent eleven to our eight. The next Day the English attacked the Dutch in their turn, and notwithstanding their superiority, forced them to retire, and to burn the only Fire-ship they had left, to prevent it being taken. On the 25th, they bore out of the River, with all the sail they could make, followed at a Distance by Sir Edward Spragge, and his remaining Fire-ships. On the 26th in the Mouth of the River, they were met by another English Squadron from Harwich, consisting of five Men of War, and fourteen Fire-ships; they boldly attacked the Dutch, and grappled the Vice-admiral of Zealand, and another large Ship, but were not able to fire them; tho' they frightened an hundred of their Men into the Sea. The Rear-admiral of Zealand was forced on Shore, and so much damaged thereby, as to be obliged to return home †.

Whilst these things were doing near home, neither English nor Dutch were idle farther off; and particularly

† Besides the Authors before-mentioned, the Reader may consult Ludlow's Memoirs, in order to be convinced, that the Dutch, and particularly the De Wits, had our Destruction more at heart, than their own Safety; and that this Chatham Expedition was chiefly contrived, directed, and executed by our own Fugitives. Camp. Nav. Hist.

larly in the West-Indies, where they attacked and annoyed each other in their Islands and Settlements, not sparing to take what they could. In the Year 1667, in the Month of March, Sir John Harman was sent with twelve Men of War, to redress the Mischief done by the Dutch in those Parts, where he found a superior Force under the Dutch Commodore Krynfen, who had embarked on board his Squadron 1300 Land Troops, and had joined at Martinico Monsieur de la Barre, who commanded all the Forces of the French King in those Parts. For we are to observe, that after the Victory obtained by the English on the 3d of June 1665, the French sided with the Dutch, as did at their Persuasion the King of Denmark, and the Elector of Brandenburg^s. However the Conjunction of the two Fleets made twenty-two sail of stout Ships, with which they fought the English Squadron on the Coast of St. Christopher's. On the 10th of May 1667, an Engagement ensued, and notwithstanding the superior Force of the Enemy, the English obtained a compleat Victory; and soon afterwards burnt the French Admiral's Ship at St. Christopher's, and destroyed all the Ships in the Harbour, except two, with the loss only of eighty Men. The Dutch, however, had quitted the French before this^t. In the first of these Engagements, our Writers have observed, that the Admiral Sir John Harman, was exceedingly ill of the Gout, so as not to be able to stir; on the first Firing, however, he started up and went upon Deck, gave his Orders throughout the Engagement, in which he acted with all the Alacrity imaginable; and when it was over, became as lame as he was before^{*}. By these Victories, he became Master in those Seas, and took from the Dutch their Plantations at Surinam; but however it was restored by the Treaty, as not taken within the Time limited by that Treaty for the Conclusion of Hostilities^u.

The

^s Philips's Continuation of Heath's Chronicle, p. 549.

^t Philips's Continuation of Heath's Chronicle, p. 561. Kennet. Echard. Bafnage. Le Clerc.

^u Columna Roftrata, p. 201. Kennet. Burchet.

^{*} This is something like a Story told of Hernan Cortez; of whom it is said, that just before one of the Engagements with the Tlascalans, he had taken Physick; after which he mounted his Horse, made a disposition for the Battle, and engaged without finding the least disorder, or thinking on the Purge; which by the diversion of his Mind, was deprived of its active Quality, and had not the effect until the next Day. Hist. of the Conquest of Mexico, by Don Antonio de Solis. ch. 20. li. 2.

The next affair after this Peace, which was signed the 24th of August 1667, that any ways concerns us, was to curb the insolence of the Algerines, who took the Advantage of the War, to disturb the Commerce of both Nations. To this Purpose, both Nations sent some Ships into the Mediterranean, which did them considerable damage; yet this pitiful Enemy still continuing to distress the Commerce of the two maritime Powers, Sir Edward Spragge was sent in 1670, with a strong Squadron of Men of War and Frigates, to put an end to the War. He cruised for some Days before their Capital, without receiving any satisfactory Answer to his Demands. Upon this, he sailed with six Frigates and three Fire-ships, to make an Attempt upon a considerable Number of those Corsairs, which lay in the Haven of Bugia. By the Way, he lost the Company of two of his Fire-ships; yet not discouraged by this Accident, he persisted in his Resolution. Being come before the Place, he broke the Boom at the Entrance of the Haven, forced the Algerines a-ground, and (notwithstanding the Fire of the Castle) burnt seven of their Ships, with three Prizes; after which he destroyed another of their Ships of War near Tadellis. These and other Misfortunes caused such a Tumult among the Algerines, that they murdered their Dey, and chose another, by whom a Peace was concluded to the Satisfaction of the English on the 9th of December in the same Year^w.

We are now come to the third Dutch War (frequently called the second, because it was so in respect to this Reign) However as soon as it was resolved on, Sir Robert Holmes, who began the former by his Reprisals in de Neuville, le Guinea, had Orders to open this also, tho' without any previous Declaration, by attacking the Smyrna Fleet^x. It was afterwards solemnly proclaimed, on the 28th of March 1672, in the Cities of London and Westminster. As it does not belong to our Province to relate the famous Naval Battles that were fought in this War more than in the former, we shall proceed to mention, what more immediately concerns littoral Conjunct Expeditions. On the 28th of May, was fought the great Battle of Solebay, between the English, French, and Dutch; for it is to be observed, the French in this War joined with

^w Philip's Continuation of Heath's Chron. Kennet. Burchet. Bashage. le Clerc. duMont. *Kennet's complete Hist. of England, vol. 2. p. 316. Philips Richard Burnet. Rapin.

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* ColumnaRo-
frata, p. 230,
231. Bafnage.
Le Clerc.

*Camp.na.hift.

with the English againſt the Dutch, but not with a view of aſſiſting the English in this War, more than they did the Dutch in the former: The chief motives of that Nation to interfere in theſe Wars, were chiefly to ſpur on theſe maritime Powers to ruin each other, and to be ſo far Spectators in their Battles and other naval Operations, as to improve themſelves by their intercourſe with theſe ſkilful People, in Navigation and Marine Affairs; and to learn of them the art of War by Sea, of which before they knew nothing about, as their own Writers confeſs^y. As an inſtance of this, we need not go far, for in one of the naval Battles of this War, Count D'Etreeſ, who commanded the French Squadron, kept ſo far off, notwithſtanding he ſaw the English warmly engaged, and Prince Rupert the English Admiral's ſignals for fighting, yet he choſe to look on at ſo great a Diſtance, that a Dutch Sailor aſking one of his Companions, what the French meant by keeping at ſuch a Diſtance? Why you Fool, answered he, they have hired the English to fight for them, and all their Buſi-
neſs here, is to ſee that they earn their Wages^z.

This Knowledge they ſo far improved by theſe Methods, that in 1676 they actually beat the Dutch and the Spaniards in the Mediterranean, and killed the famous Admiral De Ruyter. And we ſhall find them by and by, daring to fight at La Hogue the two maritime Powers together.

However, the French and English Fleets being perfectly refitted from the Damages of the Solebay Battle, and the latter having taken on board a large Body of Land Forces, failed again for the Dutch Coaſts, with a deſign to make a Deſcent on Zealand, the only Province into which the French had not carried their Arms by Land. Here they found the Dutch Fleet, but not thinking proper to attack them among the Sands, they deferr'd the Execution of their Deſign, and blocked up the Maeſe and Texel; which De Ruyter, having ſtrict Orders not to hazard a Battle, ſaw with concern, yet wanted Power to prevent. The Duke of York was reſolved to debark on the Texel the Body of Troops on board the Fleet*: The occaſion was favourable in all
Re-

* The Texel, though a ſmall Iſland, is yet the moſt conſiderable of thoſe, which, lying in a very ſtraight Line in the German Ocean, cover the Mouth of the Zuyder-zee.

Respects; the French and the Bishop of Munster were in the Heart of the Dutch Territories, so that no great Force could be drawn together to resist them on Shore, and the Coast was so low and flat, that it looked as if nothing but a superior Force could have secured the Dutch from this Invasion. It was upon the 3d of July, this Resolution was taken; and it was intended, that their Forces should have landed the next Flood: But Providence interposed in favour of a free People, and saved them from a Yoke, which seemed already to press upon their Necks. The ebb, instead of six, continued twelve Hours, which defeated the intended Descent for that Time, and the Storm that rose the Night following, forced the Fleet out to Sea, where they struggled for some time with very foul Weather, and the opportunity being quite lost, returned without performing any thing of Consequence to the English Shore*.

Whilst these things were doing in Europe, the War raged in other parts of the World. Sir Tobias Bridges, with five or six Ships, and a Regiment of Foot from Barbadoes, made himself Master of the Island of Tabago. On the other side, the Dutch, with five or six hundred Men, possessed themselves of the Island of St. Helena, lying off the Coast of Africa; for the Fort not being defensible on the Land-side, the English Governor and his People, after having several times repulsed the Enemy, retired with all their valuable Effects on board some English and French Ships, as finding it impossible to preserve the Island after their landing. But Commodore Monday being sent with four Men of War, to convoy the English East-India Fleet, and perceiving on his Arrival at St. Helena, what had happen'd, resolved to attempt re-taking it. Accordingly landing some Men on that side of the Island, which is most accessible, and at the same time attacking the Fort with his Ships, he easily succeeded in his Design.

F 2

The

* Bafnage annales des Provinces Unies, vol. 2. p. 264. where this extraordinary Accident is justly stated, and fairly accounted for. The Wonder did not consist so much in an ebb of twelve Hours, as in the time in which it happened; for though the like has happened before and since, about the Equinoxes, yet in July it never happened but at this Juncture, when the swelling of the Waters in the Y, and the Zuyder-zee repelled the Flood. Campbell Nav. Hist.

The English Court had another Design of making a Descent on the Dutch Coast in the following Year 1673. With this view, a considerable Number of Land Forces were put on board the Navy; and for which Service, in case of a clear Victory at Sea, Count Schom-

^a Basnage An-
nales des Pro-
vinces Unies,
vol. 2. p. 415.
Le Clerc, tom.
3. p. 441. De
Neuville. Ken-
net. Columna
Rostrata. Rapin

berg with 6000 Men lay ready at Yarmouth^a. But the first Naval Battle fought this Year, did not prove advantageous enough for the English to put in Execution their intended Design.

^b Philip's
Chron. p. 592.
Kennet. Bur-
chet. Columna
Rostrata. Rapin

However, they were not willing to lay it entirely aside, for Prince Rupert, about the middle of July, was at Sea again (this was after the second Naval Battle fought the 4th of June) having on board the Troops intended for the Descent, which was still pressed by the Authors of the War^b. His Highness arrived on the Dutch Coasts on the 21st of July, and declining an Engagement, stood along the shore, in order to find an Opportunity for debarking his Troops. This brought on the third and last Battle of these Wars, for De Ruyter immediately bore down upon the English Fleet. This was also the Engagement in which Count D'Etrees kept at so great a Distance, as has been mentioned; which base Behaviour was suggested by the States General, in a Letter they wrote to King Charles, and contributed (as they hoped) not a little to the Treaty of Peace, signed at London February the 9th 1674^c. The Benefit the Dutch drew from the last Battle was great; for they opened their Ports, which before the Battle were entirely block'd up, and put an end to all Thoughts of an Invasion^d.

^c Basnage. Le
Clerc. Vie de
Ruyter.
Temple's Me-
moires. Kennet.
Echard. Rapin.
^d Basnage An-
nales des Pro-
vinces Unies,
vol. 2. p. 420.
Le Clerc, tom.
3. p. 345.
Quincy, tom. 1.
p. 359.

The Corsairs of Tripoli having for some time committed great Outrages on the English Trade; Sir John Narborough was sent in the latter end of the Year 1675, to reduce them to reason. The 14th of January following, Sir John came before the Place, and having blocked up the Port in the Night, so that no Ship could go in or come out, he manned all his Boats, and sent them under the command of Lieutenant Shovel (afterwards Sir Cloudesly, the famous Admiral) into the Harbour, where he seized the Guard Ship, and afterwards burnt four Ships, which were all that lay at that time in the Harbour. After which he returned to the Fleet without the Loss of so much as one Man. This extra-ordinary

ordinary Action struck the Tripolines with Amazement, and made them instantly sue for Peace; which, however, did not immediately take place, because they refused to make good the Losses sustained by the English. Sir John thereupon cannonaded the Town, and finding that ineffectual, landed a Body of Men about twenty Leagues from thence, and burnt a vast Magazine of Timber, which was to have served for the Building of Ships. When all this failed of reducing these People, Sir John sailed to Malta, and after remaining there for some Time, returned suddenly upon the Enemy, and distressed them so much, they were glad to submit to a Peace on the Terms prescribed ^d.

Soon after the Conclusion of this Treaty, some of their Corsairs returning into Port, not only expressed a great Dislike to it, but actually expelled the Dey for making it, and began to take all English Ships as before. Sir John being still in the Mediterranean, and having Notice of what passed, suddenly appeared with eight Frigates before Tripoli, and began with such Violence to batter the Place, that the Inhabitants were glad once more to renew the Peace, and to deliver up the Authors of the late Disturbance to condign Punishment ^e.

^d Kennet's Compleat Hist. of England, vol. 3. p. 336. Burchet. Columna Rostrata.

^e Columna Rostrata, p. 251.

In 1679, we had some differences with the Algerines. Upon this Sir John Narborough was sent with a Squadron to demand Satisfaction; which he procured, as it must always be procured, by Dint of Force. This Peace however did not last long; upon which Commodore Herbert, afterwards so well known to the World by the Title of Earl of Torrington, went thither with a few Ships, and compelled them to give the Satisfaction required, and Assurances for their future Behaviour. This Expedition, which was performed in 1682, proved the last (that any ways concerns us) in this Reign ^f.

^f Kennet. Burchet. Columna Rostrata.

The next Expedition we have to speak of, is that of the Prince of Orange (afterwards King William the Third) to these Coasts. On the 6th of February 1685, the Duke of York, upon the Decease of his Brother, succeeded to the Throne, by the Stile of King James the Second. His fondness for the Popish Religion, and throwing himself into the Arms of France, set a-foot the Expedition we are going to mention, made in the

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year 1688. The British Fleet was in very good Order, when King James had the first Notice of the Prince of Orange's Design. When the Danger appeared more clearly, the Fleet was ordered to the Buoy in the Nore. The whole Fleet consisted of forty Men of War, of which thirty-eight were of the Line of Battle, and eighteen Fire-ships. This Fleet being at the Gun-Fleet, and ready in all Respects to sail, a Council of War was called; wherein Sir William Jennings, who commanded a Third Rate, proposed to put to Sea, and stand over to the Dutch Coasts, as the shortest and surest Way to prevent an Invasion; this Proposition, however, was rejected by a great Majority; so it was resolved to continue there. The true Ground of this (as Mr. Secretary Burchet fairly tells us) was the secret Resolution of the greater Part of the Captains to hinder the Admiral, Lord Dartmouth, in case he had come up to the Dutch Fleet, from doing them much Damage. We are now to turn our Eyes to Holland. The Prince of Orange had about his Person a great Number of English Noblemen and Gentlemen, and two or three hundred French Refugees. The Fleet that was to carry these consisted of about fifty Sail, most of them third or fourth Rates, and the Transports were about five hundred: these, with twenty-five Fire-ships, made up the whole Navy; the Land Forces embarked were four thousand Horse and Dragoons, and ten thousand foot. Admiral Herbert, who commanded this Fleet, first addressed a Letter to his Countrymen, in the Sea Service; and then stood with the Dutch Fleet over to the Downs, in order to look at the English Squadron, and try what Effects his Exhortations had produced. At that Time his Success did not promise much; and after a Fortnight's cruizing, he returned to the Dutch Coasts, with a better Opinion of the King's Fleet, and a worse of his own, than when he sailed. But for all this, his Epistle did almost as much Service, as the Force he commanded; for though the Desertion was inconsiderable, yet by Degrees the Sailors lost their Spirits, and their Officers began to cabal, and to consult, not how they should execute the Orders they had received, but how they might best secure the Fleet. On the 19th of October 1688, the Prince went on board, and the whole

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whole Fleet failed that Night; but the next Day the Wind turning North, and then settling in the North-West, it was found impossible to struggle with it; therefore on the 21st the Fleet returned, after having been rudely handled by a Storm. On the 1st of November the Fleet sailed again. The Prince intended to have gone Northwards, and to have landed in the Mouth of the Humber; but a strong East Wind rendered this impracticable, and seemed to direct them to a better Course. His Highness then sailed Westward; the same Wind which brought him to the English Coast, keeping in the King's Ships, though they were come down as low as the Gun-fleet; there, in a foggy Day, they passed the English Navy undiscerned, except a few Transports, which sailed in Sight; while the English Fleet rode with their Yards and Top-masts down, and could not by Reason of the extraordinary Violence of the Wind purchase their Anchors. On the 4th of November at Noon, it was resolved on board the Dutch Fleet, that Part of the Ships should go into Dartmouth, and the rest into Torbay; but in the Night the Pilots overshot both; and then it was determined to go into Plymouth: but the Wind suddenly turning from East to South, corrected the Error of their Pilots, and brought them safe into Torbay, where the Army was immediately landed, and the Prince made the necessary Dispositions for drawing the Country Gentlemen in to join him. The Embarkation was made with ease; the Passage better regulated by the Winds, than it could have been by their Prudence: the Descent in the fittest Place in England for landing of Cavalry, so that it was performed without Difficulty, as well as without Danger. Wherefore we shall here conclude this Reign and Chapter, with Bishop Burnet's Application of the following Lines from Claudian to the Prince of Orange's Expedition.

O nimium dilecte Deo! cui militat æther,
Et conjurati veniunt ad classica venti.

Oh Heaven protected Chief! whom skies defend,
And on whose call, submissive Winds attend.

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C H A P.

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C H A P. VI.

^a Kennet. Bur-
chet. Rapin.
Oldmixon's
History of the
Stuarts. Life of
King William.
Columna Ro-
trata.

^b Historie Mi-
litaire du Reg-
ne de Lewis le
Grand, par
M. le Marquis
de Quincy,
Histoire de
France, par P.
Daniel.

^c Histoire Mi-
litaire, tom. 2.
p. 473, &c.
Burnet's Hist.
of the
War, p. 93.
^d Kennet. Old-
mixon.

THE Crown was no sooner placed on the Head of the Prince of Orange, than he began to feel the Weight of it, and experience the Cares that attend it: He had not so much as leisure to taste in Peace the first Moments of Royalty^a, but found himself obliged to embark in a War, as soon as he was seated on the Throne. A War in which all Europe was engaged in point of Interest; for the ambitious Designs of Lewis the XIV. were now so evident, that even the Powers least inclin- ed to Action, found themselves obliged to provide for their own Safety, by entering into a Confederacy for the more effectually opposing the Encroachments of that as- piring Prince^b.

However the first thing in this War immediately re- lating to Conjunct Expeditions, was an Attempt me- ditated by the French King against England in 1692. For Lewis the XIV. perceiving it impossible to support the War any longer in Ireland to advantage, came to a Resolution of employing the Forces there that were still left King James, to serve his Purpose another Way. With this View he concerted with the Malecontents in England an Invasion on the Coast of Sussex; though for this Design it was necessary to draw together a great Number of Transports, as well as a very considerable Body of Forces, yet he had both in Readiness, before it was so much as suspected here. The Land Army con- sisted of fourteen Battalions of English and Irish Troops, and about nine thousand French commanded by Mar- shal de Belfondes; so that in all there could not be less than twenty thousand Men^c. The Fleet of Trans- ports consisted of three hundred Sail, and was well pro- vided with every thing necessary for the Invasion. In short nothing was wanting to the Execution of this Design in the beginning of April, but the arrival of Count D'Etrees' Squadron of twelve Men of War, which was to escort the Embarkation, while the Count De Tourville cruized in the Channel with the grand Fleet, which was also ready to put to Sea, but was de- tained.

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tained by contrary Winds. Things being in this Situation, King James sent over Colonel Parker, and some other Agents of his, to give his Friends Intelligence of his Motions; and some of these People, in hopes of Reward, gave the first clear Account of the whole Design to our Government at home; upon which Order after Order was sent to Admiral Russel to hasten out to Sea, in whatever Condition the Fleet might be in at this Time*.

These things put an end to the intended Invasion. Admiral Russel presently after joined the Dutch Fleet; for this is the War in which the French were got so expert in Naval Affairs, by having joined in the former Wars between the English and Dutch, first with one, and then with the other, as to dare to fight with both the maritime Fleets together; for on the 19th of May, 1692, about half an Hour after Eleven, Count Tourville, the French Admiral, attacked the Confederate Fleet, beginning himself in the Royal Sun, with Admiral Russel. This was the famous Battle of La Hogue, in which however the French suffered so much, that the English intended returning them the Compliment of making a Descent upon their Coast. It is true, it turned out little better than that mentioned before of the French, nor indeed is it easy to give any tolerable Account of this Descent, since neither our public Historians, nor the Writers of private Memoirs have been able to leave us any certain Scheme of this Design, farther than that it was to be a Descent on the French Coast, in order to a'arm and distract that Nation. Thus much is certain, that both we and the Dutch seemed to have very great Confidence in this Expedition, which was provided at a vast Expence, and in order to which a Promotion of Officers was made on Purpose. At first several Regiments of Horse were intended to have been sent, but at last these were reduced to fifty Horse, and two

* Queen Mary (in the absence of King William, who was at this time abroad) behaved upon this Occasion with great Wisdom and Firmness of Mind; for without discovering any apprehensions of Danger, she took all the Precautions necessary to prevent it, by publishing a Proclamation, requiring all Papists to quit London and Westminster; another for assembling both Houses of Parliament; and a third for apprehending several Persons of Distinction, supposed to be in her Father's Interest.

* Memoires
Hittoriques.
Present State of
Europe. Life of
King William.

two hundred Dragoons^k. Admiral Ruffel, who was to command the Fleet upon his return to the English Coasts, after the above-mentioned Battle, instead of finding the Troops ready to embark, and himself furnished with Orders and Instructions for the Execution of the Enterprize; was informed by Letters from the Secretary of State, that no certain Resolution was yet taken in what Service to employ them, but that this was left to be settled by a General Council of Land and Sea-Officers, when the Fleet and Transports should be joined^l. The plain Source of all this Confusion was, that the Ministers of State were unwilling to take upon themselves the Direction of an Affair which they were apprehensive would miscarry, but were willing to put it upon the Land and Sea-Officers, that they alone might remain accountable for what happened. At last, very late in the Month of July, the Transports, with the Forces on board, joined the Fleet, and on the 28th of the same Month, a Council of War was held on board the Breda, where the Schemes, or rather Hints of the Ministry were seriously considered; and upon the whole, resolved to be impracticable[†]. The Admiral, however, sent

^l Burchet's Naval Hist. p. 471.
Memoirs of
Adm. Ruffel.

† We have this in Burchet from the original; and as it is absolutely necessary, for the understanding this part of the History, it is here laid before the Reader.

At a Council of War held on board the Breda, the 28th of July: Present; Flag Officers, the Right Honourable Edward Ruffel, Admiral; Sir Ralph Delaval, Vice-Admiral of the Red; George Rooke, Esq, Vice Admiral of the Blue; Sir Cloudesly Shovel, Rear-Admiral of the Red; David Mitchel, Esq; first Captain to the Admiral.

Dutch. Admiral Allemonde; Vice-Admiral Callemberg; Rear Admiral Vandergoes; Rear-Admiral Evertzen; Rear-Admiral Muys.

General and Field Officers. His Grace the Duke of Leinster Lieutenant General of all the Forces; Earl of Galway; Sir Henry Bellasise; Monsieur de la Meloniere; Sir David Collier; Colonel Beveride; Monsieur de Cambon; Colonel Selwin; and the Earl of Argyle. The Resolutions they came to, follow: "The matter of burning the Ships at St. Maloes, being maturely considered, Vice Admiral Rooke and Vice-Admiral Callemberg (who were lately sent with a Squadron of Ships before that Port) representing the great Difficulty of carrying the Ships in there, by reason of the multitude of Rocks, and the Rapidity of the Tide, and the Pilots refusing to conduct any Frigates or Fire-ships into the Harbour, because the Marks might be removed: It was the Opinion of the Flag Officers,

sent Sir John Ashby with a stout Squadron, to endeavour, if possible, to intercept the French Fleet, which was every Day expected to sail from St. Maloes to Brest; and as soon as this was done, the Admiral, with the rest of the Fleet and the Transports, sailed for La Hogue. Secretary Burchet seems to say, that in his Passage he received Orders from the Queen to return, and that in obedience to these Orders, he came back in a few Days to St. Helens^m: Yet there is something very improbable^m in this, if we consider, that as soon as an Express dispatched by the Duke of Leinster, Lieutenant General of all the Forces, arrived at Whitehall with this News, the Queen sent down to the Fleet the Marquiss of Carmarthen, then Lord President of the Council, the Earl of Devonshire Lord Steward, the Earl of Dorset Lord Chamber-

Naval Hist.
p. 476.

Officers, that it was not practicable to attempt any thing against the Enemy's Ships at St. Maloes, with any part of the Fleet, untill the Town itself could be so far reduced by the Land Forces, as that the Ships might not receive any great Annoyance from the Enemy's Guns in the Attempt. And the General and Field Officers of the Army were of opinion, that the Troops could not do any great Service at that Place, without the assistance of the Fleet. It was then considered, whether it was feasible to make any attempt upon the Enemy's Ships at Brest; and although the Flag Officers were of Opinion that an Attempt might be made there with some hopes of Success, if the Summer had not been so far spent; yet considering the Winter was approaching, they did not think it proper to attack the Enemy's Ships in that Port, since the Fleet might be exposed to great Inconveniencies, should they be Wind-bound near that Place: And it was the Opinion of the General and Field Officers of the Army, that they should not be able to do any service there against the Enemy, unless they could be protected by the Fleet. The Flag Officers likewise thought it not safe for the Fleet to attempt any thing against the Enemy at Rochfort; the Season of the Year being so far spent, and the Place itself lying so deep in the Bay. It was in the next place considered, whether the Fleet might lie in safety on the Coast of Normandy, to protect the Army, either in an Attempt at Havre de Grace, La Hogue, or any Place thereabouts. The Flag Officers judged, that it might lie with safety on that Coast, until towards the end of the next Month, in case their Majesties Service should require it." The Flags came also to the following separate Resolutions, " That since the Transport Ships, with the Land Forces, were come to the Fleet, in order to try what might be done against the Enemy, either at St. Maloes, Brest, or Rochfort, it was their Opinion, that something might have been attempted with probability of Success, was not the Season of the Year so far spent, as not to admit of the Fleet's going with safety thither."

^a Kennet. Burchet. Present state of Europe. Life of King William. Oldmixon.

• The Political Memoirs for the Month of Septemb. 1692, say, there were 16000; but all our Historians mention the Number here inserted. Campbell's Naval Hist.

* Camp. Nav. History.

Chamberlain; the Earls of Nottingham and Rochester, and the Lords Sidney and Cornwallis, to know the reason of their Return, and to take proper Measures for their putting to Sea again immediately^a. These Lords on their arrival, found all the Troops, except two Regiments, on board, and the Fleet Wind-bound; every body expected then that the Troops would re-embark, and at last they did so; but instead of proceeding to France, they sailed under the escort of a Squadron of Men of War, part to Ostend, and part to Newport. There were 240 Transport Ships, 6 or 7000 Men, a prodigious Quantity of Ammunition of all Sorts, and whatever seemed requisite for executing a great Design, though so little came of it^c. Some refined Politicians pretended, that this Scheme had its effect; that King William intended no more than alarming the French Court, and obliging them to keep great bodies of Men constantly on their Coasts, and to be at a vast Expence to watch the motion of this small Body of Troops, which gave his Majesty greater liberty of acting in Flanders. Yet this appears strangely improbable, when we consider the return of the Fleet to St. Helens; for had this been the Design, it would certainly have proceeded directly to Ostend. Others would persuade us, that the Intention of the Court was to have landed the Forces at Port St. Sebastians; but when the Orders were opened at Sea, all the Admirals were of Opinion, that it was utterly impracticable: The Resolutions of the Council of War, shew, that this Conjecture was groundless. The bottom of the Business was a Design upon Brest; which might have been executed, if the Transports had been ready, as the Admiral advised in May^d.

With a view of remedying the Misfortunes which happened this Year in carrying on these Conjunct Affairs, the Admirals were instructed in the following Year to make all possible dispatch in getting out the Fleet to Sea, to endeavour (if possible) to block up the Enemy in their Ports, especially in Brest, which was thought very practicable, and to take care of the Merchants. In order to comply with the first part of their Charge, they began to take half the Seamen out of Privateers; but this, notwithstanding the pressing Occasions of the Public, and the great Scarcity of Men, was thought so heavy a Grievance,

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vance, and was besides so visible a Favour to the Enemy, that it was refused. Then five Regiments of Foot were put on board, with a view to the debarkment at Brest, which was a Scheme of some of the Land-Admirals, and was always thought (what it afterwards appeared to be) by the ablest of our Seamen, a very dangerous, and at the same time, a very impracticable Project. Provisions running scarce, a Mess was increased from four to six Men; and yet in spite of all these Contrivances, they were not able to form a Line of Battle at St. Helens, till the 7th of May, 1693, which lost them the Opportunity of blocking up either of the French Squadrons^a.

This Year however, was to be finished with a Secret Expedition, to moderate the Joy of the French, for having a little before taken the Smyrna Fleet^r. To this Purpose, on the 13th of November, Commodore Benbow, in Conjunction with Captain Phillips the Engineer, with four Bomb Vessels, and ten Brigantines and Well-boats, sailed for St. Maloes, where they arrived on the 16th.

^a Burchet's Memoirs, p. 166, 167. Kennet. Burnet. Life of K. William. Oldmixon. ^r Campbell's Nav. Hist. vol. 3. p. 102.

This City is well fortified, and has a very strong Castle and a good Port; it is situated upon a Peninsula, called the Island of St. Aaron, and is joined to the Main Land by a Causeway or Isthmus, upon the Coast of Upper Brittany. It is in 48 Deg. 40 Min. of Northern Latitude, and 15 Deg. 29 Min. of Eastern Longitude: High-water at six o'Clock*. At this Place about four in the Afternoon Benbow anchored before Quince-fort. Three of the Bomb-vessels with the Brigantines and Well-boats, bore in and anchored within half a Mile of the Town. About eleven they began firing till four in the Morning, when they were constrained to warp to prevent grounding. On the 17th they went in again, and threw several Bombs that Day. They continued firing on the 18th, but with frequent Intermissions, which made the Inhabitants believe they were going to withdraw: However they

* St. Malo was formerly only an Abbey of Men, but the Bishoprick of Quiladet was transferr'd here in 1172, in the Reign of Lewis VII. It is at present one of the most considerable Ports in the Channel, and the Inhabitants are reckoned some of the best Sailors in Europe.

they landed on an Island near the Town, and burnt a Convent. On the 19th being Sunday, they lay still till the Evening, when by the favour of a fresh Gale of Wind, a strong Tide, and a very dark Night, they sent in an extraordinary Fire-ship † of about three hundred Tons burthen (which the French will have to be a monstrous Machine) and which was intended to have reduced the Town to ashes; and indeed would have done it, but for an unforeseen Accident; for she struck upon a Rock within a Pistol-shot of the Place where they intended to have moored her. The Engineer, who was on board, did all he could to have got her off, but to no purpose. At last finding the Vessel beginning to open, and fearing she might sink, he set fire to her. The Sea-water which had penetrated in many Places, prevented the Carcasses from taking fire. The Explosion however was terrible beyond Description; it shook the whole Town like an Earthquake, broke all glass and earthen Ware for three Leagues round, and struck off the Roofs of three hundred Houses. The most extraordinary thing of all was this, that the Captain of the Vessel, which weighed two hundred Weight, was carried over the Walls, and beat a House it fell upon down to the Ground *. The greatest

† These Particulars are taken from Commodore Benbow's Account.

* The French Writers say, that this was one of those dreadful Machines filed Internals; which the Dutch made use of to destroy the Bridge over the Scheld, when the Prince of Parma besieged Antwerp, in the Year 1585. The Reader will perceive by the following Description, that it was in fact a Fire-ship, contrived to operate when moored close to the Town Walls. It was a new Ship of about 300, or as the Marquis de Quincy says, 350 Tons. At the bottom of the Hold, were 100 Barrels of Powder; these were covered with Pitch, Sulphur, Rosin, Tow, Straw, and Faggots; over which lay Beams bored through to give Air to the Fire; and upon these lay 300 Carcasses, filled with Grenadoes, Chain Shot, Iron Bullets, Pistols loaded and wrapt in pitcht Linnen, broken Iron Bars, and the bottoms of Glass Bottles. There were six Holes, or Mouths, to let out the Flames, which were so vehement as to consume the hardest Substances; and could be checked by nothing but the pouring in of hot Water. The French report that the Engineer who contrived this Vessel was blown up in her; because they found the Body of a Man well dressed upon the Shore; and in his Pocket-book a Journal of the Expedition. He was however only a Mate to one of the Vessels.

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est part of the Wall towards the Sea also fell down; and had there been a sufficient Number of Land-troops on board, the Place might with ease have been taken and pillaged. As it was, they demolished Quince-fort, carried off eighty Prisoners; and frightened most of the People out of the Town. This Expedition was well timed, and well executed. It struck a Panick into the Inhabitants of St. Maloes; whence the most troublesome of the French Privateers were fitted out; and it served to awake that whole Nation from their golden Dreams of the Empire of the Sea, by shewing them what a very small Squadron of English could do, when commanded by Men of Resolution and Experience.

One of the first Steps taken by King William after his return from Flanders, and hearing of the unfortunate Affair of the Smyrna Fleet, was the appointing Edward Russel Esq; Admiral and Commander in chief of the Fleet which should put to Sea the next Spring. It was then resolved, that a Descent should be actually made on the French Coast to blot out the Memory of several unfortunate Accidents that had lately happened; and to effect what had been long ago proposed, the erecting a Fort on a certain Promontory near Brest, which would have commanded that Haven, and have entirely prevented the assembling, as the French were wont to do, their grand Fleets there^s. On the first of May 1694, Ad-

^s Histoire Militaire. P. Daniel. Memoirs du Temps. Burnet's Hist. of his Own Times, vol. 2. P. 129, 130.

miral Russel joined the Fleet at St. Helens, consisting of fifty-two English and forty-one Dutch Ships of the Line, besides Frigates, Fire-ships and other smaller Vessels. The Admiral having the Land Forces completely embarked and every thing ready, sailed with the whole Fleet on the 29th of May, having before given the necessary Directions for the separating, at a proper Station, the Squadron that was intended for the Brest Expedition, which was commanded by the Lord Berkley^t.

^t Journal of the Brest Expedition, by the Marquis of Carmarthen, London 1694. 4to. p. 5.

On the last Day of the Month, at nine in the Morning, a Council of War was held on board the Britannia, at which were present the following Persons, viz. Edward Russel Esq; Admiral of the Fleet, the Lord Berkley Admiral of the Blue, Sir Cloudesley Shovel Vice-Admiral of the Red, Colonel Aylmer Vice-Admiral of the Blue, Colonel Mitchel Rear-Admiral of the Red, the Marquis of Carmarthen Rear-Admiral of the Blue, Captain

Captain Byng eldest Captain to the Admiral, Lieutenant General Talmash, the Earl of Macclesfield, the Lord Cutts, Sir Martin Beckman, Admiral Allemonde Admiral of the Dutch, Vice-Admiral Vander-Putten, Vice-Admiral Schey, Vice-Admiral Vander-goes, Rear-Admiral Evertzen, and Captain Vander-Duffen, in which it was resolved, that the Fleet designed for Brest should immediately proceed to Camaret-bay, and should land the Forces on board under the Direction of Lieutenant General Talmash; and the necessary Instructions were given to Lord Berkley, and the Officers that were to command under him^u.

^u See these Instructions in Burchet's Memoirs, p. 215.

For the better understanding this Expedition, we will speak a little first of the Place. Brest is a very considerable maritime City of Lower Brittany, and a famous Port upon the Ocean, in 48 Deg. 23 Min. of Northern Latitude, and 13 Deg. 46 Min. of Longitude: High-Water at 45 Minutes after two. It has a Citadel well furnished in the modern Way, being built by Lewis the XIV. and finished in 1687. It has also one of the strongest and finest Bays in Europe; with an Entrance called the Gullet, very difficult because of the Rocks, called Minous, Filettes, and Mingant, which are hidden at High-water. Here is a famous maritime Arsenal for the Construction of Men of War; this being the principal Port for the French King's Ships in the Ocean, which ride here in great Safety. It is divided by the Mouth of the River Lauderneau, which greatly contributes to its Trade.

For this Place on the 5th of June the Lord Berkley parted with his Squadron from the grand Fleet, having with him twenty-nine English and Dutch Men of War of the Line, besides small Frigates, Fire-ships, and Machines, Tenders, Well-boats, and five Bomb-ketches. On the 6th a Council of War was held, in which the proper Measures were taken for landing the Forces; and it was agreed that Lord Cutts should command six hundred Grenadiers, and Lieutenant General Talmash advance in Person, at the Head of the Troops that were to support them. On the 7th the Fleet came to an Anchor between Camaret-bay, and the Bay of Bertaume, the French playing upon them with Bombs from four Batteries. The Marquis of Carmarthen demanded
leave

leave of Lord Berkley the Admiral, to go into Camaret-Bay, in order to observe the Situation of the Forts, and the Posture of the Enemy. On his Lordship's return and making his Report, the Admiral ordered two Sixty Gun Ships to go in, and cover the Boats while they were landing: To which the Marquis objecting that it was too small a Force, a Council of War was called on the 8th, in which it was resolved to send in three English, and as many Dutch Frigates, besides the two Men of War before-mentioned. One of these, however, the Richmond, deserted the Post assigned her, and the Marquis of Carmarthen carried in the other five, and posted them in their proper Places; which, though a necessary, was a very dangerous Service; for at their going in, a Bomb broke over the Monk, a great Piece of which struck through her Poop, and two Decks more, and came out again into the Water, near one of the Stern-ports, on the Larboard-side in the Gun-room, killing three Marines, and one of them by the side of the Marquis. So soon as the Monk got into the Bay, and came up with the Western Point, Camaret Fort fired upon her very warmly; and when the rest of the Ships were properly posted, they were surprized to find themselves played upon from three Batteries, not one of which was discerned till they felt the Shot from it. These military Compliments they returned with great Spirit; and by keeping a brisk and continual Fire, covered the Troops in their landing, which was not, however, performed with that regularity that might have been expected. The Reason of this was, the French had been so well informed of our Design, and such strange Delays had been made in embarking the Forces, that when our Fleet came upon the Coast, they found the French every where covered with impregnable Entrenchments^x, and supported by a Body of regular Troops, more numerous than the Forces intended for this Descent.

^w See the Marquis of Carmarthen's Account, p. 21. Burchet's Memoirs, p. 222. Life of King William. ^a Campbell's Nav. Hist. vol. 3. p. 115.

This was represented to Lieutenant General Talmash in the Council of War, and he was advised not to expose himself or his Men: To which he answered, " This " Advice comes too late; the Honour of the English " Nation is at Stake, therefore I must and will land. " I know that I sacrifice Myself and the Men; but it is " necessary, and must be done, that both our Enemies

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" and

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“ and Allies may know, that even desperate Undertakings cannot daunt English Courage *.” He embarked on board the small Vessels, with about 800 Men, and landed as many of them as he could; but to very little Purpose, for several of the Well-boats sticking, all that were in them were either killed or wounded, before they could get to shore; and those that did land, were very soon driven back to their Boats, and with much difficulty carried off again. Amongst the wounded was Lieutenant General Talmash himself, who received a Shot in his Thigh, of which he soon after died †. The Marquis of Carmarthen, afterwards Duke of Leeds, whose Courage no Man ever called in question, tells us on this Occasion, that had the English Force been double to what it was, they would have found the attempt impracticable. When the Men on board the Ships saw a few Boats come off again, and the whole Affair over, they began to be out of Heart, and the Marquis had much ado to bring them out of the Bay. The Monk had not either a Yard or Sail, but was towed off; the rest of the Vessels were also brought off with great Difficulty, except a Dutch Frigate called the Teefep of thirty Guns, which had twelve Feet Water in her Hold, all her Men being killed except eight, and of half an English Company that was accidentally left on board her, only an Ensign, a Drummer and a private Man escaped; so that they were obliged to leave her behind. A Council of War being called in the Evening, it was resolved therein to return to Spithead. The loss upon this Occasion

* This Project Mr. Campbell tells us, (as he has been informed) was first proposed by a Land Officer to the Earl of Nottingham, some Years before; and Hints of it having been given to the French, they resolved to spare no Cost or Pains, in order to prevent a Scheme from taking Effect, which they knew would have deprived them of the best Port they have in this part of the World.

† Both the Marquis De Quincy and Father Daniel commend the Bravery of some French Officers, who, they say, attacked and routed the English Troops that were landed; and this with so small a Force as 120 Men, supported, however, by a Regiment of Dragoons. The Glory of this will be sufficiently diminished, when it is known, that not more than 300 did land; and that many of these were wounded in getting ashore, and were so much exposed to the Enemy's Artillery, that they never could be formed into any tolerable Order. Campbell. Nav. Hist. Note. vol. 3. p. 116.

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Occasion was computed at seven hundred of the Land Forces killed, wounded and taken, and about four hundred killed and wounded on board the Ships *.

The Marquis de Quincy, who is at once the most exact, and most moderate of all the French Writers, informs us^y, that at the time this attempt was made, M. De Vauban had taken care to put the Town of Brest in-^y Campbell's Nav. Hist. to an excellent state of Defence; it was surrounded with strong Walls, good Ramparts, large and deep Ditches cut in the Rock, with Bastions and Half-moons at proper Distances. He had erected a new Battery of sixteen pieces of Cannon, and six Mortars, on the Bastion of the Town, nearest the Castle, between it and the grand Battery, with several smaller Batteries in other Places: He had likewise taken care to render all the Vaults in the Castle Bomb-proof, and had made the best Disposition possible of 90 Mortars, and 300 pieces of Cannon. As for the Vessels in the Port, they were placed out of the reach even of Bombs; and with respect to Men, he had 1400 Bombardiers, 3000 Gentlemen, who served as Volunteers, and of regular Troops, 4000 Foot, and a Regiment of Dragoons^z. General Talmash's landing therefore with 800 Men, might well be called a Sacrifice, and yet more than half of these Men could never be got on Shore; we must therefore admit, that when the Marquis says 400 were killed, 548 Soldiers, and forty Officers made Prisoners, he carries the Thing a little

^z Histoire Militaire, tom. 3. p. 77, 78, 79.

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too

* The Marquis of Carmarthen, in his Account, does great justice to all the Officers employed in this desperate Service. He says particularly, p. 46. "My Lord Berkley, during all this Expedition, has had a great deal of unusual Trouble, by reason of the Embarkations of the Soldiers; notwithstanding which, both by his Advice at Councils of War, and issuing of Orders, which his Lordship has done very methodically, he hath behaved himself, in my opinion, with all the Conduct and Prudence that could be expected from a Gentleman in his Station.

"Lieutenant General Talmash, the Earl of Macclesfield, my Lord Cutts, and all the Officers of the Land Forces, I think have shewn all the forwardness and readiness imaginable for the attempting any thing that was possible to be done on this Occasion. There are no Officers of Note that I can yet hear of killed in this Action, but Monsieur Lamote, and Lieutenant General Talmash died the Tuesday following of the Wound he received in his Thigh. There are several Captains, &c. who are either killed or taken, whose Names I am as yet ignorant of.

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too far. Father Daniel, however, and some other Writers carry it as far, and indeed most of them agree in computing our whole loss at 2000. As to what they say of Ships being sunk, and hundreds of Men drowned in the retreat, they are mere ornaments necessary to a French detail; as their having but forty-five Men killed in this Action, is another stroke of the marvellous, which every

* Journal Historique de Louis 14. p. 177, 178. par P. Daniel. Campbel. Nav. Hist.

Reader, perhaps, may not be in the Humour to credit. After this unlucky Attempt, the unfortunate wounded General proposed, that a small Squadron of Frigates and Bomb-vessels, might be sent into the Harbour of Brest, to bombard that Town; but this was judged to be a rash, and as things stood, an impracticable undertaking; therefore Lord Berkley sailed immediately for our own Coasts, and arrived on the 15th of June 1694, at St. Helen's. There they found the Queen's Orders to call a Council of War, to consider how the Ships and Troops might be best employed. After several Consultations, it was resolved, to keep no more than four Regiments on board, and to make some Attempts on the Coast of Normandy. Advice of this being sent to Court, and an Answer being returned on the 27th of June, it was resolved, in another Council of War, first to bombard the Town of Dieppe; and then proceed along the French Coast, and do every where what Mischief they could. Dieppe is a City of Normandy, with a strong Citadel, and a good Harbour, situated in the County of Caux, in the Channel upon the River Argues, in 49 Deg. 56. Min. of Northern Latitude, and 18 Deg. 47 Min. of Longitude: High Water half past ten*.

In pursuance of this Resolution, they came before the Place, but were forced to Sea by a Storm, and afterwards anchored off Dungeness, from whence they sailed on the 5th of July, and arrived once more in Dieppe Road, on the 8th. The next Day they intended to have bombarded the Place, but were prevented by foul Weather

for several Days together^b. On the 12th, they began about nine in the Morning to play upon the Town of Dieppe, and continued without ceasing till about nine at Night;

* Burchet's Memoirs, p. 225. State of Europe Kennet. Burnet Oldmixon, &c.

* Note, this City was so much damaged by this Bombardment, that it was entirely rebuilt in 1697: It is now a regular City, pretty well fortified with Fort Polet in one of its fortified Suburbs. There is a great Fish Trade carried on here.

Night; and about eleven, they sent in one of their Machines, with an intent to burn the Pier; but several Vessels full of Stones being sunk before it, rendered that ineffectual; so that, except astonishing the Town by the mighty Noise, it did little Mischief^c. Captain Dunbar, who commanded it, acquired great Honour on this occasion; for the Train not taking Effect as was expected, he went on board again, and finding the Fuzee out, set fire to it a second time; for which he, and those that went with him, were deservedly rewarded^d. They continued the Bombardment afterwards till Day-light, and the Streets being narrow, the Houses old, and most of them built of Timber, the Town was on fire in twenty places at once, so that the far greater Part of it was consumed to ashes*. The French Court did all they could to stifle this Report, at least at Paris; but the Place was too near for any such Artifices to take effect; so that by endeavouring to lessen, they really increased the People's apprehensions; and all the Inhabitants of the Sea-coasts would have abandoned their Towns and Villages, had not Forces been sent thither to restrain them†.

^c Kennet. Burchet. Burnet. Oldmixon.

^d Burchet's Naval Hist. p. 501.

After the Bombardment of Dieppe, the English Squadron sailed along the Coast, and obliged the French to march Night and Day, in order to prevent the debarking any Troops, which however was what the English Admiral never intended‖. On the 15th, about Noon, Lord Berkley arrived at Havre-de-Grace, one of the strongest Towns in Europe, with an excellent Port for Men of War, which ride in great safety. It is situated at the Mouth of the River Seine, in the County of Caen in Normandy, in 49 Deg. 31 Min. of Northern Latitude, and 17 Deg. 50 Min. of Longitude: High Water at nine

G 3 o'Clock.

* Mr. Campbell says, from whence this is taken, that in the Dates he has generally followed the French Writers, reducing the New Stile to the Old, because they are usually more exact than our own. Father Daniel owns the total Destruction of Dieppe, but says, it was immediately built up again at the Expence of the French King; if so, the Inhabitants must be daily put in mind of the English Maritime Power, by this very improvement of their Town.

† See several Letters printed in the Present State of Europe, for the Month of July, 1694, and the Fact is confirmed by the French Accounts.

‖ Burchet, Kennet, Quincy, Daniel, &c.

o'Clock. It was built by Francis I. in 1509, and has since been well fortified; a fine Citadel has been erected, with a large Arsenal for Naval Stores. This place about four o'Clock, his Lordship began to bombard. On the 16th, 17th and 18th, the French poured Troops into it, in order to assist the Inhabitants to put out the Fires lighted from time to time by the Bombs; and as the Wind continued blowing all that time directly from the Shore, the English were not able to do much, tho' they still continued before the Place, which threw all the adjacent Country into a terrible Consternation. On the 21st, the Wind being favourable, the small Craft and Bomb-vessels were sent in, and continued bombarding the Place the whole Night; by which a third part of the Town was burnt down, and a great part of the Wall demolished, and numbers of People killed †: All this however could not be performed without loss; many of the Mortars melted, the Granado Bomb-ship was blown up, and the rest of the small Craft so shattered, that it was thought convenient to retire. But even in doing this, care was taken to give the French infinite disquiet; for appearing before La Hogue, the Forces were drawn that way, but our Squadron was in no Condition to undertake any thing; therefore after alarming the Enemy as much as possible, Lord Berkley returned to St. Helen's on the 26th of July 1694, in order to refit^e. On the 27th of August, he arrived in London, and the Command of the Fleet, which consisted now only of Frigates and small Ships, devolved on Sir Cloudesly Shovel, who received Instructions to undertake something at all Events

* Kennet. Bur-
net. Oldmixon.

† The Marquis de Quincy asserts positively, that there were not above twenty Houses burnt in the Town; but then he admits, that not only the Inhabitants, but a vast number of Soldiers, who were sent there on Purpose, laboured exceedingly in putting out the Fires wherever the Bombs fell, which must have been attended with great loss of Men and other inconveniencies. But why a Medal should have been struck on the bombarding this Place rather than Dieppe, there does not appear any just cause, yet such a one there was; having on one side the King's Head in Profile, with these Words, *Gulielmus Magnus invictissimus*: On the reverse, was Perillus's Bull, with this Inscription. *Suis perit ignibus Auster*: alluding to the French King's having begun this barbarous kind of War, by burning the Palatine, and bombarding Genoa. In the Exergue, *Portus Gratiae, exustus et everfus Bombardis Anglo Batavis, 1694. I. B. F.*

vents against Dunkirk, not only the most important Harbour, but also the most considerable maritime Town in Flanders, situated in the Channel in 51 Deg. 3 Min. of Northern Latitude, and 20 Deg. 30 Min. of Eastern Longitude: High Water at 12 o'Clock †. Mr. Meesters, who was the Inventor and Manager of the Machines called Infernals, was at this time in Flanders, endeavouring to collect Pilots able to carry the Squadron into the Harbour of Dunkirk, or at least so far into the Road, as might enable them to destroy the Enemy's Ships. Sir Cloudefly sailed to the Downs in the beginning of September, and on the 7th was joined by Mr. Meesters with 26 Dutch Pilots, when Captain Benbow was appointed to command the small Ships, and to follow the Directions of Mr. Meesters, whose Pilots did not perform what was expected from them. On the 12th however, Sir Cloudefly Shovel appeared before the Town of Dunkirk, with thirteen English and six Dutch Men of War, two Bomb-vessels, seventeen Machines, and other small Craft. In the Evening Captain Benbow went in, and sounded the Western Channel, between the Brake and the Main, notwithstanding a prodigious Fire from the Ships and the Citadel. The next Day all the Boats and small Vessels were sent in again, with the Charles Galley, two Bomb-vessels, and some of the Machines. In the Afternoon two of the Machines were sent in, the first took fire before she was near enough to do Execution; whether it was the Cannon of the Place set fire to it, as some of the French Writers say, or that those on board, finding it impossible either to bring it nearer, or to get it off, were obliged

G 4

† Dunkirk was taken by the Viscount Turenne the 30th of August 1645, under Lewis XIV. and retaken by the Duke d'Enguieu the 10th of October 1646; was taken by the Spaniards the 16th of September 1652, and retaken by the English and French the 25th of January 1658. The English remained in Possession of it till 1661, when they sold it to the French, who then made it one of the strongest Ports in Europe, and its Fortifications were finished in 1671. By the Treaty of Utrecht concluded in 1713, its Fortifications were to be demolished, which was in part complied with; but the French constructed an Harbour at Gravelin, at the Mouth of the River Aa, about four Leagues from Dunkirk. Since that Time both these Places have been repaired, and put upon the most respectable footing.

^c Histoire Militaire, tom. 3. p. 84, 85. Journal Historique de Lewis XIV. P. 197.

liged to let it burn there. The other, which was the biggest, went in boldly, and advanced very near the Mole-head; but the Tide set her on one side, so that she drove a Cable's length, and then blew up^f. It was found, the French had, according to custom, early intelligence of this Design, and by driving Piles before the Pier-head, and sinking Ships on the back of the Westernmost Pier, had secured themselves against all Attempts of this Nature. Sir Cloudesly Shovel being informed of this, and knowing that the Spring-Tides were over, sailed away for Calais, a Town situated upon the Channel in the County of Oye, in 50 Deg. 57 Min. Northern Latitude, 20 Deg. 10 Min. Eastern Longitude: High Water at eleven o'Clock *.

On the 17th he sent the Bomb-vessels in, and threw so many Shells into the Town, that about forty Houses were ruined; but the Wind blowing hard that Night, and a great Swell of the Sea happening, the Admiral was forced to bear away, and the Storm continuing two Days, he thought it not convenient to stay any longer, but returned with his whole Squadron into the Downs; from whence the Bomb-vessels and Machines were sent into the River Thames^g.

^g Kennet. Burnet. Oldmixon. Life of King William.

We are now to turn our Eyes to the Mediterranean, where Admiral Russel sailed with the grand Fleet, on the 6th of June 1694. However nothing much to our Purpose fell out, till the middle of the Month of July 1695, when the Marquis de Gastanaga, the Spanish Governor of Catalonia, formed the Design of retaking Palamos, in which he desired the Assistance of Admiral Russel. In consequence of this the confederate Forces, consisting of 4000 English and Dutch, were landed^h †. This was on the 9th of August, and it was the next Day

^h Burchet's Memoirs, p. 275. Kennet. Burnet. Oldmixon, &c.

* This Port, which was the only Conquest the English retained in France in 1558, was then retaken by the Duke of Guise, and since added to France by the Treaty of Vervin in 1598. It is built in the Form of a Triangle, with a strong Citadel and good Harbour: It is well defended on the side of the Sea by Fort Rishau, as it is also on the side of the Land by Fort Riculet, about a quarter of a League from the City.

† In the beginning of April the Admiral received a Body of Land Forces from England, consisting of 4500 Men under Brigadier Stuart, and with them came a large Fleet of Victuallers and twelve Bomb-vessels. Burchet's Memoirs, p. 268, 271.

Day before they joined the Spanish Army, the very sight of which was sufficient to discourage them, being in want of almost every thing. The French had not only a good Garrison in Palamos, but an Army at least equal to that of the Spaniards within sight of the Place. The Bombardment, however, succeeded tolerably well; the greatest part of the Town and Castle was destroyed; but the Admiral being informed, that the French Fleet was coming out of Toulon, thought proper to reembark his Forces, and to sail for the Coast of Provence, in order to watch the Motions of the Enemy.

We are now in the Year 1695. Our Attempts the last Year had not indeed answered the sanguine Expectations of ignorant People, who imagined that they were not to have left a House standing on all the French Coast; and on the other hand seemed but to justify too well, what such as were skilled in maritime Affairs had advanced, as to the impossibility of performing any great Services in the Way of bombarding; yet it was resolved that this should be pursued^l. The Fleet intended for this Service was in such Forwardness by the middle of June, that the Lord Berkley of Stratton who was to command it, had Orders to repair on board. The Design was against St. Maloes^k; and the Fleet sailed on the 23d of June; on the 4th of July Lord Berkley with all the Ships under his Command came before the Place, and began instantly to bombard Quince-fort, to the Westward, and the Battery raised by the Enemy to the Eastward on Point Danbour, between which is the Channel of the Town. The first Service was performed by Colonel Richards, who had three English and two Dutch Bomb-vessels under his Command; and the latter was committed entirely to the Dutch, who employed therein four Bomb-vessels for many Hours. On the 5th every thing being ready to attack the Town, Lord Berkley about four o'Clock in the Morning gave the Signal. Upon this Captain Benbow went on board the Charles Galley, and hoisted a flame-coloured Flag; and immediately after the English and Dutch Frigates, appointed to guard the Bomb-vessels, entered the Channel, and came to an Anchor within a Mile and a half of the Town, having Colonel Richards with the Bomb-vessels in a Line before them. About six, the Bombardment

Burnet's Hist.

of his own

Times, vol. 2.

P. 207, 208.

Burchet's

Memoirs, p.

293. Kennet.

Burnet.

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bardment began, All this time the Enemy fired very warmly from the Shore, from the Batteries on the great and little Bay, in the Island of Danbour, from Fort-Vauban, Fort-Royal, Fort-Quince, &c. Their Gallies and Boats taking also all the Opportunities of the Tides, and rowing sometimes so near, as to gall with their small Shot the Line of Bomb-vessels. Yet in spite of this Interruption, the Bombardment was so vigorously pursued, that about eight o'Clock a great Fire broke out in the East Part of the Town, and vast Clouds of Smoke were seen ascending in several Places. Lord Berkley, Admiral Allemonde, and Sir Cloudesly Shovel came in their Boats to encourage the Seamen, and expressed much Satisfaction as to the Manner in which the Attack was disposed. An English and Dutch Fire-ship set the Wooden Fort on the Quince Rock on fire, which burnt for two hours; and about four in the Afternoon a great Fire broke out in the West Part of the Town. By seven in the Evening, the Bomb-vessels had spent their whole Cargo of 9000 Bombs and Carcasses, wherefore the Signal was made to put to Sea. This Enterprize was executed by six English and four Dutch Men of War, nine Gallies, fourteen Flat Bottom Boats, and two Brigantines. The loss sustained by the Enemy's Fire was sixty Men killed and wounded; a Bomb-vessel called the Terrible, so shattered, they were forced to set her on fire; two Boats and three or four Barks sunk. The Bombardment lasted a little more than eleven Hours, with all the Success that could be possibly expected, a great part of the Place being burnt, and the Enemy reduced to the necessity of blowing up several Houses*, to prevent the whole from being destroyed.

After this Affair was over, it was resolved, that a small Squadron should proceed to Granville, a Place of great Trade. This Squadron consisted of eight Frigates, and as many Bomb-vessels, viz. five English and three

* This Account of the Engagement is taken from Lord Berkley's Narrative, published in the London Gazette, No. 3096. after it had been compared with what is said in Burchet's Naval History, and the Dutch Accounts, all which agree perfectly together; wherefore there is no Reason to doubt any of the Facts they contain.

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three Dutch. On the 8th of July about nine in the Morning, Captain Benbow anchored before the Place, and Colonel Richards about an hour afterwards began the Bombardment, which lasted till six in the Evening; and then the Squadron bore away, leaving this Town all in Flames. On the 9th the Fleet appeared before Havre-de-Grace; not with any Design to attack it, but merely to alarm and harrafs the Enemy: Which having performed they sailed for † Portsmouth. On the return of the Fleet, four hundred Soldiers immediately embarked, the next Attempt being intended for Dunkirk; Mr. Meesters received Orders to prepare his Machines, on the Success of which the whole Affair depended. After this all the proper Measures were concerted with that Engineer. However it was the 1st of August before Lord Berkley sent in the Bomb-ketches, Fire-ships, and Machine-vessels, with several light Frigates and Brigantines, to protect them against the Enemy's Half-gallies, and other armed Boats, of which they had a great many. About nine in the Morning, the Bombardment began; about two in the Afternoon four Smoke Ships were sent in, which were burnt to little or no Purpose. The Bomb-vessels, however, continued firing till about five, then with the Frigates, &c. were ordered off. Several of the Shells fell into the Rife-bank and upon the Pier-heads; and three of the Enemy's half Gallies were sunk. But they had in all places made such great Preparations for their Defence with Boats, Chains, Piles, and pontoons with Guns upon them, as rendered this Attempt altogether impracticable. The French give a long and pompous Account of this Miscarriage, making it the Effect of the Courage and Conduct of several of their most experienced Sea-Officers; whereas our Authors universally ascribe it to the want of Skill in Mr. Meesters, or to the Misunderstanding between him and some of the Sea-Officers; which is the more probable, since he deserted the Service in the Night, and could not be prevailed to take any share in the subsequent Attempt upon Calais*.

Lord

† Burchet. Kennet. Oldmixon. and the London Gazette, No. 3096.

* Mr. Campbell tells us that this Account, as those before inserted,

Lord Berkley, notwithstanding this Disappointment, resolved to prosecute his Orders; and coming before Calais, called a Council of War; in which it was determined to endeavour first of all to burn a wooden Fort erected at the entrance of the Pier-heads, which was furnished with fourteen heavy Cannon; and with several other Batteries defended the entrance of the Place in such a manner, that it was impossible any thing could be undertaken, till these Obstacles were removed. To this end, Colonel Richards was ordered to fill two Well-boats with the materials of a Fire-ship, and to dispose the Boats for making a formal Attack. Several Accidents prevented the Execution of this Design till the 17th of August in the Morning; when anchoring Eastward of the Town, the Bombardment began with such Success, that by Noon the Place was on fire in several parts. About this time the Enemy's Half-gallies came out, and stood along the Shore, in order to break the Line of Bomb-vessels; but the Frigates and Brigantines standing in, put them into such Confusion, that they retired with great Precipitation, and with much difficulty recovered the Pier-heads. The Bombardment was then continued without any further Interruption, till about five in the Afternoon, by which time six hundred Shells were thrown into the Place. The Magazine and the Rife-bank were entirely burnt, several Houses destroyed, and many more very much damaged; with this particular Circumstance in our favour; that, notwithstanding all the Efforts of the Enemy, and a prodigious Fire from their Batteries, we suffered very little loss; only Captain Osborn, who commanded the Aldborough Ketch, was killed by a Cannon-ball¹. Mr. Quincy affects to treat this Attack as a very slight thing, asserting that not above three or four Houses were consumed, and about as many People killed; yet he acknowledges, that numbers of Men had been ordered there, and a great deal of Pains taken to prevent their suffering at all by this

¹ London Gazette, No. 3107. Burchet's Memoirs, p. 303. Pointer's Chronological Hist. vol. 2. p. 413. Kennet. Bur-

net, ferted, is taken from the Relations he could meet with, either of our own, or foreign Writers, particularly that published in the Gazette, No. 3102. Burchet's Memoirs, p. 297. Histoire Militaire. Journal Historique de Lewis XIV. &c. But every thing the French Writers advance, is taken from the Relations printed by Authority to amuse the People.

this Attempt; which shews how great their Apprehensions were, and how necessary it was to calm the Minds of the People by publishing such Accounts; but depreciates their Judgments very much who took all these Precautions where (if they are believed) no Mischief could be done^m.

This was the last Attack of the kind that was made this Year; and though, upon the whole, both the English and Confederates reaped very considerable Advan-

tages, from their ruining in this Manner all the Enemy's Coasts, while their Squadrons were shut up in their Ports, and in no Capacity to undertake any thing, yet on the return of the Fleet the Council thought fit to examine into the Conduct both of the Officers and Engineers, who charged each other reciprocally with want of Skill, or want of Zeal; but upon a thorough Examination into the Matter, it was found, their want of Unanimity was the greatest Misfortune; and it appeared so plainly, that by proper Management the French Ports might be ruined, notwithstanding the mighty Pains and immense Expence employed in fortifying them, that it was resolved to prosecute the same Method; it was particularly recommended to Mr. Meesters, not only to be more careful in providing for the supply of his Machines with whatever was necessary for their acting effectually, but also to secure a sufficient Number of experienced Pilots, for want of which both the Attempts on Dunkirk had miscarried.

We are now come to the Year 1696, remarkable for another intended Invasion from the French. It was pretty early in the Winter that Lewis XIV. formed this Project, with the View of restoring King James. Their greatest Preparations being at Toulon, confounded our Politicians not a little; but in the beginning of January 1696, the French Scheme began to unfold itself, by the early sending a Fleet to Dunkirk. It was usual for them to send a large Number of Victuallers there, in the Winter, escorted by a small Squadron of Men of War. But the Fleet now sent, was much greater than formerly; and the Squadron that sailed with it as an Escort, consisted of seventeen Men of War. Soon after this, an Army of 20000 Men, drawn with all possible silence from the adjacent Garrisons, was brought down

^m Histoire Militaire. Journal Historique, as above.

to

to the Sea-coasts; and five hundred Transports provided with extraordinary Diligence and Secrecy, in order to carry over the greatest Part of them to England; while most of our large Ships were laid up, and the rest in the Mediterranean, or refitting here, in order to be sent thither *. So that hitherto all things seemed to favour the Views of the Enemy.

It was the Intention of Lewis XIV. to have embarked at Dunkirk 16000 Men, who were to be commanded by King James in Person, and under him the Marquis of Harcourt. This Embarkation was to have been escorted by two strong Squadrons, under the Marquis of Nesmond and John Du Bart; all which might have been executed, had not bad Weather and contrary Winds prevented it. When every thing was supposed to be in perfect Readiness, the whole Scheme was happily discovered; and on the 24th of February the King came to the House, and in a set Speech informed them of the whole Affair †. At the same time Orders were given for assembling, with the utmost Diligence, the greatest Number of Ships possible; and Admiral Russel in a few Days stood over to the Coast of France with fifty Ships of the Line, English and Dutch, under his Command, at a Time when the French believed we could not assemble ten; which extraordinary Expedition confounded all their Designs, and rendered their Invasion absolutely impracticable. On the 28th of February, the Admiral came to an Anchor off Gravelin, with part of the Fleet; and Lord Berkley with a Squadron under his Command lay between him and Dunkirk. As the Admiral passed by Calais, he perceived the Harbour crowded with all sorts of small Vessels, for the intended Embarkation of the French Troops. As for the seventeen Men of War which were to have escorted them, thirteen were run in as close to the Pier of Dunkirk as possible, and proved to be all large Ships.

Sir Cloudesly Shovel, with some other experienced Officers, was sent to look upon them, to see if there was

* Burchet's Memoirs. History of the War. Conspiracy against King William. Life of King James II. Present State of Europe.

† A Detail of the Conspiracy was published in the London Gazette, No. 3161, with the King's Speech, and the joint Address of both Houses.

was any possibility of burning them or not ; but after a long Consultation with Mr. Meesters and the Engineers, it was declared to be impracticable ; upon which the Admiral returned into Dover-road, leaving a Squadron under Sir Cloudesly Shovel to watch the Motions of the Enemyⁿ. This Squadron continued cruizing in the Downs all the Month of March, without attempting any thing ; but being reinforced towards the end of the Month, with several Dutch Ships, Fire-ships, and Bomb-vessels, he received Orders on the 2d of April to undertake the Bombardment of Calais ; in pursuance of which, he immediately came before that Town, and made the necessary Dispositions for performing his Orders. On the 3d about Noon, the Bomb-vessels began to fire, and continued till Evening, in which time above three hundred Bombs and Carcasses fell either in the Town or among the Ships in the Harbour, with such Effect as to kindle Fires in both, and must certainly have done a great deal of Mischief^o. But as most of the Bomb-vessels and Brigantines had their Rigging destroyed, and their Mortars dismounted, (the Wind too blowing very hard from the Shore) Sir Cloudesly Shovel having left a Squadron to keep in the French Men of War at Dunkirk, returned into the Downs ; where he received Orders to join the grand Fleet at Spithead. But before he could execute these Orders, Sir George Rooke arrived in the Downs with the Fleet from the Streights, and took upon him the Command^p.

^a Burchet's Memoirs, p. 325.

^o Burchet. Kennet. Burchet. Oldmixon. Quincy. P. Daniel. Memoirs de Fourbin.

^p Campbell's Memoirs of Sir George Rooke.

A Resolution having been taken in the Privy Council to bombard the French Coasts again, it was intended to intrust that Part of the Fleet designed for this Service to the Care of the Lord Berkley, who had behaved so gallantly the Year before. His Lordship hoisted the Union Flag on board the Britannia, on the 3d of June 1696, and on the 24th of the same Month sailed for the French Coast^q. On the 3d of July, the Admiral sent the Burford, and the Newcastle, with a Fire-ship, to the Island of Groy, with Orders to land.

^q London Gazette, No. 3197. Burchet. Kennet. Burchet. Life of

On the 4th the Fleet came to an Anchor about two Leagues from Belle-isle, and Barges and Pinnaces were immediately manned, in order to make a Descent upon Hoat, one of the Islands called Cardinals, which they performed, ravaged the whole Island, and burnt the only Town

King William. Present State of Europe, &c.

Town that was upon it. They did the same in the Island of Hodicke, and brought off a great number of Cattle. On the 5th a great Reinforcement was sent to Captain Fitzpatrick, who had landed in the Island of Groy; where they destroyed twenty Villages, containing about 1300 Houses, took a Ship from Newfoundland, and twenty small Vessels, and carried off about 1500 Horses and black Cattle*. The same Day Sir Martin Beckman, who was sent to bombard the Town of St. Martin's in the Isle of Rhee, performed his Commission very exactly; throwing in the space of one Night 2230 Bombs and Carcasses into the Place, by which the best part of the Town was burnt down, with all their Ware-houses and Goods contained in them; notwithstanding the Place was very well fortified, and our Squadron sustained a very warm Fire all the Time. On the 7th the same Squadron, which consisted but of ten Men of War, bombarded Ollonne, and in the space of a Night threw into it almost 2000 Bombs and Carcasses, which had such an Effect, that the Town was seen to be on fire

* London Gazette, No.

4204. Poin-ter's Chronological History, vol. 2. p. 437.

Life of King William. Present State of Europe.

* Burchet's Naval History, p. 547. 548.

in fifteen Places at once. After this the Admiral not finding it convenient to land on Belle-isle, continued to alarm the French Coast till towards the latter end of the Month; and then he found himself under a necessity of returning to Spithead.

We will now take a short View of what relates to Conjunct Expeditions in the West-Indies, from the beginning of the War, to the close of the next Year 1697.

The Revolution took place in our Colonies, as easily as it had done at home, on a Principle which was very

emphatically expressed by one of our Governors; who, when he was summoned by a Man of War to submit to King William and Queen Mary, very sensibly answered, that if they were King and Queen at Whitehall, they should be so there, and proclaimed them immediately. By this Means our Plantations were secured against every thing except foreign Invasions, and to these they were not long exposed. Orders were given for fitting out a Squadron for Barbadoes and the Leeward Islands

* We have followed in the Text the Orthography of Lord Berkley's Relation, as it is printed in the Gazette, No. 3203. But those Islands are Groix, Houat, Hedic.

Islands under the Command of Captain Lawrence Wright^t. He arrived in Carlisle Bay on the 11th of May 1690. From which Place, having pretty well recovered his Men, he sailed for the Leeward Islands, in order to assist General Codrington, who was preparing for an Expedition against St. Christopher's; where we had been joint Possessors with the French, who had now driven us out^u. The Commodore sailed on the 3d of June to Montserrat, where he was joined by the General from Antigua, with such a Force as the English Colonies could supply. Thence they proceeded together to Nevis, in consequence of a Resolution taken at a Council of War to make a Descent as soon as possible upon the Island of St. Christopher. On the 23d Sir Timothy Thornhill landed with 500 Men, to the East of Frigot's Bay; and having twice engaged, and routed the French, marched on to Basse-Terre, and in the Way beat the French Forces a third time. This broke the Spirits of the Enemy to such a degree, that they gave General Codrington no disturbance, when he landed with 3000 Men, and marched the same Way. The Fleet at the same time sailed into the Road, in order to batter the Town and Forts, while the General attacked it by Land. The French however saved them the Trouble, by abandoning the Place, and setting it on fire. In three Weeks the whole Island was reduced, and the Fleet returned triumphantly to Barbadoes^v. In the Month of January 1691, the Commodore received fresh Orders from England; upon which he took up six of the largest Merchant-ships, turned them into Men of War, and on the 12th of February sailed for the Leeward Islands. There an unhappy difference sprung up between him and General Codrington, which ruined the Expedition. For though in the Month of April, they landed in Marigallante, and in a great measure ruined that Settlement, from whence they proceeded to Guadelupe, and remained there for some Time; yet on the News of a French Squadron being in the Neighbourhood, they hastily reembarked their Forces, and resolved to abandon the Enterprize; at the same time almost the French had determined to abandon the Island^w. After this we hear nothing more to our purpose of Commodore Wright^x. The same Year some

^t Burchet's Naval History, p. 451. This Squadron consisted of ten sail of Men of War. The Duke of Bolton's Regiment of Foot embarked on board it.
^u Burchet. Kennet. Columna Rostrata. Histoire Militaire. P. Daniel.

^v Burchet's Naval Hist. p. 555, 556, 557.

^w British Empire in America, vol. 2. p. 54. History of the War. Present State of Europe, 1691.
^x Burchet's Memoirs, p.

other 123.

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y British Empire in America, vol. 1. p. 22.

other Expeditions were undertaken in this part of the World. The Colony of New England found themselves so liable to disturbance from the Settlement the French had at Port-royal in Nova Scotia, that it was resolved to attack it, and as soon as the War broke out. With this View a considerable Fleet with 700 Land-forces on board, was fitted out under the Command of Sir William Phips; who sailed from Nantascot on the 28th of April 1690; and by the middle of next Month, he completed his Design, and reduced Port-royal and the adjacent Settlements under the Dominion of the English. His quick Success in this induced the Colony to undertake an Enterprize of greater Importance; which was the Reduction of Quebec, the Capital of the French Settlements in Canada. The Colony raised no less than 2000 Men, whom they embarked on board their Fleet of thirty-two Sail, great and small, without demanding or expecting any assistance from hence^y. With this Force Sir William Phips sailed from Hull, near Boston, on the 9th of August, and arrived about the beginning of September, before the River of Canada; but was there unluckily by contrary Winds detained in such a manner, that it was three Weeks before they arrived at Quebec. This gave the Count de Frontenac the French Governor, an opportunity to prepare for his Defence, and of drawing all the strength of the Colony to Quebec; which Sir William Phips expected would have been divided by an Army marching over land, and attacking Mount-Royal Fort, at the same time that he fell upon the City. This Army was to consist of a thousand Men from New-York, Connecticut, and Plymouth Colonies, and fifteen hundred Iroquois. The English marched as far as the great Lake of Canada, but not finding Canoes ready for them to pass it, and the Indians not joining them according to their agreement, they returned; by which sad miscarriage Count Frontenac had no need to make any Detachments for the security of Mount-Royal. Sir William summoned the Count to surrender, but received a very insolent and haughty Answer: On the 8th of October the English landed under Lieutenant General Whalley, to the Number of 1400: for they were now reduced to that Number by the Small-pox and other Diseases. In the mean time Sir William

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William brought his Ships to bear on the West end of the City, waiting when General Whalley would begin the Assault. But this Gentleman hearing that Count de Frontenac had 4000 Men within; and was provided to make a vigorous Defence; notwithstanding the entreaties of the English Soldiers to the contrary; resolved immediately to re-embark. Sir William expecting the Signal for their attacking the Town on the East side, sent a Messenger on shore to know the Reason of their not giving the Assault; which when he understood; and saw many of the Men were almost frozen to death, to which we may add the Colonel and others ill of the Small-pox, he ordered them on board to refresh themselves; and calling a Council of War, it was therein resolved to return. Thus ended this fruitless Expedition; which cost the Colony of New England so large a Sum of Money, and as to which mighty Expectations had been raised *.

The Government being very sensible of the Inconveniencies resulting from their want of having a sufficient Force in the West-Indies, resolved in the Year 1692, to put an end to the Complaints that had been made from most of the Colonies on that Subject, by sending a powerful Fleet thither, under the Command of Sir Francis Wheeler. The Squadron consisted of twelve Men of War, besides smaller Vessels; he was likewise empowered to take under his Command such Ships of War; as he should find in that part of the World. He had under his Convoy also a certain number of Transports; with 1500 Land Troops; and had assurance given him; that he should find another Body of very good Troops, ready assembled in Barbadoes; and in Conjunction with them he had Orders to attack some of the French Settlements, which were judged very practicable for him to reduce †. Sir Francis left our Coast in the beginning of January, and arrived at Barbadoes

H 2

badoes

* See the Life of Sir William Phips, by Cotton Mather. Landon's Voyages, vol. 1. p. 155. Letter from New England, dated November 22, 1690, containing an Account of the Quebec Expedition.

† The State of Sir Francis Wheeler's Squadron was this; two Third Rates, six Fourth, three Fifth, one Sixth, three Fire-ships, a Store-ship, Hospital and Bomb vessel. See Burchet's Memoirs; &c.

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Barbadoes on the first of March. There it was unanimously resolved, in a full Council of War, that Martinico should be the Place attacked; and advice was sent to General Codrington of the arrival of the Squadron, that he might draw together the Forces of the Leeward Islands, in order to join the Regiments brought from England, and the Troops (about 800 Foot) raised in Barbadoes; to which Sir Francis Wheeler offered to join another Regiment, composed of Seamen, to be commanded as Colonel by him in Person. April the 15th 1693, the Squadron, with all these Troops on board, arrived at Cul de Sac Royal, in Martinico; but instead of proceeding to perform without delay, what they came there about; it was resolved in a Council of War, held on the 20th, that the Men should re-embark, and the Squadron sail to Dominica, there to take in Water, and to give the Men who were very sickly, an opportunity of refreshing themselves. As the Commodore was very sensible this manner of acting would be indifferently relished at home; he desired and insisted, that every Member in the Council of War should give his Opinion in writing; by which it appears, scarce any but Sir Francis Wheeler, and Lieutenant Colonel Colt were for landing and acting vigorously. The Reasons insisted on by such as voted for a contrary Measure, were, that the Enemy had a superior Force; that one full Third of our Soldiers were Irish Papists not to be relied on; and that hazarding an Engagement in these Circumstances, was hazarding the whole Leeward Islands, since, in case of a Defeat, they had not a sufficient Force to defend them. These were chiefly insisted on by General Codrington; who declared, however, that he was ready to attempt Dominica, provided the Fleet could remain in those Parts six Weeks or two Months; but this being inconsistent with the Commodore's Instructions, and the Troops from Barbadoes impatient to return, was not, indeed could not be complied with*. Such was the issue of this Expedition, of which in England,

* The French made a grand Affair of this, and have drawn up fine Accounts of their repulsing and defeating the English, though there happened but two slight Skirmishes. *Histoire de Louis XIV.* p. 172. *Histoire Militaire*, par M. Quincy, tom. 2. *Histoire de Louis XIV.* tom. 5.

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land, from the Commodore's known Character, there were high Expectations.

Sir Francis, towards the latter end of May, sailed for New England, and arrived at Boston on the 12th of June. He immediately proposed to Sir William Phips, then Governor, the attacking Quebec a second time. But though nothing could be more agreeable to that brave and public-spirited Man, yet as Circumstances then stood, he could not close with it. Such an Expedition required a Strength of 4000 Men at least, and (these having had no previous Notice) the Governor could not possibly draw together by the beginning of July, which was the very latest a Fleet that was to be thus employed could sail; therefore this grand Design appearing every way impracticable, was dropt, even by those two Men, who of all others had it most at Heart. This Disappointment determined the Commodore to quit Boston as soon as possible; on the 3d of August he left that Place, and proceeded for Newfoundland, resolving to attempt something there worthy of the Force with which he left England, and the Honour conferred upon him of carrying the Union Flag, from a view to the Advantages which, it was not doubted, would result to the Nation from his Expedition. On the 18th of August he arrived at Placentia, and found the Enemy much stronger there than he expected; for in the first Place, the Town was well fortified; next there were in the Harbour several stout Privateers, the Haven itself excellently provided with Batteries, heavy Cannon, Bombs, &c. with at least 2000 Soldiers and Inhabitants, well disciplined, and most of them old Buccaneers. Sir Francis however was not to be discouraged; he called a Council of War, laid down the Method in which the Place ought to be attacked at once by Sea and Land; and took upon himself the entering with the Men of War to batter the great Fort, which was the most dangerous Part of the Undertaking. However as there were eleven Land to six Sea-Officers in this Council, they resolved the whole to be impossible and impracticable. Sir Francis Wheeler was exceedingly chagrined at this new Disgrace^z, and on the 28th of August sailed from the Bay of Bulls in Newfoundland for England, where he did not arrive till the 18th of October following, his

^z Burchet's
Memoirs, p.
171, 172. Brit-
tish Empire in
America. Life
of K. William.
Present State of
Europe. Hist.

Ships of the War.

^a Burchet's Memoirs, p. 174.
Sir George
Rooke's Memoirs. Hist.
of the last War.

^b Mr. Booker's Letter in the Collection of Voyages.

^c Memoirs of the Proceedings of the Royal African Company, from 1690. to 1701, by Mr. John Snow.

Ships in a bad, and his Men in a much worse condition, so that they were scarce able to navigate them. As unfortunate as this Expedition proved from first to last, Sir Francis Wheeler never fell under the least censure ^a.

We are now to look a little to another Coast. The Royal African Company finding themselves much disturbed in their Trade, by the new Settlements made by the French, in the Mouth of the River Senegal, resolved to exert the great Force they had in Guinea. With this View, they sent Orders to John Booker, Esq; then their Agent General in Guinea, to attempt (should he find it practicable) the Execution of the Design they had formed; Mr. Booker, upon Receipt of these Letters, and a Commission giving him an Authority from the King and Queen, in the Month of December 1692, drew together a sufficient Force, and embarked them on board the Company's Ships and Sloops, and sailing from the River Gambia, arrived in the Mouth of Senegal, on New-Year's-Day 1693 ^b. In order to execute what the Company directed, having with some difficulty got over the Bar, he made the necessary Dispositions for attacking Fort-Bourbon; but the Governor, Mr. Dumoulin, knowing his own Condition best, sent to demand Terms, upon which he offered immediately to give up the Place. The Proposition was accepted, and the English that Evening entered into Possession of the Fort, which the French had held upwards of 50 Years. Mr. Booker afterwards made a Descent on the Island of Goerec, the only Place which remained to the French in Guinea. He arrived there on the 1st of February, and after alarming the Enemy till the 4th, he in the Night landed 100 Men under the old Fort, whence he advanced to attack the new, called the Fort St. Michael, a well fortified Place, furnished with 28 Pieces of Cannon. They made some shew of defending themselves at first, but about Noon desired to Capitulate ^c.

Affairs in the West-Indies went all this Time extremely ill: Other Business intervening, neither the Council nor Board of Admiralty thought much of the Plantations till towards the latter end of the Year 1694 they were alarmed with an Account of a brisk Attempt made upon Jamaica, by M. Ducasse, the French Governor

governor of St. Domingo; he sailed in the Month of June, with three Men of War, and 23 Transports, having on board 1500 Men for the Coast of Jamaica; where they arrived on the 24th of the same Month, and made a Descent on Port Morant, which they found abandoned; and marching from thence up the Country, they plundered, burned and destroyed whatever they met, and carried off Money and Effects to a very great Value^d. The People of Jamaica, when they found their Property in Danger, assembled readily for its defence, and behaved themselves so well in an Engagement with the French, that it contributed not a little to make the latter for the present sick of this Design, and to hinder them from resuming it afterwards^e.

^d See a detail of Mr. Duclasse's Expedition against Jamaica in Histoire de St. Domingue par le P. Charlevoix, vol. 3.

The Complaints that were sent home on this Affair, occasioned a Squadron of five Men of War, and two Fire-ships, with twelve Transports, to be got ready with the utmost Diligence and Secrecy; and to rendezvous at Plymouth, in the beginning of the Year 1695. The Command of the Squadron was given to Captain Robert Wilmot, an Officer of great Reputation and Experience, as that of the Land Forces was to Colonel Luke Lillingston; and that they might be more subject to Orders, and better directed, they were reduced into a single Regiment, consisting of 1200 Men; besides these, there were spare Arms for another Regiment, and in short every thing else that could be desired for securing the Success of such an Expedition. All this was done with such Secrecy, that even the Officers, who were to be employed, had no distinct Knowledge of the particular Design they were to execute; only knew in general, that they were to be sent to the West-Indies, in order to protect our Plantations, and annoy the Enemy. When all things were ready, the Commodore had his Instructions given him sealed up, with Orders not to open them, till he arrived in the Latitude of 40 Degrees. Instructions were also given to Colonel Lillingston, for the regulating of his Conduct, and for giving him a clear View of the Extent of his Command. Before they set out for Plymouth, both the Commodore and the Colonel were separately exhorted to be extremely careful in keeping up a right Correspondence; because hitherto all our Expeditions had suffered more through

^e P. 37. British Empire in America, Hist. of Jamaica Hist. of the last War.

the Weakness and Misunderstandings of our own Commanders, than through any extraordinary Courage or Conduct shewn by the Enemy; and that this might be the easier, their Commands were made as distinct as

^f Burchet's Naval Hist. p. 531. Colonel Lillingston's Remarks on Burchet's Naval Hist. 8vo. 1704

possible ^f. The Squadron sailed from Plymouth, the latter end of January; but before they were in a Condition to act, the Commanders had differ'd, and all things were in Confusion. Colonel Lillingston in his Account, asserts, that the Commodore opened his Instructions in an unwarrantable manner; and that after he had done so, he proposed to the Colonel, to take what care they could of themselves at the Expence of the Public Service. The Colonel rejected this Offer, as became a Man of Honor; and the Commodore thenceforward, prepared to execute his Scheme, in spite of all the Colonel could do to prevent him ^g. Towards the latter end of

^g Reflections on Burchet's Memoirs, p. 19.

March, 1695, they arrived before the City of St. Domingo, where the Spanish Governor, on the Receipt of the King of Spain's Letters, promised them all the Assistance in his Power; but how he performed this Promise, is not very well agreed. Mr. Secretary Burchet in his History, from the Letters, no doubt, ^h of Commodore Wilmot, charges him with unnecessary Delays, which were of great Prejudice to the Expedition ⁱ.

^h Campbel's Nav. Hist. vol. 3. p. 183. ⁱ Burchet's Naval History, p. 535. See Campbel's Remarks, vol. 3. p. 183. Note.

On the other hand, Colonel Lillingston asserts, that the Spanish Governor behaved in every Respect like a Man of Honour; concerted with him the Measures necessary for attacking Cape Francois, and performed all he undertook with the utmost Punctuality. It must be observed, that the Force of the Allies then in Hispaniola, was such, as that the Ruin of the French Settlements might have been well expected from it. The Spanish Governor marched 1700 Men; the Commander of our Land Forces was also to debark about 1200 Men; the Commodore promised to join this Force with 500 Seamen; the Spaniards actually added three Men of War to our Fleet, and to prevent any Disputes about Command, the Spanish Admiral took down his Flag ^k. The first thing that was attempted, was the Ruin of the French Settlement at Cape Francois; When the Fleet was arrived within sight of the Place, the Commodore absolutely prescribed the Place where the Land Forces should go on Shore; and though Colonel Lilling-

^k Reflections on Burchet's Memoirs, p. 48. where the agreement itself is to be found.

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ston represented to him, that it was extremely hard to oblige the Troops to a March of five Leagues and an half, when by rowing one League and half, the Boats might land them close by the Fort which they were to attack; the Commodore only gave him the hearing, but pursued his own Project, and they soon discovered with what View. The English and Spanish Troops joined, and continued their fatiguing March, till they arrived within five Miles of Fort St. Francois; where they saw the French blow up their Works and abandon the Place. When the Troops came up, they were surprized to find English Colours hoisted on the Fort, and a single Seaman left to attend them: But the Mystery was soon explained; Commodore Wilmot no sooner saw the Place abandoned, than he rowed a-shore with 500 Men, entered it, and carried off all that was worth carrying. This disgusted, as it well might, both the English and Spanish Forces; and had they not been composed of veteran Troops, and Men who had a great Respect for their Officers, a Mutiny must have followed, which would have destroyed the whole Design. But Colonel Lillington pacified them as well as he could¹. After

¹Ibid. p. 54.

this extraordinary Exploit, it was resolved to attempt Port de Paix, where M. Ducasse commanded in Person; but he quitted the Place, leaving in it a Garrison of 600 Men. On the 1st of June, the English and Spanish Troops marched by two different Roads, towards the Place they were to attack; and the Squadron sailed thither at the same Time; but with this extraordinary Circumstance, that had not the Spanish Admiral, out of pure Humanity, left some Transports to take in our sick Men, they must have been left to perish; for Commodore Wilmot had something else in his Head than to take care of Invalids, and had therefore sailed as soon as the Resolution was taken. The March was very fatiguing, it took up 16 Days, before they arrived in sight of Port de Paix; and then there was much Time lost in getting the Artillery and Ammunition on shore. At last this too was performed, and then the Siege of the Place was begun in a regular Manner; and the Commodore, to shew his Willingness to assist, landed a great Body of Seamen, and invested it on the other side. On the 3d of July, the Breach being practicable, and Colonel

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Lillingston employed in making the necessary Dispositions for a general Storm, the Enemy took a Resolution of deserting the Place, and forcing their way through the Quarter of the Commodore. Their Force consisted of about 530 Men, of which about 150 were Negroes, but well armed and disciplined. Their greatest Difficulty was to carry off their Women, Children, and the most valuable part of their Effects.

The latter they packed up first, and then put them in small Bundles on the Backs of their Women, who, with the Children, marched in the Front, under an Escort; while 300 Men fell into the Quarters of our Seamen, and by exposing themselves to a very brisk fire, which lasted a long time, gave the rest an Opportunity to retreat. The Affair was conducted with equal Resolution and Address; but not without a very considerable Loss. Colonel Lillingston, as soon as he heard the firing, guessed at the Cause; and immediately detached his Brother with 250 Men to support the Seamen: When Major Lillingston arrived, the Affair was over, and he marched directly to take Possession of the Fort, in Order to secure what the French had left behind them; and having posted Centinels every where, and put the rest of his Men under Arms, he thought that all was safe; but in this he was mistaken; Commodore Wilmot, at the Head of his whole Corps of Seamen, followed him instantly. As soon as the Commodore came up to him, he clapped his Hand upon his Shoulder, with this familiar Salutation; Now Major, I am stronger than You. After which he removed his Guards, broke open the Store-houses, and carried off every thing worth taking, with a Dexterity (says Colonel Lillingston) very natural to Seamen^m.

^m Burchet's Naval Hist. p. 536. Reflections on Burchet's Memoirs, p. 67. Histoire de St. Domingue, vol. 4. p. 73.

This kind of Proceeding was not like to produce much good; the Commodore offered to carry the sick Men to Jamaica, and to leave Colonel Lillingston to attempt, in Conjunction with the Spaniards, the taking of Leogane and Petit-Guavas; but they were weary of such kind of Treatment; and had so many Men disabled by the unnecessary Hardships to which they had been exposed, that it was resolved in a Council of War, not to prosecute either of the Designs before-mentioned; but to demolish the Fort, ruin the adjacent Country, carry off

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off the Artillery they had taken, and sail with all the English Forces to Jamaica. To this the Spanish Governor consented, because he saw the Impossibility of their performing, in the Condition they were in, what they had projected; and of this he was the better Judge, because he had an exact Account of the French Forces, that M. Ducasse was assembling at Cul de Sac, and with which it was expected, he would march and give them Battle, as having no other means of preserving the French Settlements; though in this there was a great deal of Dangerⁿ.

ⁿ Burchet's Naval Hist. p. 537.

It must not be supposed, that because this Expedition was in itself very ill managed, and far from being glorious to those that undertook it, that it did but very little Damage to the French. The Confederate army, in sixty Days, ruin'd their Plantations for 100 Miles round; carried off 1000 Negroes; demolished two strong Forts, wherein they took 140 pieces of Cannon, with a vast Quantity of all sorts of Ammunition and Naval Stores; so that Colonel Lillingston computes the loss of the French at 2,000,000 l.^o.

^o See a long Note of Campbell in his Naval Hist. vol. 3. p. 187.

The Account given us of this Affair by French Writers, is pretty much the same with our own: They agree that Misunderstandings between the Allies, proved the Ruin of the whole Affair; and that nothing could amaze, and at the same Time overjoy People more, than the News of the English Troops embarking for Jamaica did Mr. Ducasse and his Armyⁿ. The Squadron sailed from Hispaniola on the 23d of July 1695 with all the Land Forces on board, and from Jamaica for England on the 3d of September of the same Year. In this Passage an epidemic Distemper broke out on board the Ships, which carried off a number of Men, and among them the Commodore himself.

ⁿ Histoire de St. Domingue, tom. 4. p. 63—75. Histoire Militaire de Louis XIV. tom. 5. &c.

The next Conjunct Expedition we shall briefly mention, was carried into Execution also in this part of the World, and by the French under the Command of the Sieur Pointis. He arrived on the Coast of St. Domingo February the 19th 1697, with a Fleet of seven large Ships of War, about ten Frigates, and small Vessels of several sorts, on board which were 2260 Seamen, and 1750 Soldiers, to which Mr. Ducasse added another stout Squadron on board of which were 1500 Buccaneers,

neers, Soldiers and Volunteers. The whole Fleet failed for Carthagena, and arrived before that City on the 3d of April. They first attacked the strong Fort of Boca Chica, which was carried by Assault; then they attacked Neustra Señora de la Popa, a Monastery on an Hill, which commands the Place; they besieged and took likewise the Fort of St. Lazarus; and at last stormed the Suburbs, which forced the Governor to think of a Capitulation, which was concluded April the 24th 1697, when the City was surrendered to the French. The Sieur Pointis in this Expedition, seems to have patterned after Commodore Wilmot, making private Interest his principal Motive. He behaved very ill through the whole Affair; he disgusted the Buccaneers, so as to create a Mutiny or two, which nothing but Mr. Ducasse's presence could quiet. He treated Mr. Ducasse excessively ill during the whole Siege; he made an unfair Distribution of the Effects taken; and took no sort of Care of the sick and wounded ^P. And when the French were split into Factions, and at least one half of them fallen sick, he left this part of the World; and after escaping variety of Dangers entered with an immense Booty on the 17th of August the Harbour of Brest ^r.

^a Historique de St. Domingue, vol. 4. p. 157.

^r Pointis's Memoirs.

We are come now to the last Expedition that any ways concerns us in this War. To parry off the Blow, wherever it was intended, of Sieur Pointis's Fleet, a Squadron was sent to the West-Indies under Vice-Admiral Neville and Rear-Admiral Meeze; however by cross Accidents these good Intentions were frustrated. The Governor of Jamaica, who at that Time was Sir William Beeston, considering that this Fleet must soon be obliged to return home, resolved to suggest the Destruction of that Nest of Pirates, Petit-Goave, to the Vice-Admiral, as the most important Service, as things were circumstanced, that could be done to the English Colonies in general, and Jamaica in particular. Vice-Admiral Neville instantly complied with it, and left the Execution of the Scheme to Rear-Admiral Meeze, who was detached from the Fleet June 22, 1697, for this very Purpose, with nine Ships of War great and small. On the 27th he arrived at a small Distance from Petit-Goave, and debarked some of his Forces, ordering the Ships to come in next Day. On the 29th he surprized
Petit-

Petit-Goave, entering the Place before it was light, and seizing the Guard. He had, at first, Thoughts of remaining there some short Time; but the Seamen, and at last (through their Example) the Landmen, began to plunder and drink so hard, that when the Rear-Admiral altered his Sentiments, and resolved to burn it, there were not above fifty sober Men under his Command out of 900. When he gave out this Order the whole was executed with such Precipitation, that notwithstanding there was abundance of Gold and Silver in the Place, yet very little was saved, or brought away. However the burning the Town, and carrying off Prisoners a good number of Negroes to Jamaica, was a great and seasonable Service to the English Colonies; and gave the Enemy a remarkable Check, which they did not soon recover^s. To say the Truth, it was one of the greatest Services done during the War; which had an end put to it on the 10th of September 1697, by the Peace concluded at Ryswick, between England, Spain, and Holland, on the one side; and the Crown of France on the other^t.

^s Burchet's Memoirs, p. 369.
^t Kennet. Life of King William, &c.

This Peace was but of short Duration; for the Death of Charles II. King of Spain, which happened soon after, and his calling the Duke of Anjou to the Succession of the Spanish Throne, changed all the Affairs of Europe; and forced us, who had so lately made a very necessary Peace, upon a new, expensive and dangerous War. King William however did not live to proclaim it; for he died on the 8th of March, 1701-2, about eight in the Morning. He died as he lived, with great steadiness of Mind, and shewed himself in his last Moments as much an Hero, as he had ever done in the Field.

^t Burchet. Burnet. Present State of Europe. Life of K. William. Pointer's Chronological Hist. &c.

Queen Anne acceded to the Throne the same Day, in the Flower of her Age; if we consider her Dignity, being then about thirty-eight. And on the fourth of May 1702, her Majesty declared War against France and Spain.

The first Expedition that comes under this Work, in this Reign, is that to Cadiz. It was concerted by King William, but put in Execution by Queen Anne. At her Accession to the Throne, Sir George Rooke was declared Admiral of this Fleet, Vice-Admiral, and Lieute-

Lieutenant of the Admiralty of England, and Lieutenant of the Fleets and Seas of this Kingdom. The Duke of Ormond remained (as before) General of the Land Forces; and the Dutch having joined the Fleet with their Squadron, which had also its quota of Troops on board, the Admiral hoisted the Union Flag on board the Royal Sovereign on the 30th of May 1702. Besides Sir George Rooke, there were the following Flags, viz. Vice-Admiral Hopson, who carried a red Flag at the Fore-top-mast-head of the St. George; and Rear-Admiral Graydon, who carried the blue Flag in the same Manner in the Triumph. There were five Dutch Flags, viz. two Lieutenant-Admirals, two Vice-Admirals and a Rear. The Strength of this Fleet consisted in thirty English, and twenty Dutch Ships of the Line, exclusive of small Vessels and Tenders, which made in all about 160 Sail. As to the Troops, the English consisted of 9663, including Officers; and the Dutch 4138, in all 13801 *. On the 19th of June the Fleet weighed from Spithead, and came to an Anchor at St. Helen's. On the 22d the two Rear-Admirals Fairbourn and Graydon were detached with a Squadron of English and Dutch Ships, with Instructions first to look into the Groyne, and in case there were any Ships there, to block them up: but if not, to cruise ten or twelve Leagues N. W. off Cape Finisterre, till they should be joined by the Fleet. On the 10th of August the Fleet reached the Rock of Lisbon, where the next Day they held a Council of War. On the 12th they came before Cadiz, and anchored at the Distance of two Leagues from the City; Sir Thomas Smith, Quarter-master-general

* That this was a great Force, and that the Public had Reason to frame great Expectations to themselves, as to its Success, all the World must allow: But on the other hand, our Expectations ought never to prejudice us so far as not to be satisfied with a just Account of their Disappointment. Bishop Burnet says, that Sir George Rooke spoke coldly of this Expedition before he went out; and this he tells us, to prove that Sir George intended to do the Enemy no hurt. But the Mischief lies here, Sir George suspected they should do no great Good, because this Expedition was of a doubtful Nature; for on the one hand, they were enjoined to speak to the Spaniards as Friends, and at the same time were ordered to act against them as Foes. Campbell's Nav. Hist. vol. 3. p 327. Note.

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general, having viewed and sounded the Shore on the Back-side of the Isle of Leon, in which Cadiz stands, and reported that there were very convenient Bays to make a Descent, The Duke of Ormond vehemently insisted in a Council of War, upon landing in that Isle, in order to make a sudden and vigorous Attack upon the Town, where the Consternation was so great, that in all probability the Enterprize would have succeeded; but several of the Council, especially the Sea-officers, opposing the Duke's Motion, it was resolved, that the Army should first take the Fort of St. Katherine, and Port St. Mary, to facilitate thereby a nearer approach to Cadiz. The next Day the Duke of Ormond sent a Trumpet with a Letter to the Duke of Brancaccio, the Governor, whom the Duke had known in the Spanish Service, in the last Confederate War: But in answer to the Letter, inviting him to submit to the House of Austria, Brancaccio declared he would acquit himself honourably of the Trust that was reposed in him by the King*. On the 15th of August, the Duke of Ormond landed his Forces in the Bay of Bulls, above a Mile on the left of St. Katherine's Fort; the Cannon of which fired on his Men all the while, but with little Execution. The first that landed were 1200 Grenadiers, led by Brigadier Pallant, and the Earl of Donnegall; they were obliged to wade to the Shore, and were all very wet when they reached it. In the mean Time Captain Jumper in the *Lenox*, and some English and Dutch light Frigates, kept firing on the Horse that appeared near the Coast, and they were soon after repulsed by the English Foot. The Duke of Ormond, as soon as the Troops, were landed sent to summon Fort St. Katherine; but the Governor replied, he had Cannon mounted, with Powder and Ball sufficient to receive him. On the 16th the whole Army marched to a Camp marked out for them near *La Rotta*, a Town within a League of the Place where they landed, from which most of the Inhabitants were fled; but strict Order being given against plundering, many of them returned; the Duke of Ormond having left a Garrison of 300 Men at *La Rotta*, marched on the 20th of August towards Port St.

* The Reader will be better satisfied as to this Matter, if he consults the Collections of Lamberti, tom. 2. p. 251.

St. Mary's. Some Spanish Horse, about 600 in Number, fired upon the Duke's advanced Guards, and killed Lieutenant Colonel Gore's Horse amongst the Dragoons; but retired upon the approach of the English Grenadiers, of whom a detachment under Colonel Pierce of the Guards was sent to take Fort St. Katherine; which they did, and made 120 Spaniards Prisoners of War. The Duke entered Port St. Mary's, attended by most of the General Officers; and notwithstanding the strict Orders the Duke gave against plundering, there was a very great failure in the Execution of them. Mr. Methuen, her Majesty's Envoy in Portugal, in a Letter to the Duke of Ormond dated August the 1st, gave this wholesome Advice, concerning the Conduct of the Army: That the Point of the greatest Consequence, was to insinuate to the Spaniards, and shew by their proceeding, that they came not as Enemies to Spain, but only to free them from France, and give them Assistance to establish themselves under the Government of the House of Austria. It being found too difficult to approach Cadiz while the Spaniards were in Possession of Matagorda Fort, over-against the Puntal; it was ordered to be attacked, and a Battery of four Pieces of Cannon erected against it; but upon the firing, the Guns sunk into the Sands, and after a fruitless Attempt the Design was given over, and the Troops ordered to embark; which was done accordingly, with Intention of making the best of their way home. The Spaniards did indeed endeavour to disturb them in their Retreat, but with very little Success; a Detachment of English and Dutch Troops, having quickly repulsed them, with the loss of a few of their Horse, who were the most forward in the Attack; which discouraged the rest so, that few or none of our People were lost in getting aboard their Ships*. Thus ended the Attempt upon Cadiz, which seems by Mr. Methuen's Letter originally concerted on a Supposition, that the Spaniards had a natural Affection for the House of Austria; and would join with us in their Favour

* The Confederates found Cadiz in a much better Situation than they expected, themselves worse received than they hoped, and the General Officers so much divided in their Opinions, that a Retreat was thought more adviseable than any other Measure, in a Council of War.

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your against the French. But as the Determination of these Affairs, does not come within the Compass of this Work, we must be contented with saying, we found ourselves mistaken. While the Admiral was intent on bringing the Fleet and Forces safely home, advice was brought him by Captain Hardy who commanded the Pembroke, and who had been sent to water in Lagos Bay; that the Galleons, under the Convoy of a French Squadron, put into Vigo the 16th of September. Captain Hardy made what haste he could with this News to the Fleet, but could not get to speak with the Admiral till the 6th of October; when he informed him of what he had heard. Upon this Sir George Rooke called a Council of War immediately, composed of the English and Dutch Flag Officers; by whom it was resolved to sail as expeditiously as possible to the Port of Vigo, and attack the Enemy. In order to this, some small Vessels were detached to make a discovery of the Enemy's Force, which was done effectually by the Kent's Boat; and the Captain understood that Mons. Chateau-Renault's Squadron of French Men of War, and the Spanish Galleons, were all in that Harbour; but the Wind blowing a Storm, drove the Fleet to the Northward as far as Cape Finisterre, and it came not before the Place till the 11th of October. The Passage into the Harbour was not above three quarters of a Mile over, with a Battery of eight Brasses, and twelve Iron Guns on the North side; and on the South was a Platform of twenty Brasses, and as many Iron Guns, as also a Stone Fort, with a Breast-work and deep Trench before it, ten Guns mounted, and 500 Men in it. There was, from one side of the Harbour to the other, a strong Boom composed of Ships Yards and Top-masts, fastened together with three-inch Rope, very thick, and underneath with Hausers and Cables.

The top Chain of each end was moored to a Seventy Gun Ship, the one was called the Hope, which had been taken from the English, and the other was the Bourbon. Within the Boom were moored five Ships of between sixty and seventy Guns each, with their broadsides fronting the entrance of the Passage; so as that they might fire at any Ship that came near the

I Boom,

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Boom, Forts, and Platform *. The Admirals removed the Flags from the great Ships into Third Rates ; the First and Second Rates being also too big to go in. Sir George Rooke went out of the Royal Sovereign into the Somerset; Admiral Hopson out of the Prince George into the Torbay; Admiral Fairborne out of the St. George into the Essex; and Admiral Graydon out of the Triumph into the Northumberland. A Detachment of fifteen English and ten Dutch Men of War, with all their Fire-ships, Frigates and Bomb-vessels, were ordered to go upon the Service.

The Duke of Ormond to facilitate this Attack, landed on the South side of the River, at the distance of about six Miles from Vigo with 2500 Men; then Lord Shannon at the head of 500 Men attacked a Stone Fort at the entrance of the Harbour; and having made himself Master of a Platform of forty Pieces of Cannon, the French Governor Monsieur Sozel, ordered the Gates of the Place to be thrown open, with a Resolution to have forced his Way through the English Troops. But though there was great Bravery, there was but very little Judgment in this Action; for his Order was no sooner obeyed, than the Grenadiers entered the Place Sword in Hand; and forced the Garrison, consisting of French and Spaniards in Number about 350, to surrender Prisoners of War. This was a Conquest of great Importance, and obtained much sooner than the Enemy expected, who might otherwise have prevented it; since they had in the Neighbourhood a Body of at least 10000 Men, under the Command of the Prince of Brabant. It was likewise of great Consequence to the Fleet, as our Ships would have been excessively galled by the Fire from that Platform and Fort.

As soon as our Flag was seen flying from the Place, the

* The French Writers are very copious in their Description of the Measures taken by the French Admiral for the Defence of the Fleet; and indeed it must be allowed that the Disposition was as good as the Place would admit. The Count de Chateau-Renault was a very gallant experienced Officer; and if, as these Writers say, his Reputation was heightened by this accident, then it proves, our Men acted as well as Men could be expected to act. Hist. Militaire, tom. 3. p. 717. Rapin Thoyras Contin. tom xi. p. 487. Memoires Historiques, & Chronologiques. Camp. Nav. Hist. Note.

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the Ships advanced, and Vice-Admiral Hopson in the Torbay, crowding all the Sail he could, ran directly against the Boom, and broke it; then the Kent, with the rest of the Squadron, English and Dutch, entered the Harbour. The Enemy made a prodigious Fire upon them, both from their Ships and Batteries on Shore, till the latter was possessed by our Grenadiers; who seeing the Execution done by their Guns on the Fleet, behaved with incredible Resolution. In the mean time one of the Enemy's Fire-ships had laid the Torbay on board, and had certainly burnt her; but that luckily the Fire-ship had a vast Quantity of Snuff on board, which extinguished the Flames when she came to blow up; yet the Vice-Admiral did not absolutely escape. Her Fore-top-mast was shot by the board, most of the Sails burnt or scorched, the Fore-yard burnt to a Coal, the Larboard shrouds, fore and aft, burnt at the Dead Eyes, several Ports blown off the Hinges, her Larboard-side entirely scorched, 115 Men killed and drowned, of whom about 60 jumped over-board, as soon as they were grappled by the Fire-ship. The Vice-Admiral, when he found her in this Condition, went on board the Monmouth, and hoisted his Flag there: In the mean time, Captain William Bokenham, in the Association, a Ship of 90 Guns, lay with her Broad-side to the Battery, on the left of the Harbour, which was soon disabled; and Captain Francis Wyvell, in the Barfleur, a Ship of the same force, was sent to batter the Fort on the other side, which was a very dangerous and troublesome Service; as the Enemy's shot pierced his Ship through and through, and for some time he durst not fire a Gun, because our Troops were between him and the Fort; but they soon drove the Enemy from their Post, and then the struggle was between the French firing, and our Men endeavouring to save the Ships and the Galleons. In this Dispute, the Association had her Main-mast shot and two Men killed; the Kent had her Fore-mast shot and the Boatswain wounded; the Barfleur had her Main-mast shot, two Men killed, and two wounded; the Mary had her Bowsprit shot. Of the Troops there were only two Lieutenants and 30 Men killed, and four superior Officers wounded; a very inconsiderable loss, considering the Enemy had 15 French Men of War, two Fri-

I 2 gates

gates and a Fire-ship burnt, sunk and taken; as were also 17 Galleons. Father Daniel gives a pretty fair Account of this Affair, and a late French Historian very candidly owns, that by this blow, the Naval Power of France was so deeply wounded, as that she never re-

covered it during the War.

" See the Compleat History of Europe, for the Year 1702, p. 391.

The next Expedition any thing material to our Purpose, was performed by Rear-Admiral Dilkes; it was on the Coast of France, and what is littoral, we look upon to come within the Compass of this Work; for in 1703, while the grand Fleet was at Sea, the Council of Prince George of Denmark, the Lord High Admiral, having Intelligence, that a considerable Fleet of French Merchant Ships with their Convoy, was in Canceille Bay; Orders were sent to the Rear-Admiral, who was then at Spithead with a small Squadron, to sail immediately in pursuit of them, which he did on the 22d of July. On the 24th, he ordered the Captain of the Nonsuch, to stretch a-head of the Squadron, and stand as near Alderney as he could, and send his Boat ashore to gain Intelligence. On the 25th, he stood towards the Casquets for the same Purpose, and at six in the Evening, anchored off the South-west part of Jersey; from whence he sent Captain Chamberlain, Commander of the Spy Brigantine to the Governor, that he might draw from him the best Intelligence he could give. The Governor sent to him Captain James Lampier, and Captain Thomas Pipon, who well understood that Coast; by whom being informed of a Fleet about 40 Sail, plying to the Windward on the 15th to get to Granville; the Rear-Admiral upon a Consultation at a Council of War with the Pilots, resolved to sail immediately, though the Tide run cross in the Night, that getting clear of the Westernmost Rocks of the Minques, he might attack the Enemy by break of Day the next Morning, which succeeded perfectly well; for the next Morning, the 26th, by Day-light, perceiving the Enemy at an Anchor, about a League to the Westward of Granville; they upon his approach got under Sail, and stood in for the shore. The Rear-Admiral followed them as far as the Pilot would venture, and found them to consist of 43 Merchant Ships and three Men of War. Being come within four foot Water more than the Ship drew,

drew, he manned all his boats, and the rest of the Ships did the same. By Noon he took 15 Sail, burnt six and sunk three; the rest stood so far into a Bay, between Avranche and the Mount of St. Michael, that in the Judgment of the Pilots, our Ships could not attack them; wherefore on the 27th in the Morning, it was resolved at a Council of War, to go into the Bay with the Hector, Mermaid, a Fire-ship, the Spy Brigantine, a Ship of six Guns, taken the Day before from the Enemy, a Ketch fitted as a Fire-ship, and all the Boats of the Squadron, which was performed between ten and eleven in the Morning; the Rear-Admiral being present, accompanied by the Captains Fairfax, Legg, Mighells, Lamprier and Pipon.

There were three Ships equipp'd for War, one of 18 Guns, which the Enemy burnt; the second of 14 Guns, which Mr. Paul, first Lieutenant of the Kent, set on fire, who in this Service was shot through the lower Jaw, and had four Men killed; and a third of eight Guns, which was brought off. Seventeen more of the Merchant Ships were burnt and destroyed by this second Attack; so that of the whole Fleet only four escaped, by getting under the Command of Granville-Fort. The Enemy during this Attack, sent several large Shallops from Granville, but with no Success; the Rear-Admiral having manned a Brigantine with 80 Men, and another Vessel of six Guns with 40, who covered all the Boats: This last Vessel unfortunately run a-ground, which obliged the Rear-Admiral to burn her. There were during this Action about 5000 of the Enemy seen on shore; but they did not advance near enough to do their own People any Service, or ours any hurt. The Queen, to testify her kind kind Acceptance of so chearful and so effectual a Service, ordered Gold Medals to be struck on this occasion, and delivered to the Rear-Admiral and all his Officers, who certainly had very well deserved them^w.

We will now see a little what has been doing, relative to this Work, in the West-Indies. To this purpose, we are to observe, Sir George Rooke, in the Month of September 1702, detached from the Mediterranean Capt. Hovenden Walker, in the Burford, five more third Rates, ten Transports, and four Regiments on board,

^w See the London Gazette, No. 3937, 3938

for the Leeward Islands. He arrived in Barbadoes in the beginning of January. From Barbadoes, Commodore Walker sailed to Antigua, where he joined Colonel Coddington, who was about undertaking an Expedition to Gaudalupe, in which the Commodore was to assist him. They sailed from Antigua the latter end of February. On the 12th of March, General Coddington landed with great part of the Forces, but was so warmly received by the French, that they would have been able to have done little or nothing, had not Commodore Walker sent in the Chichester, who drove the Enemy from their Batteries, which our Men quickly seized. The next Day the rest of the Soldiers, and 400 Seamen were landed, who attacked the North part of the Town with great fury, forced the Enemy to abandon it, and to retreat into the Castle and Fort, which they defended till the 3d of April, and then blowing them up, retired to the Mountains. After this our Troops ravaged all the Country, burnt the Town to the Ground, razed the Fortifications, carried the best of the Artillery on board, burst the rest, and with a very great Booty embarked without the loss of a Man.

There were some unlucky Circumstances attended this Expedition. In the first place, when Captain Walker arrived the Land Forces had no Powder, with which, however, they were furnished from the Fleet. When they came next to examine their Stores closely, it was found, that in a thousand Flints, there were not fifty fit for Muskets; nor had they Mortars, Bombs, Pick-axes, Spades, or indeed any thing proper and convenient for a Siege. But this Mismanagement is not to be attributed either to Commodore Walker, who commanded here, or to Sir George Rooke, who sent him; since they both acted in obedience to Orders, the Commodore to those of the Admiral, and the Admiral receiving his from the Ministry, who ought to have considered better what they were doing *.

* Campbell's
Naval Hist.
vol. 3. p. 380.
Note.
† Histoire Militaire, tom. 4.
P. Daniel.
Limiers, &c.

The French Writers give a different Account of this Affair, and because the English thought fit to retreat, they will have the Victory to have been on their side †. As to this Retreat, there were many Reasons for it, and some indeed that rendered it indispensibly necessary. General Coddington fell sick, and was forced to return

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to Nevis; then Colonel Whetham, upon whom the Command devolved, fell also dangerously ill, and was carried to Antigua. The Command of the Land Forces fell next to Colonel Willis; who, upon certain Information, that the French had landed 900 Men on the back of the Island, called a Council of War, in which it was resolved to embark the Forces, and this was accordingly done, as is before observed, on the 7th of May. It must be acknowledged, this Service suffered not a little from some Disputes that happened between the Land and Sea Officers; which is generally speaking the ruin of our Expeditions in the West Indies*. As soon as the News of the Death of the brave unfortunate Vice-Admiral Benbow (which he got in a Naval Engagement with a French Squadron, fought in this part of the World in September 1702, by the means of most of his Captains forsaking him in the Engagement) as soon as this News reached England, it was resolved, that another Flag Officer should be sent thither with a considerable Squadron: Mr. Graydon took upon him the Command of this Squadron, consisting of a third, a fourth and fifth Rate, which last proved unfit for the Voyage; therefore the Montague of 60, and the Non-such of 50 Guns, were ordered to see him 150 Leagues into the Sea². They sailed about the middle of March 1703, and arrived on the 10th of April at the Island of Madeira, having been a little interrupted in their Passage by a Skirmish with a part of the Squadron under the Command of Monsieur Du Casse, with which Vice-Ad-

² See Burchet's Naval History, the compleat History of Europe for 1702, Oldmixon's Life of Queen Anne, &c.

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* The Governors of our Colonies have scarce ever been able to agree with Commanders of our Squadrons; and with respect to this very Expedition, there were as warm Complaints made against the Commodore, as ever came from the West Indies: But he represented, that the Road of Guadalupe was excessively bad; that he found it impossible to procure Pilots; that several of the Ships lost their Anchors, the Ground being foul and the Water deep, so that some were daily forced out to Sea; and added to this, that the Troops were under excessive Difficulties, having no Guides to conduct them, and being under the utmost want of Necessaries to support them. Besides the Island was not abandoned till the Expedition had cost us pretty dear, as appears by the following Account of our loss. There were killed in the first Action, one Major, two Captains, six Lieutenants; and three Ensigns died: 150 Soldiers were killed, 211 wounded, 72 died, 59 deserted, and 12 were taken Prisoners. Campbell's Naval Hist. vol. 3. p. 381. Note.

miral Benbow engaged in the West Indies : From Madeira he sailed to Barbadoes, where he arrived the 12th of May. The Day before came a Brigantine from Guadalupe, with advice, that Commodore Walker was there, and that both Seamen and Soldiers were in Danger of being starved for want of Provisions. The Vice-Admiral thereupon applied himself to the Agent-Victualler, and having furnished himself with all the Beef, Pork, Bread and Pease that could be got, he sailed on the 17th. On the 20th, he ran in with the Fort and Town of Guadalupe, and seeing it in ruins, he sailed instantly for Antigua, and from thence to Nevis ; where he met with the Army and Squadron in the greatest Distress, and having relieved them, he proceeded with the Ships of War to Jamaica, where they arrived the 14th of June^a. The first thing he did there, was to direct a Survey of the Ships under his Command, which proved to be very defective, not only in their Hulls, but in their Masts, Stores and Rigging, and at the same time very ill manned. This, together with some Differences that arose between the Admiral and some of the principal Persons in Jamaica, determined him to sail home as soon as possible : Accordingly having left the Norwich, Experiment, Sea-Horse, with the Harman and Earl Galley, Fire-ships, together with two Sloops, to attend the Island, and the Colchester and Sunderland to convoy home the latter Trade, he sailed for Blue-fields, and proceeding from thence he fell in with Newfoundland on the 2d of August^b.

^a Burchet's Naval Hist. p. 605.

^b Burchet's Naval History. Lediard. Oldmixon. Annals of Queen Anne, &c.

In the Evening of that Day, there arose such a Fog as had scarce ever been seen ; it lasted thirty Days complete, and the Weather was so dark, that it was difficult to discover one Ship from another. This occasion'd the Dispersion of the Fleet, which could not be brought together again till the 3d of September, when the Vice-Admiral thought it proper to consult his Officers, as to the principal Design of his Voyage ; which was the attacking the French at Placentia, and thereby forcing them to quit Newfoundland. At this Council of War, there were present, besides the Vice-Admiral, Rear-Admiral Whetstone and 13 Sea Captains : Of the Land-Officers, the Commander in chief, Colonel Rivers, six Captains and an Engineer. They took into Consideration the Queen's

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Queen's Instructions to Brigadier Columbine, then deceased, and those to Mr. Graydon; and finding all their Ships in a very sad Condition; that they were thinly manned, and most of them sick, already at short Allowance, and the Soldiers being forced to drink Water in so cold a Climate, had their Limbs benumbed, and were scarce fit for Service, that the five Regiments were reduced to 1035 Men; that of 500 they were to receive from New England, there came but 70, which were now reduced to 25, and those in a manner disabled; and that from the best Account, the Enemy at Placentia were judged to be not only superior in Number, and consequently able to make a better Resistance, but that the Avenues to the Place were extremely difficult, the Grounds marshy, and no Planks or other Materials for mounting the Guns on the Batteries. These difficulties and obstructions being maturely considered, together with the good Circumstances the Enemy were in, and the Assistance they might have from their Privateers and other Shipping then at Placentia, the Council of War was unanimously of Opinion, that to make an Attempt on that Place with the Ships and Forces at such a Season of the Year, was altogether impracticable; and that instead of any probability of Success, it might tend to the Dishonour of her Majesty's Arms †. This was the end of Vice-Admiral Graydon's unfortunate Expedition.

We are now entering on the Year 1704. Charles III. King of Spain, was at this Time in England, and very desirous of prosecuting his Voyage to Lisbon; to this Purpose he came to Portsmouth, where Sir George Rooke, who was to command the Fleet that escorted him, and the Land Forces intended for his Service, did every thing that could be expected to facilitate the Expedition. He sailed on the 12th of February, and arrived with the Squadron and all the Transports in the River of Lisbon on the 25th. On the 9th of March, the

† This is transcribed from a MSS. Account of Admiral Graydon's Defence, in which are particular Certificates as to the Truth of each of these Facts; and which, may be supposed, satisfied the House of Lords as to this part of the Charge, which the Admiral looked upon as that which would affect him most; since he here had not executed his Orders, but avoided attacking the French. Campbell's Nav. Hist. vol. 3. p. 386.

the Admiral put to Sea, and continued cruizing for a Month: After that being joined by a large Squadron, under Rear-Admiral Dilkes, whom he had detached for the same Purpose off Cape Spartell, Sir George signified to the Prince of Hesse, who had the chief Direction of his Catholick Majesty's Affairs, that could the Troops which were to make the Attempt on Barcelona, be speedily embarked, he was content to escort them, and to give all imaginable countenance to his Majesty's Affairs in Catalonia. In compliance with this offer, he sailed accordingly with the Transports under his Convoy, and on the 18th of May arrived before the City of Barcelona. A Priest and some others surrendered themselves, and informed the Prince of Hesse, that should some few Forces be landed, and a shew made of a Bombardment, they would declare for King Charles III. and receive him into the Town. Upon this, there landed on the 19th of May, about 1200 Marines, 400 Dutch Foot, a Company of Catalans, and as many Volunteers as made up the whole 2000 Men. They remained on Shore all Night, and the Prince finding nothing done, notwithstanding the Dutch had bombarded the Place with some Effect; his Highness himself proposed the re-embarking the Men, from an Apprehension of being attacked by a superior Force.

On the 21st of May, the Admiral steered for the Isles of Hieres; on the 27th they had sight of a large French Squadron, which they rightly judged to be sailing for Toulon; therefore it was resolved to chace them thither, and should it be impossible to prevent their getting into that Port, then to sail for Lisbon, in order to wait for

^dBurchet. Old-mixon. The compleat Hist. of Europe. a Reinforcement, which was accordingly done. On the 4th of June, our Fleet passed through the Streights Mouth, and was joined two Days after by Sir Cloudesly Shovel, with his Squadron off Lagos. A Council of War was then called, in order to consider what Service should be proceeded on: Several Schemes were proposed, particularly a second Attack on Cadiz, which was soon found to be impracticable, for want of a sufficient Number of Land Forces. At this Council of War, the Admiral also was pleased to declare, that he was limited by his Instructions from attempting any thing without the Consents of the Kings of Spain and

Portu-

Portugal; which was a Discouragement to the Service, as those Princes could very seldom agree on any thing; so that, except sending some Ships to the Terceras, in order to protect the Homeward bound Brazil Fleet, there was nothing done, which ought to be considered as the Consequence of this Order. Sir George Rooke (being very sensible of the Reflections that would fall upon him, if having so considerable a Fleet under his Command, he spent the Summer in doing nothing of Importance) called a Council of War on the 17th of July, in the Road of Tetuan, where having declared he thought it requisite they should resolve upon something, after a long Debate, it was carried to make a sudden and vigorous Attempt upon Gibraltar, for three Reasons: First, because in the Condition the Place then was, there was some Probability of taking it; which in case it had been properly provided, and had in it a numerous Garrison, would have been impossible. Secondly, because the Possession of that Place was of infinite Importance during the present War. Thirdly, because the taking this Place would give a lustre to the Queen's Arms, and possibly dispose the Spaniards to favour the Cause of King Charles.

The Fleet, in pursuance of this Resolution, got into the Bay of Gibraltar on the 21st of July; and the Marines, English and Dutch, to the Number of 1800, were landed under the Command of the Prince of Hesse on the Isthmus, to cut off all Communication between the Town and the Continent. His Highness having taken Post there, summoned the Governor; who answered, that he would defend the Place to the last. On the 22d, the Admiral, at break of Day, gave the Signal for cannonading the Town, which was performed with such Vigour, that 15000 Shot were spent in five Hours; when the Admiral perceiving that the Enemy were driven from their Fortifications at the South Mole-head, and that should we be once possessed of them, the Town must be taken of course; he ordered Captain Whitaker to arm all the Boats, and to attempt to make himself Master of them. This Order was no sooner issued, than Captain Hicks, and Captain Jumper, who were nearest the Mole, pushed on Shore with their Pinnaces, and actually seized the Fortifications before the rest could
come

come up. The Spaniards seeing this, sprung a Mine by which two Lieutenants and 40 Men were killed, and about 60 more wounded: However they kept Possession of the great Platform, till they were sustained by Captain Whitaker, and the Seamen under his Command, who very soon made himself Master of the Redoubt, between the Mole and the Town; on which the Admiral sent in a Letter to the Governor, who on the 24th capitulated, and the Prince of Hesse Darmstadt took Possession of the Place. As this Design was contrived by the Admirals, so it was executed entirely by the Seamen; therefore the Honour of it is due to them. However, nothing could have enabled the Seamen to take the Place, but the cannonading it in such a Manner, as obliged the Spaniards to quit their Posts; the General Officers who viewed the Fortifications after the Place was in our Hands, declared, that they might have been defended by fifty Men against as many thousands. The French indeed say, in order to diminish, as much as possible, the Glory of this Action, that the Spaniards had neither Garrison nor Guns there; but this is far from being true, since there were more than 100 Brass Pieces mounted. After putting as many Men as could be spared into the Place, under the Command of the Prince of Hesse, the Fleet sailed to Tetuan in order to take in Wood and Water^d.

^d Campbell's
Nav. Hist. vol.
3. p. 400.
Marquis de
Quincy.
Histoire Militaire, tom. 4.
p. 421.

^e Campbell's
Naval Hist. vol.
3. p. 403.

^f Ibid. 411.

On the 9th of August they had sight of the French Fleet, which they resolved to engage: And on the 13th of the same Month they fought the famous Battle of Malaga; which decided the Empire of the Sea, and left us and the Dutch an undisputed claim to the Title of Maritime Powers. The French avoided us ever after, and never dared to venture a Battle on that Element, during the remainder of the War^e.

Sir George Rooke after this returned to England with the Fleet, and arrived on the 24th of September; having left a Squadron under Sir John Leake to remain in the Mediterranean during the Winter to secure our Trade, and render any Designs of the Enemy abortive^f. The Spaniards found our Possession of Gibraltar so great a Thorn in their Sides that as they prevailed on the French to hazard an Engagement at Sea, to facilitate their retaking it; so they afterwards demanded, and obtained a Squa-

a Squadron of French Ships, under the Command of Monf. de Pointis, to assist them in carrying on the Siege. The Prince of Hesse having sent early advice of this to Lisbon; Sir John Leake in the beginning of October, proceeded with his Squadron to the relief of the Place; and landed several Gunners, Carpenters, and Engineers, with a Body of 400 Marines; but receiving Intelligence, that the French were approaching with a Force much superior to his, he found it necessary to return again to Lisbon. He did this with a view only to refit, and to be in a better Condition to supply and assist the Garrison in a second Expedition; for which he had very prudently directed Preparations to be made in his absence. This enabled him to put to Sea on the 25th of October; and on the 29th, he entered the Bay of Gibraltar at a very critical Juncture: For that Night the Enemy intended to storm the Town on all sides, and had provided 200 Boats from Cadiz, in order to have landed 3000 Men near the new Mole. But Sir John Leake entered so suddenly, that he surprized in the Bay two Frigates, one of forty-two, and the other of twenty-four Guns, a Brigantine of fourteen, a Fire-ship of sixteen, a Store-ship full of Bombs and Grana- does, two English Prizes; and a Tartane and another Frigate of thirty Guns which had just got out of the Bay, was taken by an English Ship that followed her.

The Enemy, notwithstanding their Discouragements, continued the Siege, in Expectation of a strong Naval Succour from France. Upon this Sir John Leake resolv- ed to land as many Men as he could spare, to reinforce the Garrison; which he performed on the 2d, 3d, and 4th of November, and continued still on the Coast in order to alarm and distress the Enemy. On the 19th and 20th he ordered his smallest Frigates to go as near the Shore as possible, and then manned all his Boats, as if he intended a Descent; but this was done so flow- ly, and the Troops feigned such a reluctance to land, as gave the Spanish General time to draw down a great Body of Cavalry, which enabled the Admiral to put his Design in Execution, and to salute them in such a Manner with his great and small Arms, as made them fly back to their Camp with great Precipitation. How- ever, upon Intelligence the Admiral received on the 22d

* Burchet.
Oldmixon.
Compleat Hist.
of Europe.
Marquis de
Quincy.

of

of November of a strong Squadron being at Cadiz, which was apprehended would soon be in a Condition to sail; upon this and some other Intimations, Sir John Leake resolved to put to Sea, and to stand with the Fleet Eastward of Gibraltar, that he might better be able to take such Measures as should be found necessary, as well for the Preservation of the Place, as for securing the Suc-

^a Burchet. Bur- cours that were expected from Lisbon ^b.

net. Oldmixon. Hist. Militaire, tom. 4. p. 450.

On the 7th of December arrived the Antelope, with nine Transports under her Convoy; and two Days after the Newcastle with seven more, having on board near 2000 Land Troops. They had fight of the French Fleet under the Command of Monsr. Pointis, consisting of 24 sail of Men of War, under English and Dutch Colours, which they escaped very narrowly. By the arrival of these Succours the Garrison was increased to upwards of 3000 Men; and having already gained many Advantages over the Enemy, it was no longer thought requisite to keep the Fleet. Upon which in a Council of War held on the 21st of December, it was unanimously resolved to sail with all convenient Speed to Lisbon in order to refit. This Resolution was soon put into Execution, and the Fleet arrived accordingly in the latter end of the Year 1704 ⁱ.

ⁱ Burchet's Naval History. Compleat History of Europe. The Life of Queen Anne, &c.

The French and Spaniards, as their own Writers confess, were obstinate in their Resolution of retaking Gibraltar, cost what it would. The Marshal de Tessé a Frenchman was appointed Captain General in the room of the Marquis of Villadarias; and the Baron de Pointis was ordered to block up the Place by Sea. This being performed, they made no doubt of being Masters of the Place in a very short Time. The Prince of Hesse also finding the French General much more expert than the Spaniards had been, and better supplied with Necessaries, sent an Express directly to Lisbon to Sir John Leake to come with all Speed to his Assistance ^k. Sir Thomas Dilkes was in the mean time arrived from England, with five Third Rates, and a Body of Troops; these being embarked, Sir John sailed for Lisbon on the 6th of March 1705, to prevent the loss of this important Fortrefs. Upon the 10th of the same Month, about half an Hour past five in the Morning, he was within two Miles of Cape Cabretta, when he discovered only five Sail

^k Quincy. Histoire Militaire, p. 441. Memoires de la Torres. Lambert, &c.

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Sail making out of the Bay, and a Gun fired at them from Europa Point; whereupon concluding the Garrison was safe he gave Chace to the Ships, which proved to be five Men of War; one of them after a little Resistance struck, the rest ran ashore a little to the Westward of Marbella; two of which was afterwards set on fire: The remainder of Mons. Pointis's Fleet, of which these Ships were a part, made their Way to Toulon. Upon which Marshal de Tefle finding it in vain to continue the Siege, formed a Blockade, and withdrew the rest of his Troops. By the 15th of March New Stile, there were thrown into Gibraltar more than 8000 Bombs, and upwards of 70000 Cannon Shot fired, though to very little Purpose*.

The next Conjunct Expedition we have to speak of was performed by the grand Fleet, commanded by the Earl of Peterborough and Monmouth and Sir Cloudefly Shovel, as joint Admirals; their Force amounted to twenty-nine Sail of Line of Battle Ships, besides Frigates, Fire-ships, Bomb-vessels, and other small Craft¹. On the 11th of June 1705, they arrived in the River of Lisbon, where they found Sir John Leake with his Squadron, in great want of Provisions; upon which the Admiral ordered them to be supplied out of the Stores brought from England. On the 15th of June a Council of War was held. where it was determined to put to Sea with forty-eight Ships of the Line, English and Dutch, and dispose them in such a Station between Cape Spartell and Cadiz, as might best prevent the Junction of the French Squadrons from Toulon and Brest^m.

¹ Burchet. Burchet. Oldmixon.

On the 22d of June, Sir Cloudefly Shovel with the Fleet sailed for Lisbon, and from thence to Altea Bay; where he took in his Catholick Majesty, who pressed the Earl of Peterborough to make an immediate Attempt on the City of Barcelona, and the Province of Catalonia, ^m Doctor Friend's Account of the Earl of Peterborough's Conduct in Spain.

* The Obstinacy of the two Courts, in obliging their Generals to continue the Siege, when they were thoroughly sensible that it was to no Purpose, proved the Ruin of their Affairs in Spain, at least for that Campaign; and had it not been for the Accident of the Earl of Galway's losing his Arm by a Cannon-shot, which occasioned the raising the Siege of Badajoz, King Philip in all probability had been driven out of Spain. *Memoires de la Tour*, tom. 4. p. 204. Quincy, &c.

lonia, where he was assured the People were well affected to him. This being agreed, the Fleet sailed accordingly to Barcelona, and arrived on the 12th of August. After the Troops were debarked, there were many Disputes, whether the Siege should, or not, be undertaken; at last the Affirmative carried it; and then a Proposal was made, that the Fleet should land 2500 Men, exclusive of the Marines; and that the Dutch should land 600 of their Men, which was agreed to; on Condition, however, that on the first certain Intelligence of the French Fleet's being at Sea, both Seamen and Marines should embark immediately. At the same Council of War, it was determined to return to England the first fair Wind after the 20th of September.

On the 3d of September, the Prince of Hesse having formed a Scheme for attacking Fort Mountjuic, it was put in Execution; and though it cost his Highness his Life, yet, through the extraordinary Bravery of the Earl of Peterborough, who renewed the Attack, it was taken. This giving a happy Prospect of the Reduction of the Place, the Gunners and Carpenters demanded by my Lord Peterborough, were ordered by Sir Cloudesly Shovel to be in constant readiness to land. After this Success, the Siege was pushed with great Vigour; the Trenches were opened the 9th, and Batteries raised for fifty Guns and twenty Mortars. His Catholick Majesty having at length consented to it, our Bomb-veffels threw 412 Shells into the Town; and eight English and Dutch Ships under the Command of Sir Stafford Fairborne, being appointed to cannonade it from the Sea, while the Cannon from the Batteries and Fort continued to do the like on shore, the Viceroy desired to capitulate the twenty-third; and the Capitulation being signed the twenty-eighth, the Gate and Bastion of St. Angelo were delivered up the same Day, and the whole City in a few Days after^a.

^a Burchet. Burnet. Oldmixon. Compleat Hist. of Europe, for 1705. Life of Queen Anne.
^c London Gazette, No. 4890. Burchet. Burnet. Oldmixon.

On the first of October it was resolved in a Council of War, that Sir Cloudesly Shovel should proceed for England with the best Part of the Fleet; that Sir John Leake with a strong Squadron should be left in the Mediterranean. This leads us to mention, that the Prudence and Fortitude which was shewn by Sir John Leake^c in preserving Gibraltar after it was acquired by Sir George Rooke,

Rooke, was made manifest to the World again by the preserving also of Barcelona; after it was taken by Lord Peterborough and Sir Cloudesly Shovel.

King Charles III. had been left in the City of Barcelona with a very small Garrison; while the Earl of Peterborough went to conquer the Kingdom of Valencia. The French and Spaniards in the mean time were projecting the Destruction of King Charles's Affairs at a single Blow: This Design of theirs was to shut him up in Barcelona, which City they intended to attack by Sea and Land in the beginning of March 1706, when they looked upon it as a thing impossible for our Fleet to have succoured him; as indeed they had Reason to imagine. The Care of the Land Army was committed to Marshal Tessé, but whatever was the Occasion, it so happened, that when the Count De Thoulouse was ready to sail with the French Fleet from Toulon, the Spanish Army was in no Condition to form the Siege; so that the Place was not invested till the beginning of April. This Design was very easily discovered here, and Advice was sent of it to Sir John Leake before he sailed from Lisbon; but it does not appear, that either the Earl of Peterborough, or King Charles, apprehended this Mischief in Time, otherwise the King would have been provided with a better Garrison. Sir John Leake was at Gibraltar when he received a Letter from his Catholick Majesty, entreating his immediate Assistance, in Terms which sufficiently discovered the Distress he was in, and the Apprehensions he was under.

^p Quincy, Histoire Militaire, tom. 5. p. 204. Lambert, tom. 4. p. 146. P. Daniel.

The King's Fears were far from being ill founded. M. Tessé came before the Place with a numerous Army, and the Count De Thoulouse landed Ammunition and Provision sufficient for the Service of 30000 Men for two Months; that it is very evident, the French did all that could be expected from them by Sea; and had the Place been as well seconded on Shore, it had undoubtedly been lost. But it so fell out, that the principal Engineer made a Mistake at the beginning, which lost him eight or ten Days Time, and before he could correct this, they lost him by a Shot from the Place. This (though he was but an indifferent Engineer) proved an irreparable Misfortune; for after his Death they had not his equal, so that when they came to make an Assault

^a This Letter is very curious. It begins and ends with, 'I the King.' It is dated the 31st of March 1706. Campbell's Nav. Hist. vol. 3. p. 443.

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^r Memoirs of
M. de Feu-
quieres, tom. 4.
p. 151.

upon the Place, they were repulsed with considerable loss ^r.

On the 3d of April, Commodore Price, with six English, and as many Dutch Men of War, joined Sir John Leake, who in a Council of War, held on the 6th, resolved in Obedience to King Charles's Letter, to sail immediately to Barcelona. In pursuance to this Resolution, he arrived on the 18th in Altea Bay, and the next Day had Intelligence that Sir George Byng, with a Squadron from England, was coming up; three Days after they were joined by Commodore Walker with his Squadron, as they had been the Day before by Sir George Byng; and then it was determined to sail North of Majorca, and that each Ship should make the best of her Way, without staying for the rest. Upon the 26th, the Earl of Peterborough came off from Terragona with a Squadron of Barks, having 1400 Land Forces on board; and when he came to the Fleet, hoisted the Union Flag on board the Prince George, as Admiral and Commander in chief. His Excellency found that the Councils of War had rejected his Proposals, and indeed their rejecting them saved the Place; since before his Arrival, Sir George Byng, Sir John Jennings and Admiral Wassenauer had anchored in the Road of Barcelona, and by the contrivance of Sir George Byng, a considerable Body of Troops had been thrown into the Town*. On the 27th in the Afternoon, the whole Fleet arrived in the Harbour of Barcelona, without meeting with the least Opposition; for the Count De Thoulouse having received an exact Account of the Naval Force of the Allies, thought fit to sail away with the French Fleet to Toulon; which obliged the Land Army to raise the Siege with great Precipitation.

This Relief appeared the more surprizing, and must have been the more grateful to King Charles and his faith-

* All these brisk and extraordinary Measures, which appeared by the Event so indispensibly necessary, were concerted as well as executed by our Admirals only; the Earl of Peterborough, though he had been constantly before of a Sentiment directly different, when he saw them put in Practice, and foresaw (as he easily might) their good Effects, very judiciously approved of them. Impartial Enquiry into the management of the War in Spain, p. 101.

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faithful Subjects, since it prevented their Destruction by a few Hours; the Enemy having made all the necessary Dispositions for storming the Place that very Night, when, considering the Weakness of the Garrison, their Success could scarce be doubted *.

Two Days after the Arrival of the Fleet, M. de Tesse raised the Siege in a very extraordinary Manner. His Army consisted still of 14000 Men; the Succours thrown into the Town did not exceed 6000; so that it was very strange he should leave behind him a vast train of Artillery and Ammunition of all kinds, as well as vast Quantities of Provisions and Forage, not only undestroyed but untouched. The Sick and Wounded he left in his Camp, with a Letter recommending them to the Earl of Peterborough's Clemency. The Admiral took to himself and his Officers the Honour of this great Exploit, which was one of the most important and most honourable, that happened throughout the War *: His most Catholick Majesty on the other hand, was no less ready to pay him a just Tribute of Praise and Respect to his Merit; so that if ever there was a Fact so well established as to be out of all Dispute, it is this, that Barcelona was relieved by Sir John Leake. To prove this, we will finish this Affair with the Postscript of the King of Spain's Letter to the Admiral; it is dated, Barcelona, May 4, N. S. 1706 †.

* Burchet. Burchet. Oldmixon. Quincy. P. Daniel. Feuquieres. DeLarrey, &c.

"Sir, You will discern the Condition we are in by our Letters, I hope You will come as soon as soon as possible to save us, of which You alone shall have the Glory."

† Campbell's Naval Hist. vol. 3. p. 449.

The next great Service that was attempted was the reducing Alicant; and in sailing thither, putting into Altea Bay, Sir John Leake received Notice, that Carthagenia was disposed to submit: Upon which Sir John Jennings was sent to that City, who returned on the 24th of June, after leaving a Garrison in the Place. But with respect to Alicant, the Governor refused to surrender;

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† This appears by Sir John Leake's Letter to the Prince's Secretary, dated at Barcelona, May the 1st, 1706, in which, among other things, he says. "The 27th of last Month I got to this Place, and in a lucky time to rescue it from falling into the Hands of the Enemy, for they expected to have been stormed that Night, &c."

^u Burchet. Old-
mixon's com-
pleat Hist. of
Europe for
1706. Life of
Q. Anne, &c.

der; therefore it was resolved to besiege it by Land, while it was attacked by the Fleet at Sea^u. To facilitate this, Seamen were landed from the Fleet, and Sir George Byng with five Ships, anchored in a Line so near the Town, that he quickly dismounted all the Enemy's Artillery, though the Guns pointing towards the Sea, were no fewer than 160. On the 28th in the Morning, it was resolved to attack the Place on all sides; and with this View, Sir John Jennings landed the Marines he brought from Carthage. About nine in the Morning, the Ships had made a breach in the Round Tower, at the West end of the Town, and another in the middle of the Curtain, between the Mole and the Easternmost Bastion; when the Land Forces were marching up towards the Walls of the City, fifteen Grenadiers, with an Officer and Serjeant, advancing without order so to do, to the breach of the Round Tower, all the Boats under the Command of Sir John Jennings, went directly to sustain them; but before the Men landed, the Grenadiers were beaten back. However the Boats proceeded, and all the Men getting ashore, Captain Evans of the Royal Oak mounted the Breach first, got into the Town with two or three of the Boat's crews; Captain Passenger of the Royal Anne followed, and next to him Captain Watkins of the St. George, with some Seamen. Sir John Jennings with the rest of the Seamen and Forces, who were in Possession of the Suburbs, moved on to support them; who coming into the Town, secured the Posts, and made proper Dispositions till the rest got in; when Mahoni retiring into the Castle, left them in Possession with the loss of but very few Men. Colonel Petit, however, was killed in the Suburbs, standing Arm in Arm with Sir John Jennings, by a small shot out of a Window, as they were viewing the Ground for raising a Battery against the Walls of the Town; besides whom there were not above 30 killed, either of the Sea or Land Forces, and not more than 30 wounded; notwithstanding the Spaniards had a continued Communication from one House to another, and fired upon our Men from the Windows and Holes made for that Purpose[†].

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[†] The Service performed by the Fleet, is fully confirmed by the Author

Next Day Brigadier Gorge, who commanded the Troops before the place, summoned Count Mahoni to surrender, which he refused to do; but the Ships continuing to cannonade very briskly, and a great Number of Bombs being thrown into their Works, the Garrison which consisted mostly of Neapolitans, compelled the Governor to give up the Place, notwithstanding his Declarations to the contrary. Brigadier Gorge took Possession of it, and was appointed Governor^w: Soon^w Burchet. after the taking of Alicant (which was esteemed a very bold Action) King Philip's Forces were entirely driven out of Arragon, and that whole Kingdom reduced to the Obedience of his Competitor King Charles III. We have spoke so much of the Transactions of Sir John Leake, that it appears as if we had been writing his particular History; but he has been so much concerned in littoral Enterprizes, we could not well be briefer: However we are going to see him put in Execution his last Orders, which were to reduce the Islands of Ivica and Majorca. But he first, after the Reduction of Alicant, sailed into Altea Bay; from whence he sent Sir John Jennings with his Squadron, intended for the West-India Service, to refit at Lisbon. And then he made the necessary Disposition for a Winter Squadron, which was to be commanded by Sir George Byng.

Compleat Hist. of Europe. Life of Queen Anne.

After this, on the 6th of September, Sir John sailed from Altea Bay, and on the 9th, anchored before Ivica, which Place on the first Summons made their Submission*. On the 13th, the Fleet sailed for Majorca, and

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arrived^x Burchet. Oldmixon. Compleat Hist. of Europe. Annals of Queen Anne. Life of Q. Anne, &c,

Author of the Enquiry into the Management of the War in Spain, who gives us the following Account of this Transaction, p. 135, " Brigadier Gorge's Troops, which were so much wanted in Castile, really contributed very little towards the Reduction of Alicant; for as the Fleet without any Assistance from the Army, had made themselves Masters of Carthagea not long before, by the exemplary Courage and Conduct of Sir George Byng and Sir John Jennings; so now the Squadron, which Sir John Leake had ordered Sir George Byng to command for that Purpose, bombarded and cannonaded the Town of Alicant with so much Success, that in a few Days they made two practicable Breaches in the Wall, between the East and West Gates, which the Sailors bravely stormed; Sir George Byng being in Possession of the Place, forced open the Gates to let the Land Forces in, who having lost their Engineer Petit, were not yet Masters even of the Suburbs." Campb. Nav. Hist. vol. 3. p. 451.

arrived the next Day before Palma. The Governor, who was a Native of the Place, was warm in the Interest of King Philip; and when the Admiral summoned him to surrender, sent him a Spanish Answer, "That he would defend the Island as long as there was a Man in it;" but upon throwing three or four Bombs into the Place, the Inhabitants forced the Viceroy to surrender. Sir John Leake left a Garrison in Porto-Pin, and on the 23d of the same Month, prosecuted his Voyage for England. Before his departure, he received a Letter from his Catholick Majesty, who very gratefully acknowledged the Services he had done him. On the 2d of October, he passed the Streights, and on the 4th, he detached Sir George Byng with the Winter Squadron for Lisbon, and on the 17th he arrived safe at St. Helen's. Thus ended as successful a Sea-Campaign as is recorded in our own, or perhaps in any other History.

See the London Gazette, No. 4272. Relating to the Capitulation of Majorca.

Before we finish the Transactions that come under this Work for the Year 1706, we must not overlook the taking of Ostend, especially as it was performed in a Week, which formerly held out so many Months.

Sir Stafford Fairborne, Vice-Admiral of the Red, was appointed, with a small Squadron, to look into the Mouth of the River Charente; with Orders also to destroy such Ships as the Enemy might have at Rochfort. He sailed for this Purpose in the latter end of April, and returned to Plymouth with a few Prizes: Soon after he was ordered to assist in taking Ostend. When he arrived before that Place, he stood in so near the Town, that they fired upon him, which he returned, but was soon after ordered to Newport; from whence after the Blockade of that Place was formed, he came back to Ostend. A Scheme had been formed by some of the Land-Officers for destroying the little Vessels belonging to that Port; but when it came to be executed, it was found wholly impracticable. The entrance of the Harbour being long, narrow and crooked, whatever Vessel or Ship attempted to go in, must inevitably be much exposed to the Platform of Guns; so that there seemed but little hopes of performing any thing against the Ships by Sea, which lay all in a Cluster close to the Key, on the Backside of the Town; but there were Letters in the Camp which insinuated, that as soon as the

the Trenches were opened, the Batteries raised, and some Bombs thrown into the Place, the Spaniards in Garrison, assisted by the Seamen and Burghers, would oblige the French Garrison to yield ^z.

On the 19th of June, the Trenches were opened before the Place; Sir Stafford Fairborne with his Squadron, cannonaded it by Sea; at the same time, two Bomb-vessels were sent as near as might be, and when they played, did great Execution. Sir Stafford likewise caused all the small Frigates to run in as near the Town as possible, and to discharge their Broadfides; which they did with so little Damage to themselves, and so great Hurt to the Place, that the People began to mutiny, and the Governor found himself (as he pretended) under a Necessity of capitulating, which he did on the 25th. Besides the Spanish Garrison, Count de la Mothe was there, with a considerable Body of French Troops, which he undertook should not serve again for 6 Months; and as one of their own Writers pleasantly says, it had been very happy for France, had he undertaken for himself never to serve again.

After the Surrender of Ostend, Sir Stafford Fairborne returned to Spithead, to assist in convoying a Body of Troops, that were intended for a Descent. It was a Design framed upon the Representation of some French Hugonots; particularly of the famous Marquiss Guiscard, who was afterwards engaged in a Design to assassinate the Queen. The Land Forces intended for this Service, consisted of very near 10000 Men. On the 10th of August, the Fleet under the Command of Sir Cloudesly Shovel, sailed from St. Helen's; but not being joined time enough by the Dutch, this Project proved abortive; and it was resolved, that the Fleet should proceed to Lisbon with these Forces on board, and be employed in the Service of his Catholick Majesty ^a.

We ended our Expeditions in the West-Indies with the return of Admiral Graydon's Squadron; and as we have no proceedings of our own Country in this part of the World material to this Work, till the close of the Year 1706, we will mention an Expedition of the French.

The driving out the English from the Leeward Islands was the Point the French had most in view; and having

^z Burchet.
Lediard. Com-
pleat Hist. of
Europe. Life
of Queen Anne.
Mercure Histo-
rique, &c.

^a Burchet. Bur-
net. Oldmixon.
Mercure Histo-
rique. An-
nals of Queen
Anne, &c.

a very exact Account of our Condition there, the Governor of St. Domingo, M. Iberville, had Orders to assist in an Attempt that was to be made on St. Christopher's. The Count de Chavagnac, with a small Squadron of French Men of War, attacked the Island of St. Christopher's, where they burnt and plundered several Plantations; but when they came to attack the Castle they were repulsed with loss. They would, however, in all Probability, have carried their point at last, had not the Governor of Barbadoes, on Intelligence of what had happened, sent down thither a Sloop to inform the Governor, that a Squadron from England was coming to his Relief. This reaching the Ears of the French, as it was intended it should, they embarked in haste, after having done a great deal of Mischief: Unluckily for us, before Count de Chavagnac sailed, Count Iberville joined him with his Squadron, so that they had now five stout Men of War, some Frigates, and twenty Sloops, with which they were resolved to attack Nevis. They landed in Green-Bay, and pushed their Success so briskly, that the Inhabitants made a Capitulation; by which they promised to deliver up all their Negroes, and to procure a Number of Prisoners equal to that of themselves, to be set at Liberty in Europe, in consideration of their not being taken off the Island. However, a new Agreement was afterwards made, by which the Inhabitants undertook to deliver to the French in less than six Months, 1400 Negroes, or 140000 pieces of Eight. Upon which the French carrying off with them most of the Effects, and a great Number of Negroes, retired ^b.

^b Campbell's
Nav. Hist. vol.
3. p. 470.
Gazette, No.
4241. Burchet.
The compleat
Hist. of Europe
for 1706, and
the British Em-
pire in America

The Complaints which had been made in almost every Session of Parliament of Miscarriages and Misdemeanors in the West-Indies, engaged the Ministry to make choice of Sir William Whetstone to go there with a Squadron of seven Men of War, in order to settle Affairs, after the Ravages which they had an Account had been committed in those Parts. He sailed in the Spring of the Year 1705, and arrived on the 7th of May safely at Jamaica. However none of his Proceedings concern this Work, till a little after the Transactions we have just mentioned of the French: When Commodore Ker arrived with a considerable Force in the Leeward Islands, and having stationed several Ships accord-

according to his Instructions, he bore with the rest for Jamaica, which was then thought to be in Danger from the Junction of Iberville's Squadron with that of Du-casse. There being now so considerable a Force the Admiral was very desirous something should be attempted capable of blotting out the Memory of past Mistakes, and worthy of the British Nation. After mature deliberation, it was resolved to proceed to Carthagena, where they knew the Galleons were, to try what Effects King Charles's Letters would produce; and whether the Governor might not be wrought upon by our Successes in Europe, to own him for his rightful Sovereign in America. With this View, Sir William Whetstone and Commodore Ker, sailed from Jamaica on the 8th of August, and on the 18th arrived before Carthagena, and sent in a Pacquet to the Governor. At first he trifled a little, and gave evasive Answers, but when more closely pressed, he declared roundly, he knew no other King than Philip V. and would obey no other. There were at that time in the Port, 14 large Galleons, lying close in with the City, and unrigged. The Admiral was for attempting to burn them, but the Pilots declared, that any such Design would be found impracticable, unless he were first in Possession of Boca Chica Castle and the other Forts; and even in that case it was very doubtful, whether Ships of so great a size as their's could get in^d.

^c Histoire de St. Domingue, vol. 4. p. 212. Burchet. Oldmixon.

A resolution then was taken to return to Jamaica. From whence, as soon as the Trade was ready, the Rear-Admiral was to convoy them Home, and Commodore Ker to remain behind, in order to take upon him the Command of the Force left in the West-Indies. Accordingly Sir William leaving the Island the latter end of October, arrived at Plymouth on the 23d of December 1706, having been long abroad and performed little, tho' no Man in the Service had shewn a greater Spirit of Activity before his being sent on this West-India Expedition^e.

^d Burchet. Lediard. British Empire in America.

The Squadron which Commodore Ker brought into the West-Indies, consisted of six Ships of the Line, three Frigates and a Fire-ship. With this Force he stretched over from Jamaica, to the Coast of Hispaniola; from whence to the Main, where he cruized till the 4th of Septem-

^e London Gazette, No. 4292. Pointer's Chronological Hist. Compleat Hist. for 1707.

September; and then the Winds proving Northerly, he returned to Hispaniola, on the Coast of which Island he held a Council of War, in order to determine whether it might not be practicable to surprize Port Lewis; but the Pilots not being well acquainted with the entrance into that Port, it was resolved to proceed directly to Petit Goave, and to go to the Northward of the Island of Gonave, in order the better to prevent their Design from being discovered. On the 13th of September, he detached Captain Boyce, with all the Boats in the Squadron mann'd and arm'd, with orders to range along the Bays of Leogane and Petit Goave in the Night, with all imaginable Care and Caution; and so to dispose themselves as that they might destroy the Enemy's Ships in either of those Roads, and be able to return to the Squadron next Morning on a Signal given. But how well soever this Scheme might be laid, it miscarried through the ill Conduct of some of the Officers, who running in too near the shore, alarmed the Inhabitants to such a Degree, that any other Attempt was rendered impracticable^f. Upon this Disappointment, Commodore Ker returned to Jamaica. We have mentioned these two unfortunate Affairs, because they were littoral.

^f Burchet.
Lediard.
Histoire de St.
Domingue.

Before we return to Europe, we must take notice of a Disappointment the Enemy also met with in attacking Carolina. When M. Iberville had finished his Designs in the Leeward Islands, he sailed with a Squadron of six Men of War and several Transports, for South-Carolina. He made a Descent in the Neighbourhood of Charles-Town with about 850 Soldiers and Seamen, and sent an Officer to summon the Governor to surrender the City and Colony to the French King, telling him at the same time, he would allow him but an Hour to consider of it. Sir Henry Johnson told him, that was much too long a time, for he did not want half a Minute to resolve on doing his Duty; therefore he was at liberty to return, and tell those that sent him, the English were not to be frightened by Words, for they should soon find they were able to return Blows. Upon this followed an Attack, in which the French met with so vigorous a resistance, they were glad to retreat with the loss of 300 Men killed, drowned and taken; and among the latter, ten Officers, viz. their chief Commander at Land,

Land, his Lieutenant, three Captains of Ships, four Lieutenants and a Master; who together offered 10000 Pieces of eight for their Ransoms. One of the French Ships having ventured to make a Descent at the Distance of six Miles from Charles-Town, the Governor sent a Detachment of Militia to the Assistance of the Planters; who were so lucky as to make themselves Masters of the Ship with all its Crew, which consisted of about 140 Men.

We are now to return to the grand Fleet, which we left under Sir Cloudesly Shovel at Lisbon. We have mentioned the Land Forces on board, who were commanded in chief by the Earl of Rivers: However their Numbers were greatly reduced by Death, Sickness, and other Accidents. On the 14th of April, 1707, the Year we have now entered, was fought the famous Battle of Almanza. Sir Cloudesly Shovel knowing the Distress our Army in Spain was in, through the want almost of every thing necessary (whatever was the Occasion of it, so it was) sent Sir George Byng with a strong Squadron to the Coast of Spain for their Relief. Sir George sailed on the 30th of March, and coming off Cape St. Vincent on the 15th of April, he received the News of our Defeat.

^a Compleat Hist. of Europe for the Year 1706, p. 548. Mercure Historique, 1707, vol. 1. p. 99.

This however, did not prevent the putting in Execution the Attempt upon Toulon, a strong Town and famous Port in the Mediterranean, in the County of Provence, in 43 Deg. 4 Min. of Northern Latitude, and 23 Deg. 41 Min. of Eastern Longitude*. It was to be concerted jointly with the English, the Duke of Savoy, and Prince Eugene; could it have been effected, it would have destroyed almost for ever the maritime Power of France, rendered her utterly incapable of carrying on any Commerce with the Spanish America, and have distressed her to such a Degree at home, as must have produced a Peace, even upon worse Terms than had

* Toulon has the Title of Suffragan Bishoprick of Arles: It has two large Basons in the Port; in the newest the King's Ships ride, in the other are Merchant Ships. Henry IV. fortified this important City with two Forts, called the Manteau and the Tower, which command the entrance of the Road. Here are very considerable Sea Arsenals and Docks for building and repairing Men of War, being the principal Port for the French King's Ships in the Mediterranean.

had been prescribed to her. For this great Undertaking, Sir Cloudefly Shovel (having joined Sir George Byng near Alicant) sailed for the Coast of Italy, and on the 5th of June came to an Anchor near Final, with a Fleet of 43 Men of War, and 57 Transports. Prince Eugene went there to confer with the Admiral, and soon after the Fleet sailed for Nice, where, on the 29th of the same Month, the Admiral had the Honour to entertain the Duke of Savoy, Prince Eugene, most of the General Officers, with the English and Dutch Ministers, on board his own Ship the Association †. After Dinner, they held a Council of War, where it was resolved, to force a Passage over the Var, in which the English Admiral promised to assist. On the last of June, this daring Enterprize was undertaken, to the great Astonishment of the French, who believed their Works upon that River to be impregnable. The late Sir John Norris, with some British, and one Dutch Man of War, sailed to the Mouth of the River, and embarking 600 Seamen and Marines, in open Boats, entered it, and advanced within Musket-shot of the Enemy's Works, making such a terrible Fire upon them, that their Cavalry and many of their Foot, astonished at an Attack they never suspected, began to quit their Entrenchments, and could not be prevailed upon by their Officers to return. Sir Cloudefly Shovel, who followed Sir John Norris to the Place of Action, no sooner saw the Confusion, than he ordered Sir John to land with the Seamen and Marines, in order to flank the Enemy. This was performed with so much Spirit, and Sir John and his Seamen scampered over the Works, the French thought inaccessible, so suddenly, that the Enemy struck with a Panick, threw down their Arms and fled with the utmost Precipitation.

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† Sir Cloudefly Shovel, though he was not one of the politest Officers we ever had, shewed a great deal of Prudence in the magnificent Entertainment he made upon this Occasion. The Duke, when he came on board the Association, found a Guard of Halberdiers in new Liveries, at the great Cabbin Door. At the upper end of the Table was set an armed Chair, with a Crimson Velvet Canopy: The Table consisted of 60 Covers, and every thing was so well managed, that his Royal Highness could not forbear saying to the Admiral at Dinner, "If Your Excellency had paid me a Visit at Turin, I could scarce have treated you so well." Campbell's Nav. Hist. vol. 4. p. 21. Note.

The Duke of Savoy immediately pursued this Advantage, and in a single half Hour passed that River, which in the Judgment of the best Officers in his Army, had, without this Assistance, proved the (ne plus ultra) of his Expedition *. On the 2d of July, his Royal Highness and Prince Eugene, with the British Envoy, and Sir John Norris, dined again on board the Admiral; and after Dinner, they entered into a Conference, wherein upon mature deliberation, his Royal Highness was pleased to declare, that since the Queen of Great Britain had earnestly recommended to him, the marching directly to Toulon, without losing Time in the Siege of any Place of less importance, he was resolved to comply with her Majesty's Proposal; and hoped for a good conclusion of the Affair, through the continuance of her Majesty's Friendship and Assistance, which had encouraged him to undertake it. The Army of the Allies consisted of about 35000 Men, all enured to Hardships, commanded by Officers of the greatest Experience, and of the highest Reputation; supported by a numerous Fleet, commanded by an Admiral of known Courage and Conduct; who upon all Occasions, shewed the utmost Zeal for the Service, and particular in this last Conference; where the Duke of Savoy having observed, that even after Toulon was taken, himself and his Army might find it impracticable to retreat; the Admiral replied, "I hope better things from your Royal Highness's Fortune; but should there be any Appearance of such a thing happening, your Highness may rely upon me; " I will

* It may not be amiss to cite on this Occasion, the Words of the Dispatch, received from the Confederate Camp, July the 14th, N. S. as they are printed in the London Gazette, No. 4352. "The Admiral himself followed Sir John Norris to the Place of Action, and observing the Disorder of the Enemy, commanded him to put to Land, and flank them in their Entrenchments. His Men advanced in so undaunted a manner, that the Enemy fearing to be surrounded, marched out of their Works, and retired with great Precipitation. His Royal Highness having received from the Admiral, an Account that we were in possession of the Enemy's Works, ordered his Troops to pass the River, which they did with so great Eagerness, that above 100 Men were driven down by the Violence of the Stream, and ten of them drowned, which was all the loss sustained in forcing a Pass, where we expected the most vigorous Opposition."

“ I will take care to supply a sufficient number of Transports to embark all your Troops.” The Duke thanked him for his generous Offer; told him, he relied chiefly on the Assistance he expected from him, and that if he would repair to the Islands of Hieres, he should not long remain there, before he had Advice of the Army’s being in the Neighbourhood of Toulon, and that then he should expect to see the Fleet in the Road †. It is impossible to describe the Confusion into which this March of the Duke of Savoy threw the French. Toulon was not in any state of Defence; they had no Troops in that part of the Country; they scarce knew whence to bring them. They had then in the Port a very fine Fleet, besides 25 Frigates, Fire-ships and other Vessels of the same size, all of which, they were sensible, were in the utmost Danger of being destroyed ‖. In this distress, Lewis XIV. shewed less presence of Mind, than on any other Occasion in his whole Reign; for he condescended to recall the best Officer in France, whom he had disgraced, viz. Marshal Catinat, in order to consult him; and after taking his Advice, was prevailed upon by Female Intrigues, to trust the Execution of an Affair of such Importance to the Marshal de Tessé, who had so notoriously blemished the Honour of the French Arms by raising the Siege of Gibraltar^b. To say the Truth, the Zeal of his Subjects contributed more to the Preservation of the Place, than either the Monarch’s Care, or the Skill of his Generals: For the Nobility and Gentry of the adjacent Provinces, did not content themselves with arming and marching thither their Tenants and Servants; but even coined their Plate, and pawned their Jewels, to raise Money to pay the Workmen employed in the Fortifications, which were carried on

^b Campbell’s
Nav. Hist.
vol. 4.

† Thus far all things went well, because all Parties were agreed; but from this very moment, the Business began to be clouded. The Duke of Savoy, whatever was the Reason, did not make the Expedition he might have done; for though he began his March from the Var on the 3d of July, he did not arrive before Toulon till the 15th: But when he found it was necessary to make his retreat, he did it with much greater Expedition, for he began it on the 12th and reached the Var by the 15th. Camp. Nav. Hist. vol. 4. p. 23.

‖ According to the List in the London Gazette, No. 4357, there were 46 large Men of War.

on with such amazing Alacrity, that in three Weeks time, the Town, as well as the Port, was in a pretty good state: They had, besides, in the Neighbourhood, three intrenched Camps, which however was all owing to the Dilatoriness of the Allies *. Sir Cloudefly Shovel, with the Fleet under his Command, sailed for the Hieres, after having made all the necessary Dispositions for securing a safe and constant Intercourse between the Army, and the Dominions of the Duke of Savoy, upon which the Success of the whole was thought to depend.

It was the 15th of July before the Siege of Toulon was formed; and on the 17th, Admiral Shovel landed, and assisted at a Council of War, in which many Demands were made on the Fleet for the Service of the Army; the Admiral promised all that was in his Power, which he accordingly performed. An hundred Cannon were landed from the Fleet for the Batteries, with two hundred Rounds of Powder and Shot, and a considerable Number of Seamen to serve as Gunners: Cordage, Nails, and Spikes, with all other Things wanting for the Camp (for indeed they were but poorly furnished) were supplied from the Ships; so that Affairs had a very good aspect till the 4th of August; when early in the Morning the Enemy, making a vigorous Sally, forced most, or all the Confederate Troops out of the Works, and took Possession to the Right; where they continued

* One need not wonder at the Surprise the French Court was in, when the Design of the Duke of Savoy was no longer to be doubted. Toulon was then in such a situation, that had the Duke of Savoy marched expeditiously, it is not easy to conceive how his Enterprize could have miscarried. They did not begin to fortify the City, till he passed the Var; and it was the 7th of August, N. S. before M. Tesse arrived there: Four Days sooner would have given His Royal Highness possession of Toulon, without a blow, unless the French had been mad enough to have stood a storm; in that case, the Dispute must have been over in a few Hours. As it was, the Duke of Savoy found the Enemy as strong as himself; they had 6000 Men in the Town, and 24000 in the Neighbourhood of it. The very Moment the Allies arrived, the Generals differed; his Royal Highness sent Orders to Prince Eugene to possess himself of Mount St. Ann, which he refused to do, because the Emperor had ordered him not to expose his Troops. Bad Weather too prevented the Fleet from landing Artillery and Ammunition: In all this time, the Enemy's Forces were increasing, since the Allies never had it in their Power to invest Toulon.

Campbell's Nav. Hist. vol. 4. p. 26.

continued all Day, and upon their going off destroyed them, drawing away eight or ten Guns into the Town; in which Action there were killed and wounded on the side of the Duke of Savoy above 800 Men; among whom were the Prince of Saxe Gotha, and some Officers of Distinction. This Attempt being made with such Numbers, it put the Troops under great Apprehensions; and the Generals were of Opinion, it would not be proper to carry on the Siege; since, while the Duke of Savoy's Army decreased, the Enemy continually gathered strength; insomuch that on the 6th of August, his Royal Highness desired the Admiral would immediately embark the sick and wounded, and withdraw the Cannon, in order to his raising the Siege; which from this Time was turned only to a Canonnading and Bombardment. His Royal Highness also informed him, that he purposed to decamp on the 10th in the Morning; and desired that the Fleet might accompany the Army as far as the Var; which being done, it was proposed to carry the Duke, Prince Eugene, and the Troops which could be spared for Service in that Country, on board the Fleet to Spain: But nothing being determined in this Affair, the Admiral soon after shaped his Course down the Streights*.

The very Day the Army began to march, the Fleet drew as near the Place as possible, and five Bomb-vessels supported by the lightest Frigates, and all the Boats of the Men of War, under the Command of Rear-Admiral

* Many Reasons were assigned for raising this Siege. It was said, that Sir Cloudesly Shovel disgusted the Duke of Savoy, by detaining the Payment of his Subsidies, which were due on his passing the Var. However this Fact could not be true, as the Admiral sailed the next Day; therefore he must either have paid the Money, or his Royal Highness would not have stirred a Foot further. Bishop Burnet says, the Duke was afraid of getting to Toulon before the Fleet, and in that Case, he would have wanted Provisions; all our Gazettes contradict this, and say, if he had arrived there sooner, he must have taken the Place, and all the French Magazines. There are three substantial Reasons which account for the failing of this Design. First, the want of 12000 Imperialists which were sent to Naples. Secondly, the Disagreement between his Royal Highness and Prince Eugene. Thirdly, the treacherous Correspondence held by the Countess of Soissons, Sister in Law to the Prince, and the Duke's near Relation, of which we have an Account in the London Gazette, No. 4368.

ral Dilkes, advanced into the Creek of Fort St. Lewis, and notwithstanding a prodigious Fire from the Place, bombarded the Town and Harbour from Noon till five the next Morning, with all the Success that could be expected. By this Means the Land Army had Time to quit their Camp at La Villette, which they did in five Columns in great Safety; the Enemy having something else to do, than pursue them: And as to any Attempts afterwards, his Royal Highness put it pretty much out of their Power, by marching in two Days as far, as in his approach to the Place, he had marched in six. This End had the famous Siege of Toulon, from whence the Confederates hoped, and the French feared so much. To speak impartially, one may safely set the Faults of both Generals against each other. Had the Duke of Savoy arrived a Week sooner, he had carried his Point: And on the other hand, had Marshal Tesse understood his Business, as well as Marshal Catinat, his Royal Highness had returned without an Army*. This Affair (though it miscarried in the main) proved of great service to the Allies, and had many happy Consequences, which perhaps ought to ballance the Expence of it; for besides the great Damage the French sustained in their Shipping; the burning and destroying eight of their Capital Ships; the blowing up several Magazines; the burning of above 160 Houses in Toulon, and the Devastations committed in Provence by both Armies, to the value of thirty millions of French Livres; this Enterprize (which struck a greater Terror throughout all France than what had been known there during the whole Reign of Lewis XIV.) brought these further Advantages to the common Cause: It caused a great Diversion of the Enemy's Forces, by which their Army in Germany was weakened, the Duke of Orleans's Progress after the Battle of Almanza retarded in Spain; the

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* This is the Opinion of all the French Writers, and seems to be founded on Truth; for it is certain, that except the loss his Royal Highness sustained by so quick a March, and the Desertion that attended it; he was very little incommoded by the pursuit of the Enemy; and yet the Siege and the Retreat are said to have cost him 13000 Men. *Histoire Militaire* par M. Quincy, tom. 5. p. 369. *Memoires de la Torres*, tom. 5. p. 67. *Histoire de Louis XIV.* tom. 5. p. 441.

CONJUNCT EXPEDITIONS. Part 1.

succouring of Naples prevented; and the Conquests of the Allies in Italy secured. As no Prince in the World knew better than the Duke of Savoy how to repair Faults, and recover past Miscarriages; so he gave on this Occasion a noble Proof of his high Spirit, by investing the important Fortrefs of Suza, which surrendered at Discretion on the 24th of September, and thereby gave him an open Passage into Dauphine; at the same time that it enabled him to shut the French effectually out of his Dominions¹.

¹ Burnet's Naval Hist. Compleat Hist. of Europe for 1707. Burnet. Oldmixon. Annals of Q. Anne, &c.

Our Admiral, not a little chagrined at the Miscarriage of an Expedition upon which he had set his Heart; after having assigned Sir Thomas Dilkes a Squadron of thirteen Sail for the Mediterranean Service, sailed with the rest of the Fleet from Gibraltar. On the 23d of October he had ninety Fathom Water in the Soundings, in the Afternoon he brought the Fleet to, and lay by. At six in the Evening he made sail again, and stood away under his Courses, whence it is presumed, he believed he saw the Light of Scilly; soon after which he made Signals of Danger, as several other Ships did. Sir George Byng, who was then within less than half a Mile to the Windward of him, saw the Breaches of the Sea, and soon after the Rocks called the Bishop and his Clerks; upon which the Admiral struck, and in two Minutes there was nothing more of him or his Ship seen. Besides the Association, the Eagle, the Romney, and Firebrand Fire-ship perished: The Phoenix Fire-ship ran ashore, but was happily got off again. The Royal Anne in which Sir George Byng bore his Flag, was saved by the presence of Mind of the Officers and Men; who in a Minute's Time set her Top-sails, when she was within a Ship's length of the Rocks. Lord Dursley in the St. George ran a great Hazard, and was saved by a mere Accident; he struck on the same Rocks with Sir Cloudesly, and that Wave which beat out the Admiral's Lights, set his Ship afloat: But as it does not fall under this Work to mention the Particulars, we are very glad to draw the Curtain over this melancholy Conclusion of the Toulon Expedition.

As soon as the Season for Action began to come on for the Year 1708, the Lord High-Admiral made the following Promotion: Sir John Leake was declared Admiral

miral of the White, and Admiral and Commander in chief of her Majesty's Fleet ; Sir George Byng, Admiral of the Blue ; Sir John Jennings, Vice-Admiral of the Red ; Sir John Norris, Vice-Admiral of the White ; the Lord Dursley, Vice-Admiral of the Blue ; Sir Edward Whitaker, Rear-Admiral of the Red ; and John Baker, Esq; Rear-Admiral of the White.

However before our Projects for this Year were thoroughly adjusted, the French played off one of theirs ; which put us into great Confusion. This was, the Attempt on Scotland in favour of the Chevalier de St. George ; which was the *Nomme de Guerre* they were pleased to give the Person, whom the Queen soon after distinguished by the Name of the Pretender. This was so idle an Expedition, that we shall content ourselves in saying that the Troops intended for this Attempt were about eleven or twelve Battalions. The Fleet consisted but of eight Men of War, which was commanded by the Count De Forbin, who is said to have disliked the Design, because, very probably, he knew the bottom of it ; for it is very certain the French never intended to land ; and refused the Chevalier to set him on shore, though he would have gone with his own Servants. The true Scheme of the French King was, to create a Diversion ; and (if possible) raise a Rebellion in Scotland. The French Politics in some measure had their Effect. Our public Securities fell surprizingly ; and Things would have fallen into downright Confusion, had the Fright not been quickly over. This was owing to the Care of the Admiralty, who, with incredible Diligence, fitted out a Fleet of twenty-four Men of War, with which Sir George Byng and Lord Dursley sailed for the French Coast, on the 27th of February ; and convinced the French that a real Invasion was not at all their Business *. On Sir George Byng's anchoring before Gravelin, the French Officers laid aside their Em-

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barkation ;

* The run upon the Bank so much alarmed the Exchequer, that all Ways and Means possible were thought of, to put an immediate stop to it. On the 20th of March the House of Commons came to a Resolution, that whoever designed to destroy, or lessen the public Credit, especially at a Time the Kingdom was threatened with an Invasion, was guilty of a high Crime and Misdemeanor, and was an Enemy to her Majesty and her Kingdom.

barkation; but upon express Orders from Court, were obliged to resume it; and on the 6th of March, sailed out of Dunkirk; but being taken short by contrary Winds, came to an Anchor till the 8th, and then continued their Voyage for Scotland. Sir George Byng pursued them with a Fleet of forty Ships of the Line, besides Frigates and Fire-ships. He afterwards detached Rear-Admiral Baker with a Squadron, to convoy the Troops that were sent from Ostend, and prosecuted his Expedition with the rest. On the 13th of March, the French were discovered in the Frith of Edinburgh, where they made Signals, but to no Purpose. They then steered a N. E. Course, as if they intended to have gone to St. Andrew's. Sir George Byng pursued them, and took the Salisbury, an English Prize, then in their Service, with several Persons of great Quality on board, besides five Companies of the Regiment of Bearn, and the Ship's Crew consisting of 300. But finding it was altogether impossible to come up with the Enemy, he returned with the Fleet to Leith; where he continued till he received advice of Count Forbin's getting back to Dunkirk; and then proceeded to the Downs, from whence he soon came to London. As we have now seen the Invasion, we will return to the grand Fleet under Sir John Leake, to mention his further Proceedings relative to our Purpose. The great Point the Ministry had in View this Year, was to put the Affairs of his Catholic Majesty into better Order; and to repair (if possible) the unlucky Consequences of the fatal Battle of Almanza. To this Purpose Sir John Leake was so early at Sea, that on the 27th of March he arrived at Lisbon: Here he found the Ships that had been left with Captain Hickes, which were fourteen of the Third Rate, besides small Frigates and Bomb-vessels: The Admiral at the request of the King of Portugal left three Ships to cruize off of the Tercera or Azores Islands; nor was there care wanted to guard the Streight's Mouth. But as we are not writing the Naval History, we shall be as short as we can; therefore shall proceed to say; the Admiral sailed from the River of Lisbon on the 28th of April, and on the 15th of May arrived at Barcelona; having in his Passage dispersed and taken a great part of ninety Settees and Tartanes laden with Corn and Oil

Oil for the Duke of Orleans's Army in Spain. At Barcelona he was joined by several of our Ships, and complimented by the King of Spain on his late Success. His Catholic Majesty took this Opportunity of desiring a Squadron might be left under his Direction at Barcelona, while the Fleet crossed to Italy, in order to bring over the Reinforcements he expected, and the Queen of Spain, who, it was thought, was by this time arrived at Genoa. He signified also his Desire, that the Provisions lately taken, might be laid up in his Magazines; that care might be taken for reducing Sardinia as soon as possible; and that, whenever the Service would permit, such Dispositions might be made, as would contribute to the Conquest of Sicily. As to the Provisions, the Admiral ordered they should be disposed of as the King required; but with respect to his other Demands, the Admiral thought it necessary to call a Council of War, to determine what should be executed; since it appeared absolutely impracticable to undertake them all. At this Council there were present besides himself, Sir John Norris, Sir Edward Whitaker, Sir Thomas Hardy, and two of the English Captains; as also Baron Wassenaer, and two of the Dutch. It was there after mature Deliberation, determined to leave with the King two Third Rates, one Fourth, and one Fifth of ours, and two Ships of the States General; and with the rest of the Fleet, to proceed forthwith to the Port of Vado, in order to the transporting the Horse and Foot from thence to Barcelona, as also the Queen of Spain, should she be ready when the Fleet arrived*.

The Admiral sailed in pursuance of this Resolution, and on the 29th of May safely anchored before Vado; but finding nothing in Readiness, he went to wait on

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* The great Reason that his Catholic Majesty was so desirous of having a Squadron to cruize on the Coast of Catalonia, was the Apprehensions he was then under, that the French would attempt to send a new Convoy of Provisions from Provence and Languedoc into Spain. Besides, during the absence of the Fleet, his Affairs were in such a distressed Condition, that it was absolutely necessary he should have always a Naval Force in the Neighbourhood of Barcelona, to secure his Person, in case of any unforeseen Accident; these were the Reasons that determined the Admiral and the Council of War, to comply with his Majesty's Requests to the utmost of their Power. Campbell's Nav. Hist. vol. 4. p. 71.

CONJUNCT EXPEDITIONS. Part I.

the Queen of Spain at Milan, where he arrived on the 18th of June. Upon his pressing Instances, her Majesty consented to set out immediately for Genoa, where she arrived on the 1st of July, embarked on the 2d, and arrived happily at Metaro on the 14th *.

After having conducted the Queen with all imaginable Respect, to Barcelona; the Admiral thought next of the Reduction of Sardinia; which he performed almost as soon as he arrived. He appeared before Cagliari on the 1st of August, and having summoned it, the Marquiss of Jamaica, who commanded there for King Philip, declared his Resolution of holding out to the last Extremity. Upon this the Admiral ordered the Place to be bombarded all that Night; and the next Morning Major-General Willes landed about 1800 Men, and made the necessary Dispositions for attacking the City; but the Spanish Governor, believing himself now at the last Extremity, saved them any further Trouble by coming to a speedy Capitulation. The Reduction of this Island, was of equal Advantage to the common Cause, and to that of King Charles; for it gave great Security to our Navigation, and enabled his Catholic Majesty to supply himself from thence, as often as he had Occasion, with Corn and other Provisions.

The Admiral had scarce compleated the Conquest of this Island, before his Assistance was required for the reducing another; and therefore sailing from Cagliari the 18th of August, he arrived before Port-Mahon on the 25th; but not finding Lieutenant-General Stanhope (afterwards Earl Stanhope, and Secretary of State) he sent two Ships of the Third Rate to Majorca, to hasten the Embarkation of those which were to be furnished from that Island. These returned the 1st of September with some Settees laden with Military Stores for the Army; nor was it more than two Days, before the Milford, and three Dutch Ships of War, arrived with the Lieutenant-General; being followed by five Third Rates, Convoy to fifteen Transports, that had on board them the

* As it was known Philip's Confort contributed not a little to fix the Spaniards firmly to his Interest; it was resolved to fix upon a Wife for King Charles, accordingly, the Princess Elizabeth Christiana of Wolfenbuttle was chosen. She is Mother to the Empress Queen of Hungary.

the Land Forces ; whereupon a Council of War was held of the Sea Officers ; and it was resolved, that the Ships, which were to return to Great Britain, should leave behind them, to assist in the Attempt, of the Marine Soldiers, above the middle Complement of each of them ; and that the Squadron of English and Dutch, designed to be continued abroad with Sir Edward Whitaker, should remain at Port-Mahon, to assist with their Marines and Seamen in the Reduction of that Place, so long as the Lieutenant-General should desire it, due regard being had to the Season of the Year, the time their Provisions might last, and the transporting from Naples to Barcelona, 4000 of the Emperor's Troops for the Service of his Catholic Majesty. It was also resolved that the English Ships should spare the Forces as much Bread as they could, and both they and the Dutch all their Cannon-shot, except what might be necessary for their own Defence ; and that, when every thing should be landed, which was necessary for the Siege, the Admiral should proceed to England, with one Second Rate and six Thirds of ours, and eight Dutch Ships of the Line ; but some time after this, he sent home two English and two Dutch Ships of War with the empty Transports of both Nations, in order to their being discharged. The Siege was carried on with such Vigour, that, by the end of October, the Place surrendered, and the Garrison, consisting of about a thousand Men, marched out, and were afterwards transported on board our Vessels, some to France, and others to Spain, according to the Articles of the Capitulation *. Before this Conquest of

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* After General Stanhope had transmitted an Account of the Conquest of this Island, the Earl of Sunderland, then Principal Secretary of State, wrote the following Letter to his Excellency upon that Subject. " Sir, I received on Monday the Favour of yours, of the 30th of September N. S. by Captain Moyser, with the welcome News of your taking Port-Mahon ; which though it came at the same Time as the News of taking Lisle, yet was not lessened by it : every body looking upon the taking of Port-Mahon as of the last Consequence to the carrying on the War in Spain ; besides the other Advantages (if we are wise) we may reap from it, both in War and Peace. I cannot express to you the Sense the Queen and every body here have of your Zeal and Conduct in this Affair, to which this very important Success is so much owing, &c." Burchet. Burnet. Oldmixon. London Gazette, No. 4481.

Port-Mahon, Port Fenelli, which had beneath it an Harbour no less considerable, though less noted than Port-Mahon, had submitted to the Obedience of King Charles. This Service was owing to Captain Butler, and Captain Fairborne, who battered that Fort, with the two Ships under their Command, till they obliged it to surrender. The Place was naturally strong, and was besides tolerably fortified; having four Bastions, and twelve Pieces of Brass Cannon: Yet it cost but four Hours time, and the loss of six Men killed, and four wounded. They found 100 Cannon, 3000 Barrels of Powder, and Things necessary for a good Defence. Some little Time after, the General sent a Detachment of about 100 Spaniards, with 300 or more of the Marquis Pisaro's Regiment to Citadella, the chief Town on the West side of the Island. Sir Edward Whitaker dispatched two Ships of War thither; which Place put them to no great Trouble; for the Garrison immediately surrendered, and was made Prisoners of War, consisting of 100 French, and as many Spaniards. Being thus possessed of this important Island, we had thereby the Advantage of an excellent Harbour, which, during the War, was exceedingly useful to us in the cleaning and refitting such of our Ships, as were employed in the Mediterranean; and not only Magazines of Stores were lodged there for that Purpose, but such Officers appointed to reside on the Place, as were judged requisite, and a vast Expence saved thereby to the Nation.

Whilst these Things were doing in the Mediterranean, the Squadron appointed to cruise in the Soundings, was commanded this Year by Lord Dursley, afterwards Lord Berkley. In the middle of Summer, a Resolution was taken, to make a Descent on, or at least to alarm the Coast of France; and Sir George Byng as Admiral, and Lord Dursley as Vice-Admiral of the Blue, were appointed to command the Fleet destined for that Purpose; and Lieutenant-General Erle had the Command of the Land Forces. Many things were given out with relation to this Expedition; the true Design of which, was disturbing the French Naval Armaments on their Coasts, and obliging the French Court to march great Bodies of Men to protect their Maritime Towns; which necessarily occasioned the diminishing their Army
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in Flanders. On the 27th of July, the Fleet, with the Transports, having the Troops on board, which were intended for the Descent, sailed from Spithead, and came the next Day to anchor off Deal. The 29th they stood over to the Coast of Picardy, as well to alarm, as to amuse the Enemy, and to be ready for further Orders.

The first of August the Fleet sailed again, and anchored the next Day in the Bay of Boulogne, where they made a feint of landing their Troops. The 3d they stood in pretty nigh the Shore, to observe the Condition of the Enemy. The 4th they weighed; but anchored again about Noon in the Bay of Estaples: Here a Detachment of Troops were landed; but the Project on shore, which this Descent was to have countenanced, being laid aside, an Express brought new Orders from England, upon which the Troops were re-embarked. The 7th, they stood over again to the Coast of England, and being joined by more Transports in Dover Road, arrived the 11th in the Bay of La Hogue. The 12th, they designed to have landed; but upon viewing the Coast, they found so many Troops brought together, to oppose a Descent, and so many Forts and Batteries on shore, that it was deemed impracticable. The 14th the Fleet sailed again to the Westward; but the Wind coming about the next Day they altered their Course, and lay before Cherburg, but found no prospect of doing any thing there. The same Day, the Lord Dursley in the Oxford, with six other Men of War, and Frigates, sailed to the Westward, to cruize in the Soundings. The 17th the rest of the Fleet returned to the Bay of La Hogue; but the Men growing sickly, and Provisions short, Sir George Byng returned to Spithead on the 28th*.

We have just seen the Western Coast of France alarmed, and our next Project is for the Southern. It was put in Execution in the Year 1710. The Inhabitants of

* Gazettes, No. 4458, 4459, 4460, 4461, &c. The French Historians magnify the great Advantage they obtained, by repelling this Invasion. After thus alarming the French Coast, and creating the Enemy inexpressible Trouble, the Duke of Marlborough desired this Body of Troops might be landed at Ostend, which was accordingly performed on the 23d of September, at so critical a Juncture, that it is thought, if they had not arrived as they did, the City of Lisle could scarce have been taken. Campbell's Nav. Hist. vol. 4. p. 81, 82.

of the Cevennes having given the French King a great deal of Disturbance, and having numbers of their Countrymen in Foreign Service, it was proposed to the British Ministry, that notwithstanding the Miscarriage of former Attempts, something should again be undertaken in their Favour; and to enforce this Advice, it was observed, that the Camisars, then in Arms, were within fifteen Leagues of Montpellier, and that it was possible to land our Troops at Port Cette, a Cape of the Coast of Languedoc, upon the Lake Thau, near that of Maguelonne, and the small Town of Frontignan, in 43 Deg. 24 Min. of Northern Latitude, and 21 Deg. 20 Min. of Eastern Longitude; it was imagined they might have been landed within a single League of that City †. Upon this, the Ministry themselves conceiving such an Expedition might disconcert the Enemy's Designs in Spain, or at least facilitate King Charles's Enterprizes in Catalonia, resolved to send a Gentleman to Spain, thoroughly instructed as to the whole Affair, with Orders to propose it to General Stanhope, and Sir John Norris, upon whose Approbation, and the Consent of the King of Spain, the Design was to be immediately put in Execution, by the Fleet then on the Coast of Catalonia. It must be allowed, that the Project was very well formed; for had our Troops fixed themselves for three Days at Cette, we might with the Assistance of the Duke of Savoy, have given the French King more trouble, than he had ever met with from any of our Projects during the War. For his own Subjects, then in Arms against him, were a bold, daring, hardy people, and with very little encouragement from us, would have formed an Army of 20 or 30 thousand Men, to whom all the French Exiles from every part of Europe would have resorted: And as among them there were many experienced Officers, it is not easy to conceive, what Consequences the Affair might have

† Near the Cape, Lewis XIV constructed a handsome City and a good Port, called Port Lewis, between the Years 1664 and 1666, five Leagues from Agues, where the Royal Channel of Languedoc begins, and empties itself into the Garonne at Toulouse, and thereby joins the Mediterranean and Ocean together, which greatly facilitates the Trade of those interior Parts of France. The first Attempt to navigate it was made the 1st of February, 1672. This City is five Leagues from the Isle and Fort of Brescou.

have had, or to what extent the Flame might have spread^k. On the Arrival of this Gentleman from England, General Stanhope, who was an enterprising Officer, eagerly embraced the Scheme, and prevailed upon King Charles, to permit a body of Troops, though indeed it was but a very small one, to embark on board the Fleet. This Resolution being taken, was communicated to Sir John Norris, who on the 6th of July held a great Council of War, in which it was resolved, to send an Express to the Duke of Savoy, and to embark the Forces immediately, that an Affair of such Importance might not suffer by delay. These Troops, which consisted of no more than the Regiment of Colonel Stanhope, and 300 Men from Port-Mahon, were commanded by Major General Seiffan, a Native of Languedoc, and a very good Officer. The Fleet sailed from Barcelona on the 9th, and next Morning after their Arrival before Cette, by break of Day, the Troops, which were but 700 Men, who had landed the Evening before without any opposition, marched directly towards the Town. Sir John Norris appointed some Ships to batter the Fort at the Mole-Head, upon which the Inhabitants retired to the Church, and soon after both Town and Fort surrendered; as in the Evening of the next Day, did the Town of Agde; so that now we had firm Footing in the Enemy's Country: and this Expedition had a more promising Appearance than any that had been hitherto taken against France; our only Misfortune was, that there were so few Men spared for so important a Design^l. On the 17th, Major General Seiffan received advice, that the Duke of Roquelaure was advancing with 400 Dragoons, and 4000 Militia to ford the Lake and repossess Cette; upon which, the Major General thought proper to leave 140 Men to secure the Bridge of Agde, and marched with the rest of the Forces to oppose the Enemy; writing at the same time to the Admirals Norris and Sommelsdyke, to desire them to send all the Boats of the Fleet, with as many Men as they could spare, into the Lake to attack the Enemy in their Passage through the same; which was done accordingly. The Duke of Roquelaure seeing his Design prevented by these Precautions, returned

^k Burnet. Oldmixon. Compleat History of Europe for the Year 1710. Annals of Q. Anne. Pointer's Chronological History.

^l Oldmixon. Burnet. Political State for the Year 1710. Compleat Hist. of Europe for the same Year.

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to Meze; and the Admirals and General detached a Major with 150 Men, to reinforce the Detachment left to secure the Bridge of Agde; but at the same time, advice came that this important Post had been abandoned upon a false Alarm; nevertheless it was resolved, to prevent the Enemy, and to return to Agde with Shallops by Sea, in order to regain that Post; but the very Moment that this was to be executed, a strong Wind happened to come quite contrary, which obliged them to abandon that Design, and direct all their Care to secure Cette. In short, the Duke De Noailles arrived at Agde the same Day they were to return thither: They began then to think of the Defence of the Mountain of Cette, and posted there the few Troops that they had in the Vineyards, surrounded with a slight Wall, but with Orders to retire; yet not before the Arrival of the Enemy. The Officer who commanded 50 Men, did not rightly apprehend this Order, or else he was surprized; for scarce had a few Dragoons fired upon our Men, before they surrendered to them at Discretion; the other Troops retired in disorder, though the necessary Dispositions had been made to support them in their Retreat; and the several Officers did all that could be expected from their Courage and Experience to rally the Troops. While these were re-embarking on the 17th, a Captain was left in the Fort, with 50 Men to guard it: It was not accessible, but on the side of the Mole, and was defended by two pieces of Cannon in the Place that leads to it; besides the Enemy had no Boats. The Shallops were just by the Fort the whole Morning; but Admiral Norris had no sooner put off to go on board his Ship, but the Enemy sent word to the Captain, that unless he immediately surrendered the Fort, he must expect no Quarter. Whereupon the Officer let down the Bridge and surrendered at discretion, even before the Troops were re-embarked. The Duke de Roquelaure sent them back the Captain who had so ill defended the Fort, in Exchange for a Burgher, who had been released before; but the Captain was set on shore again, and told, that since he had been so complaisant to M. de Roquelaure, as to deliver up the Fort to him; it was but reasonable
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he should be near the Duke's Person, and treated according to his merit *.

Thus ended an Expedition, from which much was expected, but had no other good Effect, except obliging the Enemy to recall a body of their Troops from Rouffillon, giving the Duke De Noailles an Opportunity to make a very remarkable March, of which the French have boasted excessively.

The next Conjunct Affair we have to speak of, was attended with much better Success. 'Tis true, we must go to a very different part of the World for it.

On the 1st of January, 1709, the Sieur de Saintovide, the French King's Lieutenant at Placentia, took the Fort of St. John on the East side of Newfoundland by Scalade; in which Action the Governor was wounded and made Prisoner, as were the Soldiers of the Garrison, consisting of 100 Men. The next day, the Fort at the Mouth of the Harbour, built on a Rock and extremely well fortified, surrendered also; the Garrison consisting of 60 Men, which were made Prisoners of War ^m.

This check had given the Ministry great Disquiet, notwithstanding it was some time since. They found themselves at this Juncture in a very ticklish Situation; and were therefore under a kind of Necessity of providing against new Clamours, which they were sensible would be set up, in case the French were not effectually rooted out in a Place which so nearly affected our Merchants; and upon which their Commerce with Spain, Portugal and Italy, so much depended. To provide therefore, in the best manner possible, for so important an undertaking, they made choice of two Officers of great Worth and Experience; one to command the Squadron, the other the Land Forces that were to be put on board it. The former of these was Captain George Martin, and the latter Colonel Francis Nicholson; who was sent to Boston in New England, to provide every thing necessary for the Expedition, and to draw together such Forces as could be spared from that Colony; fo

^mJournal Historique de Louis XIV. par P. Daniel, p. 256, 257.

* Father Daniel gives us a very pompous Account of this Affair. He confesses, it was a thing of great Consequence, since, if the English had become Masters of that Port, they would have been able to support the Rebels in France, which must have brought the greatest Miseries upon that Kingdom, &c.

so as that they might be able to embark as soon as the Squadron should arrive. This Squadron consisted of the Dragon, a 50 Gun Ship, commanded by Captain George Martin; the Falmouth, of 50 Guns, by Captain Walter Rydel; the Leostaff, of 32 Guns, by Captain George Gordon; the Feversham, of 36 Guns, by Captain Robert Paston; and the Star Bomb-ketch, by Captain Thomas Rothfort; to which was afterwards added, the Chester, a 50 Gun Ship, commanded by Captain Thomas Matthews. Captain Martin arriving in New England, found all things properly adjusted for the Execution of this Enterprize against the French Settlement without delay; in Consequence of which, he proceeded from Nantasket Road the 18th of September, with the Dragon, Falmouth, Leostaff, Feversham, and Star Bomb-vessel, the Provence Gally, two Hospital Ships, 31 Transports, and 2000 Land Forces; having sent the Chester before to endeavour to intercept any Supplies which the Enemy might attempt to send to Port-Royal; and on the 24th in the Afternoon, he anchored at the Entrance of the Harbour. A Council of War was called, and pursuant to what was agreed, the small Embarkations and Boats were got ready to receive the Men and put them on shore.

Things being in this Situation, on the 25th of September, about six in the Morning, Colonel Vetch and Colonel Reading, with 50 Men each, together with Mr. Forbes the Engineer, went on shore to view the Ground for landing the Troops; and soon after Colonel Nicholson himself with a Body of Men landed; the Enemy firing at the Boats in which they were, from their Cannon and Mortars, but with no great Success. Colonel Vetch with 500 Men on the North-side, so lined the Shore, that he protected the landing of the Cannon, Ammunition and Stores; and the Mortar being fixed on board the Bomb-vessel, which driving up with the Tide of Flood within Cannon-shot of the Fort both that Day and the next, bombarded the Enemy, and in a great measure induced them to capitulate sooner than otherwise they would have done: Not but they were very much galled in the Attempts made on them, and the warm Fire from the Artillery on shore; but the 28th, 29th and 30th, the Bomb-vessel was not able

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able to throw any Shells, by reason of hard Gales of Wind. At a Council of War, held on the 1st of October, two Letters, which were received from Monsieur Subercase, directed to Colonel Nicholson, were taken into Consideration, together with the Answers which he had made thereunto; and the Preliminaries being agreed on, the Governor with the Garrison marched out of the Fort*. Our Troops took possession of it soon after, with Drums beating and Colours flying; where hoisting the Union Flag, they in Honour of her Majesty, called the Place Annapolis Royal. A sufficient number of Men being left therein, the Ships and Troops proceeded to New-England, as soon as all things necessary were settled; from whence Captain Martin departed not long after, in order to put in Execution the remaining Part of his Instructions, and prepare for his return to England.

This Expedition, which was one of the most fortunate, we had undertaken in this part of the World owed its Success in a great measure to the Conduct of Colonel Francis Nicholson, who maintained a perfect Agreement with Commodore Martin, and the rest of his Officers; who on their part omitted nothing that was demanded for the use of the Troops, and supported them very cordially upon all Occasions with their Boats and Men. Another thing that contributed not a little to this happy Event, was, the Troops being seasoned that were sent upon this Expedition, and having Officers well acquainted, not only with their Duty, but with the Climate and Situation of Places; which in Affairs of this nature are Circumstances of the utmost Consequenceⁿ. Thus ended the Operations material to our Purpose in the West-Indies. But before we leave America, it is necessary we should give an Account of that famous Expedition against the French Settlements in Canada: And should we be a little longer than ordinary about it, (as it makes so great a Figure in the French Histories, and on which there are so many Reflections

* This Capitulation is worth the Reader's Notice, in as much as it contains the Terms upon which we were put in Possession of the Province of Acadia, as the French call it, or as we style it, the Province of Nova Scotia. The Articles may be seen in Campbell's Naval Hist. vol. 4. p. 131, 132.

ⁿ Campb. Nav. Hist. vol. 4. p. 130.

fections in our own) we hope our Readers will excuse it, especially as it is the last we have to mention, both in this War and Reign. We are only sorry to say, it has so seldom been in our Power to entertain them with two successful Expeditions one after the other. We mean such as have been put in Execution by our Countrymen. The Disturbance given us by the French in North America, and the Apprehensions our Colonies were under, from the strength of their Settlements in Canada, had occasioned the Earl of Godolphin often to express a desire of attempting something of Consequence in this Part of the World, that might exalt our own Character, and humble that of the French. Sir Hovenden Walker informs us, that he was consulted by that great Minister, in reference to this Design upon Quebec; it seems to have been principally under the Direction of Mr. Secretary St. John.

However, Sir Hovenden Walker, Rear-Admiral of the White, was appointed to command in Chief, and General Hill, Brother to the Favourite Lady Masham, was appointed Commander of about 5000 Land Forces, that were to be employed in this Design. As it was the first, and indeed the only great Undertaking of a new Ministry, it may be supposed, that they were in earnest, and really in hopes of raising their Reputation, by giving an extraordinary Blow to the French Power in those Parts. This one is more inclined to believe, when we consider Sir Hovenden Walker's Line of Battle; which consisted of eleven Men of War, a Frigate, two Bomb-vessels, and their Tender. There were besides thirty-three Transports, with seven Regiments, and a Battalion of Marines; making in all upwards of 5000 Men, and eight Transports and Tenders belonging to the Train^o.

^o See the Appendix to Sir Hovenden Walker's full Account of the late Expedition to Canada, p. 188—191.

The Instructions given by her Majesty to Sir Hovenden, required him, as soon as the General and Troops were embarked, to proceed directly to Boston; and should he judge it convenient, he was to detach in his Passage, a Ship of War with the Artillery, Stores, Cloaths, and other Necessaries to New York; but, if otherwise, he was to send them from Boston. On his arrival at that Place, he was to take two other Ships under his Command; and should the General think it necessary,

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necessary, he was to assist him in exchanging the Garrison of Annapolis Royal, and in transporting the old Garrison, with Stores, back to New England. He was, when at Boston; to take under his Care all Transports, Ketches, Hoys, Boats, and other necessaries provided in New England; and as soon as the Forces from thence, and those raised there, should be on board, he was to sail with them all into the River of St. Lawrence up to Quebec, in order to attack that Place; and being arrived, to make a proper Disposition of the Ships for that Purpose, as well as of such, as might be fit to employ before the Town, as others, upon consulting with the General, to pass that Place, and proceed up the River towards the Lake; not only to prevent any Communication with Quebec, but to protect the Canoes and Boats with the Forces from New York: to which End, he was empowered to convert some of the small Vessels sent from hence or New England into Frigates, suitable to the Navigation of the upper part of the River; and to man and arm them accordingly. At New England, or elsewhere, he was to assist the General with Vessels and Boats proper for landing the Forces, and re-embarking them, but more especially upon his arrival at Quebec, or for transporting them from place to place. He was also ordered, to send to the General such Marine Soldiers, as should be on board the Squadron, when he should demand the same; which he was to have the chief Command of while employed on shore; besides which, he was to assist him with such a Number of Seamen, Gunners, Guns, Ammunition, and other Stores from the Ships, as he should demand for the Land Service, or as should otherwise be found necessary. He was strictly required to lose no Time in proceeding to New England, and from thence to the River St. Lawrence; nor in putting in Execution the Service of Quebec: but that on his part, all Expedition should be used in the Reduction of the Place, and of the Country of Canada, or New France, and in the seasonable return of the Squadron and Transports.

^p See the Instructions at large, in the before mentioned Appendix, p. 166.

He was further instructed, (which shews, this Design had been thoroughly considered, in case of Success) to leave such a Naval Force as he thought proper in the River St. Lawrence; and to make use of any of the

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Enemy's Ships that might be taken, to bring into Europe such Governors, regular Troops, religious Persons, or others, whom the General by his Instructions was directed to send away from Canada, with whatever necessaries for their Transportation he should think requisite. These Services being taken care of, he was to take on board the General, (should he think fit to return) and such of the Forces as should not be found necessary to leave in Canada; and should the Season of the Year permit, he was to proceed to attack Placentia in Newfoundland, in such a manner as General Hill should direct: This Service being over, he was to order such Ships of War as did not properly belong to his Squadron, to their several Stations; directing the Masters of the Transports, which he should have no further Occasion for, to go and seek Freight to ease the Public of the Charge of them, and for the Benefit of the British Commerce*.

On the 29th of April 1711, Sir Hovenden Walker sailed with the Men of War and Transports under his Command, and arrived at New England on the 24th of June. The Admiral was far from meeting in New England, that hearty Zeal for the Service he expected; for being obliged to take up a great quantity of Provisions for the Service of the Fleet and Transports, he found the utmost Difficulty therein. For the Person who was depended upon for that Service, not only refused it, but endeavoured to serve his private Interest, at the expence of the Public; by buying up great Quantities on his own Account, in order to vend them again to whoever should undertake to supply the Fleet; so that by the Slowness of the Colony, and Avarice of this Person, the whole Expedition was ruined. The Admiral and General did all that was in their Power, by Memorials and Solli-

* Besides these Instructions, the Admiral was furnished with Copies of those sent to the respective Governors of Massachusetts Bay and New Hampshire; the additional Instructions sent to the Governor of New York, as well as those to Francis Nicholson, Esq; and the Governors of Connecticut, Rhode-Island, Providence, and Pennsylvania, that he might not be in any Doubt as to what was, or was not in the power of such Persons, as he in the Course of his Expedition might have Occasion to apply to; which was very useful, and proper in his Circumstances.

Sollicitations to remedy this Inconvenience, but to little or no Purpose; the Inhabitants being extreamly sensible of their own Interest, and deaf to every thing else. General Nicholson came to Boston, and gave all the assistance in his Power; so did some other public spirited Persons, without which, it had been impossible for the Fleet and Forces to have proceeded at all; as it was; they found it impracticable to leave Boston before the 30th of July; when with a few Pilots on board, who professed their own Ignorance; and went against their Will, Sir Hovenden Walter sailed for Quebec.

On the 14th of August he reached the Bird-islands, which lie about 250 Leagues from Cape Anne; and having sent three Ships to cruize between Placentia and Cape Breton, on an Island opposite to Newfoundland, expecting them to join him in his Passage to Quebec; the one of them took; and sent into Boston before he sailed thence, a Ship of about 120 Tons and ten Guns; that had seventy Men on board, whereof thirty were Soldiers for the Garrison of Quebec. Four small Frigates which were stationed at New York and Virginia, he ordered to join him off of Cape Breton, being empowered by her Majesty's Orders so to do, should he find it necessary; and this he did chiefly, for the Use they might be to him in his proceeding up the River to Quebec; which Navigation most of the People with whom he had spoke, represented to be very dangerous: Therefore he rightly judged the Humber and Devonshire, which mounted eighty Guns each; too big to be ventured thither; for which reason he sent them home; and shifted his Flag on board the Edgar, a Ship of seventy Guns; General Hill removing into the Windsor, which carried ten less: but having Information that two Ships of War were expected very suddenly from France; he ordered the afore-said Ships to cruize on the opening of the Bay of St. Lawrence; until the last of August, and then to pursue their Voyage home. He had very fair Weather till he got into the Bay, when it became changeable; sometimes thick and foggy, and other while calm and little Winds; and the Navigation appeared to be intricate and hazardous. The 18th of August, when he was off of Gaspe Bay, near the entrance of the River Canada, it blew fresh at N. W. and lest the Transports should

^a See Sir Hovenden Walter's Account. Burchet. Compleat History of Europe for Year 1711. Annals of Q. Anne, &c.

^r Sir Hoven-
den's Account,
p. 121.

be separated, and blown to Leeward, he anchored in the Bay, where he waited for an Opportunity to proceed up the River^r.

^s The Admiral
has published
an Account of
the Ships and
Men that were
lost, by this
unlucky Acci-
dent.

On the 20th of August the Wind veering Westerly, the Admiral had hopes of gaining a Passage; but the next Day in the Afternoon it proved foggy, and continued so till Night, and the following Day, with very little Wind till towards Evening, when there was an extraordinary thick Fog, and it began to blow hard at E. and E. S. E. which rendered it impossible to steer any Course with Safety, having neither sight of Lands, Soundings, or Anchorage. He by the advice of the Pilots then on board him, both English and French, who were the best in the Fleet, made the Signal for the Ships to bring to with their Heads Southward, at which time it was about eight at Night; believing that in that Posture, they should not come near the North Shore, but rather have driven with the Stream in the middle Channel; but on the contrary, as they lay with their Heads Southward, and the Winds Easterly, in two Hours Time he found himself on the North Shore among the Rocks and Islands, at least fifteen Leagues farther than the Log-line gave, where the whole Fleet had like to have been lost; the Men escaping the Danger with the utmost Difficulty; eight Transport Ships were cast away, and almost 900 Officers, Soldiers, and Seamen perished^s. The French Pilot (who, as it was said, had been forty Voyages in this River, and eighteen of them in Command) informed him, that when it happens to be so foggy as to prevent the sight of the Land, it is impossible to judge of the Currents, or to steer by any Course; for he himself had lost two Ships, and been another time cast away upon the North Shore, when he judged himself near the South; insomuch that it was extream difficult to procure Men in France, to proceed on so dangerous a Navigation; since almost every Year they suffered Shipwreck^{*}.

Sir

* Sir Hovenden himself gives Mr. Burchet this Account, in a Letter, sent him Express by Captain Cook of the Leopard, dated from on board the Edgar in Spanish River Bay, Sept. 12. 1711. And indeed all the French Writers who pretend to give us a Description of Canada, and the River of St. Lawrence, confirm it. Campbell's Nav. Hist. vol. 4. p. 164.

Sir Hovenden Walker plied two Days after this with fresh Gales West and South, in order to save what Men and Stores he could. On the 25th of August, by the Advice and Consent of the General, he called a Council of War, consisting of all the Sea Officers, wherein great Debates arose, most of the Captains being rather inclined to censure the Admiral's Conduct, in not calling a Council of War before he left Boston, than to give him any Reason to grow fond of Councils of War, by the Advice they gave him in this. Sir Hovenden told them plainly, that if he had acted amiss in what they mentioned, he was to answer for it in another Place; that the Nature of the Service, and the Circumstances they were in, required them to confine their Deliberations to another Matter; therefore, in order to cut short these unnecessary Debates, he would propose the single Question, proper for their present Consideration; which was, Whether they thought it practicable to get up to Quebec or not? Upon which they came unanimously to the following Resolution, viz. "That by Reason of
 " the Ignorance of the Pilots, it was wholly impracticable to go up the River St. Lawrence, with the Men
 " of War and Transports as far as Quebec; as also the
 " uncertainty and rapidity of the Currents, as by fatal Experience was found*." Upon this, all farther Operations for the Voyage to Quebec were stopt. The Admiral proceeded to Spanish River, in the Island of Breton, being the appointed Rendezvous, where all the Ships did not join till the 7th of September †.

The Admiral being very sensible of the Reproaches that would be cast upon him, should he, after failing in his Design on Quebec, return home without so much as attempting Placentia, communicated his Thoughts very freely to the General and some Land Officers upon that Head. However at a general Council of War of Sea and

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Land

* This Resolution was not taken upon any hasty Resentment of the late Accident; but after mature Deliberation, and very strict Examination of every Pilot aboard, who all agreed in confessing their Ignorance; and Colonel Vetch, who declared himself the best Pilot for that River, now desired to be excused from meddling with Sea Affairs, and said, he could not take Charge so much as of a single Ship. Campb. Nav. Hist. vol. 4. p. 165.

† Sir Hovenden Walker's Account, p. 131. Burchet. Compleat History of Europe for the Year 1711. Life of Q. Anne.

Land Officers held on the 8th of September, it was unanimously determined, that any Attempt upon Placentia, considering the Lateness of the Season, and their Circumstances, was utterly impracticable. The Admiral had now nothing more to do, than to provide for his safe return home. Which he accordingly did, meeting with no further Accidents to add to his Misfortunes; but arrived safely at St. Helen's on the 9th of October 1711, with the Fleet and Transports under his Command.

This was the last Conjunct Expedition of this War; unless we mention that of Monsieur Cassard, which was put in Execution, whilst a Negotiation was carrying on between the British and French Ministers. The French Ministry, who knew the Importance of being well at that Time with the People of Great Britain, absolutely disclaimed that Commander, insisted, that he had only general Instructions which he had misapplied, and proper Satisfaction should be given. It was a kind of predatory Business upon the Island of St. Jago and Montserrat, carrying away and doing as much Mischief as possible. The French met with little Resistance, and got off at the approach of our Ships. They also did some damage on the Coast of Antigua; after which they stood over to the Continent, and attacked the Dutch Settlement of Surinam, and obliged the Inhabitants to pay them 800,000 Pieces of Eight, by way of Contribution; this was in the Month of October 1712. This Expedition was projected (as is imagined by some who were well acquainted with the Politics of the French Court^t) in revenge of that undertaken against Quebec: but is not of Consequence enough to detain our Readers with every minute Particular; wherefore we shall finish here all that concerns this Work, during this War and Reign; the famous Treaty of Utrecht being signed on the first of April 1713. And on the 1st of August 1714 about seven o'Clock in the Morning her Majesty breathed her last at Windsor. With Queen Anne's Death, we will close this long Chapter.

^t Campbell's
Nav. Hist. vol.
4. p. 185.

C H A P. VII.

BY a Statute made in the 12th Year of King William III. for limiting the Succession of the Crown; by this Statute, after the Death of the Queen, then Princess Anne, without Issue, it was to pass to the most Illustrious House of Hanover, as the next Protestant Heirs. Accordingly on the Demise of Queen Anne, George Lewis, Elector of Hanover, was called to the Succession.

His Majesty King George I. arrived from Holland on the 18th of September, and made his public Entry on the 20th, taking the Reins of Government into his own Hand.

This Reign furnishes very little relating to Conjoint Expeditions. However in the Year 1718, a great number of large Ships were put into Commission, and other measures pursued, that rendered it evident, the Fleet now fitting out would not prove a Fleet of Parade. Upon which, M. De Monteleone, the Spanish Minister, who was a Man of Foresight and Intrigue, being alarmed at these Appearances, represented in a Memorial, dated the 18th of March, "That so powerful an Armament in time of Peace, could not but cause umbrage to the King his Master, and alter the good understanding that reigned between the two Crowns." The King answered, "It was not his Intention to conceal the Subject of that Armament; that he designed soon to send Admiral Byng, with a powerful Squadron into the Mediterranean, to maintain the Neutrality of Italy, against those who should seek to disturb it." The reason assigned for acting with so much Vigour, was the Dispositions made in Spain, for attacking the Island of Sicily, and the Hardships that were put upon the British Merchants. The Admiral sailed the 15th of June 1718, from Spithead, with 20 Ships of the Line of Battle, 2 Fire-ships, 2 Bomb-vestels, an Hospital-ship, and a Store-ship. On the 8th of July, before he made Cape Spartel, advice was brought him of the mighty Preparations the Spaniards

had made at Barcelona, and of their Fleet sailing from thence to the Eastward. In passing by Gibraltar, Vice-Admiral Cornwall joined him with the Argyle and Charles Galley. The Fleet on the 23d of July, anchored off Port-Mahon, where the Admiral was to land four Regiments of Foot, which he carried from England to relieve the Soldiers in that Garrison, who were to embark and serve on board the Squadron. But as it does not belong to this Work to give a particular Detail of the Motions of this Fleet, we shall only say, that in the Month of August, the Admiral had a fair fight of the whole Spanish Fleet lying by, and drawn into a Line of Battle, consisting of 27 Sail of Men of War, small and great, besides Fire-ships, Bomb-vessels, Gallies, &c. and on the 11th of the same Month, an Action happened between the two Fleets off of Cape Passaro in Sicily, in which the English received but little Damage, and the Spanish Fleet was totally ruin'd.

We could not well avoid mentioning what we have, to bring us to the Declaration of War, which was publish'd in form against the Crown of Spain, on the 17th of December, 1718.

The first Design of that Court after this Declaration, was to have sent a considerable Body of Troops, under the Command of the late Duke of Ormond, into the West of England. The Spanish Fleet intended for this Expedition, consisted of five Men of War, and about forty Transports; it sailed from Cadiz on the 23d of February, O. S. On the 28th it met with a violent Storm, which entirely dispersed them: Thus this Design of the Spaniards, whatever it was, became abortive. A very small part, however, of this Embarkation landed in the Shire of Ross in Scotland, though to very little Purpose.

While the Spaniards were pleasing themselves with chimerical Notions of Invasions, it was impossible to effect against us; our Admiral in the Mediterranean was distressing them effectually: But as the Sicilian Expedition (which was the present Business) was carried into Execution by German Troops, in Conjunction with our Fleet and few Troops aboard, we shall content ourselves in saying, it owed its Success as much to the English Admiral, as to the German General; for it
does

does not come strictly within the bounds of this Work, to speak more of the motions of a British Fleet, attending a Land Army for the Service of the Emperor.

However, the more effectually to humble Spain, and at the same time convince the World, that we could not only contrive, but execute an Invasion; a secret Design was formed for sending a Fleet and Army to the Coast of Spain, which was very successfully performed. On the 21st of September, 1719, Vice-Admiral Mighels, with a strong Squadron under his Command, and the Transports having on board the Forces, commanded by the late Lord Viscount Cobham, consisting of about 6000 Men, sailed from St. Helen's, and the first Account we had of them, is comprized in the following Letter ".

" His Excellency the Lord Viscount Cobham, with
 " the Men of War commanded by Vice-Admiral
 " Mighels, and the Transports with the Forces on
 " board, arriving on the Coast of Galicia, kept cruizing
 " three days in the station appointed for Captain John-
 " son to join them; but having no News of him, and
 " the Danger of lying on the Coast at this Season of the
 " Year, with Transports, rendering it necessary to take
 " some Measures of acting without him, and the Wind
 " offering fair for Vigo, his Lordship took the Resolu-
 " tion of going thither.

" On the 29th of September, O. S. they entered
 " the Harbour of Vigo; and the Grenadiers being im-
 " mediately landed, about three Miles from the Town,
 " drew up on the Beach; some Peasants fired from the
 " Mountains, at a great distance, without any Execu-
 " tion. Lord Cobham went on Shore with the Grena-
 " diers, and the Regiments followed as fast as the Boats
 " could carry them. That Night, and the following
 " Day and Night, the Troops lay upon their Arms.
 " In the mean while, Provisions for four Days were
 " brought on shore, and Guards were posted in several
 " Avenues, to the distance of above a Mile up the
 " Country. On the 1st of October, his Lordship
 " moved with the Forces nearer the Town, and en-
 " camped at a strong Post, with the left to the Sea,
 " near the Village Boas, and the right extended to-
 " wards the Mountains. This Motion of the Army,

" and

" Annals of
 King George.
 Oldmixon's
 Hist. Historical
 Register. Poli-
 tical State, &c.

CONJUNCT EXPEDITIONS. Part 1.

“ and some Parties that were ordered to view the Town
 “ and Citadel, gave the Enemy some Apprehensions,
 “ that Preparations were making to attack them.
 “ Whereupon they set fire to the Carriages of the
 “ Cannon of the Town, nailed those Cannon, and by
 “ all their Motions, seemed to be determined to abandon
 “ the Town to the care of the Magistrates and In-
 “ habitants; and to retire with the regular Troops into
 “ the Citadel. Upon which, Lord Cobham sent to sum-
 “ mon the Town to surrender, which the Magistrates
 “ made no difficulty of doing: The same Night Lord
 “ Cobham ordered Brigadier Honeywood, with 800
 “ Men, to take Post in the Town, and Fort St. Se-
 “ bastian, which the Enemy had also abandoned.

“ On the 3d of October, a Bomb-vessel began to
 “ bombard the Citadel, but with little Execution, by
 “ Reason of the great distance. That Evening, the
 “ large Mortars, and the Coehorn Mortars were landed
 “ at the Town; between 40 and 50 of them, great and
 “ small, placed on a Battery, under Cover of Fort St.
 “ Sebastian, began in the Night to play upon the Cita-
 “ del, and continued it four Days with great Success.
 “ The fourth Day the Battering Cannon was ordered
 “ to be landed, and with some others, found in the
 “ Town, to be placed on the Battery of Fort St. Se-
 “ bastian. At the same time a Summons was sent to
 “ the Governor, to surrender; signifying, that should
 “ he stay till our Battery of Cannon was ready, he
 “ should have no Quarter. Colonel Ligonier was sent
 “ with this Message, but found the Governor Don-
 “ Joseph de los Cereos, had the Day before been carried
 “ out of the Castle wounded; the Lieutenant-Colonel,
 “ who commanded in his Absence, desired leave and
 “ time to send to the Marquis de Risburg, at Tuy, for
 “ his Directions: But being told the Hostilities would
 “ be continued, if they did not send their Capitulation
 “ without any delay, they soon complied.”

* This Relation
 was published
 in the London
 Gazette, dated
 Whitehall,
 Oct. 2. 1719.

The Capitulation consisted of ten Articles, by which
 the Garrison were permitted to march out, with Honours
 of War; and the Place with all its Works, Magazines,
 and whatever they contained, were delivered up to his
 Excellency the Lord Cobham.

On the 10th of the same Month in the Morning, the
 Garrison

Garrison marched out, consisting of 469 Men (Officers included) having had above 300 killed or wounded by our Bombs. The Place it is said, cost us but two Officers, and three or four Men killed. There were in the Town about 60 Pieces of large Iron Cannon, which the Enemy abandoned, and these they nailed and damaged, as much their time would give them leave; in the Citadel were 43 Pieces of Cannon, of which 15 were Brasses, and two large Mortars, besides above 2000 Barrels of Powder, and several Chests of Arms amounting to about 8000 Muskets; all which Stores and Brass Ordnance were lodged there from on board the Ships, that were to have visited Great Britain in the preceding Spring; and the very Troops that gave up Vigo, were also of those which were to have been employed in that Expedition: Seven Ships were seized in the Harbour, three of which were fitting up for Privateers, one to carry 24 Guns, the rest were trading Vessels.

Vigo being thus taken, Major-General Wade was ordered to embark with 1000 Men on board four Transports, and to sail to the upper end of the Bay of Vigo; which he accordingly did on the 14th, and having landed his Men, marched to Ponta-Vedra, which Place surrendered without Opposition; the Magistrates in the Town meeting them with the Keys. In this Place was taken a great many Cannon and Mortars, both of Brasses and Iron, with 2000 small Arms, and some Bombs, &c. all which (except four 24 Pounders) were embarked; and Major-General Wade returned with his Booty and Troops to Vigo on the 23d. The next Day, Lord Cobham finding it would be impossible to maintain his Ground any longer in Spain, ordered the Forces to be embarked, as likewise the Cannon, &c. which being done by the 27th, he sailed that Day for England, where he arrived the 11th of November, having lost in the whole Expedition about 300 of his Men, who were killed, died, or deserted*.

This is the only Conjunct Affair we have to speak of in this War and Reign. In the beginning of the Month of February in the following Year, the King of Spain acceded to the Quadruple Alliance; and as a consequence thereof, a Cessation of Arms was soon published. King George the First died at his Brother's Palace,

* Historical Register. Political State, &c.

Palace in the City of Osnaburgh, on the 11th Day of June, 1727, about one in the Morning, in the 13th Year of his Reign, and the 68th of his Life.

An Express arriving on the 14th of June, with an Account of the late King's Death, his present Majesty King George II. repaired from Richmond (where he received this Intelligence) to Leicester House; and the Members of the Privy-Council being assembled, were sworn a-new.

The thirteen first Years of this Reign, affords us nothing relative to Conjunct Expeditions. However, notwithstanding we were at Peace all this time with the Spaniards; they acted by their continual Depredations in the West-Indies, as if they had been at War with us.

They went on ever since the Treaty of Seville, incessantly insulting and distressing the Commerce of Great Britain; so that in 1737, Memorials were presented to the Court of Spain, by the British Ambassador at Madrid. He was amused with evasive Answers. However, in the following Year, a Convention was concluded and ratified between the King of Great Britain, and the King of Spain, who had obliged himself to make reparation to the British Subjects for their Losses. This Convention was but of a short continuance: The Nations grew more and more incens'd against each other, and War was denounced against

* Smollet's Hist. of England, Book 9. Chap. 4 and 6.

Spain on the 23d of October 1739. Admiral Vernon had once commanded a Squadron in Jamaica: He was perfectly well acquainted with those Seas, and in a Debate upon the Spanish Depredations, he chanced to affirm, that Porto Bello on the Spanish Main, might be easily taken: Nay, he even undertook to reduce it with six Ships only. Upon this he was sent Commander in chief to the West-Indies. On the 13th Day of March 1740, a Ship arrived from the West-Indies, dispatched by Admiral Vernon, with an Account of his having taken Porto Bello, on the Isthmus of Darien, with six Ships only, and demolished all the Fortifications of the Place †. The Spaniards acted with

† Captain William Parker of Plymouth, was fitted out by some Merchants to cruize on the Spaniards in the West-Indies, in 1601. His

with such Pusillanimity on this Occasion, that their Forts were taken almost without Bloodshed. In the Month of May following, a Sloop arrived from the Admiral, who, since his Adventure at Porto Bello, had bombarded Carthagena, and taken the Fort of San Lorenzo, on the River of Chagre, in the Neighbourhood of his former Conquest. These were chiefly Naval Enterprizes. The next we have to speak of, is Military and Naval. During this time, Preparations of War were carried on by the Ministry in England: They had resolved to annoy the Spaniards in their American Possessions. The Hopes of the Nation centered chiefly in a formidable Armament, designed for this Purpose, for the Northern Coast of New Spain, and his Catholic Majesty's other Settlements on that Side of the Atlantic. Commissions had been issued for raising a Regiment of four Battalions in the English Colonies of North America; that they might be transported to Jamaica, and join the Forces from England. These, consisting of the Marines, and Detachments from some old Regiments, were embarked in October, at the Isle of Wight, under the Command of Lord Cathcart: They sailed under Convoy of Sir Chaloner Ogle, with a Fleet of 27 Ships of the Line, besides Frigates, Fire-ships, Bomb-ketches and Tenders. They were likewise furnished with Hospital-ships, and Store-ships loaded with Provision, Ammunition, all sorts of War-like Implements, and every kind of Convenience.

Sir Chaloner Ogle, who sailed from Spithead, was overtaken by a Tempest in the Bay of Biscay, by which the Fleet, consisting of about 170 Sail, were scattered and dispersed. Nevertheless, he prosecuted his Voyage,
and

His whole Strength consisted in two Ships; one of 130, the other of 60 Tons, with about 220 Men. With this Force, he reduced St. Vincent, one of the Cape de Verd Islands; then steering for America, he took the Town of La Rancheria, in the Island of Cubagua. He next proceeded to Porto Bello, which was then a very strong well-built Town; entering the Port by Moon-light, he passed without Resistance, and attacked the Place by surprise. The Governor, Don Pedro Melendez, made a gallant Defence in the King's Treasury, to which he retreated; but at last that too was carried by Assault, and the Governor taken. Harris's Collection of Voyages, vol. 1. p. 747. Purchas's Pilgrim, vol. 4. p.

and anchored with a view to provide Wood and Water in the Neutral Island of St. Dominica; where the intended Expedition received a great loss in the Death of Lord Cathcart. The Command of the Land Forces devolved upon General Wentworth.

Sir Chaloner Ogle arriving at Jamaica, joined Vice-Admiral Vernon, who now found himself at the Head of the most formidable Fleet and Army that ever visited those Seas, with full Power to act at Discretion. The conjoined Squadrons consisted of 26 Ships of the Line, with almost an equal Number of Frigates, Fire-ships, and Bomb-ketches, well manned; and plentifully provided with all kinds of Provisions, Stores, and Necessaries. The number of Seamen amounted to 15000; that of the Land Forces, including the American Regiment of four Battalions, and a Body of Negroes enlisted at Jamaica, did not fall short of 12000. Had this Armament been ready to act in the proper Season of the Year, under the Conduct of wiser and more experienced Officers, united in Councils, the Havannah, and whole Island of Cuba might have been reduced; the Treasure of the Spanish West-Indies might have been intercepted; and Spain must have been humbled into a Submission. Several unfavourable Circumstances concurred to frustrate the hopes of the Public. The Ministry detained Sir Chaloner Ogle at Spithead, until the Season for Action was almost exhausted; for on the Continent of New Spain, the periodical Rains begin about the end of April; this change in the Atmosphere is always attended with Epidemical Distempers, which render the Climate extremely unhealthy; besides, the Rain is so excessive, that for the space of two Months, no Army can keep the Field.

Sir Chaloner Ogle arrived at Jamaica on the 9th Day of January, 1741; and Admiral Vernon did not sail on his intended Expedition till towards the end of the Month. Instead of directing his Course to the Havannah, which lay to Leeward, and might have been reached in less than three Days; he resolved to beat up against the Wind to Hispaniola, in order to observe the Motions of a French Squadron, commanded by the Marquis De Antin. The 15th Day of February had elapsed before he received certain Information, that the
French

French Admiral had sailed for Europe in great Distress, for want of Men and Provisions, which he could not procure in the West-Indies. Admiral Vernon thus disappointed, called a Council of War, in which it was determined to proceed for Carthagena. The Fleet being supplied with Wood and Water at Hispaniola, set Sail for the Continent of New Spain; and on the 4th of March, anchored in Playa Grande, to the Windward of Carthagena. Admiral de Torres had already sailed to the Havannah; but the Place was strongly fortified, and the Garrisons reinforced by the Crews of a small Squadron of large Ships, commanded by Don Blas De Lefo, an Officer of Experience and Reputation. There they lay till the 9th, when the Troops were landed on the Island of Tierra Bomba, near the Mouth of the Harbour, known by the Name of Boca-Chica, or Little-mouth; which was surprizingly fortified with Castles, Batteries, Booms, Chains, Cables, and Ships of War. The British Forces erected a Battery on shore, with which they made a Breach in the principal Fort, while the Admiral sent in a Number of Ships to divide the Fire of the Enemy, and co-operate with the Endeavours of the Army. Lord Aubrey Beauclerc, a gallant Officer, who commanded one of these Ships, was slain on this occasion. The Breach being deemed practicable, the Forces advanced to the Attack; but the Forts and Batteries were abandoned. The Spanish Ships that lay athwart the Harbour's Mouth, were destroyed or taken; the Passage was opened, and the Fleet entered without further Opposition. Then the Forces were re-embarked with the Artillery, and landed within a Mile of Carthagena; where they were opposed by about 700 Spaniards, whom they obliged to retire. The Admiral and General had contracted a hearty Contempt for each other, and took all Opportunities of expressing their mutual Dislike; far from acting vigorously in concert, for the Advantage of the Community, they maintained a mutual Reserve, and separate Cabals; each proved more eager for the disgrace of his Rival, than zealous for the Honour of the Nation.

✓ Smollet, Book
9. Chap. 7.

The General complained that the Fleet lay idle, while his Troops were harrassed and diminished by hard Duty and Distemper. The Admiral affirmed, that his
Ships

Ships could not lie near enough to batter the Town of Carthagena; and upbraided the General with Inactivity and want of Resolution to attack the Fort of St. Lazar, which commanded the Town, and might be taken by Scalade. The General, stimulated by these Reproaches, resolved to try the Experiment. His Forces marched up to the Attack, but the Guides being slain, they mistook their Route, and advanced to the strongest Part of the Fortification, where they were moreover exposed to the Fire of the Town. Colonel Grant, who commanded the Grenadiers, was mortally wounded: After which the scaling Ladders were thrown away by the American Soldiers, who had the Charge of them, notwithstanding the utmost Endeavours of the Officers to prevent it. They either took up Firelocks, or put themselves under cover from the shot of the Enemy^z. The

^z Journal of the Exp. to Carth. in Answer to a Pamphlet, entitled, An Account of the Exp. p. 37. Note.

Officers were perplexed for want of Orders and Directions; yet the Soldiers sustained a severe Fire for several Hours with surprizing Intrepidity, and at length retreated, leaving about 600 killed or wounded on the Spot. Their Number was now so much reduced, they could no longer maintain their Footing on shore: Besides the rainy Season had begun with such Violence, as rendered it impossible for them to live in Camp. They were therefore re-embarked, and all hope of further Success vanished^a. The Admiral however, in order to demonstrate the Impracticability of taking the Place by Sea,

^a Smollet.

sent in the Galicia, one of the Spanish Ships which had been taken at Boca-Chica, to cannonade the Town, with 16 Guns mounted on one side, like a floating Battery. This Vessel was prepared for battering in a very extraordinary manner; having Merlons^b or Cafes six Feet thick, rammed with Earth, formed between the Port-holes; which made her draw more Water than any of their 80 Gun Ships. She was manned by Detachments of Volunteers from different Ships, and commanded by Captain Hore: She was warped into the inner Harbour, and moored before Day, at a considerable distance from the Walls, and in very shallow Water. This Exploit was absurd, and the Inference the Admiral drew from it, fallacious. He said, it plainly proved, there was not depth of Water in the inner Harbour, sufficient to admit large Ships near enough to batter

^b P. 50 from the Appendix to a Journal of the Exp. to Carth. in Answer to a Pamphlet, entitled, An Account of the Exp.

batter the Town, with any prospect of Success. This indeed was the case in that part of the Harbour, to which the Galicia was conducted; but a little farther to the left, he might have stationed four or five of his largest Ships a-breast, within Pistol-shot of the Walls; and had this step been taken, when the Land Forces marched to the Attack of St. Lazar, in all Probability the Town would have been surrendered^c. This Expedition falling so very short of the Success which might reasonably have been expected from the greatness of the Armament; a Treatise of this sort requires us to be a little particular in describing some Parts of the Management with which it was conducted.

The Works^d which were carried on by the Army; with all the Expedition their Circumstances would admit of, were much retarded, not only from the Heat of the Climate, which renders the Europeans almost unable to support the least Fatigue, but from the Negroes throwing down their Loads and Working-tools, whenever a Shot came near them. These Difficulties were presented to a Council of War, by the principal Engineer, signifying at the same time, that an Addition of 1600 Men to the Forces then on shore was wanting, to enable them to push on their Works with Vigour; a Demand was made of that number of Soldiers to be landed from the Fleet, which was refused, on a Supposition there could be no occasion for them.

The City^e being garrisoned by at least 3500 Men, it was found necessary to post several Guards, amounting in the whole to about 1300 Men, besides extraordinary Parties; and 600 American Soldiers, who were set apart to be ready to assist in landing Stores, cutting Fascines, or in any other Work, as occasion should require. Wherefore it was thought by the Army, that fewer Troops could not have been employed in their Circumstances; and that 4350 Men (the most which were landed, and those hourly diminishing by Death and Sicknes) were not sufficient to afford Relief to the Guards above-mentioned. This, notwithstanding, was their whole Number, tho' repeated Demands were made for their Troops on shore to be compleated to 5000 Men^f. It was even said, that two or three small Vessels were not suffered to be sent by the Army, to catch

^c Smollet. Book 9. Chap. 7.

^d A Journal of the Expedition to Carthage, with Notes, in Answer to a Pamphlet, entitled, An Account of the Expedition to Carthage. 12, p. 12.

^e Ibid. p. 34. Note.

^f Ibid. p. 44. Note.

N

Turtle

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Turtle for the use of the sick and wounded; and that during their stay before Carthagera, the Fleet was supplied with Turtle, fresh Beef, &c. whilst the Land Forces on shore laboured under the greatest Difficulties, even from the want of their Salt Provisions, which were not regularly conveyed to them^g.

^g Ibid. p. 32
Note.

It was confidently affirmed (and by no inconsiderable Persons in the Navy) that after a Way should be opened for the Ships into the Harbour, the Assistance of the Land Forces would be no longer wanted. However, the Admiral pressed the Attack^h, without making the least offer of Assistance from the Fleet; and appeared to be so far from thinking such Assistance necessary, that he had not only declared the Troops on shore to be more than sufficient for the Service they were upon; but sent from the Fleet a Number of Soldiers less by 650, than were required to be landed by a Council of War.

^h Ibid. p. 38.
Note.

ⁱ Ibid. p. 42.

It was the Opinion of the Army, that the King's great Ships lying unactiveⁱ, at a time when they might have been usefully employed, was the principal Occasion of their not possessing Carthagera; and not the Mis-carriage of the Attack upon St. Lazar. For had they got Possession of it, it does not follow, that the Town would of course have surrendered, or that they could have been compelled to it, without the Admiral assisting with his whole Force; except it is to be supposed, the Spaniards with a Garrison not inferior in Number to the Besiegers, would have tamely given it up into their Hands; for it was morally certain, the Troops which were then on shore, must, by Sickness only, in a few Days have been reduced so low, as not to be able to bring off their Cannon. And nothing could prove more that there was a sufficient depth of Water for their largest Ships, than the Station of the Spanish Galleons, being very near the Walls, for the Convenience of taking in their lading. It is well known, Monsieur Ponti sent in his Men of War, among which was the Scepter of 84 Guns, to batter the City, and with so good an Effect, as in a short time to oblige it to surrender. It was very evident, the Spaniards had no great dependence on this supposed Shalness of Water, from their having lately erected a Battery of 40 large Pieces of Cannon, for the Defence of the Town, on the side towards the Har-

Harbour; a very unnecessary Expence, had the Water there been so shoal, as to prevent the near approach of large Men of War. It was also affirmed by Persons of Credit, that a Spanish Officer of Rank ^k, who served in Carthagea, declared, they only waited for the coming in of their great Ships to have surrendered.

^k Journal of the Exp. p. 46. Note.

However the Admiral thought ^l he had tried Experiments enough, to form some general Maxims upon; which were, in his Judgment, that no Ships should ever be brought to batter against Stone Walls, unless they were first assured, they could place their Ships within Musket-shot of them. As Castillo Grande was a Fortrefs his Ships could have come within Pistol-shot of, he was not surprized the Enemy deserted it at their Approach, to save a Garrison, that must otherwise have fallen an easy Sacrifice to them: And could his Ships have come as near their Town, he would not have thanked them for it; and was glad he tried the Experiment with the Galicia, if it was only to satisfy Gainsayers. But for their Castles, he believed the Spaniards themselves would give a Certificate, that they had effectually destroyed them all; and it was entirely begun, carried on, and concluded by his Sea Engineers, Captain Knowles, Captain Boscawen, and Purser Barnes, and the indefatigable Industry of the Seamen ^m, without any Aid or Assistance from any Officer of the Train, or any depending on the Train; and the Admiral believed, it was done with the more Expedition, because they had nothing to do in it.

^l Ibid. p. 108. To his Grace the Duke of N——— signed E. V. April 26, 1741.

The second Day after the Attack upon Fort St. Lazar, he viewed that Fort from the Popa ⁿ, and perceiving how easily they might have succeeded in that Attempt, in his Apprehension, as well as how for want of prudent Conduct, and a proper Disposition, they had come so ill off; he could not forbear saying to the General, they had in his Opinion, failed for want of advancing to the right and left, where it was practicable, instead of halting at the foot of a steep part of the hill they could not ascend; and that when they had pitched upon the wrong Place, and found they could not gain the Ascent there, the not drawing the Men off before Day broke upon them, but leaving them fruitlessly exposed to the Enemy's Fire, was abandoning them a

^m Ibid. p. 132. To his Grace the Duke of N——— signed E. V. May 30, 1741.

ⁿ Extracts out of subsequent Letters to the Duke of N——— in some Measures relative to Carthagea Expedition. Ib. P. 151, 2, 3, 4.

Sacrifice. To this the General answered, the Commanding Officers then had not obeyed his Orders, who were directed to carry on the Attack to the right and left.

However it is certain, the General never carried nor sent any of the Officers, that were to lead the Attack, to the Popa; where he might have given them his proper Directions, and they have known how to have executed them, to the best Advantage from their own Observations.

The Admiral afterwards took a View of it from the Town side, from the Hill above the Jesuits Potworks on Terra Bomba; and thought, he saw plainly how all those Intrenchments without Fort St. Lazar might easily have been carried by Assault, under a proper Disposition made for it; and that, though no Soldier, he could have formed such a Disposition. And had they lodged that Night in the Enemy's Intrenchments, they would have been under cover from all Fire from the Town, and those in the Fort could not have dared to expose themselves over the Walls to fire upon them; wherefore they would have had a short and easy Sap in a Clay Hill, to have mined under a corner of the Fort, and made a Breach, had the Enemy staid for giving them that Trouble, which he did not believe they would have done. Had he been consulted upon the Attack, he should have been ready to have given Assistance in it. Nothing seemed to have been well conducted; it was said the Granado Shells, Woolpacks and Ladders were in the Rear when they began the Attack, that should have been distributed in a different manner for it.

^m Account of the Expedition to Carthage. This however is in part denied in the Journal of the Expedition.

ⁿ Original Papers relating to the Expedition to Carthage. Letter to General Wentworth, p. 42. signed E. Vernon. C. Ogle. ibid. p. 50. signed E. V.

Things were on that Occasion (as they had been throughout the whole) done without Order or Method; for notwithstanding the Army had been apprized of the Enemy's having made Lodgements along the Road; yet the Troops that made the first Debarkment^m landed without a Granado Shell, or Field-piece; though they were told the Road was able to sustain even the weight of the heaviest Cannon.

Though the Admiral did not give the Assistance with the Fleet, demanded by the Army; he was frequently pressing the General to use his utmost Endeavours to push on his Works and advance towards the Enemyⁿ.
He

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He beheld with concern the slow Progress that was made after they had the good Fortune to make a Descent without the loss of a Man, and under the cover of one of their Forts. He complained also of the Dilatoriness of the Engineers and People of the Train, as well as of some Disputes and jarring Sentiments, that were among them. As by their Accounts^o, the Numbers landed, including the Blacks, being near 6000, which were more than even the General thought sufficient. The Admirals Vernon and Ogle repeated what they had so often mentioned, that the most fatal Enemy to be apprehended was Delay, and exposing the Troops to the approaching Rains.

^o Ibid. p. 86.

To Went-

worth. signed

F. Vernon. C.

Ogle. April 6.

1741.

Whoever then considers the many untoward Accidents that seemed to concur during the several Operations of this Conjunct Armament, must think nothing but almost a Miracle could have brought it to any other Conclusion than what it had. For as if the Enemy and improper Season of the Year were not sufficient for them to contend with; the Admiral and General totally disagreed; the Engineers and People of the Train disputed; the Admiral does not assist well with his Fleet, and the General makes a bad Disposition with his Troops. That in short the want of every thing requisite towards the successfully prosecuting a Conjunct Expedition, such as Unanimity, Method, System, a right Season of the Year and better Health; we may add a more prudent Conduct to be observed in general by the Fleet and Army, rendered it necessary to call a Council of War, which was accordingly done on the 14th of April. General Wentworth laid before the Members the real State of the Troops, and declared, he deemed it to be impracticable to go on with the Enterprize without the Assistance from the Fleet. However the Admiral without much Deliberation going to put the Question, whether the Troops should be reembarked, or not; the General declared, he could not give his Vote, till he was informed, what Assistance they were to expect from the Fleet: who being interrupted by the Admiral with heat and Passion, made a Reply; to which the Admiral returned no Answer, but immediately left the Cabin. The Debate was afterwards carried on; the General having repeated his Question, Sir Chaloner Ogle and

^p A Journal of the Expedition to Carthageua, in answer to a Pamphlet, entitled, An Account of the Exp. p. 44. 45.

the other Sea Officers who were Members of the Council of War, unanimously said, it would by no means be advisable to trust the Sailors on shore, as they could be kept under no Command, and would soon disperse themselves in the Woods; to which the Admiral, who sat within hearing ^p, added aloud, that some of them would soon ramble into Carthageua.

The Admiral returning to his Place at the Board, it was unanimously resolved to reimbark the Cannon and Land Forces with all possible Expedition.

After the Reimbarkation of the Troops, the Distempers peculiar to the Climate and Season began to rage with redoubled Fury; great Numbers of those who escaped the Vengeance of the Enemy perished by a more painful and inglorious Fate. Nothing was heard but Complaints and Execrations, the Groans of the Dying, and the Service over the Dead; nothing was seen but objects of Woe and images of Dejection. The Conductors of this unfortunate Expedition agreed in nothing but the expediency of a speedy Retreat from this Scene of Misery. Some of the Fortifications were demolished, and the Fleet returned to Jamaica. The Miscarriage of this Expedition was no sooner known in England, than the Kingdom was filled with Murmurs and Discontent, and the People were depressed, in Proportion to that sanguine Hope by which they had been elevated. Admiral Vernon in the Month of July sailed from Jamaica with the Forces, and anchored at the South-East Part of Cuba, in a Bay, on which he bestowed the Appellation of Cumberland Harbour. The Troops were landed and encamped at the distance of twenty Miles farther up the River, where they remained totally inactive; and subsisted chiefly on salt and damaged Provisions, till the Month of November; when being considerably diminished by Sicknefs, they were put on board again, and reconveyed to Jamaica. He was afterwards reinforced from England by four Ships of War, and about 3000 Soldiers; but, he performed nothing worthy of the Reputation he had acquired ^q.

^q Smollet.

Fock 9. Ch. 7.
Sect. 5.

However, the Admiral and General Wentworth having received a Reinforcement made another Effort in this part of the World, it was in the Year 1742. They planned a new Expedition in Concert with the Governor

nor of Jamaica, who accompanied them in the Voyage. Their Design was to disembark the Troops at Porto-Bello, and march across the Isthmus of Darien, to attack the rich Town of Panama. They sailed from Jamaica on the 9th Day of March, and on the 28th arrived at Porto-Bello. There they held a Council of War, in which it was resolved, that as the Troops were sickly, the rainy Season begun, and several Transports not yet arrived, the intended Expedition was become impracticable. In pursuance of this Determination the Armament immediately returned to Jamaica, exhibiting a ridiculous Spectacle of Folly and Irresolution^r. In August a Ship of War was sent from thence with about 300 Soldiers, to the small Island Rattan, in the Bay of Honduras, of which they took possession.

In September Vernon and Wentworth received Orders to return to England, with such Troops as remained alive, which did not amount to a tenth part of the Number that had been sent abroad.

In the Month of June the new Colony of Georgia was invaded by an Armament from St. Augustine, commanded by Don Marinel De Monteano, Governor of that Fortrefs. It consisted of thirty-six Ships, from which 4000 Men were landed at St. Simon's^s; and began their March for Frederica. General Oglethorpe with a small number of Men, took such Precautions for opposing their Progress, and harrassed them so much in their March, that after two of their Detachments had been defeated, they retired to their Ships, and totally abandoned the Enterprize.

In the following Year 1743, some unsuccessful Efforts were made by an English Squadron in the West-Indies, commanded by Commodore Knowles. He attacked La Guaira on the Coast of Carraccas, in the Month of February; but met with such a warm Reception, he was obliged to desist, and make the best of his Way for the Dutch Island Curacoa, where he repaired the damage he had sustained. His Ships being refitted, he made another Attempt upon Porto-Cavallo in April, which like the former miscarried. Twelve hundred Marines being landed in the Neighbourhood of the Place, were seized with such a Pannic, that it was found necessary to reembark them without delay. The

Ibid.

^s Smollet.
Book. 9. Ch.
7. Sec. 33.

^t Smollet.

Book 9. Ch. 7.

Sec. 46.

Commodore then abandoned the Enterprize, and failed back to his Station at the Leeward Islands ^t.

Our War with Spain soon brought on a War with France. The Connection between those two Nations was so great, that when the Fleet under Sir Chaloner Ogle sailed along the Island of Hispaniola in its Way to Jamaica, four large Ships of War were discovered; Sir Chaloner detached an equal Number of his Squadron to give them Chace, while he himself proceeded on his Voyage. As those strange Ships refused to bring to; Lord Augustus Fitzroy, the Commodore of the four British Ships, saluted one of them with a Broad-side, and a smart Engagement ensued. After they had fought during the best part of the Night, the Enemy hoisted their Colours in the Morning, and appeared to be part of the French Squadron, which had sailed from Europe under the Command of the Marquis De Antin, with Orders to assist the Spanish Admiral De Torres ^u in attacking and distressing the English Ships and Colonies ^{*}. War was not yet declared between England and

^u Ibid,

^{*} Original Papers relating to the Exp. to Carthagena, p. 137, 138.

^{*} In a Letter from Admiral Vernon to the Duke of Newcastle dated from Port-Royal Harbour in Jamaica, May 30, 1741, there is the following story.

“ I found (says the Admiral) here Captain Warren returned from his cruize off St. Jago, after having destroyed the large Spanish Privateer Sloop, commanded by Valladon the Frenchman, whose Experience had been fatal to many of our Northern Colony Sloops. The Captain and his Crew drove them out of their Ship to the Rocks, and afterwards up the Country; where one of our brave Sailors seeing a dead Spaniard lying upon an English Ensign ashore, swore that Spanish Dog should not lie upon English Colours, and went to remove his Quarters and fetch the Colours; when he fortunately discovered, wrapped up in those Colours, the Packets and Letters from the Spanish Admiral Rodrigo De Torres, and the Governors of the Havannah and St. Jago, to their Friend and Correspondent Mr. Larnage; and the French Secretary of State's Orders to the Marquis D'Antin, and a Copy of Don Rodrigo De Torres's Instructions. I send your Grace Copies of the most material of them, by which you will see they had both Orders, jointly or separately to fall upon us.———Your Grace will observe from Rodrigo De Torres, the Spanish Admiral's Letters to his Excellency Mr. Larnage, of the 26th of February and 12th of March, that it is plainly proved, that these Orders from Count Maurepas the French Secretary of State, are the very Orders mentioned to

“ be

and France; therefore Hostilities ceased. The English and French Commanders complimented each other, excused themselves mutually for the Mistake which had happened, and parted as Friends with a considerable loss of Men on both sides.

In the same Year as Admiral Haddock, with twelve Ships of the Line, lay at Anchor in the Bay of Gibraltar; the Spanish Fleet passed the Streights in the Night, and was joined by the French Squadron from Toulon. The British Admiral sailing from Gibraltar, fell in with them in a few Days, and found both Squadrons drawn up in a Line of Battle. As he bore down upon the Spanish Fleet, the French Admiral sent a Flag of Truce to inform him, that as the French and Spaniards were engaged in a Joint Expedition, he should be obliged to act in concert with his Master's Allies. This Interposition prevented an Engagement, the Combined Fleets amounting to double the Number of the English Squadron.

We hope our Readers will not think the mentioning these Facts too great a Digression from the Subject, as we have done it to prepare them a little for the Conjunct Expeditions that were carried on in the War, which (presently after these Transactions) broke out between Great Britain and France. However we are brought to it more regularly by an old Game the French played again; which was (the endeavouring to distract these Kingdoms as much as possible, by the setting up the Pretender. As far as his Enterprizes come within the Compass of this Work, we shall relate.

Cardinal De Tencin, who had succeeded Fleury as Prime Minister of France, had been recommended to the Purple by the Chevalier de St. George, and was warmly attached to the Stuart Family. Therefore the following Project was very agreeable to him.

Count Saxe was appointed by the French King, Commander of the Troops designed for this Expedition, which amounted to 15000 Men. They began their
March

“ he sent by the Spanish Ambassador to the Spanish Admiral; an
“ Evidence, I believe, your Grace will have a Pleasure in having
“ in your own Hands, and which, I flatter myself, will prove of
“ Service to our Royal Master.”

March to Picardy, and a great Number of Vessels were assembled for their Embarkation at Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne. It was determined, they should be landed in Kent, under Convoy of a strong Squadron equipped at Brest, and commanded by Monsieur De Roquefeuille, an Officer of Experience and Capacity. The British Ministry being apprized of the Arrival of the Pretender's Son in France, at once comprehended the Destination of the Armaments prepared at Brest and Boulogne. The Remonstrance made to the French Ministry, by the English Resident at Paris, was without Effect.

In the Month of January, 1744, M. De Roquefeuille sailed from Brest, directing his Course up the English Channel with 20 Ships of War. They were immediately discovered by an English Cruizer, which ran into Plymouth; and the Intelligence was conveyed by Land to the Board of Admiralty. Sir John Norris was forthwith ordered to take the Command of the Squadron at Spithead; with which he sailed round the Downs, where he was joined by some Ships of the Line from Chatham; and then he found himself at the Head of a Squadron considerably stronger than that of the Enemy.

The French Court proceeded with their Preparations at Boulogne and Dunkirk, under the Eye of the young Pretender; and 7000 Men were actually embarked. M. De Roquefeuille sailed up the Channel as far as Dungeness, a Promontory on the Coast of Kent, after having detached M. De Barreil with five Ships, to hasten the Embarkation at Dunkirk. While the French Admiral anchored off Dungeness, he perceived, on the 24th of February, the British Fleet under Sir John Norris, doubling the South-Foreland from the Downs; and though the Wind was against him, taking the Opportunity of the Tide, to come up and engage the French Squadron. Roquefeuille, who little expected such a Visit, could not be altogether composed, considering the great Superiority of his Enemies: But the Tide failing, the English Admiral was obliged to anchor two Leagues short of the Enemy. In this Interval, M. Roquefeuille called a Council of War, in which it was determined to avoid an Engagemēt, weigh Anchor at

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Chap. 7. CONJUNCT EXPEDITIONS.

Sunset, and make the best of their Way to the Place from whence they set sail. This Resolution was favoured by a very hard Gale of Wind, which began to blow from the North East, and carried them down the Channel with incredible Expedition. But the same Storm, which in all Probability saved their Fleet from Destruction, utterly disconcerted the Design of invading England. A great Number of their Transports were driven ashore and destroyed, and the rest so damaged, they could not speedily be repaired. The English were now Masters at Sea, and their Coast was so well guarded, that the Enterprize could not be prosecuted with any Probability of Success. The French Generals nominated to serve in the Expedition, returned to Paris, and the Pretender resolved to wait a more favourable Opportunity.

But as in his next Attempt (which was in the following Year) he was accompanied at his first Arrival in this Kingdom with only a few Adventurers, though it succeeded for some time, it produced nothing material relating to Conjunct Expeditions.

The French King no longer preserved any Measures with the Court of London: And a Declaration of War was published on the 12th of March, 1744. On the last day of the same Month, a like Denunciation of War against France was published at London.

By this time, an Action had happened in the Mediterranean, off Toulon, between the British Fleet under Admiral Matthews, and the Combined Squadrons of France and Spain.

The Transactions of Great Britain that come within the Compass of this Work, were remarkably spirited in the Year 1745. In the Mediterranean, Admiral Rowley had succeeded Matthews in the Command; and Savona, Genoa, Final, St. Remo, with Bastia the Capital of Corsica, were bombarded. But the most important Achievement was the Conquest of Louisburgh, on the Isle of Cape-Breton, in North-America; a Place of great Consequence, which the French had fortified at a prodigious Expence. The Scheme of reducing this Fortrefs, was planned in Boston, recommended by their General Assembly, and approved by his Majesty, who sent Instructions to Commodore Warren, stationed off
the

the Leeward Islands, to sail for the Northern Parts of America, and co-operate with the Forces of New England in this Expedition. A Body of 6000 Men was formed under the Conduct of Mr. Pepperel, a Trader of Piscataway, whose Interest was extensive in that Country; though he was a Man of little or no Education, and utterly unacquainted with Military Operations. In April, Mr. Warren arrived at Canso, with ten Ships of War; and the Troops of New England being embarked in Transports, sailed immediately for the Isle of Cape-Breton, where they landed without Opposition. The Enemy abandoned their grand Battery, which was detached from the Town; and the immediate Seizure of it contributed, in a good measure, to the Success of the Enterprize. While the American Troops, reinforced by 800 Marines, carried on their Approaches by Land, the Squadron blocked up the Place by Sea, in such a manner, that no Succours could be introduced. A French Ship of the Line, with some smaller Vessels, destined for the Relief of the Garrison, was intercepted and taken by the British Cruisers; and indeed the Reduction of Louisburgh was chiefly owing to the Vigilance and Activity of Mr. Warren, one of the bravest and best Officers in the Service of England.

^a Smollet. Book
9. Ch. 8. Sect.
24.

The Operations of the Siege were wholly conducted by the Engineers and Officers who commanded the British Marines; the Americans being ignorant of War, were content to act under their Directions. The Town being considerably damaged by the Bombs and Balls of the Besiegers, and the Governor despairing of Relief, capitulated on the 17th Day of June, when the City of Louisburgh and Isle of Cape-Breton were surrendered to his Britannic Majesty.

The Possession of Cape-Breton, was, doubtless, a valuable Acquisition to Great Britain. It not only distressed the French in their Fishery and Navigation, but removed all Fears of Encroachment and Rivalship from the English Fishers on the Banks of Newfoundland. It freed New England from the Terrors of a dangerous Neighbour, overawed the Indians of that Country, and secured the Possession of Acadia to the Crown of Great Britain. The Plan of this Conquest was originally laid by Mr. Auchmuty, Judge-Advocate of the Court of Ad-

Admiralty in New England. He demonstrated, that the Reduction of Cape-Breton would put the English in sole Possession of the Fishery of North-America, which would annually return to Great Britain two Millions Sterling; for the Manufactures yearly shipped to the Plantations, employ many thousand Families that were otherwise unserviceable to the Public; increase the Shipping and Mariners; extend Navigation; cut off all Communication between France and Canada, by the River St. Lawrence; so that Quebec would fall of course into the Hands of the English, who might expel the French entirely from America; open a Correspondence with the remote Indians, and render themselves Masters of the profitable Fur Trade, which was now engrossed by the Enemy^w.

^w Ibid. Sect. 25.

The Reduction of Cape-Breton had encouraged the Ministry to project the following Year the Conquest of Quebec, the Capital of Canada; situated upon the River St. Lawrence. Commissions were sent to the Governors of the British Colonies in North-America, empowering them to raise Companies to join the Armament from England; and 8000 Troops were actually raised in consequence of these Directions; while a powerful Squadron and Transports, having six Regiments on board, were prepared at Portsmouth for this Expedition. But their departure was postponed by unaccountable delays^x, until the Season was judged too far advanced to risque the great Ships on the boisterous Coast of North-America. However, that the Armament might not be wholly useless to the Nation, it was employed in making a Descent on the Coast of Brittany, on the Supposition that Port L'Orient, the Repository of all the Stores and Ships belonging to the French East-India Company, might be surprized; or, that this Invasion would alarm the Enemy, and by making a Diversion, facilitate the Operations of Count Brown, the Austrian General in Provence; as well as draw a considerable Detachment from Marshal Saxe's Army in Flanders, which was superior to that of the Allies.

^x Ibid. Book 9.

Chap. 9. Sect.

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The Naval Force intended for this Service, consisted of sixteen great Ships, and eight Frigates, besides Bomb-ketches and Store-ships, commanded by Richard Lestock, appointed Admiral of the Blue Division. Six Battalions

Battalions of Land Troops, with a Detachment of Matrosses and Bombardiers, were embarked in 30 Transports, under the Conduct of Lieutenant-General Sinclair. The whole Fleet sailed from Plymouth on the 14th Day of September, 1746: After a prosperous Voyage, they found themselves at 8 in the Evening, on the 18th of the same Month, within four Leagues of Port Louis*, where they met with Commodore Cotes, who had sounded the Coast, and fixed on a proper Place for landing, about 10 Miles from L'Orient. The Admiral being unacquainted with the Coast, did not think it adviseable to approach it in the Night. The

* From a Journal in MSS. delivered to me by a Gentleman principally employed in the Expedition.

next Day General Sinclair went on board the Admiral, to concert with him the proper Measures for the Disembarkation: when it was agreed, that the two Sloops, the Bomb-tender and Cutter should go in next Morning as near shore as possible, to cover the Landing. Early in the Morning on the 20th, a large Body of Militia and some Cavalry appearing on the shore, the Admiral thought proper to add three 40 Gun Ships to what he had already ordered to cover the Landing, which was performed in a Bay about the distance of ten Miles from Port L'Orient. The Militia, reinforced by some Detachments from different Regiments, were assembled to the number of 2000, and seemed resolved to oppose the Disembarkation. However, their Intentions were frustrated by a Finesse, that did no small Credit to the General; and as it confirms the Sentiments of a valiant and experienced Countryman of ours (which we shall mention in the Second Part of this Work) relative to the Difficulties attending any Country in their Endeavours to prevent an invading Army being landed from a superior Fleet, we shall be a little particular in the Description.

There were three Places convenient for the debarking

* Port Lewis is a maritime Town, and considerable Port of the Ocean, situated upon the Southern Coast of the Province of Brittany, in 47 Deg. 43 Min. of Northern Latitude, and in 14 Deg. 16 Min. of Eastern Longitude, at the Mouth of the River Blavet, which Name it formerly had: High Water at 3 o'Clock. Port L'Orient, famous for the French East-India Company's Trade, is upon the same River near this Place. Port Lewis was ceded to the French by the Treaty of Vervin in 1598, and Lewis XIII. rebuilt it with a well fortified Citadel, and gave it the Name of Port Lewis.

ing of Land Forces. The furthest from L'Orient was a sandy Bay, bounded on one side by the River of Quimperlay; on the other, by a rising Ground, which separated it from a second little Bay. This second was divided from the third landing Place, by an Arm of the Sea, which runs above a Mile up the Country, and by an Eminence, on which were planted two Cannon. This Arm of the Sea, though fordable at Low Water, was at High Water quite the contrary. The two last mentioned Landing Places were lined with Militia and Gardes de Côte: The furthest from L'Orient was unoccupied. The Wind blew along the Coast towards L'Orient: All the Boats, in which were between 500 or 600 Men (for they contained no more) were ordered to rendezvous at one of the Folkstone Cutters, which was anchored the most to Windward, opposite the Bay, adjoining to the River of Quimperlay. The Wind blew fresh, and it required a considerable time for some of the Boats to reach the Place of Rendezvous; as their being filled with Men, prevented the Seamen from setting any Sail. Whilst the Rowers were pulling with difficulty against the Wind, the Enemy perceived it was the Intention to land in the unoccupied Bay, the most distant from the Town. They therefore determined to change their Disposition. The Body that was posted in the second Bay, marched round the rising Ground above-mentioned, and drew up on the Bay, next to the River of Quimperlay, opposite to the Rendezvous of the Boats, where they were so well covered by a Bank of Sand, that the Cannon of the Frigates could not do them the smallest Prejudice. The Corps which was drawn up on the third Landing Place, marched off, with an intent, as it was High Water, to go round the Arm of the Sea above-mentioned, and to take Possession of the middle Landing Place, which the other Body had quitted. But as a March of that length required some time, the General resolved to seize the Opportunity, and to land at the middle Place, before the Body on their March could possibly reach it. To prevent any Annoyance from the Body, which was drawn up in the the first-mentioned Bay, he ordered the Boats to row directly towards that Bay, till they should come almost within Musket-shot of the Enemy; then to turn short
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and row before the Wind with the utmost Expedition, to the second Bay or Landing Place; and there to form the Troops instantly. Left the Battery of two Cannon planted on the Eminence, upon the opposite side of the Arm of the Sea, should play upon the Boats crowded with Troops, and at so small a distance; he desired that two armed Vessels might be ordered to slip their Cables, to fire upon the small Battery, if possible, to drive the Gunners from their Guns. Previous to the setting out of the Boats, these several Orders were executed, and the Batteries were abandoned. The Corps of the Enemy waited for the Troops where they were posted, till the Boats made the turn to row along the shore, and then ran in the utmost Confusion and Disorder towards the second Bay, where they perceived it was their Design to land. But the Forces were landed and formed without the loss of a Man, before a single Person of their broken Corps could reach the Bay to oppose them^z. The General pursued the Militia about two Miles. On the 21st, the Day after the Debarkation, the Army marched in two Columns to L'Orient: General Sinclair, with one by Plemure; General Offarrel with the other, by the great Road to Quimperlay; the latter did not come up till seven at Night, having been attacked on his March by a Body, consisting part of Militia, and partly of regular Forces, which put the Troops under his Command into a good deal of Disorder*. Some of the Men were wounded, and Lieutenant Colonel Henry Erskine, Quarter-Master General, dangerously. General Sinclair, about five in the Evening, proceeded to a Windmill within Cannon-shot of the Town.

The Engineers were immediately sent to reconnoitre the Place; who reported on their return, that the Town was defended only by a thin Wall, with Loop Holes in it, without a Fosse; and from a Place they had pitched upon for a Battery, they could either make a Breach, or lay the Town in Ashes in twenty-four Hours. The following Day the General, accompanied by Mr. Armstrong the Director General, and Captain Watson the Engineer,

^z From a paper in MSS. delivered with the Journal.

* The Disorder was so great, it occasion'd afterwards an Inquiry into the Behaviour of the Troops, which lasted three Days.

neer, went to reconnoitre the Place; and in Consequence of the Assurance given him the Night before, and now repeated, he sent a Letter by an Officer to summon the Town to surrender.

He was visited by a Deputation from the Town*, which offered to admit the British Forces on certain Conditions. However the Terms being rejected, the Inhabitants prepared for a vigorous Defence; and the English General resolved to besiege the Place in form; though he had neither Time, Artillery, nor Forces sufficient for such an Enterprize. His Cannon amounted to no more than a few Field Pieces, and he was obliged to wait for two Iron Guns, which the Sailors dragged up from the Shipping. Could an Assault have been given the first Night after his Arrival, when the Town was filled with Terror and Confusion, and destitute of regular Troops, in all Probability it would have been easily taken by Scalade. But the Reduction of it was rendered impracticable by delay^b. The Ramparts were ^{b Smollet. Book} mounted with Cannon from the Ships in the Harbour; ^{9. Ch. 15.} new Works were raised with great Industry; the Garrison was reinforced by several Bodies of regular Troops, and great Numbers were assembling from all Parts; so that the British Forces were in Danger of being surrounded in an Enemy's Country.

The Engineers being asked also at a Council of War held on board the Admiral; if they thought it practicable, either to burn the Town or make a Breach in
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* Three Deputies, one from the Governor, one from the Town, and one from the East-India Company, were brought to the General, who received them at the Head of the Army. As they represented, that each was sent to treat of particular Conditions with regard to their own Corps; the General made answer, that he could have no Transactions with any but the Officer commanding in the Place for his most Christian Majesty; and would only receive the Paper presented by the Military Deputy; which contained these Conditions^a. That all the Troops, Regular, Garde Côtes, ^{a The MSS.} and Town Militia, should have free Liberty to go where-ever they Journal. pleased, with Pass-ports for their Security for four Days, in case of meeting with any of the British Troops; that they should go out of L'Orient with their Arms, Horses, Baggage, Drums beating, Colours flying, Match lighted, and all the Honours of War, and Waggons if they wanted them; that the Garde Côtes and Town Militia, might retire with the same Safety, to their Villages and Parishes, or where-ever they had a mind in the Country.

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^a Journal of the Expedition before mentioned.

the Wall, what Artillery, &c. would be wanted, and what time required. Their Answer was, that with two Twelve Pounders, and a ten Inch Mortar, they engaged to make a proper Breach, or lay the Town in Ashes in twenty-four Hours time ^a. By the 25th in the Morning the Battery was compleated, and the Mortar and two Twelve Pounders placed on it by the Sailors. This Morning also a few Carcasses and Bombs were thrown into the Town, but no Cannon were fired, the Commander of the Artillery having forgot to order the Grate for heating the Ball to be brought up: The Engineers also now despaired of being able to make a Breach, at the Distance they had placed the Battery.

^e Authentic Papers.

The Officers of the Artillery insisted they could heat the Balls without a Furnace; but the General opposed their beginning to fire, having then discovered, that through the neglect of the Officers to whose Care it belonged, there was not a quantity of Ammunition sufficient to keep a continued Fire. This Forenoon however two other Twelve Pounders and the Furnace were brought to camp by Sailors and a Body of Marines; one third of the Seamen of the whole Fleet, besides the Marines and Boats Crews, were employed in these Services^e. However in the Evening there was such a Report made of the Situation of Affairs as determined the General immediately to call a Council of War, which was held in the Camp before L'Orient; consisting of Lieutenant General Sinclair, Brigadiers Offarrell, Graham, Richbell; and the Engineers Thomas Armstrong the Chief, and Commander of the Artillery, Justly Watson, John Armstrong, and John Chalmers Commander of the Artillery. Mr. Thomas Armstrong represented to the Council, that Stores and Ammunition came in so slowly, he did not see any probability of their being supplied with Ammunition so expeditiously as was necessary for making a proper use of the Battery made last Night, and opened this Morning; and being apprehensive, that the Service intended cannot be accomplished, so soon as was at first expected, there being but thirty-four Rounds for each of the four Pieces of Cannon, and none of the Shells or Carcasses for the ten Inch Mortar left, and considering the number of Batteries opened already upon them, and daily likely to be opened, he thought it

his Duty to represent this to General Sinclair, as he now does to the Council of War ^f.

^f Journal M. 8.

John Armstrong being extremely afflicted with the Gout was not in a Condition to undergo the fatigue of reconnoitring, at the Time the Director General, and Engineer Watson did; and for that Reason, his Opinion was not taken in the Council of War held on board the Admiral; but being asked his Opinion at this, he said, there being no Horses proper to draw their Artillery from the Landing-place, and the Roads so broken and spoiled by the Rains, that the getting the heavy Guns in Time was scarcely possible; without mentioning the Advantage the Enemy had of drawing continual Supplies from the neighbouring Garrison of Port-Louis, so as to be able to mount six Guns for their one. He was of Opinion that nothing of Consequence could at this Season, and in their Circumstances, be done against the Town of L'Orient in a proper Time ^g.

^g Ibid.

The Council of War was adjourned to the next Morning, when Captain Justly Watson's Sentiments being asked, he replied, his former Opinion was, that with a ten Inch Mortar and two Twelve Pounders he should have been able to have laid the Town in Ashes in a short Time; and being asked, what that Time was, answered, twenty-four Hours. His present Opinion being demanded, he said, if the Battery could be properly served with Ammunition for the above Time of twenty-four Hours, he thought the Enterprize was still practicable ^h.

^h Ibid.

The Director General being asked, what his Opinion was, in the Council of War on board the Admiral, acknowledged, he then said, that with two Twelve Pounders and a ten Inch Mortar, and some Royals, the Town could have been destroyed in twenty-four Hours. Being asked by the Council what his present Opinion was, he said, that from the Difficulties and Delays of bringing up Ammunition, the Alteration of the Weather, and other Circumstances in favour of the Enemy, and to their prejudice, he was of Opinion, that no great Advantage would arise from continuing to push on much longer their Enterprize. General Sinclair then asked him, whether at any time he had been refused whatever number of armed Men, or Men unarmed to work, he

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had demanded; or whether he had ever applied to the General for bringing up the Royals; to all which he answered in the Negative. Being farther asked, if he ever mentioned the Royals in any of the Lifts he sent to the Commissary of the Train, at the Park of Artillery, on the Sea-side, he said he never did, as there were other things more immediately wantedⁱ.

ⁱ Ibid.

Captain Chalmers of the Artillery being at this Time obliged to attend at the Battery, his Opinion was not taken at the Council of War.

Wherefore the next who spoke was Brigadier Richbell, who thought it adviseable not to continue the Siege of L'Orient, for the following Reasons. It appeared to him from the Opinion of the Engineers, that they had from the first made a wrong Calculation. That by the great Fatigues the Troops had suffered from the Badness of the Weather, and the great Sickness among them, which daily increased, and the Uncertainty of being supplied with proper Provisions, he was apprehensive, should the Siege be carried on, it might be attended with fatal Consequences to the Troops^k.

^k Ibid.

The Brigadiers Graham and Offarrel spoke to much the same Purpose, and agreed to the reembarking the Troops; the latter adding, as the principal Motive to encourage the undertaking of this Enterprize, was founded on the short Time in which the Engineers proposed to have carried it into Execution, in which he found they were disappointed; and as their Communication with the Fleet might be interrupted, he thought it reasonable, after having expended all the Ammunition for the heavy Artillery, to desist from the Enterprize^l *.

^l Ibid.

General Sinclair then closed the Council of War, by saying, that in Consequence of his Majesty's Orders to Admiral Lestock, and him, to make a Descent on the Western Coast of France, he agreed with the Admiral to view the Strength of the Town of L'Orient, provided

* About nine o'Clock in the Morning of the 24th, a considerable Body of Troops with Colours, supposed to have been transported from Port Louis, was seen moving towards the Sea Coast, to cut off as was supposed their Communication with the Fleet. To prevent which Brigadier Offarrel was detached with two Battalions and two Companies of Grenadiers. Journal of the Expedition.

ed he would land the Troops betwixt Quimperlay River and Port Louis; which he having performed, he advanced to the Place with the utmost Expedition; and upon the Assurances given in the strongest Terms, by the Engineers to the Council of War held on board the *Princessa*, after they had reconnoitred the Place, he agreed to make the Attempt: since which Time it was well known to the whole Army, how assiduous he had been in carrying on a Scheme, he had entered into solely on the great Dependence he had on the Engineers in their own Science, and not from any Skill of his own. But now finding it was the unanimous Opinion of the General Officers and Engineers here present, that the Undertaking should be laid aside, he complied with it ^{m.} *Ibid.*

However before the close of this Day, it was thought necessary to call another Council of War, from a Report made by the Director General and Captain Chalmers of the Artillery, informing the General there were no Carcasses or Bombs left, and only one hundred and fifty Shot remaining, which was not sufficient to serve the Battery that Night and the next Day.

At this Council Captain Chalmers was asked, whether he thought the Artillery on the Battery with the remaining quantity of Stores and Ammunition was sufficient to make either a Breach in the Wall, or set fire to the Town; he answered, he was positive they could not make a Breach at the Distance the Battery was placed, considering the oblique Situation; and was of Opinion they could not set fire to the Town, as the Houses he had seen in the Country had very little Wood in them; he had likewise observed, that the Carcasses, Bombs and red-hot Balls which had been fired into the Town, had little or no Effect: he farther added, he had been able to serve only one Gun with red-hot Shot ^{n.} *Ibid.* Upon this Representation it was unanimously agreed to draw off the Troops in order to their Reimbarkation. The Guns were spiked up, as well as the Mortar, which was intended to have been brought away; though had the Attempt been made, it was generally thought it would have proved ineffectual, as they had no Gin, nor other Instrument to raise so great a weight.

However in this day's and yesterday's firing, there were thirty Carcasses, thirty Shells, thirty-two Grapes,

and three hundred and forty Shot thrown into the Town: of the Shot one fourth only was red-hot, for through the neglect of those People, to whose Care it belonged, the Bellows had been forgot °.

° Ibid.

The Troops after having sustained very inconsiderable Damage, since their first landing, were reembarked, The General expected Reinforcements from England, and was resolved to wait a little longer for their Arrival, in hopes of being able to annoy the Enemy more effectually. In the beginning of October the Fleet sailed to Quiberon Bay, where they took a French Man of War, and a Detachment of the Forces being landed, took Possession of a Fort on the Peninsula; while the little Islands of Houvat and Heydic were reduced by the Sailors. In this Situation the Admiral and General continued till the 17th Day of the Month, when the Forts being dismantled, and the Troops reembarked, the Fleet sailed from the French Coast: the Admiral returned to England, and the Transports with the Soldiers proceeded to Ireland, where they arrived in safety P.

° Smollet.

This Expedition, weak and frivolous as it may seem, was resented by the French Nation, as one of the greatest Insults they had ever sustained; and demonstrated the possibility of hurting France in her tenderest Parts by means of an Armament of this nature, well-timed, skilfully and vigorously conducted. But it is being rather too sanguine to expect Success from such an Attempt as this was, by landing an handful of Men, without Guides, Tents *, Artillery, or any kind of Horse, from a Fleet of Ships lying on an open Beach, exposed to the uncertainty of Weather in a tempestuous Season of the Year; which possibly might render the Retreat and Reimbarkation precarious †.

† Authentic Papers. Smollet. Book 9. Ch. 9. Sect. 16.

The Year 1747, affords us nothing very material to Conjunct Expeditions. There were two considerable Naval Actions fought this Year in the European Seas, between British and French Squadrons, one on the 3d of May, the other on the 14th of October. But the only Affair that remains for us to mention, is the fresh Armament the English Ministry was determined to equip,

* The Tents were sent on the 22d. Journal M. S.

equip, to enable us to undertake something of Importance in the East-Indies. The Siege of Pondicherry, the principal Settlement belonging to the French on the Coast of Coromandel, was the Design of this Armament. For this Service, a good number of Independent Companies were raised, and sailed with a strong Squadron under the Conduct of Rear-Admiral Boscawen. But before we proceed with the executive Part of this Expedition, we are to mention the closing of the Session of Parliament on the 13th of May 1748, when the King declared to both Houses, that the Preliminaries for a general Peace were actually signed at Aix la Chapelle by the Ministers of Great Britain, France, and the United Provinces. But as the Definitive Treaty was not concluded till October, we will finish the Con-junct-Affair that was carried on in the East-Indies. In the Month of August Admiral Boscawen blocked up Pondicherry by Sea with his Squadron, and invested it by Land with an Army of 4000 Europeans, and about 2000 Natives of that Country. He took the Fort of Area Coupan, at the Distance of three Miles from the Town: then he made his Approaches to the Place, against which he opened Batteries, while it was bombarded and cannonaded by the Shipping. But the Fortifications were so strong, the Garrison so numerous, and the Engineers of the Enemy so expert in their Profession, that he made very little Progress, and sustained considerable Damage. At length his Army being diminished by Sickness, and the rainy Season approaching, he ordered the Artillery and Stores to be reimbarbed, and raising the Siege on the 6th Day of October, returned to Fort St. David, after having lost about 1000 Men in this Expedition. In the sequel, several Ships of his Squadron, and above 1200 Sailors perished in an Hurricane^r.

^r Smollet.
Book 9. Ch. 9.
Sect. 32.

However we were a little more successful in the West-Indies. And as through the Progress of this Work, which is now nearly brought to a Conclusion, ill Fortune has attended almost every Con-junct Expedition of any Consequence for more than a Century back; we are unwilling to let any thing (though ever so trivial) that carries with it a contrary Air, escape our Readers and Countrymen. Wherefore we must mention an Action

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(as it is a littoral one) of Rear-Admiral Knowles; who with a Squadron of eight Ships, attacked Fort Louis on the South side of Hispaniola; which after a warm Action of three Hours was surrendered on Capitulation, and dismantled. But as if Success was never to attend two Affairs in this Work successively; so his next Effort, which was upon St. Jago de Cuba, proved abortive. The Admiral then returned to Jamaica. However to make up for this Disappointment, he finished his Campaign with a Naval Action, against the Spanish Admirals Reggio and Spinola; in which the British Admiral had greatly the best of it. It is true, this does not belong to us to mention; but we have trespassed a little through an honest Desire every Man ought to have of wishing his Country to end a War successfully.

The Plenipotentiaries still continued at Aix-la-Chapelle, discussing all the Articles of the Definitive Treaty, which was at length concluded, and signed on the 7th Day of October 1748^s.

^s Smollet.
Book 9. Ch. 9.
Sect. 33.

We are now to enter upon the present War. Our Readers perhaps might have observed we dwelt longer than a Work of this sort required, upon the Importance of the Conquest of Cape-Breton to Great Britain; — which does not appear to be at all lessened by the following Declarations of War.

The King of Great Britain's runs thus: “ The unwarrantable Proceedings of the French in the West-Indies, and North America, since the Conclusion of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, and the Usurpations and Encroachments made by them upon our Frontiers, and the Settlements of our Subjects in those Parts, particularly in our Province of Nova Scotia, have been so notorious and so frequent, that they cannot but be looked upon as sufficient Evidence of a formed Design and Resolution in that Court, to pursue invariably such Measures, as should most effectually promote their ambitious Views. — At length in the Month of April 1754, they broke out in open acts of Hostility; when in time of profound Peace, they attacked in a hostile Manner, and possessed themselves of the English Fort on the Ohio in North America, &c.”

This is the beginning of his Majesty's last Declaration

tion of War against France, given at Kensington the 17th of May 1756.

And thus begins the French King in his.

“ It is notorious to all Europe that the King of England made an Attack in 1754, on the King's Possessions in North America; and that in the Month of June last the English Navy, in contempt of the Law of Nations, and the Faith of Treaties, began to commit the most violent Hostilities on his Majesty's Ships, and the Navigation and Commerce of his Subjects. ——— “ Whilst the English Ministry were, under an Appearance of Sincerity, imposing on the King's Ambassador by false Protestations, Orders directly contrary to the deceitful Assurances given of a speedy Accommodation were carrying into Execution in North America ——— The King hoped that the King of England, consulting in the end only the Laws of Equity and the Interest of his own Glory, would disavow the scandalous Excesses into which his Naval Officers continued to give. His Majesty had even furnished him with a just and decent Method of doing this, by demanding immediate and full Restitution of the French Vessels taken by the English Navy; and had offered on this preliminary Condition to enter into a Negotiation for that further Satisfaction which he had a right to expect, and to agree to an amicable Accommodation of the differences relating to America, &c”.

This was the Style of the French King's last Declaration of War against Great Britain, given at Versailles June the 9th 1756.

We have now seen War with France declared: the present Business therefore is to mention what has since happened relative to Conjunct Expeditions. We shall just take notice, that on the 17th Day of April, before the French King's Declaration of War, the Island of Minorca was first alarmed with the News of a large Fleet of French Transports being in sight. On the 18th it was certified that the French had landed at Ciudadella. Though the Siege of Fort St. Philip and the taking the Island from the English were the Consequences of the Debarkation of a great Body of French Troops: as the Fleet which transported them and was their Convoy,

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voy, did not concern itself with the After Operations, that were carried on in the Island; nor even fired a single Shot, against any Fort or Part of the Island; but kept at such a distance the whole Time as to have only two Guns fired at them; the whole Affair was so much of a military Nature, as to need but little Mention of it here. Wherefore we shall only say, that on the 20th of May, there was a Naval Engagement between the English and French Fleets off the Island of Minorca, but not of Consequence enough to affect the Siege, which the French were carrying on in a regular Manner against Fort St. Philip.

This being the whole we have to say of our Loss of Minorca; we are to speak next of our not winning Rochfort; a City in the Province of Xaintonge, in the County of Aunis, upon the Coast of the Ocean, on the River Charente, in 45 Deg. 57 Min. of Northern Latitude, and 16 Deg. 37 Min. of Eastern Longitude: High Water a Quarter after four*.

† Letter of Intelligence in the Court Martial.

‡ Ibid.

We will give a short Account of the Progress of this Affair. We shall speak of it as we have done of the rest, without entering into a minute Detail of Pamphlet Altercation. This Conjunct Expedition was secretly set on foot by the Ministry, both to facilitate our Military Connections and Operations in Germany, as well as at the same time to distress our Enemies, by striking a Blow in their most sensible Part, that of their Marine. To answer these Ends, an Attack upon one of their chief Arsenals was thought most effectual. Private Intelligence†, as well as the well-known Posture of things, determined the choice to Rochfort — The Conjunction was particularly favourable to such an Enterprize. The French at this time had, in a manner, evacuated France to fall upon Germany with their whole Force‡. Marshal Richlieu was in Possession of Hanover, at the Head of an Army, that had marched out of France above ninety thousand strong. Whilst the

* This City has a Port and maritime Arsenals very commodious for the reception and building of Men of War. It was reunited to the Domain of the Crown of France, by Charles V. in 1364. It was rebuilt and fortified by Vauban, in 1679, by order of Lewis XIV. and the same Year he granted great Privileges and Immunities to the Inhabitants. Here are Royal Arsenals and Magazines.

the Prince De Soubise, with another of thirty thousand, was endeavouring to force his way into Saxony. After such an Exhaustion of Troops, the many Services of that Country must greatly exceed the few that were left. Indeed so great an Exertion on the Continental Side, could not be deemed otherwise than incompatible with a proper Attention to the maritime Parts.—There were in fact only ten thousand Regulars from St. Valery to Bourdeaux *. Without doubt, the French Ministry did not derive less Safety from the Anarchy and Con-^w Ibid. fusion that had the whole Summer so remarkably distracted the English Councils, than from the Valour and Number of their own Troops. How great then must have been their surprize to have received the first Intelligence of a fix'd and active Administration in England, by their being attack'd themselves. Under such Circumstances, every thing conspired in point of measure to confirm the Feasibleness of that Attempt. Whilst perhaps from the Novelty of the Subject, and the total want of System, an Apprehension could not but arise in the Minds of some military Men, of a possibility of a failure in the Execution. Whatever doubts the Commanders in chief, from their knowledge of the Design, might conceive within themselves, they were too wise to shew it in their Countenances. In short, an universal Spirit was diffused through the Troops, to whom it was sufficient to know, they were going against the Enemy. In this Situation of things, our Fleet consisting of 18 Men of War, with 6 Frigates, 6 Bomb-ketches, 2 Fire-ships, 2 Hospital-ships, 6 Cutters, and 44 Transports, with 10 Regiments on board, making about 9000 Men, sailed from Spithead, on the 8th of September 1757. Sir John Mordaunt, General Conway, and General Cornwallis, commanded the Army, whilst Sir Edward Hawke, with the Admirals Knowles and Broderick, did the Fleet. The Destination of this Armament continued doubtful till the 14th, when by the bearing down into the Bay of Biscay, it became evident, that some part of the Coast of France was the Place intended. On the 19th, about 8 o'Clock in the Evening, the whole Fleet was surprized by a Signal from Sir Edward Hawke the Admiral, to lye to; the Wind being fair, the Night clear, and the Fleet upwards of
twenty

twenty Leagues from the Land a-head. Thus it continued eight Hours, before the Signal was made to fail: However to make short, on the 23d, about eight in the Morning, the Van of the Fleet stood towards the Isle of Aix, which lies in the Mouth of the River leading up to Rochfort; the rest of the Ships anchoring at about two Leagues distance from the Island. Captain Howe in the *Magnanime* led the Van. About Noon, the French fired at him from their Fort; but for some time to no Purpose: He continued his Course with the greatest Composure, without firing a single Gun; till having gained the length of the Fort, he bore down, and dropt his Anchors as close to the Walls as the Ship could come; he then began to return their Salutations; and so incessant was his Fire, that in less than a Minute, his Ship seemed one continued Flame.

After his first Broadside, they fired but very few Shot from the Fort; it was, however, near an Hour before they struck their Flag. The *Barfleur* also pointed a few Guns; but she was at too great a Distance to do much

* Genuine Account of the late Grand Expedition to the Coast of France under the Conduct of the Admirals Hawke, Knowles and Broderick; and Generals Mordaunt, Conway and Cornwallis. By a Volunteer in the said Expedition.

Execution*. Part of the Land Forces were put on shore to take Possession of the Island; where they found six Iron Guns, mounted en Barbet; two Brass ones on the top of an old Tower, and two Mortars; near 500 Men, part Soldiers, and part Sailors, were made Prisoners of War on this Occasion: Notwithstanding the very severe Orders against Drunkenness, as well as every other Irregularity, that were given by Sir John Mordaunt, Commander in chief of the Land Forces, both Soldiers and Sailors got exceedingly drunk on this Island. Of how little Importance this first Conquest might appear, considered as an Omen of further Success, it gave great Spirits to the whole Fleet; so much, that had the Troops been landed that Night, or even the next Morning; there was good Reason to suppose, every thing would have succeeded, that could have been expected from such a Force. But as if it had been intended to have given the Enemy time to recollect themselves, as well as to gather together their Forces, eight Days were suffered to elapse, since the Fleet had been seen hovering off the French Coasts; during this time, there was little done, besides holding Councils of War,

and

and founding along the shore. However on the 28th of September, Orders came for the Troops to be ready to debark from the Transports into the Boats at 12 o'Clock at Night. It may be easily imagined, these Orders astonished every body; the Fleet at this time being at least four Miles from the Shore, where they were intended to land; which was now, as may naturally be supposed, in a more prepared Order to receive them. It must also be remembered, that, for two or three Days past, two distinct Encampments † were said to be observed at a little distance from the Sea. Wherefore should we suppose every thing to be carried on with the greatest Expedition possible; the first Debarkment, making about 1200 Men, must have maintained their Ground at least six or seven Hours^y, before they could^y Ibid. p. 49, 50 have been assisted by a second Debarkation; and without the least Hopes of a Retreat, as the Boats were immediately to row back to fetch the rest of the Troops. These Difficulties were too obvious to escape the Observation of the most unobserving Soldier in the Fleet: Yet to do the Army justice, we must say, though the Landing at this time, and in this manner, bore great resemblance to a Forlorn Hope, there appeared not the least sign of Fear in the Troops. On the contrary, things were carried on with so much Alertness and Expedition, that the Boats were filled at least an Hour before the Time appointed. The Night was very cold, and the Sea rough: In these Boats the Men continued thumping each other, and beating against the sides of the Ship, for the space of four Hours; at the expiration of which, the Troops were ordered to return to their respective Ships.

The two following Days were spent in blowing up the Fortification on the Island of Aix; in doing which, a few of our own Soldiers suffered. On the 1st of October, the Fleet with the Army on board, made the best of their way home; when on the 6th Day of the same Month, they all arrived safe.

This mighty Armada, when it first spread its Sails, carried with it that Air of Conquest, and so elevated the

† It never seemed thoroughly ascertained, what kind of Encampments these were; or whether there were any real Encampments,

the Minds of those who wished well to their Country, that its Return without effecting any thing, but the demolition of the little Fort of Aix, appeared so much below their Conception, they could compare it to nothing but the Mountain in Labour, which brought forth a Mouse. However upon this Occasion, the Nation held no Medium. There were others who were astonished, or pretended to be, at the Framers of this vain Project; and would make us believe, the attacking Rochfort, or any part of France in ² France, was seizing a Bull * by the Horns, a Horse by the Hoof.

² Candid Reflections on the Report of the General Officers, relating to the Miscarriage of the Expedition to Rochfort p. 22.

However the Clamour of the Nation in general was so great, as at last to bring the Commander in chief of the Land Forces, Sir John Mordaunt, to a Court Martial, in which he was acquitted. But as some lights may possibly arise from the Evidence on both sides tending to elucidate the Subject, which is the chief End of this Work, that is, the Nature of these Expeditions; it does not seem at all improper briefly to mention the principal things that occur'd during the course of these Proceedings.

It appear'd there were but two Landing-places, which were near Chatelaillon, at the Distance of ten or twelve Miles from Rochfort; that the Troops could not be re-imbarked from either of them in bad Weather; the Swell of the Sea making so great a Surf on the Shore, no Boats would be able to approach it, to take the Troops off. The ablest Pilot said, he had been at Anchor seven Weeks in the Road, and not a Boat had been able to pass or repass. It appeared, that in Case the Troops should be overpowered by superior Numbers, they could have no Protection from the Cannon of the Fleet; the shoal Water preventing their coming within Gun-shot. And the Nature of the Country was such,

* This was an Axiom of Marshal Schomberg, which however they have a little misapplied. Schomberg was used to say, that to attack France by Flanders, was taking a Bull by the Horns: what the Marshal alluded to, was, that as a Bull makes the greatest resistance with his Horns; so France does in Flanders, that being much her strongest Barrier. But in all Probability, the Marshal would have called attacking France by Rochfort, taking the Bull in Flank. We have made this little Observation, lest if it remained as above, our Country might be thought the Bull instead of France.

such, that near the Shore, there were some sandy Hills about 40 Yards from the High Water Mark, which were looked upon as convenient for concealing Troops to surprize the first Debarkation. However, whilst the Fortifications of the Fort on the Isle D'Aix were blowing up, it was thought right by the Commanders, to make some Attempt; and the Landing and Attacking the Forts leading to, and upon the River Charente was determined. In Consequence of this Determination, Orders were given on the 28th of September, for the Landing that Night with the whole Army. At one in the Morning, Rear Admiral Broderick, with most of the Captains, and all the Sea Officers of every kind, with all the Boats that could be got, were ready to assist, and most of the Troops for the first Embarkation were on board. Unfortunately at that time, such a Wind sprung up from the Shore, that all the Sea Officers gave their Opinion, the Landing should not be attempted, the Boats must be rowed so very slowly: It was also reported to Sir John Mordaunt, that some of the Transport Boats could not make any way at all; that it would be Day-light before the first Embarkation could possibly be landed; and it was generally agreed, it would be six Hours before that Body of Troops could be supported by a second Embarkation: Add to this, the Ships could not come near enough to help to cover the Landing, and the Garrison of Rochelle was within two Leagues.

Had the Attack against Fouras, the Fort leading to the River Charente, been made; it was the Opinion it could not have been taken but by Artillery or Escalade. However it was proposed by the Land Officers, on the footing of a joint Attack by Sea and Land: But it was reported by Admiral Knowles, who had sounded these Parts, that it was impracticable to take it by Sea.

These were the chief Matters that tended to prove the Impracticability of putting in Execution the Design upon Rochfort.

And by those who were willing to prove the contrary, the following Remarks were made: That Sir John Mordaunt declared, had Fort Fouras been taken, there would have been great ease in the rest of the Enterprize. That notwithstanding the Report made by Vice-

Admiral,

Admiral Knowles, to whose Inspection the whole Affair of the Attack upon Fouras was delegated by Sir Edward Hawke, the Commander in Chief of the Fleet, it was observed, that this Fort was built with a Design either of defending or offending. Fouras was weak to the Land, having no Ditch, as a French Prisoner certified, who had seen it three Years before; it stood at the Water's Edge to guard the Channel; it stood even on a Bank which ran into the Water; it had twenty-four Embrasures to the Water side. What then was the Use of this Fort? Was it to guard a Bank of Sand, over which scarce a Wherry could pass? If the Guns of no Ship whatever could reach the Fort, could the Guns of the Fort reach the Ship? According to Mr. Knowles, there was no Channel at all, or it lay out of Gun-shot of the Fort. Was it not then astonishing to find that after all the Delay and Hazard to the Ships in sounding and trying the Depth of the Water at a Distance from the Fort, where no Cannon could reach, that not a single Proof was attempted to be given of the Depth of the Water near the Shore, and within Gun-shot of the Fort? Is it not possible then, that the Channel, a narrow one, might run in Shore? Is it not demonstrable that it did so, both from the Circumstances of the thing, and the Evidence of those who knew and had navigated it? There was the united Testimony of two People, joined to the Reason of the thing, that there must be a Channel within Gun-shot of the Fort, though the Ships missed the Entrance of it. It was added also, that a Ship of 70 Guns was seen to go up the River Charente, which though she threw her Guns overboard, as was surmised, could not then draw so little as twenty Feet depth of Water; yet we are told, a Bomb-ketch that drew but eleven was a-ground. If Fouras then could have been attacked by Sea, undoubtedly one or more of the Sea Commanders failed in their Duty. But it does not follow, that because the Sea Officers were guilty of a Failure, the Land Officers were justified in their immediate Resolution to go home again. For it has never appeared that it ever entered into the Heads of any of them, at least till it was too late, to make an Attempt upon that Fort by Land without a Sea Operation; more than it has appeared that such an Attempt would have been

impracticable ; as we are told it was weak on the Land side and had no Ditch.

But enough has been said of Fouras, as the Admirals and Captains who went to reconnoitre, declared there were two Landing-places independent of that Fort, out of the Reach of any Battery, which were near Chatalion. They declared further, that the Beach was dry, sandy, and firm, and the Soldier need not have wetted his Shoes in getting out of the Boat ; that no Shot from any Battery could reach the Boats ; that the Men of War which drew from 20 to 30 Feet Water, might have come within two Miles ; and though the Cannon from them could not annoy the Troops, had there been any behind the Sand-hills, yet the Bomb-ketches might ; which can throw a Bomb two Miles and two Thirds ; and which, as they drew but eleven Feet Water, might have come probably as near as the Transports : so that the Men might have landed under cover of the Bombs ; which, as the Sand-hills were but forty Yards from the Water's edge, must have cleared the Ground for considerably more than a Mile beyond them. For our Parts, we cannot but think, it would have been a prudent Proceeding, as the Sand-hills were so near the Water, to have let the Boats when the first Embarkation was landed, remain on the edge of the Water, till certain Intelligence could have been procured, of what sort of Enemy there was behind these Hills ; for this seems to have been variously conjectured. Then, if any thing very formidable had been there, the Soldiers might have quickly retired to their Boats, had that Step been thought most adviseable. However we will give the final Remark made against the Commanders of this Expedition. It was observed, the Generals calculated the intermediate necessary Time between landing the Detachments, from what would have happened on the turbulent and tempestuous Night of the 28th, when the Sea run so peculiarly high, the ablest Seamen differed whether they could reach the Land or not : even then it would have been done in six Hours, or not at all. It is most evident therefore, that in the Course of a still Night, between dark and light, the whole Body of Troops on board the Fleet might have been assembled

^a Enq. p. 31.

on a dry, sandy, firm Beach, under the Protection of Bomb-ketches, which would have cleared the Ground for a Mile beyond them^a; as it was depofed, that though no exact Calculation had been made, it was thought that thirty-fix Companies of fixty Men each, with their Officers, might have embarked at a time, in all above 2000. Why then was not this done in the Nights either of the 24th, 25th, 26th, or 27th, during which Time there is no Appearance that the Surf of the Sea would have given any Obstruction? These were the chief Things alledged in Favour of the Practicability of the Design upon Rochfort. Were we to mention the Variety of little Altercation, that was handed about upon this Occasion, of what could have been done, and what could not have been done, it would be fwelling this Book to a great Size.

However, as it was the Failure of this Expedition that was the Occasion of our undertaking this Work, we will finish it with a Remark or two of our own. At the Beginning of this Book we have faid, that the frequent ill Succefs of our Conjunct Armaments was owing to want of System and a general Infufficiency in this kind of War. A very little Reflection upon the Return of the Rochfort Armament, convinced us thoroughly of this. Since which we have led our Readers over many Seas, to various Shores, upon different Enterprizes; which for this laft hundred and fifty Years, have almoft all of the grander Sort mifcarried. Wherefore we do not doubt, but they think with us now, that this laft Expedition, as well as the many former, owed in a great meafure its fruitless Attempt to no local, temporal, or accidental, but to the above general and fundamental Cause. 'Tis not much to be wonder'd at, the Event of this Affair turn'd out as it did. What was there to raife higher Expectations from the Service of these Commanders, than for those that have gone before them? It could not be their Experience in this kind of Warfare that could fuffest fuch an Idea.

If it was not the first Expedition these Officers ever served in, it was certainly the first they ever commanded. To whom were they to apply for Instructions, that had ever had the like Command? Who had also any better

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Title to the Name of Conqueror? What Records were they to search, to learn how to gain Success in these Affairs? The chief of those we have mentioned, bear a contrary Aspect. Wherefore if it was not granted to them, to know how to render former Misfortunes in some degree their Warnings, they had few former happy Proceedings for their fortunate Directions. Were we then to proceed upon the Christian Principle, which says, let that Person who has acted better, first throw the Stone; where is he to be found, who dares lift up his Hand?

Such was the melancholy Conclusion of the Rochfort Expedition; which indeed for a Time dispirited the Nation in Proportion to that sanguine Hope with which it was before elevated; an Hope not a little raised from the known Characters of the Commanders, and the kind of Eclat with which this Conjunct Armament set sail. However, the Nation had this Comfort, that though nothing was done, there was nothing undone; for the whole Armament came safe and intire home again, without the Loss of any thing more than Time and Expence; and we are not sure, though the Enemy reaped a little present Advantage by this Loss, but it may prove in the future a great Gain to these Kingdoms, by the Experience it teaches us. It must not be forgot, that whoever commands hereafter during this War, will have had, at the Expence of the Conductors of the Rochfort Armament, the investigating and unfolding every Part of that Miscarriage fresh in their Memory, as a Staff for them to lean upon; when those Gentlemen, we may say in comparison, had scarce a Reed.

The present Experience has already in some measure verified the Truth of this Observation. The Invention of the flat-bottom Boat must date its Origin from the ill Success at Rochfort. The Sluggishness, Aukwardness, and different Sizes of the Transport-boats, were so apparent to the whole Fleet, that it plainly pointed out a great Imperfection in that Part of the Equipment: how adequate the Remedy may be to the Evil, Time will best shew. Every new Expedition will in all Probability produce some new Improvement. And we hope to prove in the Prosecution of this Work, that the Subject is capable of much greater than any yet attempted.

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The intended Enterprize against Rochfort (notwithstanding it had no better issue than what has been related) had so much Influence on the French System of Politicks, that tho' they continued stedfast to their Purpose of pushing the War in Germany, they were obliged not to suffer their Army there to engross their whole Attention. The Force of a British Conjunct Armament appeared too powerful to be neglected; they found it absolutely necessary to keep a more watchful eye on their maritime Parts; the Consequence of this was, their Army in Germany did not make so numerous Appearance in 1758, as in the preceding Year.

The English Ministry were so far from being dispirited at the bad Success of their first Expedition of the War, that the Disappointment seemed rather to animate them the more. Accordingly as soon as the Season admitted of it, the Army of Invasion assembled again in the Isle of Wight. It consisted of 15 Battalions, 400 Artillery Men, and 540 Light Horse; in all about 13000 fighting Men. They were also provided with 60 Pieces of Cannon, 15 of which were 24 Pounders, and 50 Pieces of the Mortar kind. On the 23d of May 1758, Charles Duke of Marlborough arrived in Camp as Commander in chief of the Forces; Lord George Sackville and the Earl of Ancram were the Lieutenant Generals. The Major Generals were Waldgrave, Mostyn, Dury, Boscawen and Elliot. The Embarkation of the Baggage begun on the 25th: Next Day the first Brigade were put on board their respective Transports; and on the 28th the whole was finished.

The Troops that were to make the first Debarkment were to keep themselves in readiness; to take two Days Provisions, and one Tent to every eight Men. The Officers that were to command them, were to have only private Soldiers Tents, till they could establish themselves on the shore. While on board, they were to consider in what manner these Tents could be most conveniently carried by the Men.

Lord Anson and Sir Edward Hawke had hoisted their Flags at Spithead; but Commodore How commanded the Frigates, and was intrusted with the Direction of every thing, that related to the landing of the Troops in the Enemies Dominions. For this Purpose, a considerable

siderable Number of flat-bottomed Boats of a new Invention, was provided; and indeed there was nothing wanting, that could be deemed necessary, to forward the Execution of the Enterprize.

Before we proceed, it may not be amiss to give a brief Description of the Boat that was now contrived. Notwithstanding this Boat was made wholly for the use of the Soldier, to transport him at a very critical time from the Ship to the Shore, and vice versa; we take for granted, it owed not its Origin to any Gentleman of the Army; for there was no Military Order of the Platoon preserved among the Soldiers in the Boat; nor was there any of the Regiment preserved among the Boats on the Water. Confusion was as much as ever among the Men; and as much as ever among the Boats. It differed only in these respects from the common Boats of the Fleet; it was constructed to go in shallower Waters, and being all of a size, they contained the like numbers. Each had two Sails, and was full of Benches; one (if not two) was made along the whole length of the Center of the Boat, with little ones branching to the right and left, like so many ribs, with little Benches also round the edge. There were ten Rowers on each side. Between every Rower and the edge of the Boat, sat a Musketeer to defend him; by which Method each was deprived of the Liberty necessary in his Occupation, that a few Soldiers on the sides might be in a position to Fire very bad, the Rowers were obliged only to paddle. The Contrivance of this piece of Mechanism seemed, as if one main aim had been, to render it as difficult as possible for the Soldiers, when they reached the shore, to get out of it: During which Performance, the Oars being tied with Cordage sloped down the outside of the Boat like the fins of a Fish; which was the ingenious part of the Construction. Each Boat when freighted to the utmost, contained 70 Soldiers, besides the 20 Rowers.

The Weather, during the Encampment, had been remarkably pleasant; the Men, in consequence of constant Exercise, Morning and Evening, were in good Health and Spirits; and longed for nothing so much, as an Opportunity to exert themselves in actual Service. The whole Nation seemed to be animated with an uncommon Degree of martial Alacrity; Lord Downe,

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Sir James Lowther, Sir John Armitage, Mr. Berkeley and Mr. Delaval, Persons of distinguished Rank and Fortune, engaged as Volunteers in the Service; and every Lover of his Country began to form the most interesting Presages, concerning the Success of the Armament, the Destination of which was kept an inviolable Secret. Not but that the Officers at once perceived their Voyage could not be of any length or duration, because a great number of Soldiers was crowded into one Transport, as if for immediate Conveyance to some neighbouring Shore. This Disposition, however, was attended with such Inconvenience, that the Soldiers loudly complained they were in danger of being stifled, for want of Room and fresh Air. The Sum total of the Tonnage of the Transports, amounting to no more than 11,084.

In order to remedy this Evil, which would have been productive of worse Consequences, 400 Men of the Guards were taken on board of a Ship of War, and by this Expedient, the rest were considerably eased. Yet the Soldiers had another subject of Complaint, which is but too common to all Persons employed by Sea in the Service of their Country: They were put upon short Allowance of Provision, and even the Beef they received, was old, hard, salt, and disagreeable. At this Period, the Captain of a French Sloop, who had been detached for Intelligence, boldly ran up among the Fleet at Spithead, and saluted the Admiral as if he had been a Subject of England; but he was soon discovered and taken. The Enemy's Vessels were very alert upon the Coast of England; for notwithstanding the great Number of our Cruizers, their Privateers made Prize of some small Craft on the back of the Isle of Wight.

A proper Disposition being made for landing, when it should be found necessary, and every thing prepared for the Voyage; the Fleet was favoured with a fair Wind, on Thursday the 1st of June. Lord Anson immediately weighed and put to Sea, with all the Ships of War, except those destined as Convoy to the Transports under the immediate Direction of Commodore How. By eleven in the Forenoon, all the Transports were under sail; by two o'Clock the Fleet cleared the Isle of Wight, and stood over to the Coast of France, in the following Order^a, with a fresh Gale which blew all Night.

Order

^a w is to denote the Ships of War.

ORDER of SAILING.

Diligence *w*

Swallow *w*

Essex *w*

Maidstone *w*

Transports of the 1st Division

Active *w*

Transports of
Kingsey's
} }
Transports of
Wolfe's

Third Battalion
of Guards.
} }
Transports of
London's

Second Battalion
of Guards.
} }
Transports of
Home's

First Battalion
of Guards.
} }
Transports of
Bentinck's
Manner's

Fire-ships, Bombs, and their Tenders.

Portland *w* . . Ordnance Transports Deptford *w*

Rose *w* Brilliant *w* Flamborough *w*

Transports of the 2d Division.

Tartar *w*

Esingham's

Richmond's

Hay's. Cornwallis

W. Fuz. Lambton's

Success *w*

Light Horse

Speedwell *w*

Saltash *w*

Rochester *w*

Thus

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Thus sailed Commodore How with 13000 Troops over the Water, in a kind of a long square, (with the Transports (which in the Passage may be called the Impediment) in the Center, and the Ships of War on every side. Thus he passed as securely in the same Position on the Sea, as, History tells us, the famous Xenophon did once with his 10000 Greeks on Land, with the Baggage also in the Center. However the Anne, Artillery Transport, in which were four Engineers, lost her Mast, and was by a Ship of War towed into Guernsey. In the Evening, the Commodore came to an Anchor, until the Tide made; then he weighed, and made sail.

In the Morning of Saturday, June 3, great part of the Fleet was far astern of the Commodore, who being to the Westward of Alderney, brought to off the Sark, and dropped Anchor in very foul Ground and dangerous Riding, where many Anchors were lost. The Ward Transport, having on board part of the first Regiment of Guards, drove upon a Rock, and fired Guns of Distress: When she was on the point of foundering, all the Men were saved in Boats, and removed into other Vessels.

Notwithstanding the repeated Signals to make sail, the Transports lagged behind; some of them at the Distance of five or six Leagues; otherwise the Fleet might have, this Evening, come to an Anchor in the Bay of Cancele, in the Neighbourhood of St. Maloes, the Place of its Destination. At Night, the Commodore weighed and stood off to Sea, for the safety of the Fleet: In the Morning of Sunday, he made sail for the Land. The following Morning the Fleet made St. Maloes, and about two in the Afternoon, the whole stood into the Bay of Cancele. Some Batteries from the shore, beginning to fire on the Cutters, the Frigates ran in shore, and a few shot were exchanged.

About five in the Evening, all the Grenadiers of the Army were embarked in the flat-bottomed Boats for landing; the Volunteers accompanied this Detachment, and acted with them on all occasions. About seven, Mr. How, in his own Ship the Essex, led the way, and with two others, ranging up a long-side of a small Battery, poured in some Broad-sides, by which it was effectually

effectually silenced. . . We landed without the loss of one Man, (three Sailors excepted) and met with no Opposition, except some random shot from a few straggling Peasants. The Troops forthwith marched up in small Parties, to seize the Posts and Villages, which were situated on high Grounds, and rendered very strong by Hollow Ways, Enclosures, Gulleys, and every natural Defence except Water.

The Field Pieces, being ten light six Pounders, were likewise landed, and by a mistake of Orders, drawn in a deep Road, where they stuck in the Mire, until with great difficulty they were brought back to the Beach. Intrenching Tools, and Chevaux de Frise, were ordered to be in readiness for this Debarkation, in case they should be wanted. From the Prisoners it was understood, that there was no other practicable Road for Artillery, from hence to St. Maloes, but by the Way of Doll, which was a Circuit of 12 Miles; but it was learned from other Information, that we might have landed with all our Artillery in Parame Harbour, within a League of St. Maloes. All Night the Troops lay on their Arms. On Tuesday Morning, a spot of Ground for a Camp was reconnoitred, to be fortified with Intrenchments, in order to secure a Retreat. In the Evening, 600 Men were set to work on this Intrenchment. The People of the Country abandoned their Houses in the utmost Consternation, and carried off their Effects, except a few of the aged and infirm. Notwithstanding general Orders and Prohibitions, as well as the personal Vigilance and Moderation of the Officers, the Soldiers plundered and destroyed every thing that fell in their way, to the reproach of Discipline, and Disgrace of Humanity.

The disembarkation being finished, the Troops encamped on the Ground chosen for the Intrenchment, in the Road from Cancale to St. Maloes. On Wednesday Morning, the Duke of Marlborough and Lord George Sackville, with the first Column of the Army, began their March towards St. Maloes: Lord Ancram at the Head of the second Column, advanced towards the same Place, through the Great Road by the Seaside, to the right of the Village of Doll. The Brigade of Guards occupied an Encampment three Miles to the left,

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left, on a spot of Ground which was the most accessible Avenue, by which the Enemy could fall upon the Army. This Night and next Day, a Detachment of the Troops burned above 100 sail of Shipping, together with a great number of Magazines filled with Naval Stores, at St. Servan, and Solidore, a Fauxbourg to St. Maloes, with a large and open Harbour. They likewise took Possession of a Fort, near the Point of Parame, which the Enemy had abandoned. In the mean time, the Brigade left at Cuncalle were employed in making the Entrenchment, as well as in building two square Redoubts, one Horn-work, and two Batteries, for the Defence of 1130 Paces of Ground. In the Rear of this Entrenchment, were Landing-places, with high Rocks, and difficult Communications to the shore. The Front was covered by a Hollow Way, flanked with Houses, in which Loop-holes were made; and a little further advanced, was a fall of large Trees cut down for the Purpose. The left was secured by a deep Escarpment: The Center and the Right were defended by falls of Trees and the Village of Cuncalle, of very difficult Access. Never was a finer Situation, for a small Army to make a stand for any Superiority of Number.

The three Brigades encamped with the Duke of Marlborough, at Parame, had no Opportunity of acting. The Light-Horse, indeed, and Out-parties, scoured the Country, and brought in a considerable number of Prisoners; but there was little Prospect of being able to reduce St. Maloes. This Place is very strongly situated on a Peninsula, almost surrounded by the Sea, and having no Communication with the Land, but by a narrow Dyke or Causeway, about six or seven hundred yards in length. The Town is provided with 250 pieces of Cannon, mounted; but having no Outworks, the Fortifications are far from being formidable; nor would they be able to sustain a regular Siege, for any length of time: But it is very strong by Nature and Art towards the Sea.

On Friday, June 9, Commodore How, with the Ships of War and Artillery Transports, sailed from the Bay of Cuncalle towards St. Maloes, with intention to land the Battering Cannon; but the Design of a formal

formal Siege was thought at that time impracticable. The Attempt would have taken up more time, than upon the present Plan would have been prudent to have spent there. The Artillery could not be landed near the Town; nor were there Horses sufficient to draw it from any considerable Distance. Besides, before any regular Approaches could be made, the Enemy, in all Probability, would have been assembled to a much greater number than the Army could pretend to oppose. The General, moved by these Considerations, resigned all thoughts of an Attack by Land upon St. Maloes; and Mr. How sailed back to the Bay of Cancale. Some Letters passed between the Duke of Marlborough and the Governor of the Town; and an exact Account was taken of the Ships, Vessels, Storehouses and Magazines, which had been destroyed at St. Servan. By the calculation it appears, that incredible Damage had been done to the Enemy in this Excursion, however they may endeavour to conceal or extenuate the Particulars of their Loss.

On Saturday, the Troops marched back to the Landing-place at Cancale, and encamped within the Entrenchments and Redoubts, which were next Day finished.

On Sunday, the Light-Horse were re-embarked; as were the three Brigades of Infantry. Next Day, the Weather was very rainy; nevertheless, the Troops were, by two o'Clock, safely conveyed on board their respective Transports. The Guards covered the Retreat. Their Disposition was such, as to leave the Village of Cancale quite unguarded; so that if any Attempt had been made to interrupt or disturb the Re-embarkment, great Confusion must have ensued. The Peasants that were taken, were dismissed upon the Beach, before the last Division got on board.

On Tuesday, the Town of Granville was reconnoitred by a Gentleman, who had formerly been in the Place. He perceived a Camp before it, consisting, as was afterwards learned, of 5000 Men; and Intelligence was received, that a considerable Body of Forces was here assembled, under Marshal de Harcourt, Commander of the French Troops in Normandy.

The

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The Fleet was detained at Cancele, by North-westerly Winds, for two Days, during which a Packet arrived from England; another was dispatched thither with an Account of the Success, and safe Re-embarkation; and a Flag of Truce, from St. Maloes, went on board of the Commodore.

On Friday 16, the Fleet sailed from the Bay; but next Day was obliged, by contrary Winds, to return to its former station.

On Sunday, the Duke of Marlborough, with some General Officers, went along the shore to reconnoitre Granville. On Tuesday, Commodore How, and the Engineers, made an Excursion for the same Purpose. On the backside of Granville, they perceived nothing but an old Wall on a Precipice, without any manner of Defence, wholly exposed to a Bombardment. The Engineers, at their Return, made a Report of their Observations to the Duke of Marlborough. On Wednesday the 20th, the Fleet tacked out of the Bay, with hazy Weather: Next Day and the following, the Weather continuing fair, it cleared Jersey and Guernsey: On Saturday it made Portland: The next Day it stood for Cape de la Hague, and on Monday steered for Havre de Grace, the Weather being extremely rough. On the following Day, it was understood the Design was for Caen; but as the Fleet could not make this Place, on Account of the tempestuous Weather, it sailed along shore towards Harfleur. The Wind abating, on Thursday it directed its Course for Cherbourg, the Bay of which is open to the Sea, without affording good Security for Shipping. Here it was resolved to land; and a Disposition was made accordingly. The Generals determined that the Forts Querqueville, Hommet, and Gallet, should be attacked in the Night, by the Grenadiers of the Guards, and the first Regiment to be supported by the rest of the Guards and the other Regiments. The Men were actually distributed in the flat-bottomed Boats, and every thing in readiness for the Service; when it began to blow with such Violence, that the Soldiers could not be landed, without the utmost Danger and Difficulty; or even if they had gained the shore, they could not have been sustained in case
of

of a Repulse. For these Reasons the Attempt was postponed, and a Resolution taken to stand in shore with the Ships, in order to cover a general Landing next Morning. Preparations were made for this Purpose; but the Wind increased to a very hard Gale, and the Transports ran foul on each other. The Wind blew right in shore: The Weather had a very unfavourable Aspect: The Provisions had run short; and the Hay for the Horses was almost exhausted. For these Reasons, it was judged proper, to put to Sea immediately; accordingly the Fleet sailed with easy Weather towards the Isle of Wight, and on Saturday Evening anchored at St. Helens.

Such was the Issue of the first Enterprize; an Enterprize atchieved with considerable Success, if we consider the Damage done to the Enemy's Shipping, and the Object which the Ministry had in view, namely, to secure the Navigation of the English Channel; to alarm the French King in such a Manner, as would oblige him to employ a great number of Troops for the Defence of his Coast; to hamper him in the Prosecution of his Designs upon Germany; and to screen the Kingdoms of Great Britain from all Apprehension of Invasion and Insult. Our Success was obtained with as little Loss, as ever attended an invading Army, or a Fleet exposed to bad Weather, contrary Winds, and a variety of other Accidents. The Duke of Marlborough and Lord George Sackville, going ashore, set out for London; leaving the Command of the Troops to Lord Ancram.

On Thursday, July 5, Orders arrived to disembark the Troops, until the Transports should be re-victualled. They accordingly landed at Cowes, and marched to their former Encampment, in the Forest of the Isle of Wight.

Various Conjectures were formed, touching the second Destination of the Armament: Some Officers eagerly wished for a German Campaign; but this they had no Reason to expect, considering the present System of Politicks, which seemed to deviate from the old Scheme, of sending Armies to the Continent. However the Duke of Marlborough, Lord George Sackville, and Major General Waldgrave, shortly after set
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out for the Army in Germany; Lord Ancram also quitted the Isle of Wight, and the Command of the Army was conferr'd on Lieutenant General Bligh, with Instructions, that his Royal Highness Prince Edward would serve on board of Commodore How, as a Volunteer in the Expedition.

The favourite Plan of Action, for employing the British Troops, was still to alarm the Coast of France, destroy the Enemy's Shipping, and distress their Maritime Places; and the little Army was continued in this Service of Invasion.

The 23d of July, the thirteen Battalions (for there were now no more) consisting of about 6000 Men, their Numbers being greatly reduced by Sickness, re-embarked at Cowes, and fell down to Spithead.

On the 27th, his Royal Highness Prince Edward, attended by all the Barges of the Fleet, was rowed on board of Commodore How. The Barge in which he sat, carried the Standard of England: The Flags and Captains followed in Order, according to their Seniority: The Guns of the Garrison fired as he passed.

On Sunday the 30th, the Fleet weighed Anchor, and endeavoured to turn it out *, till 3 o'Clock in the Afternoon; when the Commodore perceiving it would be impossible for the aftermost Ships to clear the Land, put about and stood away for Spithead. He cast Anchor at a considerable distance from the Shore, to keep clear of a Victualling Fleet just arrived; and bridle that Propensity which the Soldiers had, to land in their own Country.

The next Day the Fleet weighed again, and sailed to St. Helens, where it remained at Anchor till towards the Evening: Then it stood out, and by Night cleared the Land, with easy Wind and fair Weather. August 1, in the Morning, the Isle of Wight appeared six or seven Leagues astern: The Fleet edged quite along the West end of the Isle of Wight all Tuesday; and about 9 at Night, tacked and stood down the Channel. During Wednesday and the three following Days, there were fluttering Winds and calm Weather, so that it was waisted to and fro near the Isle of Alderney, between

* A Sea Term,

tween the High Land of St. Albans, and Cape de la Hague.

On the 6th of August in the Afternoon, the Fleet tacked several times and stood close in by the Town of Cherburgh a free City on the Coast of Normandy, with a good Port, situated at the Extremity of Collentin, near Cape la Hague, in 49 Deg. 38 Min. of Northern Latitude, and 16 Deg. 5 Min. of Eastern Longitude: High Water at half an Hour past Seven. It was founded by Julius Cæsar when he conquered England, and was the last City Charles VII. dispossessed the English of. It was a Place of Importance so early as 1050. The Empress Matilda founded here the fine Abbey, called the Vow, in 1145 † The Fortifications of this Place were razed by Lewis XIV. in 1698, but were since in some measure rebuilt upon the same Plan, though the Town was left open and defenceless. The Commodore ordered the Fleet to anchor about a League and half West of this Town, to be ready to weigh by Day-break, and to keep close to the Frigate on board of which the Commodore's Pendant was flying. In the Night two of the Bomb-vessels anchored close in to throw Shells into the Town, which did but little Damage. At Day-break, whilst the large Ships tacked, and seemed as if the Intention had been to attack the Forts; the Frigates and Transports stood further to the Westward, a League from Querqueville: The Signals were made to get the flat-bottomed Boats in readiness, and to prepare to land. The Commodore's Pendant was hoisted on board the Pallas; seven or eight Frigates and two Bomb-vessels stood into shore
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† Matilda or Maud, was the Daughter of Henry I. King of England, by Maud the Daughter of Malcolm III. King of Scotland. Matilda was some time herself Queen of England, though Normandy was her Portion given her by Henry her Father. She married Henry V. Emperor of Germany, and after his Decease, Geoffrey Plantagenet, Earl of Anjou. Her Son, Henry Earl of Anjou, who was afterwards King Henry II. of England, and the first of the Royal House of Plantagenet, commanded the said Abbey to be built, which was endowed, and confirmed by the Charters of Richard and Edward, Kings of England; under which Protection it had continued to the Year 1450, when it went to the Crown of France. It had fifty Parishes in Dowry before the Civil Wars, and Jersey was part of its Endowment. Father Cantel of the said Abbey gave the above Account of the Endowment. See Eng. Hist.

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as close as possible, and anchored in such a Manner as to scour the Coast entirely. During this time, the Enemy had discover'd, that the real Design was to make the Descent in that Place; the rather as there was no Artillery planted on that part of the Coast, it having been deemed impracticable, on account of the rocky Ground close in shore; where indeed the Richmond Frigate struck, and made Signals of Distress. About 11 o'Clock in the Morning, the Boats with the Troops having drawn close under the Commodore's Stern, and every thing being ready, the Signal was made for landing the first Division of Troops, about 1500 Men, and to scour the Coast by the Fire from the Shipping; this was done so effectually, that the Enemy, who by this time had got behind the Sand-hills, and the natural Ramparts on the Shore, were struck with a Panic and fled before the Guards and Grenadiers (of which the first Division were compos'd) were landed. The Enemy that was on the Beach to oppose the Debarkment, consisted of the following Numbers.

Le Count de Raimont, Marechal du Camp.

Lord Clare's Regiment of Irish	— — — — —	700
Le Count de Lorraine	— — — — —	600
Dragoons of Languedoc	— — — — —	600

These were old Regiments.

There were besides; Le Count d'Horion's Regiment, newly rais'd about Wesel and Liege 1300
Gardes des Cotes ^a — — — — — 6000

The Landing was nearly finished before Night.

^a This List was given by the Town Major of Cherburg.

The advanced Regiment immediately took Post at Naqueville, on an Hill, and it would have been fortunate, could the Army have march'd on without Delay: In that case, it might, by proper Dispositions, have surrounded several detached Parties; extended the Front on the Plain; and occupied the Village of Querqueville: But it was judg'd more prudent to remain at a Village called Erville, near the Place where the Army disembarked. There it encamp'd at Night in a manner so crowded, that if it had been attacked, with the Hills on the right, and the Sea on the left, it could not have room enough for the Front to operate with any advantage; for the Ground on which it lay, did not extend above 400 Paces ^b. The Reasons given for not

^b Journal.

not advancing, were these : The whole of the Infantry was not yet landed ; and all the Light-horse were on board : The General thought it imprudent to march without his whole Force, and Fort Querqueville was still in the Enemy's Possession.

Next Morning, a Disposition was made for moving forwards : A party of Light-horse and Grenadiers, with two Pieces of Cannon, were ordered to advance by the low Road to Querqueville ; to be followed by the whole Army, except one Column, directed to march by the way of Naqueville, along the rising Grounds. Long before it began to move, a Gentleman who had been out reconnoitring, reported to the General, that no Parties of the Enemy were seen moving on the Hill or Plain ; and that Fort Querqueville seemed to be entirely abandoned.

Notwithstanding this Intelligence, the March of the Army was retarded several Hours, by their waiting for Cannon. The advanced Party of Light-horse and Grenadiers found the Information true ; took Possession of the Fort ; struck the French Ensign ; and hoisted English Colours. Then the Army marching up to the Village of Querqueville ; and another Party of Light-horse was detached to reconnoitre the High Road by Hainville. In the mean time, the first Party marched by the Low Road, on the back of the Forts ; and found the Lines along the Coast, the Batteries and every thing clear. Thus encouraged, they advanced behind St. Aulne, Ecœurdeville, Hommet, and la Galet, to the City of Cherbourg, which was abandoned by the Enemy, and open for our Reception. The Afternoon was not yet far advanced, and the reconnoitring Party on the Right from Hainville, had made Report, that the Wood was clear on that Side ; so that the Army might have marched in two Columns. Instead of this Disposition, the Troops moved in one Column ; and the Line of March being lengthened till after Midnight, the Rear was bewildered and fatigued, and the Men did not know where to pitch their Tents. * The Generals were quartered in Town ; and received all Manner of Civility from the Citizens. No Guards had been placed in the Skirts of the Town, nor other Parts that ought to have been secured ;

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cured ; so that great Disorders were committed. The Effects of this License * appeared but too plain, to those Officers who were early on Duty in the Morning. Endeavours indeed were used, to put a stop to such irregular Proceedings ; but it was late before the proper Guards and Sentries could be placed : Even this Precaution when it did take Effect, could neither remedy the Mischief which had been done, nor sufficiently restrain the growing Evil : For, to speak impartially, neither the Declarations, nor the Safeguards were sacred. It was found indeed on these Services to be a difficult Task to make them so :

The Town of Cherbourg and its Avenues being reconnoitred, it was determined to destroy the Forts and the Bason, without Delay. The Destruction of the Forts was left to the Direction of the Engineers : That of the Bason, was undertaken by some Officers of the Fleet and the Artillery.

The Port of Cherbourg was some Years ago, considered by the French, as an Object of great Importance ; from its Situation in regard to the River Seine, by which it favoured the Navigation of their Ships sailing down the Channel ; and from the Circumstance of its being opposite to the finest Parts of England. Mr. Belidor enhanced its Merit, by giving a Plan and Description of it, in his Treatise of Hydrostatics, where he expatiates on the Utility of Cherbourg. Part of his Plan is executed with great Labour, solid Materials, and excellent Workmanship. The Stones are four Foot by one and a half, almost as hard as Marble, and cramped with Iron : The Bridge and Flood-gates are equally strong and elegant. What was done, must have cost an immense Sum ; but, from the Work's being discontinued, it would appear that the Plan did not answer, or that they were tired of the Expence ; perhaps both Reasons concurred. The Bay has been thought by some too open and insecure, notwithstanding the Island of Pelee and the Point of Hommet, which form the Harbour ; and that the weight of Back-water in the little River, is not sufficient to clear the Bason. It might always, however, have been a Nest for the Enemies Privateers

* Drunkenness.

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teers and Frigates, to have annoyed our Trade lying opposite to the Isle of Wight.

The Town itself is quite open and defenceless. They had indeed raised a few unconnected Batteries: On the Beach, at the Distance of a Mile from the Town, was Tour la Ville, a square Redoubt; and along the Beach, in front of their former Camp, was an Entrenchment with Cannon. To the Westward of the Town, the Shore was secured with the following Defences, that stood at the Distance of Six or Seven hundred Yards from each other: Galet, which has two Faces to the Sea, two Flanks to the Beach, and a Horn-work to the Land: Hommet, a square Redoubt: Ecœurdeville, a Battery en Barbette to the Sea, and two Towers to the Beach and Land: A little above this Work, begins a Line of Entrenchment along the Coast, with several Batteries: Fort St. Aulne, and Querqueville, on the Point, nearly of the same Form with the Ecœurdeville. But to return to our military Operations. The Camp was formed in a straggling Manner, on the summit and descent of a Hill, fronting Eastward, to the strongest Ground^a; open and exposed to the Right Flank,^a Journal of difficult of Access to the Rear, having the Sea and the Exp. close Ground to the Left. A commanding Post on the Hill at the Hermitage was occupied; but a rising Ground in the Valley below, on the Rear which commanded an Avenue of the Town, was neglected. The Army was kept very quiet in Camp, by the Out-parties of the Light-horse, which were always vigilant and alert. In this Corps were several excellent Officers.

At first, they proceeded but slowly in the Demolition of the Works; a very uncomfortable Consideration, as Intelligence was daily received from Deserters, that the Enemy were employed in assembling a considerable Body of Forces to intercept the Retreat. That such a Number of Troops should retire before the Army when it landed, is not to be accounted for any other Way, than by supposing they had not recovered from their Panic, that they did not chuse to trust their Militia, and expected a

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CONJUNCT EXPEDITIONS. Part 1.

Reinforcement of Regulars sufficient to overpower the Army at once.

The French Camp was formed at Vallogn, an open fertile Country, at the Distance of four Leagues from Cherbourg.

Some Mines in the Basen were sprung: The Forts had hitherto been run down by Hand, for want of Miners; but now the more effectual Method was taken of blowing them up. A Report in Writing was given in to the General, of the Situation and Strength of Cherbourg and its Outlets; together with Proposals for encamping in Lines; and a Remonstrance touching the Necessity there was, to prepare a Disposition for a regular and safe Retreat. His Royal Highness Prince Edward was every Day on Shore, from the first Landing, and very attentive to the different Operations.

The Barracks in Town were occupied by the Grenadiers of the Line, and some other Troops. Detachments were sent out every Day to the Eastward, towards Vallogn, where they often discovered and skirmished with Parties of the Enemy. Deserters were daily brought in, particularly from Clare's Battalion of the Irish Brigades, among whom were many English, who had been forced into their Service when Prisoners of War. From these a Variety of Intelligence was received. It was learnt, that at the Camp of Vallogn, were assembled, besides the Troops that were on the Beach, the following Regiments of Dragoons:

Descar	—	—	500
Bourbon Basset	—	—	500
St. Chaumont	—	—	500

Of Infantry:

Guienne	—	—	700
Limosin	—	—	700
Poitou	—	—	1400

The chief Commanders were the Duke of Luxembourg, Marshal of France; the Duke de Harcourt, Count de Coctologon, and Mr. Ruth, Lieutenant-Generals

nerals of Infantry ; Le Marquis de Brancas, Major General : Monsieur de Brisac and Count de Raimont, Marshals de Camp.

The Soldiers continued to marraude ; some were tried and acquitted. The Inhabitants of Cherbourg, who chiefly suffered by their Licentiousness, complained in vain ; they were courteously heard, but received little Relief. They were terribly alarmed when fire was set to their Ships in the Bason, apprehending that the whole Town would soon be reduced to Ashes : But so much Caution was observed, that the Houses sustained no Injury.

Considerable Progress was made in the Demolition of the Works. A Plan of Re-imbarkation was concerted : The Commodore proposed that a slight Intrenchment should be made, sufficient to defend the last Division that should be re-imbarked. He said he would order the Ships in to cover us, to flank and scour any Works we should make : He pitched on the Bays where he judged the Re-imbarkation might be most easily and safely performed : He expressed his Opinion, that the Forts should only be demolished towards the Sea ; and the Walls towards the Land be left intire, to cover the Retreat. His Advice was followed accordingly. The Intrenchment was begun and ended in two Days : It extended across the Neck of Land, on which Hommet stands ; was flanked on the Right, by Ecœurdeville ; on the Left, by Gallet ; and in the Front of it, was the Village of Bellecroix, with a small Redoubt. Between the Forts were intermediate Bays, from which the Troops were to be re-imbarked.

The Work was retarded by the Sloth and Drunkenness of the Men, who had discovered some Magazines of Wine, and became extremely dissolute : The Foot-Guards, however, on this Occasion, exhibited a laudable Example to the rest of the Troops ; for, after the first Night at Cherbourg, they were strictly kept to Camp and Discipline. The Duty was carried on in the common Routine : The Out-Parties were still Active and Alert : The Labour was moderate, and the Army enjoyed the utmost Tranquility.

The public Taxes in Cherbourg were raised for his

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Britannic Majesty, together with a Contribution, and Ransoms for the Town; as well as for a Glass Manufactory, a Royalty which yields considerable Profits: All these Sums when collected, did not exceed 60,000 Livres, equivalent to about 2500 Pounds, of which about 1000 l. remain still unpaid, but Hostages were retained in Lieu of it.

The General, attended by some of the Commanding Officers, going out to reconnoitre, with a Detachment of Grenadiers and a Party of Light-horse, some of the French Cavalry appeared at a Distance. Captain Lindsey, of the Light-horse, was immediately ordered to attack them; he accordingly advanced at a brisk Pace, without detaching from his Front and Flanks; and falling in with a Body of Infantry posted behind a Hedge, received a severe Fire, which obliged the Light-horse to wheel about and retire. Captain Lindsey was mortally wounded by a Musket Shot, and died universally regretted, as a worthy young Man, and one of the most intelligent, active, and industrious Officers in the Service. It was thought there was no great Necessity for this Charge.

The dissolute Behaviour of the Troops continuing, several Individuals were tried, and one Soldier suffered Death: Some others were murdered by the Peasants, in the very Act of marauding.

The intire Demolition of the Forts Tourlaville, Galet, Hommet, Ecœurdeville, St. Aulne, and Querqueville, with the Bason built at a great Expence, and capable of receiving Ships of large Burthen; being quietly finished by the consuming, from the Eleventh of August in the Morning to the Fifteenth at Noon, an Hundred and Forty-one Barrels of French Powder taken in the Place, and the springing with it fifty-three Mines; General Bligh took a Resolution to re-imbark. All the Brass Ordnance taken from the Enemy, had been put on board a Danish Vessel, lying in the Port of Cherbourg, and sent to England under Convoy. The Stores and Artillery were shipped on the Fifteenth of August; and the Light-horse embarked on Platforms, laid in the flat-bottomed Boats in the Evening.*

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* They were placed in Hyde-Park for a few Days. The Populace came in Crouds hardly to be conceived, to see them. They

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On the 16th at three o'Clock in the Morning, the Camp was struck; so that when the Inhabitants of Cherbourg awoke, they saw no Vestige of the Army but the Destruction and Havock it had made.

The Troops marched down to the Beach, on the West Side of Gallet; but did not enter the Entrenchment, as no Enemy appeared to disturb them. The whole Army was re-embarked under the shade of Fort Gallet; cover it could not be called, as it had neither Troops within, nor Artillery on the Ramparts, to defend them in case they should have been attacked.^k Before Eleven o'Clock the Embarkation was^k Journal. compleated, with equal Ease, Distinctness, and Expedition. His Royal Highness Prince Edward came off with the last Division of the Grenadiers, and steered the Boat aboard. Hostages had been taken, for the punctual Performance of the Articles of Ransom.

Though no immediate Danger appears in Re-embarkations of this Kind; yet, if military Dispositions are ever necessary, they ought to take place in an Enemy's Country; where the Troops are exposed to Accidents, that may be of the most pernicious Consequence: Besides, by such Dispositions, the Officers and Men are habituated to military Manœuvres; and learn by Practice how to behave with Coolness and Composure, on all Emergencies. No better Opportunity can offer for learning these Operations, than during a Campaign in the Face of an Enemy. The Neglect^l of such Manœuvres, is attended sometimes^l Ibid. with the most fatal Blunders and Mistakes, when it becomes necessary to occupy, to cover, or to abandon Posts, in time of Action. In such Cases, the most spi-

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They were afterwards conveyed through the City to the Tower in grand Procession: As were a few Days before from Kensington to St. Paul's Church the French Colours, brought much about the same time from Cape Breton, taken by the Conjunct Armament in North America, under the Command of Admiral Boscawen and the Generals Amherst and Wolf. The People, like the Romans of old, seemed greatly delighted to behold passing in their Streets these Trophies of Victory, atchieved at the same time in such very different Parts of the World. As they were Shews that had never been exhibited before, scarce in the Memory of Man, they imprinted in their Minds an high Idea of the Force of a British Conjunct Armament.

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rited and intrepid Troops are puzzled, perplexed. and thrown into Confusion, by not knowing the Detail of their Duty.

The Fleet remained part of two Days in the Harbour, without seeing the Face of an Enemy; and on the 18th, sailed with little Wind and fair Weather. Off Alderney the Garland of 22 Guns fell in with the Fleet, which one of the Frigates engaged; but she being likely to escape, the Rochester Man of War bore down upon her, and she struck immediately.

The Fleet steered for England; and on Saturday 19th anchored in Weymouth Road, under the High Land of Portland, where was received the agreeable News, that Louisbourg was taken by the British Troops in America, on the 26th of July.

On Tuesday, about Midnight, the Fleet weighed again; and next Day stood along shore off Torbay. On Thursday Morning, it stretched over to the Southward; but, the Wind changing and blowing a hard Gale, the whole Fleet bore away for the English Shore, and anchored a second time in Weymouth Bay under Portland Hill, famous for its Quarries of Free-stone.

The Fleet under Commodore Lord How*, sailed from Portland Road, for its third and last Enterprize, August 31st at Six in the Morning, for the Coast of France; it had all that Day and the Night following foul Weather and a rolling Sea; on the 1st of September it was heaved up Channel by the same N. E. Wind, as far as the Start, when the Weather turning calmer, it stood over for the French Coast; the following Day made Guernsey, and towards Night was in sight of Jersey.

On Sunday 3d, it was off Cape Frehel, and Cutters were dispatched through the Fleet to send the Troops ashore in the flat-bottomed Boats, as soon as the Com-

* Upon the Return of the Fleet to England, News was brought to Commodore How, of the Death of his Brother George-Augustus Lord How; who was unfortunately killed in a Skirmish in America. He was a sensible, noble-minded, honest Man, and one of the bravest Soldiers in the British Service; by those who had so little Envy in them, as to honour and respect such a Character, he was as deeply lamented, as his Death deservedly merited.

modore came to an Anchor. It was supposed that the Reason for making the Debarkment there, was to take a Fort defended by five or six Guns, in sight of which the Fleet then was.

By Six in the Evening having passed that Fort, the Fleet came to an Anchor in the Bay of St. Lunaire about two Leagues distant from St. Maloes. This Bay (as it is called) is environed with Rocks, and has very indifferent anchoring Ground. The same Night the Signal directed the Troops to remain on board and take off their Accoutrements; however, soon after Orders were issued to prepare for Landing at Break of Day; and accordingly the flat-bottomed Boats were got ready that Night.

At Day-break on the 4th upon the Signal made, these and all the other Boats of the Fleet were got out; by Six or Seven the greatest Part of the Army, and about 30 Horse, were embarked and lay under the Stern of the Commodore and of the large Ships. The Troops had Orders to take three Days Provisions ashore, and the Tents were to follow, which did late at Night. About 9 o'Clock the Commodore who had hoisted his Flag on board a Frigate, stood in, and the whole Fleet weighed and followed; during this time and greatest Part of the Day, there fell a prodigious Quantity of Rain, which incommoded the Troops, and had like to have damaged their Ammunition exceedingly. A Boat or two was overset by a Frigate in tacking, and four or five Men lost, besides the Accoutrements of several others who were with Difficulty saved. A Signal was soon afterwards given for the Boats to lye to, owing to the Uncertainty of being able to cover the Landing with the Frigates on so rocky a Coast, and one they were so little acquainted with. Two or three of the Frigates and a Bomb-ketch got however close in shore, and by the Return of the Commodore on board the Frigate, where his Pendant was hoisted, it was understood the Descent was to be made immediately. During this Delay, two Pieces of Cannon played upon them from the Shore, but at too great a Distance to reach.

A Shot from one of the Frigates was fired in shore; the Boats stood in, and the Landing was effected at Noon; the Men formed as fast as possible, and took Possession

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session of the high Grounds on the Beach near the Village of St. Lunaire. The Remainder of the Troops, and about fifty Light-horse with two Field Pieces were landed in the Afternoon, and their Tents in the Evening. No Troops were discovered any where on the Beach, which was a lucky Circumstance, as there was Crouding and Confusion with the Boats. This is not to be wondered at, there being nothing among them, whether the new-invented, or those belonging to the Fleet, to denote Distinction or regimental Order. No Enemy indeed being near, the Soldiers extricated themselves from them, (their Make and Fashion considered) with as much Agility as could be expected.

It was obvious to suppose, altho' few were admitted into the Secret, that the Design was against St. Maloes. It was however given out, the better to cover the real Design, that at St. Briac within a League and half of the Army, there was a Harbour where they might find a great Number of Ships, as it some times contained in Time of Peace two or three hundred. Accordingly five Companies of Grenadiers under the Command of Sir William Boothby, were detached that Evening, and found there a three-masted Vessel, Eight of two Masts, and about Four Sloops, which they burnt, and returned next Morning without any Molestation. A Detachment of the Grenadiers of the Guards burnt likewise Five Barks the following Day at another Place. In the Afternoon the Works of St. Maloes and the Forts at the Mouth of the Harbour were reconnoitred.

On the Morning of the Fifth, it was understood that an Attempt was to be made against St. Maloes, notwithstanding in the Month of June last it was judged impracticable to take it, though then the Army had a greater Provision of Artillery, and was more numerous; the Consternation of the Town and Country was also stronger, the Coasts less guarded, and not the Number of Forces (as now) at Granville, fifteen Leagues from St. Maloes.

Notwithstanding the Increase of Difficulties since that time, several Methods were proposed, by which they might make the strongest Efforts against the Place. The Ships were to attack the Forts; the Bomb-ketches were to run in to bombard the Town; the flat-bottomed Boats

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Boats were to be rowed up after the Forts should be taken, so as to pass the Town in the Night, that they might transport the Troops to the St. Servan Side, where a Blockade should be formed, and Bomb-batteries might be erected against the Town.

Every Person acquainted with the Situation and State of St. Maloes, believed it was above Insult, either from the Land Forces or Shipping. The Mouth of the River that forms the Basin from St. Malo, to St. Servan, extends two Miles in Breadth, and the Forts that defended the Entrance were strong and numerous, considering the difficult Navigation of the Entry, through which none of the Pilots would undertake to conduct the Ships. The Entrance is defended by several Batteries, mounting in all above 50 Pieces of large Cannon; and 40 Pieces are planted on the West-side of the Town. There were Seven armed Vessels lying in the Basin, whose Guns might have been brought to bear upon any Batteries that could have been raised on Shore, to the Westward above Dinar, or upon any Ships that could have entered by the usual Channel.

Upon more mature Deliberation, it appeared to the Council of War, that the two Deckers which were intended, were insufficient to silence the Batteries, and that no Attempt could be made upon the Walls, which were Forty Feet high, till a Breach was first made; nor was there as yet any Artillery on Shore to make one.

It was then proposed, that the Troops should advance between four or five Leagues up the River*, pass the Bridge at Dinant, and march down on the other Side; that the Artillery should be landed between St. Maloes and Roteneuf; but as this might have required several Days, even if the Weather was favourable, the Scheme was laid aside. Indeed, every one who knew the Situation of the Forts, the Frigates in the Bay, and other Difficulties, the bad Roads for the Artillery, and the Strength of St. Maloes on the East-side, esteemed the executing either Proposal with Success a great Improbability.

The Marquis de la Chatre, the Commandant of St. Maloes and the bordering Coast, upon the Appearance
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* We have not been able to know for certain, whether the passing up the River, is to be understood, going by Water or by Land; we imagine both Methods were under Consultation.

the British Fleet, drew into the Town in the Night the Regiment of Boulonnois, and a Battalion of the Militia of the Fontenai-le-Comte, and the best Part of the Capitainerie of Dinant, and afterwards that of Dol. He had also furnished the Forts and other Works with every thing necessary for a vigorous Defence. And, as he could not think that the Plan of the English was only to pass the River Rance, in order to come at, and burn a few small Vessels that had escaped their first Descent; he had them all armed, and disposed of at proper Distances along the Mouth, and up that River ^f.

^f Relation de la
Victoire rem-
portée sur les
Anglois, le 11
Sept. 1758, pres
St. Cast.

The next Scheme of the English, was to send in the Brilliant and two Bomb-vessels, to bombard a Fort and the Town; but this Plan was thought so hazardous it was also dropt. Some were then of Opinion, that the safest and best Measure now left, was to re-imbark; but the Ships had, upon the Wind's coming about, been forced to weigh and stand off without the Rocks: Six or Eight of the Transports could not now clear them, and seemed in great Danger.

The Situation of the Army was now none of the best; their Ships were at a Distance, and the Troops were very short in Provisions, and the Hopes of getting any, unless some could be brought from St. Briac, whither an Officer was sent in quest of them.

The Peasants had drove away their Cattle, and abandoned the Country, so that very little was brought to the Camp.

The Commodore and Prince Edward, were obliged to lye that Night amongst dirty Straw in a Hay-loft, being not able to get to their Ship.

The Ground where the Fleet lay at Anchor, was so foul and rocky that the People in the Neighbourhood came out to see them dash in Pieces. ^b They declared they never durst anchor in that unsafe Road of St. Lunaire; and were sure our Sea Officers were extremely uneasy. The Commodore thinking it unsafe to lie longer in this Place, moved up to the Bay of St. Cast, about three Leagues to the Westward.

The Design upon St. Maloes being now laid aside, it was resolved to penetrate farther into the Country; moving however, in such a manner as to be near the Fleet, in case it should be necessary to re-imbark. For
this

^b Journal.

his Purpose, on the 7th, 300 Grenadiers with Pioneers and proper Officers, went in search of the Road by which the Army was to march, now about five Leagues distant from their Shipping in Frenaye or St. Cast's Bay.

On Friday the 8th in the Morning, about 8 o'Clock, the whole Army was formed in a Column. However, the March was retarded by a General Court Martial; and the Difficulty of conveying the Sick to the Fleet; for all the Carriages amounted to no more than three Ammunition Waggons. Some Parties were at the same time dispatched to the Beach to learn from the Sea Officers who waited there, if it would be practicable to get the Sick on board; which was found in the Affirmative.

About 11 o'Clock, the Army began to move, preceded by 300 Grenadiers of the Line and Quarter Masters. They travelled under a heavy Rain the whole Day, and through a fatiguing Road, till they came to a Church situated by a Gut of Water made by the Tide, which they waded through about Knee deep, and in an Hour after came to their Ground near St. Guildo.

The Grenadiers had the Village of St. Guildo in Front across the River, where the Tide flowed some Fathoms deep in the Channel, which was therefore fordable only at Low Water. From thence the Militia or Gardes des Cotes with a few Regulars amongst them, fired some Shot on the Grenadiers, but did no Hurt. The Artillery which attended this March, were two Field Pieces, with which a few Shot were fired and silenced the Enemy for that Night. The Rain was so heavy, that many of the Soldiers were obliged to quit their Tents.

The Intention was to pass this Water the next Morning at six o'Clock, and every necessary Preparation was accordingly made: When to their Astonishment, they found at that Hour, they had mistaken the Time of Low Water for that of High; and that they were some Hours too late. The Hour

of passing was then fixed for the Afternoon^a.

In the course of this Day, the Maidstone and a Cutter stood in close by the Abbay St. Jagu, situated

^a An authentic Account of the last Attempt on the Coast of France. Anony.

^m See La Neptune Francoise.

situated about Half a Mile from Guildo, on a Neck of Land, and environed on the two Sides with the Tide, and deep Water to the Sea. ^m All this Day was calm, and it was the Opinion of some of the Seamen, that the Troops could be taken on board at that Place very safely; as many of the Ships could stand in, and the Boats get near, if nothing further on Land was in View. Had it been resolved to have embarked here, or to have made the most of the Grounds, and waited for the Enemy, the Army would have had, besides a Village, and Entrenchments in their Front, their Frigates at hand, to have answered the Purpose of Batteries.

The Hour for passing the Water being come, Orders were issued for the Troops to prime afresh, and to see that their Fire-locks were in Order; and to the Grenadiers of the whole Army to pass the Ford opposite to the Village of Guildo, from whence the Gardes des Cotes had kept firing, but with little or no Effect all that Day. The Brigade of Guards was to ford the River at the same time, lower down in the Face of the Wood of Val, where they must land on a Beach within thirty or forty Yards of the Edge of the Wood, which had in it Parties of armed Peasants and Militia.

At four o'Clock, the Grenadiers of the Guards marched to the Ford with two Field Pieces, which discharged three or four times.

As soon as they entered the Channel, the Enemy from the Windows of the Houses and Garden Walls fired upon them, and wounded several Men; amongst the rest Lord Frederick Cavendish in the Thigh, and Captain Daniel Jones in the Foot; this Firing continued till the Grenadiers got into the Village and scoured it. This was not the only Difficulty they had to contend with in the passing this Ford; Captain Caswell had almost been lost in a Quicksand; as it was he could not save his Arms.

Colonel Julius Cæsar, who marched at the Head of the Brigade of Guards, as he drew near the Water,

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Water, observing the Advantage he should give the Enemy, was he to attempt a Passage over it, in the Face of the Wood that bordered it, filed off with his Column more to the Right; by which the Guards not only found a better Ford, but gained the opposite Bank without any Disturbance. The Night was so cold to the Troops, where the Army encamped, which was between St. Jeguhel and the Wood of Val, especially after wading the River, that some of the Men were obliged to quit their Tents and walk about the best part of the Time.

This was the Situation of the English Army at this time. We will now turn to that of the Enemy.

The Duke D'Aiguillon, who was the Commandant, or (as we call it) the Lord Lieutenant for the Province of Bretagne, having been informed by M. de la Chatre of the Position of the British Fleet, the Descent our Troops had made, and of their After-movements; upon the immediate Notice, ordered the Troops under his Command of Bretagne to begin their March; leaving however in some of the principal Posts in that Province, as many as were thought necessary. He arrived on the 8th at Lamballe, a Town between Brest and St. Maloes, about 33 Leagues of that Country distant from the former, and 12 from the latter, standing near a River. This Place was appointed for the assembling a Party of their Troops. A Battalion of Volontaires Etrangers, or Foreign Volunteers, having reached this Spot by two forced Marches, was sent with a Squadron of Dragoons, under the Command of M. Le Comte D'Aubigny, to take Post at Dinant, a Town as we look to the Sea, considerably more to the right, between Lamballe and St. Maloes, and about eight Leagues distant from the former, and between four or five from the latter. This Place was of great Consequence, standing on the River Rance, and commanding the Passage over it. It had besides some Magazines of the Enemy, and was appointed the Rendezvous of one of their Columns. It was between four or five Leagues distant, and more up the Country, at this time from the British Army. The Duke D'Aiguillon, upon Advice being brought him of the Position the Army under General Bligh was in at the River on the Right of Guildo, called Er-
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guenon, went himself to Plancoët, a Town standing on the same River, but a League and half from the Passage of it, higher up, with two Squadrons of Dragoons, and eight hundred Gardes des Côtes. He ordered M. D'Aubigny to proceed to Plouer, on the Banks of the River Rance, situated about half way between Dinant and the Mouth of that River, with the Regiment of Brie, the first Battalion of Volunteers, that of Marmande, a Militia Regiment, and three of Gardes Côtes, with two Squadrons of Dragoons. M. le Chevalier de Polignac was to advance with a Detachment as far as Pleurtuit. Whilst these Troops were inclining thus to the Right, nearer St. Maloes, M. de la Châtre had Orders to send out of St. Maloes Chevalier de Beon, Lieutenant Colonel of the Regiment of Boulonnois; with a Detachment to march to Ploubalai, a Village standing near the edge of a little Bay of the Sea, between the River Rance and Guildo; a little more than a League from each, to the Right of the Chevalier de Polignac. The principal Object of these different Detachments, was to disturb and disquiet the

*Relation de la Left of the British Army^a.

Nouvelle De-
fcente des An-
glois à Saint
Malo. Rela. de
la Victoire rem-
portée sur les
Anglois, le 11
Sept. 1758 pres
St. Cast. a Saint
Malo, imprim.

By these Movements also the Troops from St. Maloes now formed a Part of the Column under M. D'Aubigny. M. de Beon occupied Ploubalai on the Right by the Sea; M. D'Aubigny Plouet or Plouer, on the Left up the Country; and M. Polignac's Detachment advancing as far as Pleurtuit, on the Right of Plouet, took Possession of the Center.

However, by the Disposition of the English Camp at Val, Plancoët becoming uncovered, the third Battalion of Volontaires Etrangers marched thither in the Night. The Chevalier de St. Pern was detached also in the Night to take Post at St. Potan, to watch the Movements of the English Army, to which we shall now return.

On the 10th in the Morning, about 6 o'Clock, while the British Army was forming to march off for Matignon, about three Miles distant, and as many from St. Cast, Accounts were brought that the Enemy's advanced Pickets, and some Horse, had been seen by the Grenadiers, who were advancing with the Quarter-masters and Camp Colour Men, to mark out

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out the Ground for that Night's Encampment. At the same time information was had that some of the flanking Parties had been heard firing, and that some of the Soldiers were wounded. The greatest Part of the Army, in short, marched on in full expectation of seeing the Enemy, who had wheeled off, and every now and then only shewed themselves: Some of the flanking Parties fired at a Lieutenant and six or eight Men, who had advanced too far to reconnoitre, and killed the Officer. This Alarm occasioned a considerable Discharge of Musketry from the Column. As the Army advanced a little further, a Body of Infantry and a Squadron of Horse appeared; they stood a few Shot from the Field Pieces, and afterwards wheeled off thro' Matignion.

A Detachment however was ordered to disperse the Country People; for as such, by some, they were look'd upon; they who had a quicker Discernment, esteemed them in a different Light. Colonel Whitwell Griffin declared them to be Regulars, as he could discover nothing of the Irregular, either in their Uniform or Movements.

About one o'Clock, a Prisoner was taken, who belonged to one of the Regiments encamped in that Neighbourhood, who gave a List of the Names of eleven Battalions, and two or three Squadrons, who were with the Duke D'Aiguillon, at the Distance of a League and half from the Army. About two o'Clock the second Battalion of the Brigade of Guards was detached to the Bay of St. Cast, where the Fleet then lay, for more Provisions for the Troops, which they were to escort back next day to the Camp. The remaining Part of the Brigade marched in the Rear of the Line, through the Village of Matignion, and encamped on their Right, leaving the Ground unoccupied, which had been marked out for the Coldstream Regiment of Guards. The Grenadiers of the Army were posted on the Left, on the St. Maloes side of Matignion, separated from the Army by that Village: About three o'Clock, certain Intelligence was brought, corroborated by such a Variety of Circumstances, as made it past all doubt, that at least 14 Battalions of old Regiments, and 4 Squadrons, with 12 Pieces of Can-

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non and several Mortars, were on their March from Brest, and close by: a Priest who had been sent by the Enemy to inform himself of the Situation and Strength of the British Army, and whom they had seized, confirmed the Account, repeating the same Regiments that the Prisoner and several others had named, and further assured the Troops of what they had been told by the People of Matignon, that the Army from Granville and St. Maloes was expected that Night to join the other from Brest. Major-General Elliot, in the Evening, at a Meeting of some of the Principal Officers, not knowing what was in View, made this Proposal: that if it was not the Intention to fight the French Army, to retreat immediately, and be as expeditious as possible in the Re-imbarkment. This Advice was complied with, notwithstanding the Opinion of those who took old Regiments of France for armed Peasants and Militia. Orders were dispatched to the Beach at St. Cast, which arrived at eight at Night for the Shipping to stand in to re-imbark the Troops. The Army received Orders to beat the general at three, and march off at four; all this Evening and in the Night, the Pickets were disturbed by little Parties of the Enemy, whose Fires were lighted up within half a Mile of the advanced Pickets. If the Intention was not to fight the Enemy, (and by the very few Field Pieces they had with them, the contrary is scarce to be supposed) this was the most wholesome Advice that could have been given; for on this very Day about Noon, the French under D'Aubigny, and La Châtre consisting of about 3000 Men, passed the River Erguenon at the same Passage of Guildo^a. The Duke D'Aiguillon, with whom this Column was not yet joined, had with him the main Body of the Army. D'Aubigny, in order to join him, would have re-passed this Water, but the Tide being up, was prevented; he was then obliged to traverse the Country, through other difficult and intricate Roads; and by this means (being among Friends) they fell in with the Van-guard of the Duke's Army at 10 o'Clock at Night.

^a Suite de la
Rela. et de la
Vietoire rem-
portée, par le
Duc D'Aiguil-
lon, 1758,
suivant une
Lettre écrite de
St. Malo, le 13
suivant.

The Regiments of Bourbon, Brissac, Bresse and Quercy, having reached Lamballe the Evening before, advanced to Henan, a League from Matignon. M. de Balleroy

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Balleroy had the Command of these Troops, with two Squadrons of Dragoons. The second Battalion of Pen-thièvre came from Jugon to Plancoët*. M. D'Aubigny passing Guildo, joined his Corps to that of M. de la Châtre, who conducted from St. Maloes the Regiment de Boulonnois, the Battalion of Fontenai-le-Comte, and two of Gardes-Côtes Militia. About Noon, the Duke D'Aiguillon came from Henan, with a great Detachment towards Matignion, to reconnoitre the Position of General Bligh's Army, which he found too advantageous to think of attacking; upon this he determined to incline by their left, and march towards St. Potan, where the Marquis de Broc was established with eight Companies of Grenadiers, twelve Picquets, and 200 Dragoons. M. D'Aubigny with his Corps, was stationed upon the Right of this Village; the rest of the Troops were established at Pleuduno, except a Part of the Regiment Royal-des-Vaisseaux, which did not arrive till Night, when it brought with it a Division of Artillery^b.

^b Relation de la Vict.

The whole French Army now might be said to be joined, and on the same side of the River as the English. They were in a good regular Position; to form which, they seem to have fallen a little back, especially their Right Wing: M. de Broc was the most advanced to the English Army at St. Potan, a little more than a League distance: D'Aubigny was upon his Right, and the rest of the Troops were on the Right of D'Aubigny at Pleuduno, a Place on the River Erguenon, and just by Plancoët, about three Leagues from Matignion; which at this time was the greatest distance between any Division of the French Troops and the English Army. It was M. de Broc's Business during this Night, to disturb and disquiet as much as possible, the advanced Posts of General Bligh's Army, and watch strictly all their Movements.

We have now seen the Situation of the two Armies the Night before the Combat. The advanced Parties were so near, as to disconcert one another very much.

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* The former is situated on the same River as the latter, about three Leagues higher up.

CONJUNCT EXPEDITIONS. Part I.

The English Army from having been Invaders, were in effect reduced to the Necessity of being invaded.

Their advanced Pickets were not suffered to rest quiet; it was M. Broc's Business who was stationed at St. Potan for the Purpose, with the most advanced Part of the Enemy, to beat up their Quarters this Night.

In this Situation, at the appointed Hour, on the 11th of September, the general, according to Order, was beat in the British Camp, upon which their Pickets came in. The Grenadiers of the Army, under Colonel Griffin, having been obliged, from the continual Alarms given by their Out Posts, to lie on their Arms, thought it unnecessary for them to beat the general: Indeed they look'd upon it to be the most prudent Measure, as the Plan now was to retreat from an Enemy near at hand, to march off as silently as possible.

The Army began to move at Day-break in one Column, with the Grenadiers in the Rear. Captain William Wynyard commanded the small Party which made the Rear of the whole Army. He was afterwards ordered by Colonel Griffin, to incline a little to the Right, that his Command might become a Flanking Party, as well as the Rear-guard. Captain George Bridgman marched in a Parallel Line with him, with another Party for the same Purpose on the Left. This Alteration in the Rear was very necessary; because the Army, in order to reach the Bay of St. Cast, was obliged to return through Matignon, in effect to come a little back again, only inclining down as fast as the Road would admit to the Sea. Though the Distance of this March did not exceed three Miles, the Halts and Interruptions occasioned by bad Roads were so frequent, that the Army did not arrive on the Beach till near 9 o'Clock: The French having all the Inhabitants of the Country their Friends, found out a shorter Road, and bore quicker down to their Right, by which means, by the time Captain Wynyard's Party was got a Mile on their March, the advanced Party of the Enemy appeared from an Orchard and fired upon them. Captain Wynyard immediately faced the Enemy, and returned the Compliment with great Spirit. The Enemy did not chuse to advance; no considerable Body appeared until the Troops had reached the Shore.

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The Imbarkation was immediately begun; but by a kind of Obstinacy in some Officers, the Boats were rowed too far in quest of their respective Ships, when at such a critical time, they should have been embarked in those nearest at hand. The Transports Boats did not return with that Regularity or Punctuality which was requisite, and when they came, some were employed in carrying off Horses and Cows instead of Men; notwithstanding all the Attention and Authority of the Sea-Officers, who behaved with great Conduct and Moderation. The small Ships and Bomb-ketches ranged in Shore, to cover the Embarkation; and it would have been well judged to have had all the Cutters and small Craft brought in towards the Beach. The Enemy first appeared by a Windmill to the Left as we fronted them; and played upon our Troops all the time of their Embarkation with their Artillery.

Their Movements and Dispositions were as follow.

On the 11th in the Morning, M. de Broc informed the Duke D'Aiguillon, that the British Army had began their Retreat, and were making Preparations for their Re-imbarkment in the Bay of St. Cast. Upon this Intelligence, the Enemy, who was already in Motion, redoubled their March, and hastened with all the Diligence possible to the Heights of St. Cast. The Duke D'Aiguillon arrived there with the Dragoons a-gallop, which he dismounted, the Ground not being proper for the Service of Cavalry. During this, M. de Broc followed with his Detachment, and examined the Movements of the English. It was about Nine o' Clock when the Dragoons first came to the Height; the English Fleet appeared to the Enemy in a Line, and their Boats were busy in the Re-imbarking the Troops, which were in order of Battle on the Beach, at the Bottom of the Bay behind some Sand-hills.

The Enemy's Infantry soon followed their Dragoons, and shewed themselves from the Hills. The Duke D'Aiguillon having reconnoitred the different Passages, by which his Troops could descend to the Attack, made his Dispositions. M. le Comte de Balleroy, with the Regiments of Bourbon, Brissac, Bresse and Quercy, was to make his Entrance (looking from the Shore to

• Ibid. French
Accounts.

the Sea) by the Right: M. D'Aubigny with the Régiments of Boulonnois, Brie, and the Battalions of Fontenai-le-Comte, of Marmande, and the first of des Volontaires Etrangers by the Left. M. de Broc had Orders to march with his Detachment straight to the Center of the English Army. The Chevalier de S. Pern was kept in Reserve with the second Battalion of Penthievre, and the third des Volontaires Etrangers. The Marquis de la Châtre not being confined to any Column, carried himself equally through the whole. Whilst these Dispositions were making, which were done with as much Expedition as possible, M. de Villepatour brought up the Artillery from Brest, and M. D'Urtuby that from St. Maloes: They were planted in Battery below a Mill, between the Right and Center of their Army. The Column on their Left, about half an Hour after Eleven, were the first that came down the Hill and shewed themselves on the Beach, headed by fifty Grenadier Volunteers des Volontaires Etrangers, followed by the Grenadiers of Boulonnois and Brie. They began to march down, partly covered by a Hollow Way on their Left; their Design was to gain a Wood, where they might form and extend themselves along the Front of the Army, then to advance forward under shelter of the Sand-hills, which favoured them greatly. They were no sooner in Motion, than the Shipping began to play upon them with Cannon and Mortars, which produced great Confusion. Their Line of March down the Hill was much staggered; continued some time in suspense. All the Grenadiers of the British Army, and a few Companies of the first Regiment of Guards, remained on shore, making about 1500 Men, under the Command of Major General Dury; who seeing the Enemy advance, ordered them to face and march from behind a Bank that covered them; but at the same time from its sloping Position, rendered the Rear-ranks incapable of acting. At a moderate Distance from these Sand-hills was the Mouth of the Lane or Defile at the Bottom of the Hill, from whence the Enemy now began to come out; they endeavoured to gain as fast as possible these little Heights. The Grenadiers of the Guards upon the Right, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Clavering, faced this Lane, and

and beat them off as fast as they attempted to come on : Indeed Colonel Clavering shewed here great Composure and Steadiness, considering what a forlorn Hope they were become. The Enemy made several Efforts of this sort, in which they suffered extremely from the Musketry of the Grenadiers. At last one of their Officers, quicker sighted than the rest, perceiving these fruitless and bloody Attempts, pulled off his Hat and wav'd it to his Comrades ; and instead of troubling himself with the Sand Bank, turned short to the Right, and run along the Shore behind it ; the Enemy followed him immediately, which gave liberty to the Crowds that came down the Hill, to extricate themselves from the Defile, and form an extended Line along the Beach, opposite our Army ; this Officer was killed, who thus led the first Column, which was followed by two others with great Spirit and Valour. This small Remnant of the British Army was drawn up in uneven Ground, and began now with an irregular Fire from Right to Left : This was returned by the Enemy, and the Engagement continued for some time with doubtful Success. The French having such a great Superiority in Number, the English Troops were in Danger of being surrounded and cut in Pieces ; it was proposed to General Dury, that they should retreat along the Beach towards a Rock on their Left. In this March, their Flanks might have been secured on one side by an Intrenchment, and on the other by the Sea ; and the Enemy in pursuing them would have been exposed to the whole Fire of the Shipping, which, in all likelihood, they would have found difficult to have born. No Prospect of Victory, or even Escape remained, except by Boats. Sir John Armitage was shot through the Head in the beginning of the Action ; many of the Officers fell, and a great Number of Men were slain. At length their Ammunition, which was far from being compleat, began to fail ; they were seized with Panic, they faltered, they broke, and fled in the utmost Confusion : Some ran to the Sea, and endeavoured to save their Lives by swimming towards the Boats, which were ordered to give them all possible assistance. General Dury being wounded, took to the Sea where he perished, and this was the Fate of a great Number. The Enemy no sooner

perceived our Troops give way, than they pursued them, tho' in an irregular Manner, and a considerable Slaughter ensued. Our Men were killed both on the Shore and in the Water, and many in swimming lost their Lives by the Shot and Shells thrown from the French Cannon and Mortars for that Purpose, as well as to sink the Boats, one of which was destroyed. The Slaughter would not have been so great, had not the Frigates continued to fire occasionally on the Enemy. These being silenced by a Signal from the Commodore, the French Officers and Soldiers exhibited a noble Instance of Humanity and Moderation, in giving immediate Quarter and Protection to the Conquered. Some Hundreds of our Men, instead of throwing themselves into the Sea, more wisely retired to the Rock on the Left, where they made a stand, exhausted their Ammunition, and then surrendered at Discretion. Our Loss on this unfortunate Occasion, amounted to about 700 choice Troops killed, wounded, and taken Prisoners; nor was this little Advantage cheaply purchased by the Enemy. The Shot from the Frigates, and the Shells from the Ketches, as the Enemy marched down the Hill, did considerable Mischief among them, and the Fire of our Troops had so great an Effect, that their Loss could not be inferior to that of the English, tho' they endeavoured as much as they could to lessen it.

Commodore Lord How, perceiving the Sailors in the Boats were a little staggered by the Enemy's Fire, ordered himself to be rowed in his own Boat, and brought off as many Men as it would carry, which was the last that came from the Shore.

The Action was very warm for the time it lasted, considering the great Disproportion of Numbers between the English and French; out of the former that were on the Beach, half were either killed, wounded, or taken Prisoners. Among the first were Major General Dury, and Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson. Lieutenant Colonel Cary was knocked down, and received a bad Contusion. Colonel Lord Frederick Cavendish and the Lieutenant Colonels Pierfon and Lambert, with the Captains Rowley, Mapleson, Paston, and Elphinston, of the Navy, were made Prisoners. These were the Officers of Rank in their Professions among the English that suffered by this Affair; in which we had more than
forty

forty Officers killed and wounded, fifteen died on the Spot. Dr. Fordyce the Principal Surgeon, who attended the first Landings, did this last Embarkment, and had the Fortune to escape.

The Principal Officers among the French that suffered, were the Chevalier de Redmont, Marechal de Camp, Quarter-master-General; Marquis de la Châtre Brigadier, and Commandant of Upper Bretagne; the Chevalier de la Tour D'Auvergne, Colonel of the Regiment of Boulonnois; the Chevalier de Polignac, Colonel of the Regiment of Brie; Marquiss de Montaignu; Marquis de Cuce; M. de la Bretonniere, Governor of Dinant: These were wounded, with 50 more of lower Rank. They had also seven killed on the Spot, tho' none of high Rank: The Regiments of Infantry that came from Brest, were Bourbonnois, Royal-Vaisseaux, Briffac, Bresse, Quercy, Penthievre, Volontaires Etrangers and Brie, with two Squadrons of Dragoons, eight Cannon and as many Mortars. Most of these Regiments had two Battalions; wherefore when joined with the Regiments that came from St. Maloes, and the Militia and Gardes des Cotes, from both Brest and St. Maloes, the French must have had in the Field a very considerable Body of Men. The Noblesse and Gentry of Bretagne gave upon this Occasion, great Proofs of their Valour and Zeal for the Service of their King. Numbers of them repaired to St. Maloes upon the appearance of the English Fleet, and entered as Volunteers at the Head of the Grenadiers of Boulonnois, with which they marched out of that Town, and distinguished themselves in the Combat; as did a great many others who joined the Duke D'Aiguillon's Army on that and the preceding Day.

As this Expedition is to finish the first Part of our Book, we will conclude it with a Remark or two of our own.

The great Failing on the side of the English, in this Affair, seems owing to their want of making a right Distinction between the Littoral and established Continental War. In the former, one great Advantage is sure to be on the side of the Enemy or Invaded; which is in Regard to Intelligence. The Conjunct Armament is landed in a Country, where perhaps the Principal Officers are entire Strangers, from whence they

they are to depart, before they have had time to establish, or find out any kind of Method, by which they can gain any knowledge of what is doing in the Country. The Enemy is sure to have the truest and best of Intelligence, as the Inhabitants of the whole Country are their Friends (except indeed in such a Case as at Cette) wherefore when we are to poke about in the dark in this manner, we should let our own Reason, as much as possible, be our Light and Guide.

In the Circumstances the British Army was in, in this last Affair, too little Attention was given to what was both seen and heard; by which means the French were at our Heels, when it was not believed an Enemy of any Consequence was in the Country. We were sending for more Provisions to march about the Country with, when the Enemy was within a few Hours March of the very Spot, from whence the Embarkation was to be made; and this was done too, when the Plan was to avoid a Battle.

For our Parts, we cannot but be of an Opinion, that the French acted in this whole Affair, their part of Defence, with more Judgment, than we did that of the Offence. It may be observed,

That the three Towns, Lamballe, Jugon, and Dinant, which seem to have been the principal Posts and Places of Rendezvous, for the assembling of the French Troops coming from different Parts, stand near three Waters; Lamballe by one, Jugon on the River Erguenon, and Dinant on the Rance; they stand likewise on the great Road from Brest to St. Maloes: Therefore, the Enemy by judiciously pitching on these critical Places, for the first Rendezvous of their Troops, kept their Communication quite free between St. Maloes and Brest, by commanding not only the Passages of those Waters, but the great Road itself.

St. Maloes, Guildo, and St. Cast, stand near the Edge of the Sea, almost in direct Lines from Dinant, Jugon, and Lamballe, up the Country. Dinant being distant from St. Maloes, between four and five Leagues; Jugon from Guildo, about the same Number; and Lamballe from St. Cast between five and six. The intervening Space from that great Road and those Waters to the Sea, might be called the Seat of War of this Expedition.

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It is esteemed a great Art in an established War, to make choice of a proper Place for the Rendezvous of an Army to open the Campaign with; wherefore, it must be still a greater for the Army of an invaded Country to act this Part well; to have pitched on proper Places for the assembling their Troops to oppose the Invaders, who come on a sudden, without giving the least Notice to what Quarter. This inclines one to think, that we lost in some measure the Advantage of this kind of War, which is chiefly to surprise, by going a second time in a Summer to St. Maloes. For it is natural to suppose, that after the first Visit, the Enemy gave their Thoughts a Turn that Way; that they amused themselves in planning and studying what were the most availing Methods to have opposed the Progress of the Descent. The second Visit then was giving them an Opportunity of putting their Theory in Practice, which they seemed to have been very expert at, and to have well contrived. The English Fleet appeared to the Enemy on the 3d of September at five o'Clock in the Morning, six Leagues off Cape Frehel. On the 9th of the same Month, the Infantry from Brest were at Lamballe, a March of above thirty Leagues, or near an Hundred English Miles, in seven Days; then out of these seven Days, the Time is to be deducted, that was spent in giving those Troops Notice, which must be a Part of it, even though that Notice was given by the firing of Guns stationed for the Purpose; which very likely was not the Case. And even when the Information is received, there are some Preparations necessary to put any Number of Troops in Motion, notwithstanding they have been ever so much warned before, all which take up Time. The Troops on this last Enterprize against St. Maloes, were debarked on the 4th of September. The Combat in St. Cast's Bay, happened on the 11th of the same Month. In the first Enterprize against the Place, the Troops were landed on the 5th of June, and re-imbarked on the Twelfth of the same Month. In the first Expedition, we hear nothing of the Troops from Brest, and not much of any others, though the English Forces were the same Number of Days on the Enemy's Shore; but at the last we are told, the French had some Magazines at
Dinant,

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Dinant, a Town standing on the same River as St. Maloes, and commanding the Passage; this Place was appointed for the Rendezvous of one of their Columns; Lamballe was another Place marked out for the same Purpose: All which is a manifest Indication the Enemy had turned their Thoughts this Way.

We are apt to think, that the Troops which are said to come from Brest, did not come immediately from that Place; but being those that were appointed for the Defence of that whole Coast, to guard better the whole, especially the St. Maloes Quarter, and since the first Visit to that Place, were cantoned and encamped in more central Parts; by which, not having so far to march, they consequently got to their Journey's End the sooner.

As to the Action itself (which to be sure might have been avoided) but when the Blow was struck, we don't see how it could have turned out much better than it did.

The most prudent Measure that appears to us, would have been to have proceeded as follows: As soon as ever the Resolution was taken to retire to the Ships (the Reasons for thus resolving consider'd) would have been to have ordered some good Engineers with all kind of working Implements, to have joined immediately the Coldstream Battalion, that was already at the Bay of St. Cast for Provisions; that the whole Battalion might have been employed, in rendering the Grounds as defensible as possible, for the covering the Re-embarkment. A Calculation should have been made of the Number of Men all the Boats of the Fleet would have contained together; and such a Number should have been disposed in these Works to defend the whole during the Embarkation of the Troops; which being finished, all the Boats should have been brought up to the Shore together, to have cleared the Coast of the whole Armament. This, however, (when the present Practice is considered) would have been a very difficult Thing to have performed. There being few Artillery capable of being moved about on Land, and no Distinction among the Boats, it must have been almost a Miracle to have avoided Confusion. The Beach was indeed very irregular, therefore in all probability might have been

been turned to Advantage by able Engineers. The French say, we had made some Entrenchments; and our Accounts make mention, something of this sort was proposed, if not begun, but could not be proceeded on for want of Tools.

As the French were coming down the Hill, it was suggested to General Dury, to march to the Mouth of the Lane, and there have stopt their Progress, by not suffering them to extend themselves on the Beach.

In their Situation, had this Measure been pursued, they would have avoided their Fate for a few Minutes only; this Lane being too far from the Water for a Proceeding of this Sort, and M. de Broc and Balleroy were coming as fast as they could down the Center, and on their Right of the Hill, consequently must in a very few Minutes have surrounded this small Remainder of the English Army.


Wherefore, we will conclude with this Comfort. Were we infallible, we should prove ourselves more than Men. ^a Turenne tells us, Experience teaches, he is the ^a Turenne's greatest General, that commits only the fewest Mistakes. Mem. Epaminondas the famous Theban Commander, being asked which was the greatest General, Chabrias, Iphicrates, or himself; answered, 'tis hard to judge while we live ^b.

Charles the XII. King of Sweden, having done a great deal with a little, thought with a little he could do every Thing. Upon this Principle, he fought the Battle of Pultowa, and ruined his whole Affairs. The great Monarch of Prussia, and Hero of the World, in this present War, having ventured too far, and met with a severe Repulse *, had Wisdom enough to acknowledge his Error; wherefore if we are as wise, we may say with him, *'We will do better another Time,'* *Nous ferons mieux un autre fois.*

^b Hist. of Greece. Stan.

* At Colin, on the 18th of June 1757, from Count Daun's Army.

The End of the First PART.



PART II.

CHAPTER I.

IN the seven preceeding Chapters ^a we have given our Readers according to Promise a Cursory View of all the Conjunct Expeditions that have been set a-float by these Kingdoms ever since the Descent of Julius Cæsar. By this time then, they know as well

a This second Part is printed by another Press, to get the Work finished the sooner.

as ourselves, what has been done for almost eighteen Centuries by these Conjunct Armaments; they know also what has been left undone. What remains further for us, is to perform the second Part of our Promise. Which is, to discover our own Thoughts, and Inventions upon these Matters; to reduce (if possible) this Amphibious Kind of Warfare, to some safe regular System, to leave as little as we can to Fortune and her Caprices; we may say here, to Wind and Water: and finally to render former Misfortunes our future Warnings; former Happy Proceedings, our future fortunate Directions.

To do this, we shall not go higher in our Remarks than the Reign of King James the First, except in some particular things, that may upon an Occasion require to be mentioned. For we would be understood to comprehend the Conjunct Armaments of Great Britain: and should we go higher they would be the Conjunct Armaments of England only. There are also other Reasons sufficient to limit us to that Period of Time. For in our Wars with the Continent, before the Reign of King James the First, on whom the Crowns of England and Scotland were first united; Part of the English Fleet was generally employed in watching the Scottish Coast; as the Scots generally sided with the Enemies of England. To speak of what these Fleets did upon those Coasts which were in effect open, and unfortified; would only be to speak of so many plunderings and Predatory Affairs; for that was generally their Chief

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Business,

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Business, having scarce any thing to oppose them. Should we go much beyond this Time our Kings had such large Dominions upon the Coast of what is now called France, as well as other Princes, that there was seldom any Art required in the Debarkation of their Troops, for their Military Atchievements in those Parts; because they could Debark and Re-embark them without any Opposition, in their own Towns or on the Territories of some Allied Prince. Besides in the early Time we are now speaking of, America was not discovered; which has since been a great Subject, for Conjunct Expeditions. We may add also, about the Time of King James the First, Fortifications were become more frequent, as well as more perfect. Sir Walter Rawleigh, who lived at this Time, remarks that France was strengthened much more than England with fortified Places. Wherefore we may reasonably suppose, more Art was required in making Descents upon a Coast fortified, than upon one, open and defenceless. Nothing proves this plainer, than our Conjunct Expeditions from this Period of Time which gives us near an 160 Years, not meeting with that Success as they did before, in the same length of Time. For these several Reasons, we will not go higher in our general Remarks than the beginning of James the First's Reign: which we may call the beginning of the 17th Century.

Though we shall confine ourselves to this Period of Time; we must give our Readers to Understand, that what we shall endeavour to prove, which is, that, the conducting of a military, naval, littoral Enterprize, was never rightly pursued: we must give them to understand, we could prove it, from as early times, as we have begun these Conjunct Expeditions; even from the Day the Standard-Bearer of the Tenth Legion, leaped from his Ship (flattering himself by such an Action, as indeed it turned out) he should encourage Cæsar's Army to gain the Shore: or even from the Night Cæsar with this very Army thought the wisest thing he could do, was to steal away, and re-embark his Forces at Midnight. But there is no Occasion to go so far back; as the Art of this Kind of War, with regard to the Shipping and Artillery, is so much changed: we can't but think, it would confound, rather than elucidate.

Wherefore

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Wherefore though we have already collected together all the Conjunct Expeditions of these Kingdoms both great and small, in as narrow a Compass, as the Nature of the thing will admit, either for the Satisfaction or Instruction of our Readers. We will now, methodise and sort them: and beginning not earlier than the seventeenth Century, we shall like the Fisherman at the end of his Draught Contract (as it were) the net to give at once a general View. We shall not take any notice of the Places attacked by the Parliament's Forces in the great Civil War, which held out for the King; nor immediately of the Bombardments in King William's Reign. We mean where a Descent was actually made, or intended on the Coast of our Foreign Enemies; or at least Enterprizes that were in some degree of a Conjunct Nature. We shall divide these Armaments into great and small. All that contain 4000 or more Soldiers or Marines, we shall call great; all under that Number, small. Such whose Numbers are not mentioned; we shall say what to us appears most probable.

To begin then, the farthest off, that we may end near home; we are first to Mention the Expedition to the East-Indies; which comes under the Denomination of a large Conjunct Armament, and miscarried. In Africa, five miscarried, and nine succeeded. Four of the five probably were large; all the rest small; seven of the latter were chiefly conducted by Seamen. In North America and the West-Indies thirteen miscarried, and ten succeeded. Of those that miscarried five were large, and eight small. Of those that had Success, two were large, and eight small. Three of the latter appear to have been managed entirely by the Shipping.

We are now to see at one View our European Expeditions; there are thirty in the whole, besides Bombardments of which nineteen miscarried, and eleven succeeded. Of those that miscarried, seventeen were large, and two small. Of the Successfull, five were large, and six small. However as these are nearest home, we will examine them more narrowly. We find one at Berghen in Norway, which did not succeed, this was chiefly a Naval Operation. There were three large against the Dutch, one of which only succeeded.

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Against

CONJUNCT EXPEDITIONS. Part 2.

Against the Spaniards there has been eleven, four of which were large, and seven small. Of the former two succeeded, and two miscarried. Of the latter, six succeeded, and one miscarried. We are now come to the French, against whom there has been made fifteen Expeditions; of which fourteen were great, and one small; twelve of the former Miscarried and two succeeded, the small one miscarried. The Reader perhaps may understand this better, by the following Calculations.

We have been obliged to give the above fixt Number to determine between great and small Armaments. But it must be remembered that notwithstanding 4000 Soldiers or Marines exclusive of Seamen, is the given Number; some of the small Armaments come very near that Number, as well as some of the large, do but just exceed it. Some of the small also are much Inferior to that Number; as well as some of the great are much Superior to it. These Inequalities can't well be remedied; wherefore as it is necessary, a certain Number should be given for this Determination: we have pitched upon 4000, as a Body sufficient, to go under the Denomination of a large Armament; and all below, to be small.

East-Indies. [At Pondichery - - - - - I

Africa. [At Algiers, James the First's Reign - 4

North America and the West-Indies. { At Hispaniola, Martinico, Quebec
Carthagenæ, Cuba, and Panama } 5

Europe / Against the Dutch 2

Spain.	{	At Cadiz	-	-	-	-	}	2
	{	At Palamos	-	-	-	-	}	1

France.	{	At Rochelle and the Isle of Rhee	4
		The Duke of Leinster's Expedition	1
		At Brest - - - -	1
		Against Dunkirk - - -	1
		At Toulon - - - -	1
		Lord Dursley and Byng's Exped. -	1
		At Port l'Orient - - -	1
		At Rochfort - - - -	1
		At St. Maloe - - - -	1

Total 27

CONJUNCT EXPEDITIONS. Part 2.

A LIST of the small Conjunct Expeditions that have been made by Great Britain and miscarried since the Reign of Queen ELIZABETH.

Africa.	At Algiers	-	-	-	-	1
North America and the West-Indies.	At Quebec	-	-	-	-	1
	At Placentia	-	-	-	-	2
	Against Carthagen, chiefly Seamen	-	-	-	-	1
	At Leogane and Petit Goave, chiefly Seam.	-	-	-	-	1
	La Gueira on the Coast of Carracas	-	-	-	-	1
	Against Porto Cavallo	-	-	-	-	1
Europe	Against St. Jago de Cuba	-	-	-	-	1
	Norway	{	At Berghen, chiefly Seamen	-	-	1
Europe	France	{	At Cette.	-	-	1
Total						11
Great						27
Small						11
Total miscarried						38

A LIST of the great Conjunct Expeditions made by Great Britain, that have succeeded since the Reign of Queen ELIZABETH.

North America and the West-Indies.	{	At Jamaica	-	-	-	{	1	
		At Cape-Breton	-	-	-		1	
Europe	{	Holland. At Brandaris in the Isle of Schelling					1	
		Spain. At Vigo	-	-	-	-	2	
		France.	{ At St. Maloe	-	-	-	{	1
			{ At Cherburgh	-	-	-	{	1
							Total	7

A LIST

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A LIST of the small Conjunct Expeditions made by Great Britain, that have Succeeded since the Reign of Queen ELIZABETH.

Africa.	{	At Santa Cruz in the Island of Teneriff,																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																												
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Besides the Expeditions in these Calculations, we have given the History of four others, that are not here included, viz. that of Admiral Benbow at St. Maloe, which succeeded pretty well where the Shipping was concerned : the Attempt of the Land Forces in making a Descent, came to nothing worth mentioning. An-

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other was at Granville which had great Success; and as far as we can find, was performed entirely by the Shipping. The two others were carried on in another Quarter of the World, the one at Hispaniola, and the other at Guadalupe. These may be said to have succeeded in part and in part to have miscarried. The taking of the Islands Majorca and Ivica are too trifling to be called Expeditions. However we will now shew the Sums Total. Of the sixty-eight Expeditions in the above Calculation. Thirty-eight miscarried and thirty succeeded. Out of those that miscarried, twenty ~~seven~~

Seven were great Armaments; and eleven were small. Out of those that succeeded, seven only were great; and twenty three small. Ten of this last Number, we are to remember, were performed almost if not wholly by the Seamen. Twenty then, only out of sixty-eight Expeditions, remain, for the Gentlemen of the Army, *to claim* any share, in the several Conquests. Out of these twenty (we must repeat it again) seven only were great; though their Miscarriages of the great Armaments, were twenty-seven, all but one, four times the Number of their Successes. We must observe also, that out of these sixty-eight Expeditions, we don't recollect one at least of any Consequence, that owed its Success wholly to the Army. What Conclusions then may we draw from this? Why, whenever we hear of the Failure of a Conjunct Expedition; first there is no great Reason to be surprized at it: then that it is a great Chance, but the Miscarriage, is owing chiefly to the Military Part; that it is to be attributed by the Army to no Local, Temporal, Accidental, but some general and fundamental Cause. A Cause as we have said at the Beginning, a little Reflection tells us must be an Insufficiency, and a not Right understanding this Amphibious Kind of Warfare.

It has been observed, that out of the thirty Expeditions which succeeded, seven only were great and twenty-three were small. Out of the thirty-eight which miscarried, eleven only were small, and twenty-seven great. What Inferences are to be drawn from this? Why, first, this Amphibious War is not reduced to a Perfection Sufficient, to give us an even Chance, whether we shall succeed, or not: nothing proves this Imperfection more, than our Defeats out-numbering
our

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our Successes ; and our better Management of the small Enterprizes, than great. Secondly, we have seldom known how, to proportion our Forces, according to the Size of the Object. We have scarce ever made a right Distinction in regard to our Numbers, and strength of our Armaments destined for very different Parts of the World ; as Africa, America, and Europe ; as between the American Islands and the American Continent ; the European Islands and European Continent. The Consequences of this has been, we have succeeded oftner in Africa, than America ; oftner in America, than Europe ; oftner in the American Islands, than on the American Continent ; oftner on the European Islands, than on the Continent of Europe ; oftner on any Part of Europe where Attempts have been made, than on the Coast of France. We mean all through in proportion to the Number, of Conjunct Expeditions we have made, in those several Parts of the World. For out of fourteen made in Africa, nine had Success. Of twenty-three in America, ten only succeeded : of thirty in Europe, no more than eleven. Nine of the ten, which succeeded in America, were made against the Islands. Against the European Islands, two alone miscarried, which was at Rhee and Texel. At the latter no real Attempt being made, through an extraordinary Accident. Those against Schelling, Minorca, Sardinia ; without mentioning Majorca, Ivica, and lesser Isles, were attended with a contrary Fortune. Of the thirty Expeditions made in Europe ; fifteen were against France. Of the eleven which were Crowned with Success, nine were against other Countries. From the above Remarks, we may draw these further Conclusions. That small Bodies, may be conducted easier than large, especially when there is no true System laid down for either. That for the generality a Force greater in proportion to the Object has been given for the small Expeditions, than the large. And we are not sure, whether or no, it might not be said ; that the Capacities of those who have had the Conduct of them, have seemed rather calculated for little Armaments ; we mean chiefly the Military Part. We may say further, that the losses, when they happen to these small Enterprizes, are not so great for the generality, as to large
Arma-

CONJUNCT EXPEDITIONS. Part 2.

Armaments. Nor is there the Probability of Miscarriages happening to little Expeditions as to the great; because the Places they go to, are seldom thought Objects sufficient to take up the Attention of the Mother Nation to which they belong, so as to have them so well fortified, or garrisoned. The Nature also of these Conjunct Expeditions being to Surprize, is carried more Effectually into Execution by small Armaments; (however we mean one equal to the Object) because the Debarkation as well as all other after Operations, are quicker, easier, and done with less Confusion, therefore safer, than when the Troops to be debarked are very numerous. This is a matter of serious Consideration for those, who Command, in these Enterprises; as with a very little Reflection, they must see the crude and ill-digested Methods, we have, of performing this very essential Part of the Service; and how frequently our Conjunct Expeditions have suffered upon these Occasions. It has been observed, we have failed in almost all our great Attempts; in several of them, the Miscarriage has been attributed, to the having not a sufficient Number of Troops, for two thousand Men upon an American Island, is a greater Force than eight-thousand upon the Continent of France, nay, we may say than twelve: that Coast ought never to be insulted with less than twice eight-thousand, we may add sometimes another 8000 to that Number. It would be very dangerous, to Land such a Body of Troops in such a Country according to the Methods used at present for these Purposes, unless they are protected and defended by the Shipping; which is seldom to be obtained as there are few Parts of the Coasts bold enough to suffer great Ships to ride so near. This particular Circumstance renders these Attempts hazardous and uncertain: of which we have had a very recent Instance in the Affair of Rochefort. When Ships are at a distance we must not forget the length of Time required for the debarking or re-embarking 16000 Men or a larger Number, with all other necessaries; nor how incompatible delay is with a Surprize; as well as the Danger of having the Communication between the Fleet and Shore cut off, should the Wind, or any other Accident serve against them. We see then with
what

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what a Disadvantage, we have always gone against the Coast of France. A Coast so populous and fortified as to require at least 16000 Soldiers; when we have seldom afforded more than half that Number. Which is a great Force, considering the Risk we run, with our unsystematical Methods of Proceeding. To venture a double Number might with good Reason be thought going too far, as it would be baring the Nation of Troops, in all Probability to render more confused and consequently less Successful, the Operations of the Expedition. Will any one, after this, wonder, that out of fifteen Conjunct Expeditions which are all the Military Part have been concerned in against France; thirteen should have miscarried? When we have the Melancholy Reflection to think, we have never sent scarce half Forces enough; and was the Number to be doubled, we should still be more at a loss, unless this Kind of War was by some plain and simple Methods made more reducible to Practice.

Notwithstanding this, we do not imagine, we can flatter ourselves, it is from any Diffidence of our Capacities, as not knowing how to Conduct a more numerous Body; that we have always sent, so small a Force to those Coasts; more than we can imagine other Nations, in their intended Attempts upon these Kingdoms, have prepared much greater Armaments, through any high Opinion of their better understanding and Management, in Enterprizes of the same Sort. They did it, through an high Conception, they had of the Power, and People they were to be concerned with: as well as having never pushed their Enterprize so far, as to know by Experience, the Confusion and Danger of landing a Numerous Body, in a Foreign Country, upon a Plan Irregular, and reduced to no true System, if to any System at all. We went too with our half Numbers not with any Notion of our Incapacity to manage a greater Force; but through (one might say) an Infatuation and obstinate Determination to keep our Eyes so closely shut, as to suffer no Experience or repeated Defeats ever to open them; but to keep moving on, in the Steps of our Predecessors, in a continued Round of bad Management; depriving ourselves of our own Wisdom like unprofitable

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table Servants burying the talent bestowed upon us; and without any Judgement of our own, admiring and approving of the Inventions of our Ancestors.

Perhaps it may appear strange, what we seem here to assert; that Success should in any Kind of Military Enterprize, be expected more from the lesser Force than the greater: (however it must not be understood, little to extremes,) the Surprise will soon cease, when it is known to be a much easier thing to find Commanders for the conducting properly a small Armament than a large one: it oftner happens that the capacities among the generality of People are more adequate to the former than the latter. Besides if we are to grope in the dark, the less we are, the fewer Rubs we meet with. How giddy were the Motions of the Giant Polypheme, after he lost his Eye!

However as we have seen the Strength for the generality of our Conjunct Armaments; it is but Right, to give our Readers the Idea our Enemies, seemed to conceive of these undertakings by the strength of their Armaments of the same Nature, intended against these Kingdoms.

The first we find in the 17th Century (for we are to go no higher,) was made by the Dutch in the year 1667. We can't directly say what Number of Forces they had on Board, though it was Manifest they were numerous enough not to be afraid to Land; and their Fleet consisted of 70 Men of War besides Fire-ships.

The next was made by the Prince of Orange afterwards King William the Third, in the Year 1688. The land Forces embarked were 4000 Horse and Dragoons, and 10000 Foot, the whole escorted with a strong Fleet.

The first Descent on these Coasts intended by the French was in 1692. The land Army consisted of about 20000 Men, with every thing necessary for the Invasion.

Their next intended Attempt of this Sort was four Years after; when they drew down to the Sea side 20000 Men; their Design was to have embarked 16000, who were to have been commanded by King James in Person. For which Business two strong Squadrons were appointed to attend.

In 1708 they made an Attempt upon Scotland, the Troops were about eleven or twelve Battalions; and the Fleet was commanded by the Count de Forbin, who is said to have disliked the Design; because he knew such a small Force was never intended to be landed. Which made him refuse to set the Chevalier de St. George on Shore, for whose Service this Armament was pretended to have been prepared, though he would have gone with his own Servants.

The next intended Insult was in 1719 against the West of England; this was by the Spaniards, who embarked a considerable Body of Troops under the Command of the late Duke of Ormond. Five Days after they sailed, the Men of War and Transports were entirely dispersed by a Storm. We don't know for certain, what Troops were embarked; though probably not a very great Number.

However the next Project we have to speak of, and which was again contrived by our Neighbours the French in 1744, was not to have been so deficient in Numbers; as the Troops designed for the last Attempt: this was destined against the Coast of Kent and amounted to 15,000 Men, under the Count de Saxe: and Monsieur de Roquefeuille an Officer of Experience and Capacity commanded a strong Squadron for to Convoy them.

And the Troops the French employed in the Year 1756, against Minorca, are well known to have consisted of upwards of 14,000 Men. And were we permitted to go as far back as the Year 1588, a little before the seventeenth Century, to which Period of Time we have confined ourselves for our Chief Remarks: we should find the Spanish Armada to consist of more than 19000 Soldiers and 2000 Slaves.

What Inferences then shall we draw from this? What Reasons shall we give for our Enemies to visit these Coasts almost always with double the Number of Troops, we send against theirs? It will be said perhaps, the View with which our Enemies entered on these undertakings was of a larger Scope, than just to make, like us, a Temporary, local Impression; and the cases are not similar. Should there be any Difference, it cannot be great; they made their Preparations for the
carrying

carrying into Execution these Enterprises after much the same Manner as we did. Their Land Troops, as well as ours, were always escorted by a strong Fleet. For the generality they too took the like Opportunities when Part of our Forces were in other Countries. Nor was the Probability much greater, that sixteen thousand French should Conquer Great Britain; than that eight or nine thousand English could do the same by France. The chief Motive then of every Country for the prosecuting this Kind of War, seems nearly parallel; in short to distract and confound their Enemies as much as possible. Though there has been no great difference in the Motive for the undertaking, there has in the Method of Prosecuting. To do it more effectually, our Enemies have pursued more strenuous Measures, by employing a double Number of Troops. Such great Armaments could not be sent because these Coasts were less fortified, and had fewer strong Places, consequently less Opposition might reasonably have been expected at their Debarkation. Nor because our standing Army, has been always less Numerous to receive them than those of the Countries we have mentioned, especially that of France. Their Reason then must be as follows; that should they be so fortunate to Land, they might with a numerous Body be able to maintain their Ground; or should they be obliged to retire to their Ships; a numerous Body might command Respect enough to keep us at too great a Distance to molest them in their Re-imbarkation; in short, to extort by their Numbers from the wisest of us, the Council, the good Aristides gave his Countrymen, who upon a Proposal being made to break down the Bridge, by which Xerxes^b and his numerous Army entered Europe, and cut off the Retreat of the Persian; advised the Greek, instead of such a Proceeding rather to lay another for them; and represented to them, they were likely to have Enemies enough without giving themselves the Trouble of encreasing them. Our neighbouring Nations might think too, that when they had sixteen or twenty thousand Men landed on the British Coast, such Council equally as wholesome for us; especially when we consider the latter Part of it, for at most of the Times these Armaments were prepared
against

^b Plutarch

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against us; we had, or were thought to have, Enemies enough at Home.

It may indeed be alledged that the Spanish Armada came, with a view of Ambition and bare-faced Conquest. However there is not Foundation enough to ascertain this of the Rest. The Expedition of the Prince of Orange carried with it a different Complexion, he came by fair Invitation from the Chief of the Nation: And fair as it was, he was wise enough not to trust himself with a less Force than 10,000 Foot and 4000 Horse. But we have gone repeatedly even against France, whose Coasts in general undoubtedly are the best defended of any in the World, with our little Numbers to beat down their strong fortified Places: We have returned even without moving a Stone, unless sometimes to fall upon our own Heads.

However we will now give a Sum Total of the Conjunct Expeditions, our Enemies have made or intended against us; we mean only in Europe, as what they have done in America, deserve no better appellation than little prædatory Affairs, becoming rather a Company of Buccaneers, than Armaments sent forth by great Nations. As we are to confine ourselves to the Beginning of the 17th Century: We find from that Period of Time only eight Conjunct Expeditions have been equipt, against any Part of the Dominions belonging to the British Crown in Europe. Out of these eight, two never failed: Out of the six that failed, three only landed, which were that of the Dutch, the Prince of Orange's, and that of the French against Minorca. A small Part indeed of the Spanish Armament in 1719, was drove by a Storm to Scotland, from which a few Troops debarked. The Endeavours of the Spaniards to re-take Gibraltar in 1704; and with the French to do the same at Barcelona in 1706, do not savour enough of what is to be understood by a Conjunct Expedition; both Places being upon the Coasts of Spain. Wherefore they are not reckoned as such here. By the above Calculation then, eight are found to be the whole Number of the European Conjunct Expeditions made by all our several Enemies against us. When we in Europe only have made thirty; almost four Times the Number, of those

of

of all our neighbouring Powers put together. Were we to compare those that have been carried on in the other Quarters of the World, the Difference will be still greater on our Side.

We may now draw an Inference or two, from the above last Calculation. The first is, it is found, that our Enemies out of the little Number they have ever made, have succeeded thoroughly only at Minorca, and though the Prince of Orange's is to be called an Expedition, it cannot be esteemed that of an Enemy. However instead of being not surprised at their succeeding no oftener; it is more to be wondered at, that they should ever have had success in Europe against us, even at Minorca, a little Island. When the many Disadvantages and Chances are considered and weighed that must be against any Nation in Enterprizes of this Sort, with whom this Kind of War has been ever little in Fashion, consequently less studied. This seems to carry with it more Force when it is further observed, that notwithstanding we have pursued this Kind of War more than all Europe besides, how often we ourselves have been foiled: And even to this Day, we do not perceive, it has ever been reduced to any truer and better System, than it was at the beginning of the 17th Century; at least nothing scarce to speak of. This same Reason holds good with our European Expeditions, or rather with our European Defeats: For though we have put in Execution many more than other Nations: We have been almost always as great Novices at it. We have taken that Kind of Precaution (as if we had been determined to reap no Advantage from Experience) by ever suffering the same General to Conduct in his Life Time more than one Expedition: For which we refer our Readers to look back the last hundred Years. Where they will find every fresh Conjunct Armament with a fresh General to Command the Military Part. Whilst we make this Remark, we must remind our Readers, it has been a general Observation: That in the Execution of these Conjunct Affairs, the Military Part have been chiefly found insufficient. However, to whom the Article of Experience in this Amphibious War does not appear so striking, Instances may be brought to confirm it. In 1654.
and

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and 5, General Venables may be said to have most egregiously miscarried in his Attempt upon Hispaniola: From whence with his broken Troops he went low in Spirits and Reputation to Jamaica. Where he met with a very contrary Fortune: And whoever considers those two Attempts, will find the Success of the latter to be not a little owing to the Experience he acquired by the Miscarriage of the former.

In the Year 1702, two great Attempts were made against the Coasts of Spain: The first at Cadiz, the other at Vigo. The Duke of Ormond Commanded the Land Forces at both. At the former the whole Army was landed, but to so little a Purpose, they were obliged to give over the Attempt. They failed from thence to Vigo, where the Army co-operating on Land with the Fleet at Sea, so deeply wounded France in her Naval Power by destroying her Ships, which were in that Harbour, that she never recovered it during the War. To shew further, Experience in all hostile Operations, is of more Consequence, than some People may imagine; we will mention: The Bombardments that were carried on against the Coasts of our Enemies in King William's Time; though we have not taken Notice of them in our Calculations. Of which, was the Question to be asked, who succeeded most; the Answer would be, the Person most employed. In 1692 Admiral Benbow exercised this Kind of War against St. Maloes, as Admiral Russel did, two Years after at Palamos in Catalonia. In 1694 and 96, Sir Cloudesly Shovel practised the same at Dunkirk and Calais. And whether they may be said in general to have had Success, or not, appears to us a Kind of Doubt. This at least, we are sure of, it was nothing equal to that of Lord Berkley, who was employed in Bombardments almost continually in the Years 1694, 5, and 6, against the Western Coast of France, sailing from one Place to another, and succeeding almost every where he went, and in some Places to a great Degree. Yet whoever knows the History of the other three Admirals, cannot affirm, they had less Knowledge in Naval Affairs, less Spirit, or less Zeal for the Service of their Country. Therefore the Whole must Amount to this, (which is nothing

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nothing unreasonable to suppose) Lord Berkley was more expert and a greater Adept at that particular Branch of his Business, which he had practised more than any other Admiral, if not more than the three above-mentioned together.

Another Inference to be drawn from the last general Calculation, is, that by as many Expeditions we have made against our Enemies, more than they have carried into Execution against us; so much the more ought we to esteem it our Interest to study and employ ourselves in order to bring to perfection this Kind of War; especially when it is known the chief Reason of our Enemies not having put in Practice this Method of annoying us oftener, has not been through want of Will, but want of Ability. Wherefore there is all seeming probability to imagine, the same Reason must subsist among them: As we owe this Power to our Superiority at Sea; which should be considered as derived to us from Providence, consequently not easily to be taken away. Our Naval Strength took its early Rise from the Situation of the Kingdom with Regard to the rest of the World. Being an Island not so large either to lose the Benefit of its Insular Situation, or so little as not to partake in some Measure the Advantages of a Continent. What is to be understood by this, is our happy Situation and good Laws naturally enforced a Trade; this Trade gave Birth to Shipping and our Naval Strength, as well as all the Blessings that are the Effects of a great and universal Commerce.

A Nation thus circumstanced, need not fear the Attacks of foreign Powers, the Arts of Men will little avail to destroy what has been so firmly established by the Works of Nature. How unwise must a People be to neglect cultivating and improving that Kind of War the most adapted to the peculiar Interest of their Country! A War of such Consequence, as to confirm to us above all other, the (*Imperium Maris*,) which we are told, draws after it, the (*Imperium Terræ*.) Whether this can be fully ascertained or not, we are very sure it must be our own fault, if it does not, the (*Imperium Littoris*,) which is no small Empire. Besides should we be able to Command the Harbours of our

Enemies;

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Enemies; where will their Fleets find an Asylum?
Where will they sail to for Refuge? *

What a glorious Figure did Athens make, when Themistocles ruled at the Helm.^c He first gave the Athenians a right Notion of Sea-Affairs; and encouraged them to pursue in the prosecution of their Wars, every Method calculated for the Interest and particular

^c Stanyan's
Hist. of Greece,
Book 2. Ch. 3.

* The Situation of Great Britain environed by the Sea, says Puffendorff, gives it unspeakable Advantages. While its Superiority by Sea, is maintained, all the Powers can never hurt her; and it is in her Power greatly to annoy any one, that is accessible by Sea. If by defeating, or slipping by, any Part of the British Fleet, a Body of Troops could be landed in this Island, except they were sufficient, which, if the Inhabitants were well united, would require a vast Number, to make an intire Conquest, as retreating, or being re-inforced are scarce possible, they must in all probability, be quite ruined. If it be true, that the Safety of Great Britain depends chiefly on her being Mistress of the Seas, and that the Trade of Britain has never flourished so much, or its Glory been so far extended, as in those Reigns, when its Naval Strength was principally attended to, it follows, that this ought at all Times to be the point in View. To give some Assistance on the Continent, when the Liberties of Europe are threatened, is undoubtedly right, provided there be such an Alliance formed, as is likely to check the Designs of an ambitious Power; but it has been the Opinion of many considerate Men, that going into Land Wars ought, as much as possible, to be avoided by Great Britain; because as her Strength is thereby divided, her Naval Power must be diminished. As it has moreover, been found by dear bought Experience, that Dominions on the Continent, cost more to get and keep than they are worth, nothing but the Preservation, of the Ballance of Power, can induce Britain to meddle at any Time upon the Continent. When this is, really, in Danger, and strong Confederacies are formed, for its Support, the Weight of Great Britain thrown into the Scale, may have glorious Consequences; but if other Powers cannot see; or will not heartily oppose this Danger, which concerns them most immediately, it seems her wisest Way, to save her Blood and Treasure, and to provide, by augmenting her natural Strength against the Worst. Supposing, that by Supineness or Infatuation, of other Powers on the Continent, some one Prince should arrive at universal Monarchy; it is probable he would have Business enough upon his Hands, to support himself in his new Conquests. If this was not the Case, and he should form any Design upon this Island, it would require many Years to get such a Fleet together as to look that of Britain in the Face. And in the mean Time, by his Death, or many other Accidents, the Posture of Affairs on the Continent, might be entirely changed. To suppose further, what can scarce ever happen, but by her own ill Conduct, that the Superiority of Sea was lost; as the Invading so populous an Island, whose Inhabitants are naturally Brave, would be dangerous, and very expensive, and there is no Instance in History, of its being ever conquered, except the People were at Variance among themselves, it may justly be presumed, that the Conquest of Britain would, even then be very difficult.

Puffendorff's Intro. to the Hist. of the Principal Kingdoms and States in Europe. Vol. I. Chap. 4.

C 2

Situation

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Situation of their Country, as the surest Way to succeed and render them Great and Powerful. He laid the Foundations of all their Naval Glory. He confirmed to them the Superiority of Command at Sea; and shewed them the Means, by which they might obtain the Sovereignty of Greece. He established it as a Maxim, that their present and future Safety depended entirely on their Shipping. They were not presently convinced of this Truth; therefore reproached him with taking from them the Spear and Shield, and binding them to the Bank and Oar. But they afterwards found the good Effects of it; and so long as they pursued his Plan, and continued to act as a Maritime Power, they were a great and flourishing People: For he had an Eye, says Plutarch, that could penetrate into the Womb of Events.

The Council then of Themistocles was followed, and his Predictions verified; he spoke ('tis true) to Athenians, a People famous for Wisdom; to the Inhabitants of Athens, the very Seat we are told, Minerva herself chose for her Residence. The ill Reception it first met with serves to show, how prevalent, Fashion has ever been in the World; almost enough to outweigh every other Consideration. Even Themistocles was reproached by his Countrymen, by Athenians, for taking from them the Spear and Shield, and binding them to the Bank and Oar. It seems then, a folly for a Person less than a Themistocles to aim at changing the Method of War; to speak in opposition to Fashion that much admired Phantom, as predominant with Englishmen, as it ever was with Greeks; to venture to say, the Strength of most Nations of Europe relative to War, is as different to that of Great Britain, as was in the Days of Themistocles, the Power of the Persians and some other Countries to the Athenians; and (though it is in contra-distinction to the rest of the World) if we would pursue it wisely, it must be done as differently.

The Fleet and Army acting in Consort seem to be the natural Bulwark of these Kingdoms. Whenever we prosecute a War, like Nations on the Continent, more than is consistent with a Country circumstanced as this is; it must be pursued by Means, which cannot

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not be supported but by a trible Expence to much less Purpose with Regard to the Success itself, and the Consequence of that Success. How absurd it would appear to us; should the Polanders, or any other Inland People of the Continent study no Kind of War, but such as is suited to the Algerines, Genoese, Dutch, or what we ought to study, at least as much as any other. We don't mean to lessen the Dignity of the Army, but to encourage it to make the Conjunct War their great Object, as the sure Way to acquire more Glory, with more Ease.

Whenever in these Affairs as well as other, we swerve from the natural Bent of a national Interest, we rest our Hope on Art; which requires to be carefully watched, as the vestal Flame of old, continually fed and cherished; or it is sure to grow languid, and in a short Time expire: When lusty Nature will struggle against many Difficulties, and is scarce to be extinguished by any neglect. We would willingly speak, what one may conceive a Themistocles (was he) among us would teach. He alone knew how to persuade a sensible People, to forsake absolutely the Sort of War in which they had been trained up, and to embrace an entire new System. To obtain a change of Custom in these Days, it is necessary Men should feel a thorough Conviction of its Utility. Its Advantages should be confirmed by the strongest Reasoning, and most undoubted Facts. The Conjunct Armament goes against the Enemy, like an Arrow from a Bow. It gives no warning where it is to come, and leaves no traces where it has passed. It must wound too, where it hits, if rightly pointed at some vulnerable Part. When this is done, a new Aim is directed.

The Enemy in the mean Time, like a Man in the Dark labouring under the Weight of an unwieldy Shield, moves slowly to and fro distracted and at a Loss which Way to go, to guard against the Stroke of an invisible Hand. Does he come here, the Blow is made there. Before he reaches that Place, the Impression is felt at another. Should he at last arrive there, before perhaps he can be well informed of the Event, he is hastened away by the Alarms of a Third. Conformable

to these Ideas, we will give the Sentiments of the famous Sir Walter Rawleigh on this Subject.

It is impossible (says Sir Walter) for any Maritime Country, that have not their Coasts admirably fortified, to defend itself against a powerful Enemy that is Master of the Sea. Let us suppose, that Philip the Second had fully resolved to hinder Sir John Norris in the Year 1589, from presenting Don Antonio, King of Portugal, before the Gates of Lisbon, and to keep off the English with his Army; as we are to suppose him too weak at Sea, through the Overthrow his great Armada received from Queen Elizabeth's Fleet the preceding Year. Without doubt it was not difficult for the Spaniards to get together an Army sufficient to resist the eleven thousand Men that attended Sir John Norris. But how was this Army to have been disposed? If about Lisbon, it would have been easy for the English to have taken, ransack'd, and burnt the Town of Groin, as well as the adjacent Country. The great Preparations of the Earl of Altemira, the Marquis of Seralba, and others, were not able to prevent them performing this. Nor did the Earl of Andrada's 8000 Men, which he hastily got together, serve to any other Effect, than the increase of Honour to Sir John Norris and his Associates. For the English attacked them at Puente de Burgos, and passing the great Bridge flanked with Shot, and barricadoed at the further End behind which they lay, routed them, took their Camp, their general Standard with the King's Arms, and pursued them over the whole Country, which they fired. Had it been a Royal Army, and not (as this was) a Company of private Adventurers, that thus begun the War in Galicia, the Spaniards would have been forced to have quitted Portugal, and hasten to the Defence of their St. Jago, whose Temple was not far from the Danger. Had they held their first Resolution, knowing the chief Aim of Sir John Norris was to bring Don Antonio with an Army into his Kingdom, where he expected to be readily and joyfully welcomed: Could they have hindered his landing in Portugal? for he landed at Penicha, and marched over the Country to Lisbon, six Days Journey. And when all Don Antonio's Promises failed him, he passed along by the River

ver of Lisbon to Cascaliz ; and there taking a Fort, quietly embarked his Men, and departed : For these, (says Sir Walter) though no more than an handful, yet were they Englishmen.

Sir Walter Rawleigh observes, that in his Time, France was strengthened much more with fortified Places than England : Notwithstanding which (he says) upon a Supposition that an Army is to be transported over Sea, and landed in an Enemy's Country, and the Place left to the Choice of the Invader. Such an Army (says he) cannot be resisted on the Coast of England, without a Fleet to hinder it ; no, nor on the Coast of France, or any other Country, except every Creek, Port, or Sandy Bay, had a powerful Army in each of them to make Opposition. We will suppose Kent able to furnish twelve thousand Men, which are to be disposed in the three best Landing Places in that Country. As three thousand at Margate, three thousand at the Nesse, and six thousand at Fulkstone ; which is nearly equidistant to them both. Two of these Bodies we will suppose (unless some other Disposition is thought better) are ordered to reinforce the third, when the Enemy's Fleet appears to bend towards it : I say, notwithstanding these Precautions, should the Enemy sail from the Isle of Wight at the first Watch of the Night, so as to arrive by Day-break at the Nesse, towing their Long-Boats at their Sterns, and there land their Troops, it will be very difficult for those 3000 at Margate, twenty-four long Miles from the Nesse, to come Time enough to support their Countrymen. Or how should they at Fulkstone be able to do it, though nearer by half the Way ? when they perceive the Enemy at their first Arrival, forcing an Entrance with three or four hundred Shot of large Artillery, quickly obliging the first 3000 intrenched at the Nesse to run ; or else to find them so much Work as to render them under a Necessity of sending for Assistance to Fulkstone, and perhaps to Margate ; by which those Places will be left exposed. We will now suppose the whole 12,000 Kentish Soldiers arrive at the Nesse, before the Enemy can have disembarked, and are disposed in such a Manner, as to make it too hazardous for them to attempt it, in the Face of such Numbers

prepared to oppose them : In this Situation, it is but reasonable to imagine the Enemy will play as good a Game as they can (especially being at full Liberty to go where they please) and should they take the Advantage of the Night, and sail towards the East, what will there be to hinder them from landing either at Margate, the Downs, or some other Place, before they at Nesse can be well aware of their Departure ? There is nothing more easy than to do it. The same may be said of Weymouth, Purbeck, Pool, and of all Landing Places on the South Coast. No Man is ignorant, that Ships without putting themselves out of Breath, can easily out-run Soldiers that coast them. *Les Armées ne volent point en Poste* ; Armies neither fly, nor run Post (saith a Marshal of France.) And I know it to be true, that a Fleet of Ships may be seen at Sun-set, and after it, at the Lizard ; yet by the next Morning may recover Portland, when Infantry can't march it in six Days. When Troops disposed on the Sea Shores are obliged to run from Place to Place to no Purpose after a Fleet, they will at last set down in some Center-Place and leave all to Chance.

There are not many Islands in the World better secured by Nature, and strengthened by Art, than that of Tercera, being every where difficult of Access, and having no good Harbour to shelter a Navy of Friends, and upon every Cove or Watering-Place, a Fort erected, to forbid the Approach of an Enemy's Boat. Yet when Emanuel de Sylva, and Monsieur de Chattes, who held it for the Use of Don Antonio, with five or six thousand Men, thought to have kept the Marquis of Santa Cruz from landing there ; the Marquis having shewed himself in the Road of Angra, sailed before any perceived him, and arrived at the Port des Moles far distant from that Place ; where he took a Fort, and landed before Monsieur de Chattes marching in vain to the same Place, could come to hinder him. The French had not got half Way, when they found their Purpose frustrated by the Spanish Ships. This may suffice to prove, a strong Army in a good Fleet, which neither Infantry or Cavalry are able to follow, cannot be hindered from landing where they please, whether in England, France, or any other Country, unless they are
pre-

prevented by a Fleet of equal or sufficient Strength. We hope the Remarks Sir Walter has left behind him relating to our own Coasts, will not be the less pleasing upon that Account, as they must be more striking and better understood by our Countrymen. And we presume, that they who are thought to have an Understanding sufficient to conduct an Expedition, may have an Understanding sufficient also to apply them to any other Coast. For which reason we will give two other striking Instances; the first relating to this Country, between Canutus and Edmund Ironside; the other to a neighbouring one. Canutus entered the Thames with his Navy and Army on board; and not being successful against London, suddenly embarked; and sailing to the West, landed in Dorsetshire, drawing Edmund and his Army there: However, not finding the Entertainment he could wish, he embarked his Troops again, and entered the Severn, obliging Edmund to march after him there also to the Succour of Worcestershire, which Country Canutus plundered and ravaged to a great Degree. When he had got Edmund there, he sailed back again to London. In this Manner he fatigued the King and his Army, ravishing and spoiling where he pleased, before any Force could come to prevent him.

The other Instance is of much later Date; and is the Advantage the People of the Netherlands took by being Masters of the Sea in Defence of their Liberty against the Spaniards, by transporting their Army entire and unfatigued from Place to Place with all the Ammunition and Artillery belonging to it, in the tenth Part of the Time their Enemies were able to march it. Count Maurice of Nassau, one of the greatest Captains and worthiest Princes of his Age, in the Year 1590, carried his Army by Sea with forty Pieces of Artillery to Breda, pretending either to besiege Boisleduc or Ger-treudenberg; which Places the Spaniard to defeat his Design filled with Soldiers and Provisions. But as soon as the Wind served, he suddenly set sail, and arriving in the Mouth of the Maeze, turned up the Rhine, and thence to Yssel, sat down before Zutphen. Before the Spaniards could march over the Country round about Holland, above fourscore Miles, over several great Rivers, with their Cannon and Baggage, Zutphen was taken.

taken. However, when the Spanish Army had overcome this fatiguing March, and was now got far from their home; Prince Maurice pretending to sail up the Rhine, chang'd his course in the Night, and went down the Stream; and presented Himself and Army before Hulst in Brabant, before the Spaniards knew what was become of him. This Town he also took, before the Return of the Spanish Army. At last, the Spaniards appear'd in Brabant; where they were scarce arriv'd, when Prince Maurice (having fortified Hulst) well attended with his Fleet, spread his Sails again; and presented himself before Nimegen in Guelders, a City of no small importance, and became Master of it ^d.

^d Rawleigh's
Hist. of the
World, Book 5.
Ch. I. Sect. 9.

These indeed were Instances of former Ages, tending to prove the Utility of this Kind of War. We will now turn to the present Times, to see how far our Enemies have been affected in these Respects. It has been said, or at least, words to the same meaning; that the Conjunct Armament brings with it, not only Terror but Surprize; it is the first Messenger of its own Ap-

^e Aut æquavit
præstantissimo-
rum gloriam aut
excessit quod
per sæpe Nuntius
de se pervenit.
Suetonius de Jul.
Cæs.

proach; ^e nay, here are two Sorts of Surprizes. The first is to the Quarter of the World, it is destined; (as we are to suppose it to be conducted with secrecy, which is so well known to be the Life and Soul of every Military Atchievement, we shall not dwell upon it here). When this is for certain known, the second is to the Part of this Quarter. Did the French or we ourselves know for an absolute certainty in our late Expeditions, when our Fleets set Sail, to what Sea they were bound? When it was fully ascertained, that France was the destined Object, was it not then among us as well as our Enemies, a mere Guess to know the Part? Whether it was the British or Western Coast. When it was found that the Western was the Part of the World in the Rochfort Expedition, the Fleet was to present itself before, was it known without a Doubt by the Inhabitants of that or any other, whether Brest, Port l'Orient, Rochelle, Rochefort, Bourdeaux, Bayonne, or any of the bordering Islands was the particular Object? Were our Enemies in the after Expeditions truer Prophets than in the first? Did they foretell that the British Side of France was then the Aim? or that St. Maloe, and Cherburgh were the Places to be attacked?

History

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History says three Conjunct Armaments in the Space of two Years, were sent against Rochelle ^f. They ^{f In the Reign of Charles the First,} who were not ignorant of this, perhaps, might have imagined, in the same length of Time, two might have gone against its neighbouring Town of Rochefort.

It requires then little Penetration to perceive the Alarms and Disquietudes our Enemies in this present War must have laboured under, through the continual Apprehension and Uncertainty of the Place where the Blow was to be struck.

We will now give also some late Instances to shew more particularly the Disadvantage it is to the People of that Country, whose Situation obliges them to reduce their Art to the defensive Part only. What will manifest this, proves the Necessity of encouraging any Proposition, that tends towards giving us the Superiority over an Enemy struggling under such a Disadvantage. This ought to be a sufficient Reason to eradicate the Dislike some People have to any Innovations (which however for the generality dwells in little minds) as well as that foolish Notion, of fancying what our Predecessors thought or did, was wisest and best.

If to trip at the Beginning, which the Ancients termed (errare a Limine) is esteemed a Capital Fault; the opposite Behaviour should be reckoned in some degree a Merit. The War carried on by Conjunct Armaments, makes its Exordium with acting the Offensive Part; and surely it is easier to strike a Blow, than to ward it off; still much easier to strike some Part of a great Object, than for that extensive Object, every where equally to guard itself from being struck. To defend a large Country approachable in many Places, requires the Strength or Troops of that Nation to be disposed in those several Places; which is converting Solidity into Extensivity. It is beating the Massey Breast-plate into mere leaf to cover the whole Man.

That we might not seem to speak at random, we will Mention the great Preparations made by the French, against the Bombardments which were carried on against their Coasts in the Reign of King William the Third; as well also as through the Fear of the English making Descents.

For

g The whole
is taken from
French Writers.

h Hist. Militaire, tom. 3. p. 276. Memoires Historiques & Chronologiques, par Daniel, Burchar's Nav. Hist. p. 548.

For the Security of Brest, Lewis the XIV, was under the Necessity of sending 12000 Regular Troops that way ; as well as submitting to the Inconveniency which must attend, the obliging Mr. Vauban to accompany them. The Marquiss de Beauvrou went with a great Detachment to Diep, Marshal de Choiseuil to Havre de Grace, the Duke of Maine, Count Tolouse, and Marshal Villeroy, with the greatest Part of the Army in Flanders, to Dunkirk g. M. Quincy tells us, Marshal Choiseuil who was appointed on the Coast of Britany, had at La Hogue two Battalions of Marines, three of Militia, a Regiment of Horse, and another of Dragoons : besides these, a numerous Corps de Reserve. M. d'Estrees commanded in the neighbourhood of Rochelle another Body of Forces. M. Vauban who had the Care of Brest, and the Adjacent Country, had also a special Commission to enable him to Command the Marines, of which there were twenty two Battalions on the Coast. All this shews, how apprehensive the French were of these Visits, into what Confusion they put them, and what mighty Expences they were obliged to be at, to provide against their Effects. Notwithstanding which they affected to ridicule them * ; and the same humour seems very unaccountably to have possessed abundance of People at Home. The Reader however must think, they were not lookt upon in so cheap a light ; when he is told, that besides sixty thousand Men quartered up and down on the Coasts, to prevent the Mischief of an Invasion ; the French between Brest and Goulet had erected forty Batteries on one Side, and twenty-five on the other ; on these Batteries were mounted nineteen Mortars, and four hundred and eighty-nine pieces of heavy Cannon h. If France had been under no concern, such Precautions had never been taken. What can indicate more fully the Distressing Circumstances of those that act the defensive

* M. Devise the French Gazetteer, exceeds them all in his accounts. " The Exploits of the English, says he, are so extravagant they are " scarce credible, and their Expeditions so pitiful they serve only to " excite Scorn and Contempt." This was certainly very proper news for the Court to publish, to keep up the Spirits of the People, but an Historian certainly deserves Blame who copies after such an Author. Campbell's Nav. Hist. vol. 3. p. 162-63.

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fensive Part in this Kind of War, than the late Affair in St. Cas's Bay? Only let us suppose, the British Troops at that Time had been all on Shore, or all on Board their Ships; what would have been the Consequence? Had the first happened, the French that came from Brest, would have had a march of near (if not quite) fifty Leagues of that Country, perhaps after so great a Fatigue to a very bad purpose; had the latter fallen out to no purpose at all. The many Disadvantages and Expences, that are sure to attend those on the Defence serve to manifest the Influence and availing Power that accompany our Conjunct Armaments; and it may be presumed will do, in a much higher degree, when the Art of this littoral War shall be so perfected and refined, as to have the Efficacy naturally inherent to it; so as to have a Right Use made of the Power lodged in our Fleet and Army, which when they go united, become many times accumulated.

The Success however of our Expeditions for this last Century, or more, not having been so general, as of those of former Ages: it will be said perhaps, the Places upon all Coasts, are now much stronger, than in those early Days, and more prepared against a sudden Assault; in short, the Times are altered. All which we acknowledge, nay, we grant more. Which is, we have not changed with the Times, as we ought to do. We have not kept Pace in our Manner of Attack, with the improved Method of Defence. We have declared the Miscarriages, which attend our Naval, Military Expeditions, proceed from an Insufficiency. To prove this Suggestion, we will divide the Execution of what we call a Conjunct Armament under three Principal Heads. The landing of the Troops, or Intention so to do, in an Enemy's Country: their Proceedings during their Stay in that Country: their Retreat and Re-embarkation. These three Heads (especially the second) may be several Times subdivided; which for Brevity sake, we shall avoid here; upon a Supposition that the Army and Navy employ'd are compleat in every respect according to the present Notion of Naval Military Armaments; according also to every Kind of good Discipline. Should we be able to prove from real Facts, that we have shewed ourselves deficient in these

three

three principal Parts (which are so Effential) they may be said to comprehend this whole Art of War; we shall confirm what we set out with; that our Failures happen from nothing Local, Temporal, or Accidental, but from a general Insufficiency. Where there is no Opposition nor Expectation of any, there can be no Tryal; consequently no Conclusion to be drawn from thence. To be then as Short as possible, we will confine ourselves to one Country; and for the stronger Proof, to that, where the stronger Opposition has been always expected, or actually found, which is France. For this purpose we shall throw together several Enterprizes, that have been made against it; by having them before us in one short View, it will appear that the Management in general with which they were conducted, and the variety of unlucky Incidents, which are look't upon, as the chief Causes of the several Miscarriages, serve only to make every impartial Person sensible; that this War has never been studied enough to put us upon an Equality with the Enemy; and to furnish us with Abilities sufficient to make up the want of Method in the Debarking and Re-imbarking; and when a Descent has been made, the want of Artillery and Cavalry in the after Operations. And also to bring it upon a Par with any established Continental War; by reducing it to such a Pitch of Perfection, as to render it equally improbable, that the Operations of a Conjunct Armament shall have any greater Chance of being frustrated by inconsiderable Incidents, than those of any other Kind of War.

The History of these Expeditions having already been related, the Reader must excuse the Recapitulating a little for this purpose. As by doing so, what we would willingly instil into him, will be more obvious. We shall mention first those Armaments, we know were, or intended to have been landed. As we are to go no higher than King James the First. We find from that Time the following Armaments that were never able to put in execution their Intentions of making a Debarkment, through an intire Sense of their own Inability, from an Apprehension of the Resistance they were to meet; for we can impute it to nothing else.

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At two Different Times Lord Denbigh was sent with a large Force to the Assistance of the Rochellers; neither of which he was able to Land; and though the first Failure was through the Lateness of the Season he set out in, which was the Excuse; that could not be alledged of the latter, as he anchored in that Road on the first of May. Wherefore he has left us to make the second Excuse for him, which was, though he was much superior to the French Fleet then riding before the Harbour ⁱ, he was afraid, and did not know how to do it. The same Year the Earl of Lindsey went with another Armament to this same Place. The Fleet sailed the eighth of September, in all probability not many Days earlier in the Season, than Lord Denbigh's first Expedition was, as we find it in October; however in this one Respect Lord Lindsey was more fortunate, for though he sailed so late as above-mentioned, he arrived safe before Rochelle: but to little purpose; for now a Boom was raised to block up the Port, so strong, that though many Attempts were made to break it through they proved vain. Upon this, the Place surrendered to the besiegers, the English Fleet looking on, but unable to help them. The Night after this surrender, notwithstanding the prodigious Obstacles we are told of, the Sea made such a Breach, as would have opened an Entrance for the largest Ship in the English Fleet.

ⁱ See back,
Reign of Charles
the First.

In 1693, Commodore Benbow with Bombs and other Machines almost beat the Town St. Maloe to the ground; at least in such a Manner, that the Place might easily have been taken; as the greatest Part of the Wall, towards the Sea was thrown down; but the excuse here was a want of a sufficient Force to venture the making a Debarkement, unless upon a little Island ^k.

^k See back,
Reign of King
William.

In 1708. Sir George Byng, and Lord Dursley commanded the Fleet, and Lieutenant General Erle the Land-Forces. The Intention of this Armament was to alarm the French Coast, and make Descents. The first Part of the Intention succeeded very well; for when the Eye only was to be struck, it had its Effect. But as to the Descents, there were but lame doings. The Fleet anchored in several Places; and in the Bay of Estaples on the 4th of August, a Detachment of Troops

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Troops were landed. These Troops were re-embarked. They were afterwards joined by more Transports, and on the 12th, the Design was to Land in the Bay of La Hogue. Upon viewing the Coast, they found so many Troops brought together, so many Forts, and Batteries raised, it was deemed impracticable. The Fleet afterwards lay before Cherburgh; but there also was found no Prospect of doing any thing. It returned to the Bay of La Hogue, and from thence to Spithead.

The Failure of the Design of the Rochfort Expedition relating to the making a Descent, is so recent in every Person's Memory; and has already been so fully related, we shall not Mention it again here.

Thus then we see, when there is any thing of an Opposition to be met with even in the first Essay of our Expeditions, we are so at a loss, and fearfull (for the generality) of the Event; as to frustrate the Hopes of the Nation, by returning with the Fleets almost without attempting the thing intended; and to every discerning Person, it must appear not a little owing to the Methods used in the Debarkment of Troops in the face of an Enemy, being reduced to no Regularity, or Perfection.

We are next to discover what Skill has been shown in the after Operations of those Armaments, which have been landed. As we are to confine ourselves, to the already mentioned Period of Time, and Country; we shall examine for this purpose only two Conjunct Expeditions, that, at Cette, and at l'Orient. The Miscarriage of Toulon perhaps may not be thought similar enough to the present Point to be brought over again.

We are to consider then the Affair at Cette; where the few Troops destined for this purpose, landed without Opposition; soon after the Town and Fort surrendered, as did the Town of Agde the next Day. Could the Troops have fixt themselves for three Days only, they would have answered the End of the Expedition. But three Days were found too long a Time. The news of the Enemy's approach came first. Upon a false Alarm the Bridge of Agde, (a Post of Consequence) was abandoned. The Attempt to retake it was frustrated by a contrary Wind, which arose so suddenly, it seemed almost on purpose. Then the
Mountain

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Mountain of Cette was also abandoned ; the Officer mistook his Orders, and his Men retired too soon, and upon a few shot surrendered at discretion. To compleat the Affair, a Captain and fifty Men were left in a Fort to cover the Retreat ; a Fort very difficult to be approached ; but no sooner had an Admiral put off to go on board his Ship, than he surrendered upon the first summons from the Enemy.

L'Orient is now to appear. It is true, this Armament was landed by a *Finesse*. Wherefore by a *Finesse*, they had like to have drawn themselves into a Scrape. The first Fright began in Quimperlay, where a Brigade of three Battalions were very much disordered ; so much, it was afterwards the employ of three Days to find out the Delinquents, and an Officer was broke with Infamy. It was thought the Place might have been taken had the Assault been immediately given ; Delay rendered it impracticable. The Engineers could not Support what they had said. Their Calculations were wrong. The Battery was too far placed, and against an oblique Part. The most Material things had been forgot, the few Bombs and red hot Balls that could be thrown, had little Effect, for it was found when it was too late, the Houses were built with Stone. The Enemy all this Time was gathering round them, in such a Manner, had they staid much longer, it was thought, it would have required not a little cunning to have got Home again.

By this Time we don't doubt, but our Readers are thoroughly sensible, of what little Purpose it is, to have effected a Debarment ; when we are to meet with Opposition in our after Operations. It is in short nothing less, than verifying the old Proverb, out of the Pan, into the Fire ; or avoiding a Rock to be plunged in an Eddy. What Man can this Occasion any Wonder to ? When it is known there was no Cavalry, and very little Artillery. If to any, it must be to him only, who with these Deficiencies, can make himself equal to his Enemy properly appointed to receive much more respectable Armaments. But it is to be feared, there is no such Man to be found. However when the Winds and Waves have so far favoured us, as to suffer us to become Trespassers on an Enemy's Land ; there

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is another serious Consideration arises; sometimes it turns out very serious: which is, should the Enemy chuse (after we have got into their Country) if not to keep us there, to exert their chief Efforts to prevent our getting back again, at least, with whole Skins. We are now to see what Kind of Figure we have made in these Circumstances. Which is a Re-embarkation (in the Military Phrase) with the Bayonet pressing at our Backs.

To observe the Rules we have prescribed, relative to Time and Place, we shall show, only two Instances. The first, is the Expedition to the Isle of Rhee.

To make ample Amends for the great Disappointment the Rochellers met with, from the Return of Lord Denbigh's first Expedition; the Duke of Buckingham his Brother in Law, (whose Vanity made him believe himself as great a Minister, as he was a Favourite at Court, and willing to prove himself also as great a General). Resolved to go himself as Admiral and Commander in Chief. He landed on the Island of Rhee, notwithstanding he met with a strong Opposition. Upon the Alarm of this first Success, we are told the French King fell sick. And we don't doubt, but the Duke appeared as big to that Nation, as he did to himself. If it was so, it was not so long. The Mountain soon sunk to a Mole-hill. Their Terrors quickly wore away; for they were informed, he had little Capacity as a Commander, and too much Pride to be advised.

There is an Advantage in making a sudden Enterprize upon an Island that is not large; for should all its Inhabitants be collected together to oppose the Debarkation, in all probability there might not have been many proper for such a Service. Whether the Duke was sensible of this, or not; he did not seem to recollect that an Island so near the Continent, might soon receive Succours, unless timely prevented. The error in this respect which he committed, proved his entire Ruin. The Fort that covered the Landing-Place was neglected, and served afterwards like a Door for the above Purpose. Having no skill in the Besieging Part, he began to negotiate; where he shewed as little. The Garrison being reinforced, he had nothing then to con-
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sider but his Retreat; which was made as if he had not thought at all: so that he lost in the Execution, fifty Officers, two thousand Soldiers, and thirty-five Volunteers. Thus he concluded his Expedition with great Loss to the Nation, Confusion to himself, and small comfort to the poor Rochellers.

We are now to speak of the last Affair, to prove our general Ignorance in this littoral War; which is the Enterprize upon Brest*.

We are told, the French had been so well informed of our Design, and such strange Delays had been made in embarking the Forces, that when the Fleet came upon the Coast, they found the French every where prepared to receive them. This was represented to General Talmash, but it had no weight, for the Honor of the British Nation was at Stake; to which he fell himself a Sacrifice. For though the Landing was covered by the Fire of two Men of War, and five Frigates, it was done with no Regularity. The General embarked on board the small Vessels with about 800 Men, and landed as many of them as he could; but to very little Purpose. Several of the well-boats stuck, and all that were in them were either killed or wounded. Those that landed, were soon driven back to their Boats, and with great Difficulty were carried off again. The Men in the Ships that covered the Debarkment seeing but a few Boats coming off, and the whole Affair over, were so out of Heart, that it was with much Difficult they could be get out of the Bay. The Monk was obliged to be towed off, and the Teesep a Frigate had twelve Feet Water in her hold, all her Men killed except eight; and of half a Company of Soldiers that was accidentally left on Board her, only an Ensign, Drummer, and Private Man escaped; so that she was obliged to be left behind.

Thus these two Expeditions which we have last mentioned, served instead of intimidating a great Nation, only to render our own ridiculous, and bring to the minds of People the Proverbial Story of the Turk

* The Misfortune of this Expedition, may be said to be both in the Debarkation and Re-embarkation, however we have mentioned it here, as at the latter.

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and his Tartar ; and to prove we are as deficient, in the Re-embarkation, or the finishing Part of a Con-junct Expedition, when we meet with a serious Resis-tance, as in any other Part from the Beginning, or in the Debarkation itself. It has just been said that this Expedition to Brest was the last Affair, we intended to have made Use of here, to prove a general Insufficiency in the Littoral War, as indeed it was, when we wrote it. We thought then, it was shewed sufficiently and should have been glad to have been furnished with no other Instance, much less, a stronger ; as it cannot be produced, but by a fresh Calamity befalling our Country. But alas ! scarce had we finished the above, when the news of our Misfortune in St. Cas's Bay was brought us, almost as though, it demanded to follow immediately the Affair at Brest. However as this has happened since the fruitless Attempt on Rochfort ; there is less Occasion to mention it again ; and we are glad to draw the Curtain over it. From first to last then there is no Perfection, no true System, or Regu-larity ; but all random hits, just as it happen'd, whether Right or Wrong, Light or Darknes.

These Armaments such as dared make the Experi-ment, have all failed in the moment of Resistance ; whether that has happened in the Debarkment, the after Operation or the Re-embarkation ; which seems to constitute the whole Art of this War. Wherefore we shall remain of the same Opinion, we set out to prove ; which is, that the Failure of our Con-junct Ex-peditions proceeds from nothing Local, Temporal, or Accidental, but from a Total Deficiency. There is Reason thus to think, till the Contrary, by our future Successes in a like Number of Expeditions, and where we have been in these principal Parts as vigorously op-posed, has proved it otherwise. As many Units make a Number, so when we are Ignorant in many Particu-lars, it may be called a general Want of Knowledge ; which in these Con-junct Affairs, could not be con-firmed, but by thus collecting a Number together ; for it was impossible to shew from such that were not able to effect a landing, that they either knew, or did not know how to manage the after Operations. However we have shewn no partiality in the Choice by picking out parti-

particular Enterprizes for the above Purpose; as we fixed at once upon a large and neighbouring Country, against which these Kingdoms have fitted out several of these Armaments; and in all probability, will furnish a great many more. When our Insufficiency has so generally manifested itself, especially in the great Expeditions; it is not to be attributed, to this or that Thing, this or that Object; no, nor to this or that Commander. For set them all aside, an Excuse must follow a Disappointment; and some other Thing might have been a greater impediment, another Object might have been more difficult, another Commander might have been as little or less Skilful, if it may be allowed to judge of the Future by what is past, there is Reason to imagine, it would have so turned out. As to the Commanders, it would be doing a great Injustice (unless very well founded) to lay the whole Charge of Miscarriages, as is generally done to them. It seldom happens but some others are as much, and often more in Fault. Nobody doubts but Benbow would have landed at St. Malo's had he had Troops enough. It is evident that Talmash fell in a great Measure a Sacrifice, to the Weakness of the Force he was furnished with: Lord Denbigh's first Expedition was too late in the Season; some others have not been much earlier, nor equipt in a Manner satisfactory to the Commander, nor proper for the Object: Wherefore if there was any Blame, it was elsewhere to be looked for. The same may be said upon a close Examination of many others in this Treatise; at least enough to prove, the ignorant and mistaken Judgment, (to which we owe the bad Success of our Conjunct Armaments,) dwell in other Places as well as in the Fleet and Army; Places as critical for the Success of these Affairs. The more we consider this, the more we are confirmed in our own Opinion, which is, that in these Matters there is a general Barrenness of Understanding.

Thus then it must be obvious to every Body, that when opposition has called upon us to exert our utmost Skill and Conduct, we have made but a lame Appearance. We are found wanting in the three principal Parts; though to be insufficient in any one of them, is full enough to Ruin the other two. Our Conjunct Armaments go out then to Fight like a Man

imperfect from top to bottom, in his Head, Hands, and Feet: Who consequently is incapable of contriving, executing, and even running away. When this is the Case, unless he is a Fool or a Madman, the Disease will surely seize the Heart; for he'll be sure to lose his Courage. To this we may in a great Measure attribute the frequent Panicks, that seize Soldiers in these Kinds of Enterprizes, such as happened to the Van Guard of Venables's Army in Hispaniola: To the Forces at Toulon, Cette, Porto-Cavallo, Quimperlay, and other Places. These Frights are not to be wondered at; a general Diffidence first gives them Birth; they are afterwards strengthened from the little Knowledge an Army has at the sudden Entrance in an Enemy's Country, of the Number and Quality of that Enemy; which at the first Sight, their Apprehensions are apt to enlarge. The Alarm once begun, does not lessen by the thought of the Difficulty of reaching their Ships, with Soldiers that perhaps had just before experienced a Difficulty in reaching the Shore. Should it then be proved, that a British Conjoint Armament goes forth with a Strength not made the most of, and Abilities weakly exerted; what is the Advantage of calling ourselves the Lords and Rulers of the Sea? What is it more, than having frequenter Opportunities than other Nations to meet with Defeats and Disgraces? We are taught by Experience, these have been the Consequences of this great Brag. However to probe the bottom of a Wound, and then administer no Lenitive; would be encreasing the Malady by tormenting the Patient to no Purpose. Wherefore we shall offer a few Thoughts of our own, in Hopes to assuage a little (we may say) the Virulency of the Disorder; a perfect Cure must be worked out by Time and Practice.

CHAPTER II.

IT is necessary before we think of striking into a new Tract, to know how to shun the Rocks of the old; we mean such, as are and have been in the Power of most Commanders to avoid. For though we have been proving that the Miscarriages of Expeditions are frequently very falsely laid to the Charge of the Chiefs; we mean to exculpate no one of what he is blame worthy. And we find it too often where we could wish it least; which is, in these Conjunct Transactions among the Commanders of both Sea and Land.

The best Use that can be made of History, is to correct in our Times, the Errors committed in those of our Ancestors. We will for this Purpose, point out some of the Chief, which like so many Rocks, many of those who have been before us have split upon. The Expedition to Cadiz in 1625, to Dunkirk and Calais in 1695, to Hispaniola in the same Year, to Cadiz in 1702, to Guadalupe in 1703, to Toulon in 1707, to Carthage in 1741. All these Expeditions owed their Ruin in a great Measure to the Want of Unanimity among the Commanding Officers. Should we go as high as Queen Elizabeth's Reign. We find Sir Francis Drake, and Sir John Norris joint Commanders in 1589, in the Lisbon Expedition; we find again in 1596, the joint Commanders the Lord High Admiral Howard, and the Earl of Essex at Cadiz; in 1597, in the Island Expedition the Earl of Essex and Sir Walter Raleigh, all disagreeing; by which those several Services were very much detrimented. And as if we were determined to quarrel with our Friends as well as our Enemies; we find Vice Admiral Graydon in 1703, disputing with the Governor and chief People of Jamaica, in such a Manner, as to be obliged to leave the Island. Which (as has been already observed) is what frequently happens between our Governors and Commanders of Squadrons.

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In Opposition to all these, we can place but one, of which it is remarked, that it owed its Success almost entirely to that cordial Harmony which was observed between the Commanders of the Fleet and Army, Captain George Martin and Colonel Francis Nicholson; who assisted one another in every Thing they could. The thus uniting of the two Heads occasioned the same with the Bodies; the Soldiers and Sailors with cheerfulness, did all in their Power to help one another. The Consequence of this was, the taking of Port-Royal in a few Days. The Fleet anchored before the Harbour on the 24th. of September 1710, in the Afternoon; the Capitulation was signed on the 2^d. of October following, and in Honour of the Queen was called Annapolis Royal; to the Honour of Colonel Francis Nicholson and Captain George Martin.

The want of Unanimity, we see has been one great Obstruction to our Conjoint Expeditions; which we look upon to be in the Power of every sensible Commander to avoid; therefore it may be said, the Blame of such Miscarriages ought wholly to be charged to them. It is the common Inconvenience, attending a joint Command, and proceeds frequently from the following Causes, between the Admiral and General; Jealousy and Ignorance. They are jealous of two Things; lest the one should gain more Command, as well as more Honour than the other; and lest the one should do harder Service than the other; which is difficult to reconcile, as in all probability they are both sensible at the same Time, that where the greatest Danger is, there the most Honour is to be acquired. Ignorance, however, is a more common Cause of Dispute, for by not having a right Knowledge of what they are about, they differ in Opinion, their Business goes wrong, the Apprehensions of a Miscarriage and future Disgrace, souers their Tempers, and incites in them a Spirit of Cabal; but each cherishes it principally with a View of exculpating himself, and throwing the Blame upon his Brother Commander.

We may add also, that some People are so unfortunate in their Disposition as to be able to agree with no one with whom they are any ways concerned in high Command.

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Command. Captain Robert Wilmot and Colonel Luke Lillingston before they set out for Hispaniola, had their Commands made as distinct as possible, and were separately exhorted to be extremely careful in keeping a right Correspondence; yet before they were in a Condition to act, we find them quarrelling and all Things in Confusion. We will finish this Remark with observing, that the Strength of a Body consists in a close uniting of all its Members, as we are taught by the Fable of the Faggot.

He that has not a Disposition or an Understanding sufficient to keep up a strict Harmony among all under his Direction, is not equal to his Station; much less if he is a principal fomenter of the Discontent; this we may venture to say, though we have mentioned some great Men, who have suffered their Caprice and Humour to have too great a sway over their better Judgment in this Respect: Neither is Success to be expected from their Operations: Discord and Success being almost as great Strangers to each other, as Light and Darkeness. The Emperor Charles the Fifth was so sensible, of the Inconveniencies arising from the least Misunderstanding in a joint Command; that when he added his Fleet to King Henry the 8th.

¹ Sir Thomas Howard the English Admiral received from the King by special Commission, the Emperor's Commission to be Admiral also of his Navy, consisting of an 180 large Ships.

¹ Reign of King Henry VIII.

The Spanish Admiral at Hispaniola was so fearful of the same Thing, and of encreasing the Feuds that subsisted between Wilmot and Lillingston; that though he actually joined their Fleet with three Men of War, he took down his Flag. This want of Unanimity (as in Matrimony, when the Honey Moon is over) happens more frequently in long Voyages; and may be looked upon as one great Cause of the Failure of these Expeditions.

Another Thing to be strictly observed by those to whom the Conduct of a Conjunct Armament is given. Is (before they Sail) to be sure, that nothing is forgot, requisite for the Execution of the intended Enterprize; that the whole Apparatus is embarked. This may seem a trifling Consideration to those who
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are not aware how many Things are to be carried; the want perhaps of a very inconsiderable one, may impede and render ineffectual the Expedition. We could venture to affirm, the first Time any Person was put at the Head of a Conjunct Armament, if he was left to himself, he did not know hardly half the Necessaries that would be required, neither the Quantity nor the Quality. As the Nature of an Expedition is to execute with the utmost Dispatch, from whence it derives its Name, the Want of the least Thing, becomes a great Retardment; and the least Retardment often the Ruin of the Whole.

We have heard that at the Rochefort Expedition during the Preparations for the Landing, the Chevaux-de-Frise was inquired after, by those who had a right so to do; from whence it may be presumed, they were supposed to have been brought. But this was only a Supposition, a Thing only to be presumed; for no Chevaux-de-Frise was there. The Bellows was forgot at L'Orient, there was no Planks and Materials for mounting a Battery at Placentia. In the Guadalupe Expedition, it were found that the Troops which Commodore Walker brought, had no Powder; this however the Fleet furnished them with: Upon a closer Examination out of a thousand Flints, fifty were not fit for Use; they had neither Mortars, Bombs, Pick-axes, Spades, or any Thing convenient for a Siege. At Cadiz a Battery was erected against Matagorda Fort; but it proved a fruitless Labour; for the Guns upon firing sunk into the Sands, and they had no Materials or Conveniencies to prevent it; insomuch they were obliged to give over the Attempt. At Hispaniola General Venables was deficient in all Kind of Necessaries: one Mortar it is true he had, to throw some Shells. However here, and at Guadalupe the Want of Things were not to be attributed to any forgetfulness or neglect of the Officers to whose care they belonged, but to the willfulness or little fore-sight of such People by whose Authority, these Armaments were ordered.

History is apt to be silent upon these failings, unless they are as notorious as they were, at the two last mentioned Places. An Historian does not know how

to think, that through the Want of a Bellows or a few Planks an Expedition can miscarry. It is owing to this Kind of Silence, that these Neglects seldom come to Light. Wherefore it is more incumbent upon us in such a Work as this, to make it appear of how great Consequence it may be to the Success of an Expedition to be wanting even in minute Things. Where a Surprize is intended every Thing must be ready at Hand. For the Want of it, we have seen in this Treatise how much the above Expeditions suffered. We could venture to affirm much oftener than has come to Light. To avoid it, we must do, as they do in Poland; when we Travel, we must be sure to take all our Furniture with us; Custom perhaps may render this Method no more strange to us, than it did once to a certain Bishop, as he was journeying through that Country. For my Part (says the Prelate ^m) I think Poland the most free easy Country in the World, for let me go where I will, I seem ^{m Baron Polnitz's Travels.} always at home.

We will finish this Remark with the Words of Nicias ^{n Thucydides; Lib. VI.} the Athenian General, which were spoke a little before he set out upon the Sicilian Expedition. "We must provide (says he) every Thing ourselves, and not rely on others; as for that which we are told is ready for us at Egese, think it ready in Words, but not in Deed."

We will now mention another Thing very material to the Success of a Conjunct Expedition, and which behoves every Commander to sift narrowly; that is, the Skill of his Pilots; we give this rather as an Hint, it being very difficult to get them exactly to one's Mind. At the Time of hiring, for the sake of Wages and Reward, according to their own Accounts, there is nothing they dont know relating to their Trade; and it frequently happens when they arrive at the destined Object, they scarce know any Thing; then the Excuse is, Time makes great Alterations in Places, as well as in their Memory, or some such Sort of Comfort. The Way is to Question them as much as possible; and at the best, not have too great a Dependance on their Knowledge.

When General Venables arrived before the City of St. Domingo, the River Hine was the Place proposed to

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to Debark the Troops at; for which Purpose Part of the Squadron was detached under the Command of Vice-Admiral Goodson; who when he was out at Sea, declared he had no Pilots that could Conduct them to the Mouth of the River; and the Troops were forced to be debarked at another Part of the Island, by which they were obliged to March forty Miles through a thick woody Country without any Guide, to the great Distress of the Army; after four Days March they came to the Place where they might have been first landed. The Strength of the whole Country by this Time was drawn together, and quite recovered from their Surprize.

The Expedition against Dunkirk in 1694 miscarried chiefly through the Ignorance of the Pilots. It owed its failure in the following Year besides the Want of Unanimity among the Conductors in some Measure to this Cause also; notwithstanding Mr. Meesters was sent into Flanders to collect the most able, and got twenty-six Dutch Pilots; however they did not perform what was expected of them, to the great Detriment of the Service.

We find Commodore Walker upon the failure at Guadalupe, and upon the Complaint made against him; representing the Road to Guadalupe was excessively bad, and he found it impossible to procure Pilots, that is, such who could be of Service to him. The Ignorance of the Pilots prevented Commodore Ker in the Year 1707 from attempting to surprize Port-Lewis in Hispaniola. Four Years after this, the Service suffered extremely in the Quebec Expedition through the Ignorance of the Pilots. However we are told the Pilots here professed their Ignorance, and went against their Will. Whether it was so, or not, the Consequence of it, was the Loss of eight Transport Ships with near 900 Men. This ruined the Expedition, for it was afterwards unanimously resolved at a Council of War, that by Reason of the Ignorance of the Pilots, it was wholly impracticable to go up the River St. Lawrence with the Men of War and Transports as far as Quebec. This Resolution was taken after mature Deliberation, and strict Examination of every Pilot abroad, who all agreed in confessing their Ignorance;

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ance; and Colonel Vetch^o, who had declared himself the best Pilot for that River, now desired to be excused from meddling with Sea-Affairs; and said, he could not take so much as charge of a single Ship.

^o Campbel's
Nav. Hist. vol.
4. p. 165.

Thus then we see the great Consequence of having skillfull knowing Pilots. We should not have been so particular on this Head, did we not think it concerned (in these Conjunct Affairs) the General as much, if not more than the Admiral. The Art of Navigation is now so well known, that we would be understood to have these Remarks confined to particular Objects, not the navigating a Ship from one Quarter of the World to another. But when we are arrived at the destined Quarter of the World, to find out the destined Point of that Quarter: as the Mouth of the River Hine, the Road to Guadalupe, the Entrance of Port Lewis &c.; in this respect it concerns the General, as to the De-barkation of his Troops, of which there cannot well be a stronger Instance than that at Hispaniola. The Success of an Expedition frequently depending in landing the Troops on a particular Spot; therefore on the Pilot's Knowledge or Skill to bring the Fleet to a Station convenient for that Place.

We must take notice of another thing very necessary to be guarded against. That is, in Case of any first Success, which probably might put in the Soldiers power more strong Liquors than were necessary for their immediate Use, their over-Joy and Spirits or perhaps Over-Fatigue don't make them be too free with it; as is observed happened to some of our Troops at the Isle of Aix, notwithstanding the strictest Orders of the Commander against it. The same happened at Petit-Goave in 1697. where out of 900 Men, there were not more than 50 sober, by which means, the Business they went upon was not half performed. The Men got so excessively drunk at Cadiz in 1625, that if the Enemy had known, or had been vigilant enough to have taken the Advantage, few of them had returned home. As it was, it put their Officers into such a Fright, they were actually obliged to Re-imbark their Forces.

It would have been to very little Purpose, to Point out new Methods, or be refining on the old, for the
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more successfully carrying into Execution a Conjunct Expedition; should we pass over unobserved the principal Errors to which many Commanders, and some very Eminent have owed the Ruin of the Expeditions under their Command, to the great Loss of the Nation and their own Reputation. Errors, which for the generality, with a very little Prudence might be avoided; as the Instances we have collected together, concern immediately the Commanders, and chiefly of the Land-Forces; we could not but think it incumbent upon us, in a Work of this Sort, to throw them in the most striking Light; to render those who for the future shall be at the head of Conjunct Armaments more wary in their Conduct; by letting them see, how minute a thing might Ruin a great Enterprize, and when Ruin is the Consequence, of a small Error; how careful and even we ought to steer to avoid the Rocks, those who have gone before us have split upon: Though they appear little and trifling to the Eye, we have had proof sufficient to make us understand they are large enough to lay the foundation for a train of Evil: though they may seem easy to be avoided, the Number of Instances we have given, one would think Argues the Contrary; and many more we are satisfied might have been added, was not History apt to be silent in what appears Trivial. There are many other things destructive to an Expedition; that oftentimes can't well be avoided, some of which shall be related in their Place; what we have mentioned here comes immediately under the Cognizance of the Commanders; we thought it requisite so to do, as Wisdom and Prudence tells us before we seek new and more refined Paths, we should learn to tread without stumbling in the old: we ought to walk well, before we attempt to dance.

As we have seen the Advantages that attend a Conjunct Armament in its first Progress. We are to consider in what Manner we can best keep (as it were) alive, or push the same Advantages. The Transactions to be performed by a Conjunct Armament, are all comprehended in the word Expedition; the true meaning of which word, explains itself; being an Enterprize to be executed out of Hand, a Kind of Coup de Main, that admits of no Delay; as the least is the very Opposite

Opposite to the sense of the Word, so is it the most detrimental to the Success of the executive Part; which is to make an unexpected vigorous Effort, to lay waste, or overthrow, or cut off some Part of an Enemy's Country. To excell in which, we are to imitate, as near as may be, those who are Eminent in the Practice of Surgery. Many are concerned in the taking off a Limb. And when they have been all thorough Masters of their Art, there are frequent Instances of the Work done, before the Patient has been well a ware, it was begun. The Limb has been off, before he has had time to recover from his first Surprise; which the sight of so many Operators naturally stir up in him. In the same Manner should the Operations of a Conjunct Armament be put in Execution; the better half at least should be over, before the Surprise Subsides, of its having been begun. There is Reason to think this might be brought to pass, when they fall under the Conduct of those who are skilful in the Art of this Littoral War *. These Kind of Enterprizes are made for the Generality, on some Weak and thinly garrisoned Place; therefore little capable of making a sturdy Resistance.

As it is now fully ascertained, what is a material Advantage in the first Progress of a Conjunct Expedition; we are next to endeavour to investigate the ways and means by which we may the readier reap that Advantage. To do this, we will consider the Difference between this Amphibious War, and a Continental War; for it is to be observed, that though the War which is carried on by the Conjunct Armament is of an Amphibious Nature, it is a War on the Continent, with those against whom this Conjunct Armament is sent. It has already been shewn, that the chief Advantage attending a littoral Enterprize, is the surprising some unprepared weak Part; in opposition to this we
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* Ce que l'on peut dire des Surprises en général, est que celui qui a le plus d'esprit & de vûes, est celui qui embrasse mieux tout son Projet; qui prévoit mieux tous les petits Obstacles, qui pourroient faire manquer, ou retarder son Expedition, parce qu'il avoit tout prévu, & qui est le plus précautionné dans sa Retraite, lorsque son Entreprise est de nature à ne pouvoir rester dans le lieu, où il a exécuté son Projet. Mémoires de M. le Marquis de Fouquier. Tom. 3. Ch. 64.

are to set the Disadvantages, or the Advantages that attend the other Side.

Which are the Uncertainty of Winds and Tides, not always adapted to Man's Occasions; we may add to this the Dangers of the Sea. However we will suppose, the Winds and Tides are on our Side. Then there is the Difference, of the Debarkation, the Re-embarkation, the having little or no Cavalry, and not much Artillery, we mean on the Land. By this Calculation the Disadvantages a Conjunct Armament is subjected to, outweigh the Advantages; what seems to confirm this, is, the Defeats that have been the Consequences of these Enterprizes greatly out numbering the Successes. To make this War then so terrible as we have been describing it, and as successfull as we could wish it, and also to reap fully the great Advantage of surprizing some weak Part; we must lessen the Difficulties of the Debarkation and Re-embarkation; and make up the Insufficiencies, which are, want of Cavalry and want of Artillery. If indeed the Enterprize should be against some Place on the Edge of the Water; and the Shore so bold as to admit the Fleet or Part to come near enough to cover the Troops during their whole Operations; in such a Case there would be no want of Artillery; whether with regard to the Place, or even to fight a Battle on the Shore; as there can be no finer Train than that of a Fleet; we have seen two Instances of the Execution done by such a Train at the Battle of Musselburgh or Pinky ^p and Gravelin, where the French and Scotch Armies suffered extremely, by their being flanked by the English Fleet. We shall shew by and by that such Places which have been situated so as to be attacked by the Fleet, have always been taken and generally easily. However these are Situations that seldom happen, therefore to depend upon what will rarely come to pass, is confining the Operations of a Conjunct Armament too much to answer the Expence in fitting them out. We often should find, when the Troops landed, dared not to move from the Shore, that they might as well have not moved from their Ships. We call that a littoral War, when the Communication is kept open between the Fleet

^p See the Reigns
of Edward VI.
and Q. Mary.

Fleet and Army ; when the latter receives their whole Subsistence and Ammunition from the Former ; wherefore though they advance fifty Miles up the Country, in those Circumstances, it is still littoral ; in those Circumstances with regard to their Provisions, the two contending Armies are nearly upon an Equality ; a whole Country is a Magazine to the one, and a whole Navy to the other.

It is obvious then in a Conjunct Expedition, there are four Material Things, that require Consideration : and to be reduced (if possible) to a safer and more perfect System, to make the Chance equal, whether it succeeds or not ; much more to make an Enterprize of this sort so terrible as we have already mentioned.

However, what will lessen the Danger of a Debarkation, will likewise that of a Re-embarkation : as one in Point of System partakes in a good Measure of the Nature of the other. The Innovations we are now going to offer concern chiefly the Army. It is the Business of the Admiral at a Debarkation of Land Forces, to Point out the Time, to lend his Boats as well as every other thing in his Power ; and to be aiding and assisting as much as he can, and to cover the whole with his Fleet ; this latter Part sometimes he can do, and sometimes not. When he has performed the above Offices, he has done his Part. The Order and Manner in which the Troops are to gain the Shore, after they are in the Boats, often the most difficult and dangerous Part of the Service, is not an affair of the Admiral, and by the Methods usually pursued, it has not seemed, as if it had been an Affair of the General ; yet this Interval is the precise Time of all others the most critical. Our Word (Army,) is derived from armed Men ; the Latin Word (Exercitus) which answers it, is, from Men exercised. The Word Legion, is from chosen and pick't Men ; and our Word Regiment, from being under Rule and Order. Wherefore at our Debarkments, it is true, we Debark an Army, but we never yet debarked Regiments. At the very moment, the Army is required to be in Regiments most, it is least : and we must tell our Readers an Army may become a Mob, as much as a Multitude of Men without Arms ; the only difference

rence is, it will be an armed Mob. We are to steer clear of Confusion in all Military Operations; much more at a Time we expect to be engaged; still much more, when we expect to be engaged, in a disadvantageous Situation; a Situation where we have the Winds and Waves to Struggle with, the unsteady Motion of the Boat, and the Soldiers so jambed together, that the use of their Musket is rendered useless; in Boats too of different Sorts as well as Sizes, containing various Numbers, drawing several Depths of Water, consequently requiring different Time to gain the same Space; consequently almost sure of not arriving at the destined landing-Place together. What must be the End of this? Confusion horrid Confusion! And where the Fleet can't scower the Shores lined with an Enemy, absolute Destruction! and an End of the Expedition. Thus it happened at Brest, though the Ships covered the landing; but the Well-Boats stuck in the Mud, and became Marks to be shot at. The same might have happened at Rochfort, had the Attempt been made, and an Enemy there, that dared to have received them at their landing. For the Reader's Curiosity, we will here give a Description of an intended Debarkation of Troops, as it was told us by a Person who was an Eye Witness.

When the Ordinary Boats of the Fleet were filled with Soldiers, at an appointed Signal they were to set off together from the Place of Rendez-vous, and row to a Ship at a certain Distance, which was a Kind of second Rendez-vous or halting Place. By the Manner they arrived at this second Station, it may be judged in a good Measure how they were likely to do at the third, (had the Experiment been made) which was the Enemy's Shore. At this Place, after much struggling they all met; but like so many Strangers from different Countries, who had lost their Fellow-Travellers upon the Road: a Company of one Regiment was staring with Surprise at a Company of another that was got next to them; perhaps they had scarce ever seen each other before: the Right Left and Center trespassed upon one another; there was nothing to preserve Order, Distinction, Regularity. It is true, they all spoke one Tongue, nevertheless Confusion was great among them.

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The Boats were like Beasts jumbled together at a Fair, of all Sorts and Sizes : the Men with their Arms were confus'd as much, in the Boats ; and stood so many ways for room, they were in effect disarm'd. And had they been faced Right, they were so croud'd and situated, they could have made Use of none. We are to Understand further, the Boats freighted with Soldiers, were tow'd by other Boats. Thus then was the Army to have pass'd, in the face of the Enemy (if such there was) instead of like Regiments to a Battle, like Beasts in Ferry-Boats over some River to a Market, or rather Slaughter-House.

This was the Case of a certain Expedition : as we do not doubt, but it was that also of most others ; wherefore it would not be Right to Mention any particular Name, and by that means expose one in a more ridiculous Light, than the rest. We have just been told, there was no regularity in the performing this Part at Brest ; the same was observ'd of Carthage. We will proceed then, to ask the Question. Who shall we blame for such unwarrantable Management ? Not those by whose Authority the Expedition was order'd ; for that would be to blame the Master, because his Workmen and those to whose Profession it belonged, had not Art sufficient to perform his Business properly. Was the Admiral to be censur'd ? No, he was not accustomed to the form of Regiments ; for Sailors are not regimented ; he provided the Boats, such as he had, and left it to the Generals to stuff them, as they pleas'd, Nor were any particular Generals in Fault ; for at this Time, a Conjunct Expedition was a Novelty, from many Reasons, as well as its having been in small Repute. The Sound of large Armies and Continental Campaigns were still ringing in their ears : therefore they follow'd the Custom of their Country ; which was to follow the Steps of their Predecessors. Were we to tread out of the common Path. How do we know, but we should be shivering on a Quick-sand ? It was better then to go on quietly in Ancient Folly, then to run the risk of being wise ourselves ; it seems as if we thought so : or we should never so long have neglected to bring to perfection a War peculiarly advantageous to this Kingdom ; consequently not the Interest

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of any other Nation to endeavour to explore its Virtues. this is the chief Reason they still remain clouded, rude, and ill digested. For the generality, Nations are too wise to invent a Perillus's Bull for themselves. And we have been too foolish to contrive it for our Enemies. Where ever then the fault was, in the above mentioned Beastly Method of Debarking; the best excuse we can make, is to plead the Characteristick of the Nation: we are a People that know how to improve, but not invent. Which is the most Honourable, we do not venture to determine: as we are told-Wisdom dwells
q Prov. Ch. 3. v. 12. with Prudence, and finds out Knowledge of Witty^q Inventions.

To introduce any new Invention, is acting then contrary to the Temper of our Country; and to be an Innovator perhaps is to become Odious. This with middling understandings, is generally the Case: but with the more illuminated, we flatter ourselves it is otherwise.

It has already been said, it is one Business of the Admiral to make the best Disposition of his Fleet, for the Conveniency of debarking the Troops into the Boats, and to cover the landing. The latter Part is often not in his power to do, as the recent Instance at Rochfort manifested: the whole weight then rests upon the General; therefore to the General of the Army in these Circumstances we are now to direct the Discourse.



C H A P. III.

THE Knowledge and Skill of his Profession, which a private Soldier acquires by constant Practice, and which often is not much ; ought not by any Body to be lessened or taken away ; much less by his General who should inculcate in him the opposite Doctrine : still much less when the Soldier is required to exert that Knowledge and Skill most ; the only time perhaps he thinks, he has not in learning it, laboured in vain ; when it shall appear obvious to his understanding though ever so slender, that his Safety depended wholly upon it ; when the Practice of Parade Exercise which for many Years he had undergone, showed itself in its full Utility. At such a Crisis as this, to tye down the Arms of a Soldier, when they ought to be most at Liberty ; to annihilate his whole Regimental Exercise, and cloud and confound at once all his Military Ideas, of Regimental Order, Distinction, and Regularity, by sticking him promiscuously in the above Manner in some crowded Boat ; and waisting him from the Ship to the Shore, (over as it were, the River Styx,) should the Fleet be not able to protect him, and should an Enemy be waiting in good Order to receive him ; the Commander who does this, makes a Waterman or Bargeman of the Soldier, and no General of himself. It may be said of the Soldier that is incapacitated from making Use of his Arms ; in him the Regimental Exercise is at an End ; which says Vegece ^r is the only Difference between a Soldier and ^r Liv. 2. C. 23. a Peasant ; had he meant a Soldier occupied on the Water, he probably might have said, a Waterman. Montecuculi too, (the Modern Vegece) tells us, that in so great an Affair as a Battle ; we are to Use much Prudence with much Valor. To attack an Enemy on the Shore, with Soldiers in the Situation as above described ; is certainly making Use of a great Deal of Valor, but a very little Prudence, when the latter is as

much the Characteristick of a General as the former. Montecuculi immediately after speaks a saying of Galas
 “ that it was a foolish Ambition to endeavour to acquire at the expence of the Blood of others, the
 “ Reputation of being brave ” s.

s Memoir. de
 Montecuculli.
 Lib. VI. Art. 2.

We have seen then in how ridiculous a Light the General appears, who thus degrades his high Office, by attempting to Land a Division of an Army on an hostile Shore in the face of an Enemy like Sailors on a Quay, or a Company of Watermen on a Wharff. The present Business is to shew in what Manner this Division may be debarked in the face of an Enemy, without breaking their Rule and Order, without derogating the least from the Word Regiment; in short how they may be landed like Regulars instead of Irregulars, like Soldiers instead of Sailors.

Every Soldier that knows his Business, knows also that a Regiment is drawn up three deep and divided into two Wings, or four grand Divisions, which are divided into eight Subdivisions, which are divided again into sixteen Platoons or lesser Divisions, with the Company of Grenadiers equally disposed on the Flanks making a Platoon on each. The Regiment thus drawn out into eighteen Platoons, is told off into three firings, being six Platoons in each. By which they can Fire, by Wings, Firings, Grand Divisions, Subdivisions, or Platoons: and are ready for any Evolution that the Nature of any Action can require. Therefore the whole Mistery at once not to drown a poor Soldier's Understanding, as soon as he is put in a Boat; is to let that Boat be a Subdivision Boat, which is to be calculated to carry a Subdivision; as the Platoon Boat would be too small and trifling, therefore too numerous. By this Method we will show, how his whole Exercise will become more obvious to him, and plain upon the Water than upon the Land; which (if possible) should be done, to Balance the Confusion, or rather the unaccustomed Motion the Winds and Waves will naturally put him in; as well as to make the Affair more equal between him and his Enemy, who stands firm on the Shore. Our Design is to Debark three Regiments at a Time, by which we may form an Idea how a Landing may be made with ten Times that Number.

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The Reason why a Regiment is so called, has been already shown. One Regiment does not differ from another in any Part of their Exercise; they are all under the same Rule, Form, and Order; we are speaking of the Infantry. The only Distinction then between one Regiment and another, is their different Cloathing, being differently laced or coloured; and there needs no greater Distinction than this. However though this is the Distinction between one Regiment and another; the Cloathing of one intire Regiment is the same; under one Rule, Form, and Order; and for the same Reason as such a Number of Men under one Rule, Form, and Order, are called a Regiment; so their Cloathing under one Rule, Form, and Order, is called a Uniform or Regimental. And these Words may be applied with as much Propriety to any other thing regulated under a particular Form and Order, as well as to a Body of Men or suits of Cloaths.

To a Regiment then and Regimental, a Soldier has been accustomed; in short they may be said to be the Effence of him, for he knows for the generality little of any thing else. Wherefore though we are going to put him on the Water, we will not take him out of his Element. We will not rob him the least of his Military Knowledge, perhaps (till he has been on the Enemy's Shore) the only Wealth about him.

To do this, we must Debark him from the Ship into a Regimental Boat; we must Regiment the Boats; that is, put them under Rule, Form, and Order. As we intend each Boat to carry a Subdivision, there will be to each Regiment for the eight Subdivisions as many Boats, besides two for the Grenadiers. Ten Boats to a Regiment, will give us thirty to our three Regiments. Those for the Grenadiers are not Subdivision, but Platoon Boats; and will be one on the Flank of each Regiment. We have now formed our Boats, into three separate Bodies; to throw them into as many Regiments, we must give to each a different Regimental, or Colouring. The ten upon the Right, shall be Blue, the ten upon the left, Red, the ten in the Center, White. As White is the most distinguishable Color, being placed in the Center, makes the Distinction of the whole the greater. By this Method nothing but

Winds and Weather too bad to make a debarkation can make the Regiments interfere with one another. The Blue sees directly they have no Business among the White or Red; as the White and Red do among the Blue, or one another. It is usual as soon as a Regiment have got their Regimentals, to consider next of their Regimental Exercise. To this Purpose, it has been customary in the Army, to have the Regiments make the finer Appearance and perform their Firings with more exactness, and freer from mistakes and confusion, to give every Officer that Commands a Platoon, a Card; on which is specified what Platoon it is, of what Subdivision, and Grandivision it makes a Part; of what Firing it is, whether first, second, or third; and in these several Divisions when it is its turn to give Fire, with some few more Remarks. This Card then, is the Officer's Book of Military Knowledge for the Day; which as soon as he is placed at the Head of his Platoon, he hums over to himself; 'till he has got it by heart; then he deals it out by Bits, (like the Oracles of Sibyl) to his Command.

This is the Custom on the Land of a Regiment that is to go through their Firing (which may be called the Essence of their Exercise.) We shall now shew how to make the Soldiers on the Water in their Firings wiser and more knowing, without any Book in their Hands, than their Officers are with it on the Land. When this is the Case with the common Men, to how great a pitch of Wisdom and Military Knowledge their Commanders may arrive, we must leave the Reader to guess.

The three Regiments of Boats have now got their Regimentals, or Colourings, therefore cannot Trespass upon one another: The next Thing to take Care of is, that the Boats of each Regiment, stand in their proper Places, as clear of one another, and as free from Confusion, as the different Regiments do with Regard to one another: That a Subdivision Boat upon the Right may not get in the Center or Left of the Regiment; nor one of the Left in the Right, and so of the Rest. This is as easy to be avoided as it is for a Blue Boat to Steer clear of the Red or White, and *vice versa*. For instead of the Card which the Officer has upon Land
to

to guide him, and which there may be very useful; here, he has his whole Lesson wrote in large spreading Characters on the Sides of the Boat, both inside and outside. As for Instance, upon the Subdivision-Boat on the Right; on the Center of the Side, is wrote (first right Hand Subdivision, such a Fire) opposite the right Platoon, (second Platoon, such a Fire,) upon the Left, third Platoon and so on. By this Method every private Man as well as his Officer has his Lesson constantly before his Eyes, and as these Boats are large they give Room for many Particulars of their Exercise to be inserted; consequently here can be no Confusion, for should the seventh Subdivision-Boat get between the second and third, or fourth and fifth, the Mistake will appear by the Writing on the Sides of the other Boats, as Easy as a Blue Boat perceives it is got among the Red, and the Mistake can be as easily rectified. For here they have this double Advantage; which is, the Soldier as well as Officer, not only can read his own Lesson but any of his Neighbour's too, wherever he can throw his Eye; which is a very great Consideration when there is any Thing tending towards Confusion.

For this Purpose the same is wrote on the outside, as is on the inside; and in the Kind of large Letter a Soldier is most used to; such as he sees, when he finds himself Dry and Money in his Pocket, (good Drink) wrote on a Sign; which for the generality though he is ever so great a Blockhead, he will read the whole length of a Street. (Plate 2. Fig. 1. a.)

Thus then we have thrown into a Form, and Order the most intelligible for a Soldier, a Number of Boats sufficient to Debark three Regiments; when we want more it is only giving other Colours, as Green, Yellow, Purple; it is only regimenting more Boats.

We are now to say something relating to the fashion of the Boat, which as it is a mechanical Business, don't fall to us to speak determinately; but to give only a Kind of general Idea, of what we are very well assured might be accomplished; notwithstanding the thousand Difficulties we are certain will be started by those who are lovers of plodding in the old Way; who have Geniusses like that of a Mill Horse; whose little
Propen-

Propensity to go beyond his String, or out of the Circle, serves only to discover his Blindness.

In the Boat now to be contrived, two Things are principally to be considered; we are to remember those that are to fill it, are much more accustomed to the Land than the Water; therefore to have it resemble as much as possible the Land, it must be made so as to be as steady as possible; consequently must have a flat and broad Bottom. And whoever has been upon the Water ever so little rough in a Boat, must know, that he is much firmer when he sits, than when he stands; wherefore we must make the Soldier to sit down; by which he obtains one of the Things principally to be considered, steadiness; and in the Method we must contrive for him to sit, we hope he will obtain the other; which is, even upon the Water not to loose the Use of his Musket; that every Soldier in the Boat may in this Respect be a Match for his Enemy out of it. Why it is not as easy for a Soldier to Fire sitting as well as kneeling, we have never yet heard any Reason; however we will give a Reason, why it may be supposed to be easier. Among the Winter Sportsmen we see often on a River, sitting in the rear of their Boat and in that Position shoot flying as their Game rises and as the Boat passes: and if a Sportsman in this Situation can kill so small and swift a Bird as a Snipe upon the Wing, which is frequently done; there can be no Reason to imagine why a Soldier may not hit a Line of Men on a Shore, which instead of a swift flying Snipe is like a standing Wall.

This however we presume may be done; therefore we are to contrive to put it in the Power of every Soldier in the Boat to do it. We will suppose fourteen half Files to every Platoon, which will make forty-two Men to each, consequently eighty-four, besides the Officers to every Subdivision-Boat; which with twenty-four Rowers and a few Men to a two pounder Gun at each End and one at the Rudder will make the whole Number, about one hundred and thirteen Men. Which we will dispose in the following Manner: In the Center of the Boat, we place eight Rowers, four on each Side; in the Front and

Rear

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Rear of these Center Rowers, a Platoon of ten half Files in each. Which is the Subdivision, thus divided: on the exterior Flank of these two Platoons, which sit as we shall presently show with their side Faces to the Ends of the Boat; on each of these Flanks are eight more Rowers, disposed in the same Manner as those in the Center. One Man sits at the Rudder, and a few Artillery Men, or at least Men we so call at each Gun. By this Disposition we shall show, how every Subdivision-Boat may be said to contain a little compleat Army within itself, which (if possible) should be; as frequently by the Violence of Winds and Waves, one of these Boats may be incapacitated from receiving any Assistance from the Rest, therefore should have every Thing intire as may be within itself. An Army is composed of Regulars and Irregulars; by the Use of the latter, the former remain 'till the Time of Battle quiet and undisturbed; which are the Cavalry, Infantry, and Artillery. Those we have already mentioned then in the Subdivision-Boat may be called the Regular Part of this Army in Miniature; who are not to move out of their Places 'till the Time of Action: the twenty half Files or two Platoons are the Infantry, the two Guns the Artillery; the Commanding Officer of the Subdivision stands in the Center and is the General; and when they pass along, the Man that Steers, is the Guide. As we have seen the Regulars, we are to observe that an Army is never compleat without Irregulars; their Use have been always found so great, that the Custom of having them seems to have commenced almost from the first Commencement of an Army; a Custom (to be sure from its Utility) which has never been broke. The Greeks had their Peltati and Velites, the Romans had too their Velites, their Fundators and Baleares; the Carthaginians their swift-footed Numidians; the Turks have their Tartars, and other Eastern Nations their wild Arabs; our modern Europeans have their Hussars, Hunters, Rangers, and Light Horse; and the American Armies the scalping Indians. By the Help of these Irregulars, these Exploratores, that are ever (we may say) on the Watch and on the Wing, the grand Army sleeps secure; not to be ruffled (in the Marine Language) by every

t Memoires de
Mont. Lib. J.
Ch. 2.

every squal of Wind. Now these Irregulars are not of more Service to a great Army, than we shall find them presently to our Subdivision-Boat. By which we shall verify the Words of Montecuculi, ^t that a Company may be called a little Army, as well as an Army a great Company. It is the Custom in the British Army to draw their Men in the Battallions up three deep. Agreeable then to this Custom we have drawn them up three deep in the Boats: the two parts of the Boat, the Platoons cover, are raised a little higher than the rest of the Floor of the Boat; so that when the Front and Rear Rank of the Platoons sit down easy on the Edge of this raised Part, there may be space enough between them to have about eight Inches breadth of the whole length of the raised Part, about eight or ten Inches higher than the other raised Part, which will be a little Bench or Step for the Center Rank to sit upon: by this Method as in the Degrees of a Theatre they overlook those before them. The Parts of the Boat where the Front and Rear Ranks, as they sit, rest their Feet on, may be sunk a few Inches: this is the Position of the Platoons whilst the Boat is out of Reach of the Enemy. The Front and Center Ranks of all the Platoons of every Regiment must sit one Way, with either their right or left Side to the Prow of the Boat; and the Rear Rank of the Whole when sitting will consequently be the Reverse; but when they draw near the Shore or Enemy, they stand up, and face with the rest; by which Means they will be about as much higher than the Center Rank, as they are then the Front, consequently may all Fire together on the Water as well as on Land. (Fig. b.) before they are ordered to make ready to Fire; the Front and Rear Ranks rest the Buts of their Muskets on the Floor of the Boat, the Center-Rank on the Floor the Front sits upon; when they are to make ready to Fire, they then rest them on their Knee, and the Rear stand up with their Arms recovered, as they do on Land. But when the Rear Rank stand and are not in their firing Position, they then are shouldered.

Should the Platoons after they have given Fire, be ordered to load in the Boats, the whole Platoons stand up, the Front and Rear Rank move a Step to the Front and Rear to give themselves and Center Rank liberty

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liberty to load ; which when done, the whole as on the Land come down to their Firing Position again, unless they are ordered to Debark ; which we are now to show how is to be done.

The Platoons according to this Disposition in the Subdivision-Boats contain only ten Half-Files or thirty Men in each ; yet their Original Number was fourteen Half-Files. There remain then four Half-Files to each Platoon to be accounted for ; which we do in the following Manner : As soon as a Subdivision is paraded in the Ship to be debarked into the Boat ; the Officer who Commands it, is to be very careful in picking out twenty-four the most ingenious Men of his Subdivision, especially those who have been most used to the Water ; these twenty-four Men he forms into eight Half-Files, and then disposes three on each Exterieur Flank of his Subdivision, with also a clever Serjeant on each Flank to Command them, and one Half-File on the Center Flank of each Platoon. Whilst they remain in the Ship, or upon the Land, they are united and make a Part of the Subdivision : but during the whole Time they are in the Boats, or preparing to get in, they are to act the Part of Irregulars, which is to do all extraordinary Offices, that can be required during the whole Time, they are concerned with the Boats ; for which Reason it is plain to be perceived they must be the Men of the most Ingenuity.

As soon then as the Boat is ready, the three Divisions of Rowers enter it and seat themselves, then the Person who guides the rudder, with the Artillery Men, or those who have the direction of the two Guns, follow. After these, the two Serjeants with their Irregulars March into it, nine to the Front, and as many to the Rear ; their proper Place being between the Exterior Divisions of Rowers. When all these People are in the Boat, each in his Station, they get their Apparatus in perfect Readiness as fast as they can ; then the Irregulars unfurl the Sails if the Wind permits, as there is to be one in the Center and towards each end of the Boat, and prepare every thing for the Accommodation of the two Platoons : when the Commanding Officer of the Subdivision sees every thing is done to his Mind ; he enters the Boat with his Subdivision, who

who immediately take their Seats, telling them at the same time which way they are to face. When they are all settled, a sensible Corporal with the two Center half files of the Subdivision finishes the Debarkation from the Ship into the Boat ; by entering with his six Irregulars, and taking his Station in the Interval between the Center Rowers. The Boat has now got its full Freight ; before we give a description of the Use of the Irregulars, or the Subdivision Boats Hussars ; we must be a little more particular in mentioning the Form and make of the Boat. The exact Dimensions we don't pretend to say ; our whole Aim in this respect is only to give a general Idea of the System, we are upon. The Sides of the Boats are to be as high as possible, so as not to hinder the Front Rank, as they sit, from firing over it ; consequently may be about as high as their Mouths whilst they are in that Position, for the higher they are, the more they cover the Men. Those Parts of the Sides which are Opposite to the Platoons, let up and down ; and are fastened by Buttons at each End, and by strong hinges at bottom, about eight Inches from the top Edge when buttoned up, to compleat the Sides of the Boat ; when unbuttoned these whole Parts fall back outwards, which will lower those Parts of the Sides by eight Inches, and make at the same time a Kind of Step, eight Inches broad ; as they are at each End supported by a strong Chain fastened to the top of the Boat, to prevent them falling down close to the outside of the Boat. By this Method they form a step for the two Platoons to march out of the Boat in full Front. When the Front Rank marches out, the Rear Rank may step a step Bakwards to balance a little the Boat. The length of the Boat we imagine will be about sixty-six Feet ; allowing to the twenty half-Files of Soldiers, as they sit, thirty Feet ; being one Foot and an half to each half-File ; and thirty Feet to the Rowers, being two Feet and an half to every Rower : there remain now six Feet, three beyond each Exterior Division of Rowers, for the Pilot, and Artillery Men ; which (as we shall show presently) we imagine will be sufficient.

We

We are now to consider the Breadth of the Boat ; (Fig. c.) which, allowing seven Feet to the Platoons as they sit, & four Feet between them and the sides of the Boat in front and rear, will be fifteen Feet. We will allow for every two Rowers and their Oars the same room as is allowed to the three Soldiers or half file : by this Calculation and Disposition there will be an Interval of four Feet round the Platoons, and eight Feet in the Center between the Rowers ; consequently there will be sufficient space for any one to pass from one end of the Boat to the other ; notwithstanding the Boat may shape inwards a little towards the Ends ; which was what we intended.

As the Sail in the three Intervals of the Boat must be made of Sail Cloth, they will be all of one Color ; but the Streamer at the top of every Mast-head must be of the same Color as the Boat. Nor would it be amiss to have the figure and first letter of the Platoon and Subdivision it belonged to, inserted in some other Color on each Side of the Streamer : because ever now and then when the Water was rough, it would so happen, that those in one Boat might not be able hardly to see the sides of another, much more to read what was wrote on those Sides, and the Sails might not always be spread. All these Precautions tend to keep us free from Confusion : nor can there be too many, when we consider the Element we are upon, and the critical Situation of the Business in Hand.

We are to speak next of the Gun at each End, which is a two or three Pounder Swivel-Gun. The meaning of these Guns being only to protect the particular Boat they belong to ; consequently will never Fire but against the Enemy, and when not far off ; small Guns will answer this End very well, and will be of little Weight, therefore convenient and easily managed. They must be fixed so as to be moved against any Object streight before them or upon the Right or Left ; by which they Command a very large Semi-Circle. The Contrivance to do this, will be a piece of Mechanism, not to be harangued upon here. As the first Debarkation that is made upon an Enemy's Shore is esteemed a Post of Danger, so, is it likewise a Post of Honor ; and as such, has been claimed by the Grenadiers.

nadiers. However though the Grenadiers may insist upon this, we do not imagine (to have it the more honourable) they will insist upon having it the more dangerous ; therefore though they alone make the first Debarkation, it may be supposed, the Rule, Form, and Order we have thrown the Boats in for the greater Utility, Conveniency and Safety of a Regiment, will be equally as agreeable to Grenadiers as Hat-men ; and that there can be no such particular Virtue in a Cap as to balance the Danger of going against an Enemy like a Mob, instead of like a Regiment. Wherefore, though the Boats should be first filled with Grenadiers, we form them into the same Order as a Regiment consisting of Hat-men and Grenadiers ; which according to the present Practice is divided into eighteen Platoons ; and as eight Subdivision-Boats contain only sixteen, we must have two Platoon-Boats one upon each Flank of a Regiment, to answer the Company of Grenadiers disposed in the same Manner upon the Flanks of the Regiment. As the Company of Grenadiers to a Regiment are designed often to do extraordinary Works ; so these Platoon-Boats shall upon particular Occasions answer the same end. To this Purpose we shall place the Platoon of ten half Files exactly in the Center of the Boat ; (Fig. d.) the four and twenty Rowers, and four and twenty Irregulars instead of being disposed in three Divisions shall be equally divided upon the right and left of the Platoon ; by this Method, the Platoon-Boat will have as many Rowers and Irregulars as the Subdivision Boat, with a Platoon less ; therefore the Boat will be fifteen Feet shorter, and lighter, besides by as much as is the Weight of thirty Men with their Officers ; consequently having at the same Time the same Number of Rowers and Irregulars, they will be more adroit at every Kind of Expeditious Movement, for which Reason the Platoon-Boats now and then may be detached from the rest, when more haste is required, or perhaps to go round some Elbow ; or to reconnoitre, or to come upon the Back of some Place ; we are also to observe, as the Boats are shorter, they will be able to turn in narrower Waters, and as they are lighter perhaps in shallower : the six Platoon-Boats to the three Regiments differ in nothing else from the Subdivision-Boats ;
and

and carry altogether with the Officers about three hundred and thirty Soldiers. As this Platoon will be very large, it would be proper to give it two commissioned Officers. By this Means at the same time we are preserving the exact Order and Form of a Regiment, by the help of two Platoon Boats ; we reap also another very considerable Advantage. By these Regulations then, it cannot be said, that as soon as we put the Soldier into a Boat, we put him out of his Element ; he is more in it on the Water, than on the Land. On the former the Officer may shut his Book of Laws ; they are no longer of use ; during the whole time he is on the Water, he and his Platoon have a Table of Military Statutes, wrote in large legible Characters, continually before their Eyes. It is not here as on Land, here is no fear of our Memory deceiving us ; every private Soldier can see his Regimental Exercise as often as he pleases, we mean what is most Essential. It is all made plain and intelligible to the most slender Capacity.

We are now to relate the great Use of the twenty four Soldiers we call Irregulars. Of the regular Part of our little Army a description has been given ; however it is to be observed, that was it not for the Irregulars presently to be mentioned, there would be no Part of the Forces contained in a Subdivision or Platoon-Boat, could claim any Pretensions to the denomination of Regulars. As the Fable makes the Mastiff Dog to say, if it was not for Curs, there would be no Mastiff. The Regulars then are the Mastiff or solid Part of our little Army, in comparison to our Irregulars ; as much as the Roman Armati were to their Velites. Wherefore were the Regulars, or the Men which compose the two Platoons, upon every slight Occasion under a Necessity of moving out of their seats to different Places in the Boat ; they would become Irregulars and would cause a perpetual Motion and Confusion ; should the Rowers quit their seats, the Boat would be retarded ; should the Man at the Rudder, it has no one to guide it ; should the Artillery Men, their Apparatus for their Guns is broke in upon ; by all which it is easy to perceive that these several degrees of People which make the Regular Part of our little Army, must remain

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quiet

quiet and undisturbed, to do the Regular and Ordinary Duties ; as all the Irregular and Extraordinary must be done by Men appointed for that Purpose, which are those we call Irregulars, and which Services we are now to shew.

The Troops which compose the Irregulars we already know. As soon as the Order is given to separate the Boat from the Ship to be launched on the Water ; the Irregulars are to be separated from their Subdivisions, that they may be ready to give their Assistance. Those whose Stations are towards the Guns, are the Van and Rear Guard of the Boat : The Irregulars in the Center are to support, either of them that require it. If a Rower, an Artillery Man, should by any Accident be killed, one of the Irregulars immediately supplies his Place ; they have also the Direction of the three Sails. Wherefore towards each Flank more are required, than in the Center. As the Irregulars prepare the Boat for the Platoons to enter ; so when they come to the Shore, they do likewise for the Platoons to get out of it. Some are to assist (if required) with Poles to push the Boat in such a Manner, that the Broadside may front the Shore ; whilst others are to unbutton the Parts of the Edge which fall down. When the Broadside of the Boat is brought tolerably well round towards the Shore, the Irregulars are the first to Land ; some of whom are to have Poles, which besides their iron Point, have also an Hook turning upwards, to grapple the Sides of the Boat, and hold it firm and proper for the Debarkment of the Platoons ; there must be also Chains at each End of the Boat for them to pull by, and facilitate this Work the better. (Fig. e.) the Irregulars whilst employed in these Offices are to sling their Muskets over their Backs. During this Business the Platoons and Artillery Men in the Boat put themselves in their firing Position, by which they protect the Irregulars. When every Thing is ready the Platoons march out in full Front ; we have seen how easy it was to separate the Irregulars from the Flanks of the Platoons in the Ship : Nor is there any Reason to imagine (when on Land) it will be more difficult for them to join their respective Flanks again, which they are to do immediately :

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ately: The two Platoons which make the Subdivision then incline inwards 'till they join, and as they will have had every Thing relating to what Division and Fire they make a Part, before their Eyes during their whole Passage from the Ship to the Shore; it cannot well happen otherwise but they will be in as good and as intelligent Order, as when they are dressed upon a Parade. In this Manner a Debarkation of a Subdivision and Platoon-Boat is performed: And as the two Platoons of the former, as soon as ever they are on the Land incline to each other 'till they form one Body, which is a Subdivision: So when a whole Regiment is debarked, do the several Subdivisions and Platoons of Grenadiers which compose it, incline to the Center Division, 'till they all join, and form Battalion. Several Regiments incline in the same Manner to form a Brigade, or Wing. The re-embarkation from the Land into the Boat is performed in much the same Manner as the debarkation out of it. The sides of the Boats may be unbuttoned by the Rowers; the Corporal with his six Irregulars only are to be assisting in holding the Boat properly; the other Irregulars with the Commanding Officers form the Rear Guard, and face to the Country, whilst the youngest Officer with the Platoons retreats into the Boat. As soon as they are seated, they are to put themselves in their firing Position to defend the Irregulars, which with their Serjeants next are to enter, having a particular Care, not to get into the Boat opposite the Front of the Platoons, so as to obstruct their Fire. Wherefore every Man of the Irregulars, is to enter where he sees the fairest opening, whether it is between the Rowers or at the other Side of the Boat opposite the Rear of the Platoons.

When entered they face immediately to the Country to protect the Officer, Corporal, and six Irregulars, which are under the Necessity of entering last the Boat, because they hold during the re-embarkation the Boat. The Reason for the Commanding Officer of the Boat continuing on Land after the Platoons are re-embarked, is because it is then become the post of Honour, as well as his Duty to see his whole Command safe out of the Enemy's Country, before he quits it himself.

By these Methods the Regulars and Irregulars of every Boat in their debarkation and re-embarkation mutually defend each other. In some Places it might happen that the long Side of a Boat could not be brought up to the Shore; perhaps with much difficulty the End of it could be brought in a Manner proper for the debarkation. In such a Situation the Difference will be, the whole must march out by half Files, beginning as before with the Irregulars; but the Regulars and Irregulars in this Case, during the Act of landing or re-embarking having so narrow a Front, are not well disposed mutually to defend each other, as in the last mentioned Method; wherefore this is not so eligible, consequently to be avoided, if possible. However should this happen to one Boat; perhaps it might not to those which are next it; and then they will in some Degree defend it. The Irregulars whilst they are in the Boat are to place their Arms as well as themselves, wherever it is most convenient; and may stand, sit, or lye down, unless otherwise ordered; but they are not to break in upon one another's Divisions, unless it is to support some Part that requires it. They are all under the Command of the eldest Officer of the Boat, besides their own particular Officers. When they are to Fire, every one must do it as he can best, taking Care not to hurt his own People; they must level the muzzle of their Firelocks over and between the Rowers, and the Rowers and Gun.

We have already said, we do not pretend to speak in a determinate Manner with regard to the Dimensions of the Boat. But should the Boat remain, as here described; we are not sure whether sometimes at a re-embarkation, when Order and Form in the Boat was not so very necessary, it might not hold three Platoons instead of two; every Man of the third Platoon standing as he can, like Irregulars: This would quicken a re-embarkation very much. We are to observe again, that should the Boat be thought too long, it may be shortened, by the whole length of a Platoon, or fifteen Feet. To do this, the Platoons must be drawn up four Deep in the Boat; the Difference will be, when they Fire, the two Rear Ranks will stand as they do on Land; which may be done here, where the two
Front

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Front Ranks sit. This shortens the Platoons by six half Files or nine Feet. And should we take from every remaining half File two Inches, and three Inches from every two Rowers, and four Inches from each Gun; which we believe might be done, without too much crowding the Men, we get six feet more, which with the above nine make fifteen. The Boat now will be only fifty one Feet long instead of sixty-six: However for many Reasons the Boat thus contracted is not so convenient, as when it has its full length, especially at a re-embarkation. When this is done, the Seats of the Front Ranks of the Platoons must be brought a little forwarder. The Platoon-Boats must be altered in Proportion to the Subdivision-Boats.

We will finish our Platoon and Subdivision-Boat with a Description of two Boats contrived by Charles the XIIth King of Sweden, with one of which he passed the River Duna in 1701. The King of Sweden (says Mr. Voltaire) had caused large Boats of a new Invention to be built; the Sides of which being higher than the common Fashion, could be pulled up and down like Draw bridges; when they were up, they covered the Troops which they carried; and when they were down, they served instead of a Bridge for their disembarkation.

Charles the XIIth King of Sweden, (says Mr. Fordard ^u) one of the greatest Captains of our Age, was ^{u Comment on Polybius. Tom. IV. page 51, Amsterdam Edit.} beyond expression excellent in passing Rivers. He never passed but on Floats; which were made with such Art, that the Soldiers were ranged in Order of Battle upon them, ten deep, and even with Cannon. These Floats were composed of several Beds of Timber laid longways, and likewise across very close together, and well fastened to each other. That which he made in 1718 to pass the Swinsund at Frederick-Hall may pass for the most perfect; the Planks were squared on four or five Beds and surrounded with a Border; it carried two twenty-four Pounders and five hundred Men.

We have mentioned these two Instances of Charles XIIth, not to have them imitated, as his Boats were not portable: Besides the Difference of the Motions of a Boat on a River and the Sea; but to shew the Necessity he thought there was (if possible) to pass his

Army in Order of Battle over Waters, even with Cannon. However though his were four and twenty Pounders and ours only two or three ; we do not intend to be behind his Majesty in that Respect, which the following Chapter will shew.

CHAPTER IV.

THE Armies in the four Quarters of the World are formed into Regiments, and are composed of Regulars and Irregulars. In this our littoral War then, as yet we have not swerved from the Custom of the known World. We have regimented our Boats and filled them with Regulars and Irregulars. However we must carry the Imitation farther. The Irregulars we have given, are only to be employed about the little Army contained in their own Boat. But as great Armies have several whole Regiments of Irregulars ; so must great Navies too ; at least we are very well assured, that when the Military compose a large Part of these Navies, they will be of our Opinion. And as the Irregulars of a great Army are to scower the Inclosures, Roughs, Woods, Bogs, Mountains, and Rocks, and in short all Places impassable for heavy armed Troops ; so are the Irregulars we are going to contrive for a large Fleet, to scower in like Manner Rivers, Bays, Shoal-Waters, Shallows, Creeks, as well as every other Place on the Water, where the heavy armed Vessel can't fail. The Fox-Hunter will tell us, no Pack is perfect without their Tarriers : And this is as applicable to the Fleet as the Army, we mean in this littoral War. For where is this War made ? The Latin Word *Littus* explains it, which signifies a Shore. What is the Purport then of a thousand great Guns of a Fleet, that can't approach perhaps within two Leagues of the Seat of War ; where our Musketry are landed ; for that is the proper Word, when they have not a single great Cannon to protect them against an
Enemy

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Enemy perhaps at their first landing more numerous and compleat with Musketry, Cavalry and Artillery. However, should we (as we ought) surprize the Coast; this might not be the Case, with those that make the first Debarkation; but the probability is greater, that it will with those who compose the last Re-embarkment; of which we have had a very recent and fatal Instance. What signifies our distant Thunder, what Influence can it have more than any other empty Sound? Besides the many in this Book, we have had two late Examples, to tell us, that something must be invented to obviate the Difficulties of both a debarkment and re-embarkment in Shoal-Water. The Necessity is so urging and cogent, we shall harangue upon it no longer; but proceed immediately to the Invention: The Lives of our Brother Soldiers and Countrymen, in a Treatise of this Kind, seem to demand it of us: Nor can the Art of this Sort of War be brought to any perfection without it.

What we are to invent then, is something to act in the Stile of an Irregular or Huffar; and as it is for a Conjunct Armament, it must act in a double Capacity; that it may, when required, be aiding and assisting to either Fleet, or Army, or both; either on the Water or Land. The Frigate answers this to a Fleet out at Sea; but to a small Degree to a Fleet employed in a littoral Enterprize which is where we mean; and to scarce any Degree at all to the Army on Land that co-operates with the Fleet.

We have invented and regimented two Sort of Flat-bottomed Boats, the largest of which should be made, not to draw more than three feet Water, when fully freighted; and the Platoon Boat, should not (if possible) draw so much by a Foot and half. We shall now invent two other Kinds of Boats entirely for Artillery; and as they are to co-operate with the Subdivision and Platoon-Boats, they must be made not to draw more Water; that they may answer the intended Use, which is, to be their constant Bulwark and Defence, therefore to be their inseparable Attendance, in all Places where Troops may be landed, or re-embarked. To make them capable of acting in as many Capacities as possible; the Guns they carry, must be so contrived and adapted, as to be ready for a

field Fight, a Siege, either of a Town or Fort, and also to attack a Battery up a River; as well as our new invented Method of River Canonading; which when brought to perfection, we believe, will prove the most formidable of all Canonading.

The Subdivision and Platoon-Boats were calculated entirely to convey the Troops. The Boat we are now to invent, is a Boat (we may say) of War; Part of whose Business is to Convey the Transport Boats; in the same Manner as a Man of War is a Convey to a Transport-Ship. And why a Boat full of Men; should not be protected as well as a Ship full of Men; though it is what has never been in any perfection; no sensible Reason can, nor ought to be given. If the loss of an hundred Lives is not so great, as that of a thousand; the Expence of the Boat that is to protect these hundred, is nothing equal to the Man of War that defends the thousand. But a single life was never given to be sported with, when by a little extraordinary Expence and Labour, it may be preserved.

As we have given a brief Description of the Services and Places in which this Boat is to be employed, with regard to both the Fleet and Army, it rests upon us now to give some name to the Boat itself; and we know none that can suit it better, than the Artillery Ranger Boat.

As these Boats are contrived only for Conjoint Expeditions, and will be employed more particularly in the Service of the Army than the Fleet; we shall Regiment them, as we have done the others; to make their whole Employ, intelligible at once to every Soldier and Marine in the Fleet. One Regiment of Artillery Rangers will be full sufficient to the three Regiments of Transport-Boats: Whose colourings being Blue, White, and Red; so the Regimental we give the Ranger, shall be Black; to render them less discernable to an Enemy, but when discerned, more terrible. This Regiment then is the Black Artillery Ranger Boats. By Regimenting them, we form them into Platoons; two Boats are a Platoon, four a Subdivision, and eight a Grand-division, which with the Platoon on each Flank make thirty-six Rangers. Every Ranger is wrote upon and lettered, as well as the Transport-Boats,

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Boats. We have now got the Artillery Boat as well as the Transport Boat within the Soldier's Knowledge. The sixteen Center Platoons are composed of Boats of a larger Sort, being calculated to go wherever a Subdivision-Boat goes; (Fig f.) and the Platoon on each Flank, wherever the Platoon Boat goes; for that Purpose is of a Size less, and distinguished from the rest of the Regiment by being spotted with Brown Spots, but not so as to be discerned by an Enemy at a distance. (Fig. g.) By which Method there can be no Detachment without a Convoy, no Transport Boat without one of the Artillery. This is our System, whether the Boats we are going to describe will be able to answer it, we do not pretend to speak determinately; nor would it become a land Soldier to do. As we have said already, it is the System, we want to show: But it is the Place of those who are experienced and accustomed to the Water, to contrive and work out the rest: When this is done to perfection, we do not in the least Doubt, but our Enemies whenever they fall in the Way of the Artillery Rangers, will think them of an Aspect unpleasant, and sound unmusical; their description being as follows.

We cannot take upon us to speak infallibly of the Construction of this Boat, more than the others; however it must be made for three general Uses, to carry a four and twenty Pounder Gun and a six Pounder, with the utmost Expedition, and in shallow as well as other Waters; from whence we give it the Name of the Artillery Ranger Boat. As this Boat is to accompany always the Transport-Boat, besides other particular Uses, it must have the same Number of Oars, and Kind of Bottom; to make it capable of Expedition and going in the same Waters: It must not be longer than is absolutely necessary for its Use.

The Boat that carries a twenty four Pounder Gun and a six Pounder, is the great Artillery Boat, and the Convoy to the Subdivision Transport-Boat. But as the lesser Artillery Boat, or the Speckled Ranger is more particularly the Convoy to the Platoon Transport, to make it lighter, and better adapted for this Purpose, instead of a four and twenty and six Pounder Gun, we Place at each end a nine Pounder. By this Method we have different Guns for different Uses, (which we shall

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shall shew presently) we have, two, six, nine, and twenty-four Pounders. We will now give an Idea of the several Weights the Transport-Boats and Rangers when compleatly freighted, carry; that we may be better able to judge, whether the latter may be depended on, as a Convoy to the former. However the Calculation here given, is not meant to be looked upon as fixt and determin'd; but only just to assist a little those who have a Mind to give their Thoughts a turn this Way. We shall afterwards proceed to the Construction and Use of the Ranger Boat. We will begin with the Subdivision Transport-Boat.

To 113 Hatmen, each Man weighing with Arms and Necessaries 14 Stone or one hundred and ninety-six Pounds. . . .	21148
To the two, two Pounder Guns. . . .	800
To 30 Charges of Shot to each Gun. . . .	120
To Powder, Oars, Masts, Sails, Poles, &c. . . .	1932
The Subdivision Transport Boat then completely filled, carries	24000

To find out the Weight the Platoon Transport Boat carries, we must Subtract from the twenty-four thousand, the Weight of thirty Men which make a Platoon; then we are to add to the remaining Platoon and Irregulars, (as we are to suppose the Platoon Transport is loaded with Grenadiers) the extraordinary Weight of ten Pounds to each Man, which will be ten times fifty four.

From the 24000 we are to Subtract the Weight of a Platoon or thirty Men, which is 5880.	24000
	5880
	18120

To the 18120 we are to add the Extraordinary Weight of ten Pounds to each Man of the remaining fifty four supposing them to be Grenadiers, which is 540, which added to	18120
	540

The Platoon Transport filled with Grenadiers carries.	18660
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If

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If we Subtract 18660 from 24000 it
 will give us 5340, which is the Weight 24000
 the Subdivision Transport filled with 18660
 Hatmen has more than the Platoon-
 Transport filled with Grenadiers. . . . 5340

The Weight the large Artillery Ranger carries, that
 is to be the Convoy to the Subdivision Transport Boat,
 is as follows :

To the 24 Pounder Gun.	4000
To its Carriage.	2000
To the 6 Pounder Gun and Carriage. .	2000
To 60 Rounds of Shot for the 24 Pounder.	1440
To as many to the 6 Pounder.	360
To Powder.	200
To forty four Men with their Arms and Ne- cessaries.	8624
To Oars, Poles, Mafts, Sails, Gin, Bridge, &c.	2376
The full Freight of the great Ranger Boat	
then is	21000

To find out the Weight of the lesser or speckled
 Ranger Boat, that is to be the Convoy to the Platoon
 Transport ; we must subtract from the two Guns and
 Carriages 2600 Weight, allowing to each nine Pounder
 Gun and its Carriage 2700 : From Shot in Proportion,
 720 ; and as we allow to this Boat only forty Men,
 there will be four Men or 784 Pounds to be also sub-
 tracted ; and 376 from the other Neccessaries which are
 here in a less Degree, will make the Account, as follows.

To two nine Pounder Guns and their Car- riages.	5400
To 60 Rounds of Shot to each Gun. . . .	1080
To 40 Men with their Arms and Neccessaries.	7840
To Powder, Oars, Poles, Mafts, Gin, Bridge, &c. all in a less Degree. . . .	2000
The speckled Ranger then carries.	16320

Which

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Which subtracted from 21000 will give us

4680; being the Weight, the great	
Artillery Ranger, with a 24 and 6	21000
Pounder Gun and forty four Men carries, more than the little speckled	16320
Ranger with two nine Pounder Guns	4680
and forty Men.	

By these Calculations then, according to the Weights, it is plain to perceive, the Transport-Boats can go in no Waters, where the Rangers cannot attend them. As the Subdivision Transport carries 24000 Weight, when the great Artillery Boat has only 21000: And the Platoon Transport 18660, when the little Ranger has only 16320; consequently each Transport Boat carries considerably more than 2000 Weight more than their Convoy.

However as the Transport-Boats are much longer than the Rangers, that are to be their Convoies; it does not follow, though the latter carry less Weight than the former; that they are capable of going in as shallow Waters; unless it is proved, that the extraordinary Weight of the Transport-Boat, is in proportion to its extraordinary length. To be able to judge a little of this, we will proceed to the Form and Fashion as well as the Use of the Artillery Ranger Boat. We shall speak first of the large.

As it is absolutely necessary to have in this Boat two Guns of a very different Calibre; one a twenty-four Pounder, and the other only a six Pounder, and to be planted one, at one end of the Boat, and one at the other; and as the great Gun weighs 6000 Weight, and the little one only a third Part, and its Shot only a fourth Part of the great Shot, which are to lye ready for Use towards the Ends of the Guns; it is easy to perceive the Difficulty there will be, to balance this Boat, with such very different Weights at the Ends. We have tried several Experiments, but none answers the Purpose so well as what we are going to show.

We have already said, we shall allow to the Ranger as many Rowers, as we have to the Transport-Boat; consequently there will be 12 on each Side of the Boat; and each Rower having three Feet given him to

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77.

to use his Oar, makes the Boat thirty-six Feet in length. This then is the length ; and from the Experiment we have made, we find two thirds must be seventeen Feet in Breadth ; the remaining twelve Feet, we make only thirteen Feet broad. The great Gun we place on its Carriage at the broad End of the Boat, with two Wheels taken off, as when prepared to Fire in any other Place. The Mouth of the Gun may be a little beyond the End of the Boat. The little Gun we place in the same Manner at the narrow End of the Boat.

We suppose the great Gun and Carriage thus situated, to measure sixteen Feet, and the little one twelve Feet. The Men are pretty equally dispersed all through the Boat. Therefore in the following Calculation, we shall take no notice of them.

By this Method it is plain, that the sixteen Feet of the broad End of the Boat, must carry 7440 Pounds, being the Weight of the great Gun, its Carriage, and Shot ; when the twelve Feet of the narrow Part of the Boat, carries only 2360 ; we have not here mentioned the Weight of the Powder, to either of the Guns. In our Experiment, we found it impossible, in a Boat of this Size, to make that broad Part to carry almost four times the Weight of the narrow Part, without having a Part towards the broad End Buoyed up, as we have been informed, the Dutch Buoy their Ships, to carry them over the Flats into Amsterdam.

The Experiment we made, was as follows.

We took a Piece of Deal Wood, four Inches and a Quarter in length ; this Wood as to length and breadth we cut in the above Proportion, of 36 Feet in length ; two thirds, seventeen Feet in breadth ; and the other thirteen. This Board was quite flat at the Top ; but the Part that was to be on the Water, was shaped a little rounding, like the Bottom of a flat Boat as were the Corners ; the middle of it, was about a Quarter of an Inch thick, and sloped away a little thinner towards the Edges. When we found we could not make it carry an even Balance, with such a great disproportion of Weight at the Ends. We took six quills of rather a small Sort and cut them two Inches and three Quarters long ; we then scraped them thin and tied them under the broad Part of the Boat, lying long-
ways


ways under, as the Gun does over. When we had proceeded so far, we set it on the Water, and found the greatest Weight this Piece of Wood would bear, was a large Ounce. This Ounce then, we divided into forty-eight Parts ; and allotted to every thousand Weight three of these Shares. We then loaded the Piece of Wood as follows.

The Part equal in proportion to the sixteen Feet for the large Gun and Carriage, bore eighteen Shares, three at the end Edge, behind those, twelve, and behind those, three more. These eighteen Shares, were equal to the 6000 Pound Weight. For the Shot and Powder, (which to prevent coming to Fractions) we will call fifteen hundred Pound Weight, we placed towards the end of the Boat, four Shares and an Half, being two and a Quarter, on each Side of the exterior three Shares. At the narrow End of the Boat, we placed there Shares, behind them, three more, being equal to the little Gun or 2000 Weight ; and for its Shot, half a Share on each Side. Between the sixteen Feet and the twelve Feet of the Boat which we have now loaded ; there remains a Space of eight Feet in length (as we must call it here) and seventeen Feet in Breadth. This Center Part, we loaded with seven Shares, being equal to the 2376 extraordinary Weight : Being six for the two thousand, and one for the remaining odd Numbers ; which we look upon to be sufficient, as a Part of that Weight must necessarily be dispersed all through the Boat for Poles and other little Things.

The Boat bore the Weights thus disposed, with as even a Balance as possible ; consequently answered in this Respect the End we proposed by it, as much as we could wish.

See the Figure.

The



The Board with which this Experiment was made, was in the Shape of the outermost Line; but it should have been brought sloping like the dotted Line (o).

The following are the several Calculations of the Weights of the three Divisions of the large Artillery Ranger Boat with the Sum Total, exclusive of the Men; as they are disposed in the above Figure or Piece of Wood, which was just capable of bearing a large Ounce; which Ounce being divided into forty-eight Divisions or Shares, made the Weights by which these Calculations are made; allowing three Shares to every thousand Pound Weight,

Whole

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Whole Shares.

Parts of Shares.

The Number of	(2	$\frac{1}{4}$	Shot.
Shares the 16 Feet	(3		Great Gun
of the broad Part	(12		and Car-
contain.	(3		riage.
	(2	$\frac{1}{4}$	Shot.
Total.	(22	$\frac{1}{2}$	Equal to 7500 Pounds Weight.

The Number the			
Center, or Space be-			
tween the two Guns	(7		Gin, Bridge,
contains.			Maft Sail, &c.
Total.	(7		Equal to 2000 and odd Weight.

The Number the	(0	$\frac{1}{2}$	Shot.
twelve Feet of the	(3		Small Gun
narrow Part con-	(3		and Carriage.
tain.	(0	$\frac{1}{2}$	Shot.
Total.	(7	0	Equal to 2000 and odd Weight.

			The 16 Feet of the broad
The Summs	(22	$\frac{1}{2}$	Part.
Total	(7		The Center.
	(7		The 12 Feet of the nar-
			Part.
Total.	(36	$\frac{1}{2}$	Equal to 1200 & odd Weight.

This

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This then is the Weight the great Artillery Ranger-Boat carries besides the Men; which substracted from the forty eight Divisions, which made the Ounce or the utmost Weight, the Piece of Wood by which we made this Experiment would bear, leaves eleven Shares and an half. We are to remember this Wood was quite flat at top without any Side. As it is absolutely necessary to have the large Ranger Guns of so very different a Caliber; this Experiment was to find out the Disproportion, the two Ends would bear, more than what the utmost Weight the Boat would Bear. Because should a Boat of thirty-six Feet by seventeen and thirteen, be not capable of carrying the Weight requisite; either the Weight all through must be proportionably lessened, or the Boat all through proportionably enlarged.

The higher the Sides are the better, for the same Reason as we have already said, when we spoke of the Transport-Boat; we do not however mean so high as to hinder any necessary Operation. The Guns too should be mounted on Carriages with high Wheels; because high Wheels go better in moist and swampy Places, which will often happen, when they are taken out of the Boat. When this is performed, the Bridge must be fastened to the End of the Boat, with strong Iron Hooks, so as to take off and put on occasionally; the Bridge must be made to fit either End sloping gradually to the Ground that it may be in our Power to have which Gun on Shore we chuse, or both, without dragging them from one End of the Boat to the other.

As to the Number of Men, though we have said here forty-four, we do not speak determinately; further than the twenty-four Rowers and the Man that Steers. As the others who have the Management of the Guns are not required to sit like the Platoons in the Transport-Boats, we shall not distinguish them by Regulars and Irregulars. They are all to be properly armed like any other Soldier; and every Platoon should have at least one commissioned Officer besides non-commissioned. As the Boat goes with the great End foremost, the Rudder must hang at the narrow End. The Mast must be fixt in the Center, and should have leathern or rope Loops nailed to it up to the top,

G

for

for now and then a Person to climb up and reconnoitre a little the Country; to be able to look over a sand Bank, or Bank of a River; this is as necessary to the Transport-Boats. This then is the Form of the large Artillery Ranger, which we must leave as thus described 'till some better is found out. Whether it will go in the same Waters as the Subdivision Transport, we cannot speak determinately; therefore we shall only say, that though it is not but little more than half as long, it has the same Number of Oars; and though it has but one Sail, it has no large Intervals without Rowers, and if one third of the Ranger is narrower by two Feet than the Transport-Boat, two thirds of the Ranger are broader by two Feet than the Transport-Boat. And should this inequality in its breadth, as well as having one End buoyed up, be an hindrance to its sailing, we must remember, it carries three thousand Weight less. Therefore whether they can always accompany each other, the Experiment only will shew; and we must not forget, that from Experiments frequently come Improvements.

We are now to speak of the little or speckled Ranger. This Ranger like the Grenadier Company to a Regiment; like the Platoon Transport-Boat, to a Regiment of Subdivision Transports, is calculated as well as for ordinary, extraordinary Busineses, both as to Land and Water; in regard to the Land it gives us nine Pounder Guns, being a Kind of Medium between twenty-four and six, when that Medium shall be most proper; when perhaps the six Pounder shall be judged too small for the Business, and the twenty-four Pounder too heavy for the Ground it is to pass over. In regard to the Water, it sails with more Expedition, and in shallower Places, and is more particularly the Convoy to the Platoon Transport. Besides these Advantages, the two Platoons of speckled Rangers, one on each Flank, preserve the exact Order of a Regiment among the Artillery Rangers.

We shall not be long in the Description of this Ranger, as it carries even Weights at each End; for this Purpose the breadth all through is even, being seventeen Feet wide. The nine Pounders and their Carriages. must be as short as possible, that they may be able

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able to be turned to Fire over the Sides of the Boat, as well as the Ends : By firing them over the Sides, we gain the great Advantage, of being able to Fire the two Guns of each speckled Ranger the same Way ; and could the six Pounder Gun in the large Ranger be brought to Fire to the Right or left as well as to the Rear, it would be of great Service. However the speckled Ranger Boat is seventeen Feet wide for this Purpose. The Rudder as well as the Bridge is made to hang, on either End, as Occasion may require. The Sail is to be in the Center of the Boat. As to the length of the Boat, considering it carries near 5000 Weight less than the great Ranger, and is seventeen Feet wide all through, and may be buoyed, equally at each End ; we conclude though we should curtail the length a little, to put it in our Power to turn it quicker and in narrower Waters, it will nevertheless pass with more Expedition and in shallower Places. And as it carries two thousand Weight less than the Platoon Transport. We conclude also, it will answer the End of being the particular Convoy to that Boat.

Wherefore we shall take from every Rower three Inches, which make it four Feet shorter than the great Ranger, being only thirty-two Feet in length. To a Regiment of Artillery Rangers in a Time of War, there should be at least a Colonel and four Captains with Subaltern Officers in Proportion. We will suppose then in a War with France as we are at present ; that so great a Maritime Power as Great Britain had two of these Regiments, called the Black and Brown Artillery Rangers ; the little Rangers to the former, are black speckled with Brown Spots ; as the little to the latter, are Brown speckled with Black. The Carriages to the Guns they bear should be painted with the same Colour as the Boat they are in ; and marked also in the same Manner, showing the Platoon, Subdivision, and Grandivision they belong to ; that whenever they should be taken out of their Boat, they might not when they were re-imbarked, by mistake be put in a wrong Boat. The Streamer on the Mast Head, should be lettered like those belonging to the Transport Boats, and should also be of the same Colour as the Boat.

By having Officers in the above Manner, they would soon grow expert in their Trade, consequently render our Rangers more efficacious. Besides this, the Regiment is better calculated, for different Expeditions. As for Instance, in an Expedition to the Coast of France, the Colonel with a whole Regiment goes; and (as we have already said) with at least three Regiments of Transport-Boats. To a less Conjunct Armament, perhaps destined for some of their Settlements in the West-Indies, we send of the other Regiment a Captain with a Grand Division, and one speckled Ranger. A Captain with another Grand Division and speckled Ranger, with an Armament destined for their Settlements in North-America. Another we will say for the East-Indies.

^a See back his
Reign.

To Sennegal or any other Place, another. However to a very little Armament, a Subdivision might be sufficient. The famous ^a Henry V. after he had safely debarked his Army in Normandy, dismissed his Fleet, but kept some small Vessels for Transporting from one Place to another his Artillery. Regiments of Transport-Boats we send with every Conjunct Armament in Proportion, to the Number of Troops, the Importance of the Expedition, and the Artillery Rangers. This is with Regard to such a Country as France. As to any other Country we should be at War with, we have nothing to do but to calculate the like Kind of Proportions.

By this Method the Colonel who Commands the Regiment, is also (as in any other Regiment,) the Captain of the first Grand-Division; which here is to represent a Company: Three of the other Captains have each a Grand-Division, and the fourth Captain the speckled Rangers, which though they make only a Subdivision, will require a very sensible Officer to Conduct them.

When a speckled Ranger is sent with only a Grand-Division upon any particular Service; an Officer must always be sent in it. We have no other Reason, for allotting so few Officers, but to save Expences.

Wherefore to conclude, and give a right Idea of the speckled Ranger, we shall say, that as the Regiment of Artillery Rangers, is a Kind of Hussar Regiment or
Irregular

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Irregular, armed with Artillery, to act between the Fleet and Army, but more particularly for the Army, and consequently the Transport-Boats; so in like Manner, is the speckled Ranger a Kind of Hussar or Irregular to its own Regiment of Artillery Rangers.

Thus then we have found it absolutely necessary towards the bringing the Art of this littoral War to any Kind of Perfection, to invent four different Boats for different Uses; In short (we may say) we have been obliged to contrive four Sorts of Tools for the Future and more refined Operations of a Conjunct Armament. However as Inventions of any Kind are apt to incur a good deal of Raillery and Witticism, especially from those who are little guilty of becoming a Subject on the same Account for others to vent their Wit against. As this is the Case, before we proceed to set our four Engines to Work; we will give a few Instances of some Naval Inventions of those who have gone before us; and also of the Raillery that has been exhibited on the Occasion.

We have given two Instances, of the Methods Charles the XIIth took to pass his Troops over Waters; wherefore what we shall now relate, tend more to the active and executive Part on the Water.

For our first Instance, we shall go as far back as the great King Alfred. In the preceding Reigns to this great King, the Danes had so invaded, plundered, and laid Waste this Island, that when Alfred came to the Throne, he had, properly speaking a Kingdom without Subjects. The Country was destroyed, all the Cities and great Towns demolished, and the People worn out by continual Fatigue, having been sometimes compelled to Fight nine or ten Battles in a Year. In short their Wealth, Strength and Spirits were exhausted; instead of attempting to defend themselves as they were wont, they began every where to submit to the Danes, to embrace rather a settled Slavery, than a precarious Freedom, in a Country now become a Desert, and where it was a difficult Matter to find Subsistence, even when for a small Time released from the Fear of Enemies. The King, though in this low Condition, did not despair of the public Safety; but with equal Vigor and Prudence applied himself at once to the Ma-

b A. D. 871.

nagement of the War, and to the Conduct of public Affairs; so that, in a short Time encouraged by his Example, the Saxons began to resume their Spirits, and in many Battles defeated the Danes, compelling them as often as it was in their Power, to quit their Country; and, when they found this impracticable, permitting them to live among them upon reasonable Conditions, and in a regular Way.^c

^c Affer. Mc-
neven. in Vit.
Alfræd. Mag.
Gulielm. Mal-
mesb. de gestis
Reg. Ang. Lib.
II. Cap. 4. Hen-
ric. Huntingdon.
Hist. Lib. V. p.
349. Roger Ho-
ved. p. 416.
EthelwerdiChro-
nicon. Lib. IV.
Cap. 3. Chroni-
con. Saxon. p. 82.

There were two Maxims which the King steadily pursued, and thereby extricated himself from his troubles. The first was, fighting the Enemy, if possible, at Sea; of which we have frequent Instances in the Saxon Chronicle, and almost always with Advantage; by the steady Pursuit of which Method, he had constantly a Fleet, and considerable Numbers of experienced Sailors. But, as it was impossible to guard all the Coasts of his Dominions; and as the Enemies Squadrons were frequently superior to his own, he was sometimes obliged to Fight on Shore; and, in this Case, he likewise used all imaginable Expedition, that the Enemy might not have Time, either to gain Intelligence, or get Refreshment.

His other Maxim was to have always in his Court the ablest Men, not only in the Sciences, but also in Arts; and to converse with them frequently and familiarly. By these Means he came to the Knowledge of many Things, by a Comparison of Informations, of which even those, from whom he learned them, were ignorant; and by his superior Judgement, so adapted the Intelligence he received, as to render his small Force successful, both at Sea and Land, against his numerous Enemies.

In Maritime Affairs (as we have said in the first Part of this Book) he was particularly skilfull. He considered with himself, that as the Fleets of these Invaders, were frequently built in an hurry, hastily drawn together, meanly provided, in respect to Victuals and Rigging, and crowded with Men, a few Ships of a larger Sort built in a new Manner, of well seasoned Materials, thoroughly supplied with Ammunition and Provision, and manned by expert Seamen, must at first Sight, surprize; and in the Course of an Engagement, destroy Numbers without any great Hazard to themselves.

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In pursuance of this Project, he caused a certain Number of Ships to be built, capable of holding, each, sixty Rowers, and as in that, double, in all other Respects, to the largest Ships then in Use. Ancient Authors are loud in the Praises of Alfred; and take abundance of Pains to possess their Readers with high Ideas of his Wisdom, Courage, and other Virtues. But it will perhaps be more Satisfactory, the Nature of this Work, especially, considered, to examine this Matter a little more closely; and thereby convince such as will pay a proper Attention, that Things were really as these Writers have stated them; and, that there was something highly useful, and, at the same Time, very extraordinary, in this Invention; which, as we have seen, was entirely due to this Monarch's Sagacity and Penetration.

The learned Sir John Spelman, who wrote an accurate Life of this famous Prince, seems to be in much uncertainty on this Subject; he is not able to determine, whether they were Ships, or Gallies; nor can he well reconcile the height of the Vessels to the Number of Rowers; but, after having intimated many Doubts, and cleared none of them, he leaves the Reader in that perplexity into which he brought him.^d In the first Place then, it appears from good Authority, that they were Gallies; which takes away all the Difficulties about the Rowers; ^e since in the Mediterranean, these Sort of Vessels are common, because they are convenient; for the same Reason which inclined King Alfred to make Use of them, the Facility of running with them close into Shore, or up into Creeks. That they might be longer, higher, and yet swifter than the Vessels in common Use, in a duplicate Proportion, which is the true Sense of what ancient Writers say of them, may be easily conceived; and thence their great Utility arose.

We have seen, in Point of Numbers, the King had no Hope of equaling his Enemies; by this Contrivance, he removed that Difficulty which seemed otherwise insuperable. These Ships did not carry exclusive of their Oars, above an hundred and twenty Men, if so many. The Saxon Chronicle has preserved another Circumstance, from which the Wisdom

^d Life of King Ælfred the great. p. 150, 151.

^e Cambel's Naval Hist. Vol. I. p. 54.

^f Chronic.
Saxon. A. D.
897.

^g Hen. Hun-
tingdon, Hist.
Int. Script. post
Bedam. p. 350,
351. Rog. Hove-
den, p. 420. 421.
Chron. Saxon. p.
98. hron, Joan.
Brompton Int. x.
Hist. ad A. D.
897.

^h A. D. 897.

ⁱ Campbel's
Nav. Hist. Vol. I.
p. 57.

^k Ibid.

of Alfred will incontestably appear. These Gallies were built after the Model of the Frisian, or Danish Ships ^f; so that they were wholly strange to the Enemy, who for a long Time knew not how to board them, though their Courage might be great, and themselves, for the Age in which they lived, able Seamen.

But it is now time to descend to Facts ^g of which some are very well worth the Reader's Notice. The same Year that few of these Ships were built ^h, six Pirates of an unusual Bigness, infested the Isle of Wight, and the Coasts of Devonshire. The King immediately ordered nine of his new Ships in quest of them, with instructions to get (if possible,) between them and the Shore. Three of the Pirates, as soon as they perceived them ran a ground; but the other three stood out to Sea, and boldly engaged the King's Ships. Of these, two were taken; and all the Men killed: the third, indeed escaped, but with five Men only. They then attacked the Ships which ran a ground, and killed a great Number of Men. At length the tide took them off. But in so battered and leaky a Condition, that it was with much Difficulty they reached the Coast of the South-Saxons, where, again running on Shore two of their Vessels; the Men endeavoured to escape, but were taken. The third Vessel, though the Men in her were grievously wounded, escaped; and in this single Year, not less than twenty Ships, with all the Men on board them, were destroyed, on the South Coast only: which sufficiently demonstrates what mighty advantages were derived from this happy Invention of the King's. Should the Reader enquire how this Superiority at Sea was lost, we must observe, ⁱ it was very late in the King's life, before his Experience furnished him with Light sufficient for this noble Design, which very probably his Successors wanted skill to prosecute; though they were moved by his Example, to make great Efforts for preserving their Territories on Shore, by maintaining the Sovereignty of the Sea ^k.

The Vessels built by King Alfred for resisting the Danes (says Mr. Campbel) and which were so very serviceable in that Respect, appearing to be a very singular and material Point, some have wished, he had more Plainly described them; which, he says, he would have

have done, if it had been in his Power. Those Vessels were built, not only by the direction of the King, but in a new Manner which was of his own Invention; and the Writers who have preserved an account of them, tho' they are certainly competent Witnesses as to the Fact, yet were they very far from being proper Judges of the Manner. They can tell us, what the King did, and what were the Effects of his Doings, but how, or upon what Principles he constructed these new invented Ships of his, was out of their Way to enquire, and consequently what they could not be expected to declare. This being so, it would be a thing preposterous to pretend to lay it down as a Fact that King Alfred's new Ships were built in this Manner or in that, all that he meant to suggest, was, that the King built these Ships longer than usual, and in such a Proportion, as made them at once stronger and swifter, than any with which that Age were acquainted.

The candid and ingenious Reader will readily allow, we had good Reason to commend the Superior Skill of the King, who made that a Science, which to others was but a Trade. There were, no doubt, in that Age, a Number of Shipwrights, who knew how to put Vessels together, so as to make them sound and tight, and good Sailors too, as things went at that time; yet it does not appear, that the King asked their Advice, but on the contrary, he directed their Labours, and commanded that Ships should be built of a new and very different Make, from those that were then in Use. He was very well acquainted with the Danish Ships, and saw, that tho' they were very convenient for transporting Troops, yet that very Circumstance might be turned to their Disadvantage, by employing against them Vessels of a very different make, longer, higher, and stronger, and of a very different Proportion in respect to Breadth, which is a plain Prooff, he had made himself Master of the Principles of Ship-building, and knew how to vary the form in constructing Vessels so, as to fit them for different Uses and Services, which if the Ignorance of those Times was half so gross as modern Writers are willing to represent, it was certainly a very great and wonderfull Discovery¹.

¹ Ibid. p. 93.

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It is also probable, that though the King gave Directions to his Ship Builders, and perhaps a Model of the Form in which he would have his new Vessels built; yet he did not acquaint them with the Principles upon which he went, or explain to them the reasons why Vessels built in this new Form, were swifter, and stronger, than those of the Enemy; but kept that within his own breast as a great Secret of State. His Naval Architects might be, and in all Probability were, Men of as great Skill, and as extensive Capacity, as any of their Times; but then their Knowledge was of a very different Nature from that of the King; they might be great Artists in their Way, but they were still Mechanics; and tho' they knew how to build what were esteemed the best Ships in this Part of the World; yet were they far enough from penetrating into the Causes of things, or from apprehending clearly the Reasons upon which those Rules were founded, by which they were guided in their Profession, and which Experience had gradually introduced.

We have the more likelihood, that this was the true State of the Case, from the other Circumstance, that the King made great Improvements in the Art of building Ships for Traffick. Hence we plainly see, what he contrived, was not the Effects of Experience, that, is an Application of what he had seen, or heard, that others performed, to his own Affairs; or flowed from a lucky thought which was found to Answer upon Trial; but arose entirely from his great Sagacity, which enabled him to see to the very Bottom of this Art, and put it in his Power to assign the just Proportions of Vessels of any Dimensions, provided they had the Scheme of such Vessels given them, in case they were of a new Invention.

These trading Vessels, were, without doubt, of quite another Form, than those Warlike Gallies fitted out against the Danes, and consequently far less expensive; for broad, large, and roomy Vessels, such as are fit for carrying Merchandise, are in every respect, far less expensive than Vessels built for Strength and Swift-ness^m.

^m *Ibid.* p. 94.

We hope our Readers will excuse the dwelling so long on this head, as it is something similar to the present

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sent Case; and that they will be as candid to us, as Mr. Campbel presumes every ingenious Reader will to him with regard to the Construction of Alfred's Vessels. And as we belong to the Land-Service and have no Opportunities of being conversant with Shipwrights, it cannot be expected from us to lay down, determined and fixt Rules for the Construction of these Boats; this we say, ought not with the like Reason to be expected from us, as it might from Alfred, considering he was not only a very wise Man, but also a great King; and the Authors that tell us of this Invention of his, tell us also, that one of his Maxims was, to have always in his Court the ablest Men, not only in the Sciences, but also in Arts; and to converse with them frequently and familiarly.

This agrees with the Saying of John the second King of Portugal ⁿ, that a Kingdom either found Princes ^{n Mariana's} wife or made them so, by their continual conversing ^{Hist. of Spain.} with Men of Parts; who constantly are about the ^{an. 1481. L. 24.} Courts of Kings, and use all Arts in Speech and Behaviour to obtain their Desires, and discover their own Abilities. ^{Ch. 9.}

King Alfred from Reflexion and his own Sagacity perceived that a Kind of Vessel might be constructed that should be more efficacious than any then used, in a Naval War, as it was carried on in those Days. And Historians though they were not Shipwrights enough to tell us how these Vessels were built; they have told us they were made, they have told us also of their Effects, and that by those Effects, they answered the End, Alfred expected of them.

And we, with a very little Reflexion and Sagacity do perceive, as well as once did the great and wise King Alfred; that for a littoral War, Boats might be constructed in these Days as well as anciently, according to the present Method of making War, to push it with more Efficacy against the Enemy, and Safety to ourselves. And though we are not Shipwright enough, to tell exactly how these Boats are to be constructed; we will venture to affirm that such Boats might be made, and when made, would have the Effect expected from them, which in some degree we have already shewn, but presently shall illustrate more.

And

And though we belong to the Land Forces, and these are Inventions for the Water; we must remind our Readers, it does not always follow, that Inventions relative to a particular Profession, must owe their Birth to People of that Profession: Gunpowder was not found out by a Soldier; nor was the Art of Printing by one of the Litterati. And we will now show two Machines calculated and invented entirely for the Water, by Men who had their Occupations entirely on the Land.

• Age of Lewis
XIV. by Mr. de
Voltaire, vol. I.
p. 219.

Lewis the XIVth acquired the Title of Great, as did our King Alfred. Lewis was very careful in exciting the Efforts of all the Geniuses of his Age^o; but he could not be more careful than Alfred. As the Vessel above described owed its Rise to the Genius and Care of Alfred; so the Vessel we are now to describe, owed its Rise to that of Lewis. There was a young Man, named Bernard Renaud, generally known by the name of little Renaud, who without having ever been in the Service, was an excellent Mariner through the Strength of Genius. Colbert who had the Management of the Marine of France, distinguished Merit though in obscurity; and had frequently called Renaud to the Council of the Marine, even in the King's Presence: and it was by his Skill and Care, that a new, more regular and easy Method in the building of Ships, was soon after practised. Algiers having disoblged the King, Renaud proposed in Council to bombard it with a Fleet. We had then (says Mr. Voltaire) no Idea how it was possible to fix Mortars for the casting of Bombs in any Manner but upon solid ground; his Proposal was therefore rejected; and he experienced all that raillery and contradiction which every Inventor must expect: but his continuing to persist in his Opinion, joined to that Eloquence which Men generally have, who are strongly prepossessed in favor of their Opinions, determined the King to permit the Experiment to be made.

Renaud directed five Vessels to be built (since called Bomb-Vessels) smaller than the ordinary size, but stronger in Wood, without Decks, and with a false Deck in the hold, upon which hallow Places were made, in which the Mortars were put. With this Equipage he set Sail, under the Command of old Duquene, to whom the Conduct of the Enterprize was com-

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committed ; and who did not expect any Success from it ; but Duquene and the Algerines were astonished at the Effect of the Bombs. Part of the Town was demolished and consumed : But the Art which was afterwards carried into other Nations, became more than once terrible to France. This Bombardment of Algiers was on the 28th of October 1681. ^{p Ibid page 267.} And in July 1694 and 1695 Dieppe, Havre de Grace, St. Malo, Dunkirk, and Calais were bombarded by the English Fleets. And were we not at this Time, as we were then, the greatest Maritime Power in the World ; and from our Situation, with common Prudence and Care sure as we can be of any earthly Thing, to continue so, we should think it very ill judged to publish this Treatise.

The other Instance of an Invention to be used on the Water, had its rise about nine Years before, in 1672. About this Time all that human Prudence and Ambition is capable of contriving for the Destruction of a Nation, was prepared against the Dutch by Lewis the XIVth. There were as yet among the French no Inspectors of the Cavalry and Infantry, which they have since had. Two Persons only were appointed to do this Service. Martinet brought the Infantry, under the Discipline in which it still continues : The Chevalier de Fourilles did the same in the Cavalry. Martinet about a Year before, had introduced the Bayonet in some few Regiments ; before which Time, it had never been used in a general and uniform Manner. He also modelled the Construction of Copper-Boats, which might be easily transported from one Place to another, upon Carriages, or upon Mules. The King caused his Troops to advance towards the Rhine, in those Provinces which border upon Holland, Cologne, and Flanders ; and Holland expected to be subdued, as soon as the King should have passed that River. And his real Design was to do it over a Bridge composed of those little Copper Boats invented by Martinet. However through the Driness of the Season, it was found possible to ford the River at a certain Place, which was accordingly done on the 12th of June 1672 by the King's Household Troops and best of the Cavalry, to the Number of about 15000. The Prince of Condé appeared by the Side of them during the

the Passage, in one of the Copper Boats. And Lewis the XIVth passed it with his Army upon a Bridge of

^q Ibid p. 162. Boats. ^q
Pelisson's Letters

Thus then we see, neither the Bomb-Vessel nor Ponton or Bridge Boat, was invented by those who had their Occupations on the Water.

As Instances of this Sort then have been produced, there can be no Reason, why they may not again. Wherefore without any Hesitation, we shall suppose, we have got in high Perfection as above described, three Regiments of Transport-Boats and one Regiment of Artillery Rangers.

CHAPTER V.

WE are to shew in the following Chapter to what Uses these new Inventions are to be employed, so as to lessen the Difficulties of a debarkation and re-embarkation, and make up the Insufficiencies of Want of Cavalry and Want of Artillery: So as to render this littoral War, as terrible as we have described it, and as successfull as we could wish it; and also to reap fully the primary and great Advantage of surprizing some weak Place; to give a mortal Stab, like the Rhinoceros to rip open the Elephant's Belly.

However before we proceed to this, we are to make some few Remarks; and first, that notwithstanding our Readers will find in what we are going to show, the Artillery Rangers principally employed; they must not construe from it, that we would lessen, take away, or derogate in the least, the Use of the Man of War, Frigate, Bomb-Vessel, Fire-Ship, or any other Vessel, belonging to our Naval Armaments. We are as sensible as they can be, that an hundred Guns will do more Execution than one; that a Man of War will bear perhaps an hundred Blows more than one of our Boats. Wherefore it is to be supposed, in the future Plans, that all the Use and Disposition of the Fleet is made, as the

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the Place, Time, Circumstances, as well as the Abilities of the Admiral are capable of. But as that belongs more properly to the Art of War by Sea, (even though it was in our Power) it does not fall to our Province to say any Thing about it. The Reader is to observe at the same Time that as the Rangers do not take away the Use of the Fleet; the Fleet do not take away the Use of the Rangers. However when they both can be brought to co-operate, so much happier is it for that Conjunct Armament. But in a littoral War it will much oftener happen, that a Fleet can't co-operate (at least effectually) with the Army when landed, like the Rangers; as the latter are made to go wherever the Regiments of Transport-Boats pass, there can be no debarkment, or re-embarkment, but under the cover of their Fire; which puts it in our Power of making a safe and efficacious War, wherever we can land our Forces, even though the Fleet cannot approach near enough to the Shore to protect them. To every sensible Reader there needs no Argument to prove the Latitude we gain by it, in this Sort of War. We mean the Number of Places we can make safe debarkments by the Assistance of the Rangers more, than we can without them. It answers in the same Proportion, with regard to re-embarkments. There are other Advantages gained by it; one great end is to Surprise some unprepared Place; and certainly the chance is much likelier to succeed in this Respect, when the Places where the Conjunct Armament can operate, are so many Times multiplied; the Probability must be the greater, when so many are to be defended, that none of them will be, thoroughly. When so many Places are Subject to be surprized, neglect possibly might spread through them all. It is very well known, when we have but a few Objects to take up our Attention, that Attention is more confined, not so dissipated and confused, as when by many Objects, many Times divided. When there is but one Business in Hand, nothing can well escape.

We are to observe also, when there are so many Places attackable, it is hardly possible for our Conjunct Armaments to make a fruitless Voyage, without attempting and executing something; a something; that
may

r Plutarch
Life of Marcus
Cato.

s Ibid Life of
Philopæmen.

may reasonably be supposed sufficient to answer the End, and Expence of the Equipment of the Armament. War at all Times is expensive, but at no Time so much, as when the Army is rusting with Idleness, or when the Navy for something to do, is yawning on the Seas. It will be difficult to bring our Country to think with Scipio the Great; who being censured by Cato for his too great Expences, answered, he had no need of too accurate a Treasurer; for he resolved to go (as it were) full Sail to the War; that he ought to give the People an Account of his Actions, and not of the Money he spent. We say, this Country cannot be brought (even though we have Actions to give an Account of) to talk in this Stile; much less when we come home (as it were) full Sail from the War, with an Account only of much Money spent, and no Action done. We all know what a Clamor there was upon a late Instance of this Sort. The Saying then of Philopæmen suits the Temper and Genius of our Countrymen better, as it does their Pockets. Philopæmen^s than whom no one was more active and enterprizing, smartly replied, upon hearing King Ptolemey praised for keeping himself and Army in constant Exercise; "what Praise is it for a Man of his Years, to be always preparing and never executing."

What we would willingly instill into the Reader by these Remarks, is, the Advantage that must accrue in this Sort of War from a Regiment of Artillery Rangers. As by being capable of going in the same Places, the Subdivision and Platoon-Boat can pass, they protect and consequently facilitate every Operation that is to be performed by the Troops those Boats contain. This will be more clearly manifested in the Plans we shall produce, to give every one an Opportunity of judging for himself, whether what has been asserted may be credited, or not. The first Operation we shall shew is a debarkment of Troops in an Enemy's Country. And as we are treating of this War in general; we are to go according to Rule and Method; therefore before we proceed to one of the chief Operations, we must mention some Things that are principally to be considered.

First,

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First, the Situation of the Part of the Country in general, with regard to the fortified Towns, or other Places likely for an Enemy to come from. Secondly, the Situation of the Spot in particular, where the Descent is to be made; these are local Considerations; but there are others called, temporal. Which are as well as the local, also of two Sort, general and particular. The general Consideration with regard to Time, relates to the State of the whole Country, against which the Descent is intended; that is, whether it is at a Time, it is at War with any other Country, so as to have its chief Strength drawn some other Way, which is almost always the Case, should the Armament be sent against a powerful Nation: Therefore a general Calculation is to be made of the Distance and Extent of the Country by which we may judge of the Time an Enemy would require to March from that Seat of War, to the Object intended to be surprized. This then is the general Consideration with respect to Time; the particular is of the same Nature, extending only to small Distances; as for Instance, the Troops that are at all Times left in every Country liable to be invaded, at such and such stated Districts; therefore this last Measurement of Time by these little Distances, is of a much nicer though smaller Sort. Another Consideration to be made, is of the Strength that may reasonably be expected, both from the smaller and greater Distance. As in a great Country, it is not to be supposed, that this Kind of Armament would run any Risk of waiting 'till the whole Power of that Country could come against it, which may be imagined, is at the greater Distance; therefore it is the smaller Distances, where are also moderate Bodies of Troops that we are to attend to more nicely.

To have this better understood, we will refer the Reader to the Rochefort Expedition. The local Considerations here, as to the Places where Troops might be expected to come from; were chiefly Rochelle, and Rochfort, and a semicircle round this last Place of near an hundred Miles: This was the general Consideration as to Place. The Particular was the Bay of Chatalilon. As to Time, France was then as at present, at War in another Country and had her chief Strength in Ger-

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many; this was the general Consideration as to Time; the particular was, she had nevertheless some Troops in this District to guard her Coast, of which both Rochelle and Rochefort were supposed to have the chief Part. It is easy then to find out, that it was not the Army in Germany, that our Rochefort Armament most dreaded; but the Forces near at hand; which in respect to Strength or Numbers, might perhaps be seven or eight Battalions. Should we make our Calculations exact as we ought to do, we are to remember before Troops can come from the Distance of any Number of Miles; those Miles must have been gone over by some Body, to give them Notice, to tell them to prepare for their Journey. And though a Messenger may go fast he does not fly.

In Opposition to this, we must mention, the Time that is sometimes lost by contrary Winds, and by not judging well of the Tides. In War, and in no Sort, more than the littoral, it is all Calculation, of Distances, of Time, and the comparing together of Forces that are ever in motion, in order to bring themselves in a Situation capable of acting with the most Advantage one against the other. *

The general Considerations both as to Time and Place, may be supposed to have been duly weighed before the Fleet sailed, it is therefore the specific Spot intended to be attacked, that is to demand the more particular Attention of the Commander; though when a discretionary Power is lodged in the Breast of the Chief, (which ought to be as often as possible) he then is supposed to comprehend within his Plan, every Consideration. As we are to shew the several chief Operations, that will frequently occur, during the Progress of a Conjoint Expedition; to include Places adapted for them all in the most intelligible Manner, we shall first give a View of a Coast; and as it must be more entertaining to have it be that, of a real than an imaginary one; as also we undertook this Work upon the Return and bad Success of our Rochefort Armament; and as

* Dans la guerre tout est supputation de distances & de tems, & comparaison de forces mouvantes pour agir, c'est sur ces principes que M. de Turenne forme le projet d'assiéger Rethel. Puysegur, Art de la guerre. Tom. 2, Ch. 8. Art. 17.

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that Affair was thoroughly canvassed over, by the People of this Country; as this was the Case, it may reasonably be supposed, this Nation is as well acquainted, with the Chart of that Coast, as any other; it may also, with as much Reason be supposed, such a Chart will amuse them as much: Wherefore as it answers the present Purpose just the same as another, we have fixt upon that Coast, and Part of France; because this Plan is already done to our Hands by Admiral Knowles, who was one of those who were principally concerned in that Expedition.

We have given it, as it is prefixed to a little Pamphlet published by that Gentleman relating to his own Conduct in that Affair. Our first Plan then is a general Chart of this Coast. From this general Plan we shall afterwards draw four others. The first is to represent (as is already said) a debarkation, for which we have the Bay of Chatalilon. The second is the Attack of a Fort at the Mouth of a River, or at the Edge of the Water; for which we have Fort Fouras. The third represents the Attack of a Battery up a River, for which the Battery of Vergeron answers. The fourth represents three Regiments going up a River in Order of Battle, for which we have the River Charente.

These are four principal Operations in a littoral War; a debarkation and re-embarkation we shall shew, come under the same Plan. We are to suppose, in these Plates as indeed we are told it really happened; that through the Shallowness of the Waters, these several Operations are to expect no Assistance from the Fleet; however had it been otherwise, what relates to the Fleet, belongs to the Art of War by Sea. We are also to say further, this Treatise being the History of Conjunct Expeditions, and the Art of a littoral War; what relates particularly to inland Operations, we shall not meddle with here, as it properly belongs to the Art of War by Land; which has already been treated, by many Authors in many Languages. It must be understood, that an Operation on the Water, having no connection with the Soldier, or an Operation at Land having as little with the Sailor; We look upon to be no Ways comprehended within the Scope of this Work. And notwithstanding we have said, it may be called a

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littoral War, whenever the Army receives its whole Sustenance and Support from the Fleet, and consequently may sometimes be several Miles up the Country; as any Operation up that Country, is to be performed in all probability, in the same Manner as a like Kind of Business, in any established War on the Continent; such Operations cannot be esteemed as littoral; unless there should happen to be Boats or other Vessels accompanying and co-operating at the same Time through the Means of some River.

Before we begin upon the Plans, we must beg it may be observed, that we do not mean to lay down the Manner we should have attacked Rochfort, for it may be easily conceived, that they who could take Fort Fouras and make a Landing there, would not make it in a Bay some Miles farther from the destined Object, as is that of Chatalilon from Rochfort. These Designs then are only to show in general those several Operations: as to the Manner we should have proceeded against this particular Place, we do not mention here. Our first Operation then is in the second Plate (Fig. 2.) which is a view of that Part of the French Coast called the Bay of Chatalilon, in which we are to shew a Debarkation of Troops.

To represent this in the clearest Light, for the discovering the Regimental Order and Disposition of the Boats; we have been under the Necessity of drawing them by a larger Scale *, than that with which the Bay is described. The Waters A, and C, in which the Platoon Boats and Speckled Rangers are detached, being at least four Miles asunder. It will be thought perhaps the Distance is too great, to send any Troops, from so small a Debarkment. Wherefore the Reader is to observe, that we have taken Possession of those Waters, chiefly to manifest more our System; which is, (by having the Rangers and Transport-Boats regimented and calculated for all Kind of Waters,) to shew we can take Possession and Advantage of any Place on the Water, in the same Military Manner, as on the Land:

* Notwithstanding they are drawn with a larger Scale than the Map; yet we could not find Room to insert on the Boats the Letters and Figures, to denote the Fire, Platoon, &c. Wherefore they are put in a slight Manner by each Boat:

that



At the Mouth of Charente River, are the Soundings in Feet, and the others are Fathoms.



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that the Irregularity of Places on the former, will not disconcert our Dispositions more than on the latter ; as they may be suited without the least tending to Confusion, to all. We have made the Disposition for the present Debarkment according to the Chart, as it appears to the Eye ; were we on the Spot, in all Probability, a very Different one might be required, and made with as much Ease. However should the two Waters A, and C, be judged too far from one another, the Waters B, and C, which are about two Miles and an half asunder perhaps might answer the Purpose better ; which Waters as will be shewn in its Place, we have taken Possession of for the Re-embarkation.

We are now to make the Landing in a Manner suitable to the Considerations both general and particular, relative to the Place. Which Place, or Bay of Chatalilon having been thoroughly surveyed, we find as follows. We find it lying near the two garrisoned Towns of Rochelle and Rochfort. The former situated to the North, and the latter to the South-East. Upon the Right of this Bay runs a small Water (A, Pl. 2. Fig. 2.) a considerable Way up the Country, which the Garrison at Rochelle must pass, should they endeavour to interrupt the Debarkation ; upon the Left of the Bay is another Water C, that runs a small Way up the Country, which in all Probability any Troops from Rochfort, must pass pretty near, that would also annoy the Debarkation. Wherefore by taking Possession of these two Waters, we form a Kind of Peninsula with the Bay, and cannot be flanked either on the Right or Left ; consequently we confine the Efforts of the Enemy to one Position only, which is in the Front of the Debarkation. As the Waters on the Right and Left, that run up the Country are small and narrow, it may reasonably be supposed, they are not very deep : wherefore we here see the Use of the Speckled Ranger, and Platoon Transport ; which can pass in shallower and narrower Waters. As the Water towards Rochelle runs much higher into the Country, than that nearer Rochfort, to take Possession of the first, we detach three Speckled Rangers with the Platoon Transports, of the two Regiments on the Left ; to take Possession of the latter we detach the other Speckled Ranger with the

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Platoon Transports of the Blue or Regiment on the Right. These Rangers are to point their Guns towards Rochelle and Rochfort, and the Grenadiers are to be landed, so as to have those Waters between them and those Garrisons. That is, the Grenadiers upon the Left, between them and Rochelle; those on the Right between them and Rochfort; they are to be stationed in such a Manner, as to defend best the Passes, and particularly the Bridge. We have now remaining to be disposed, of the Debarkation of the first Brigade, four Grand-divisions of Artillery Rangers, and twelve Grand-divisions of Troops, being the three Regiments without their Grenadiers. We do not know, whether it would not be better, to let the Rangers set out from the Ship or appointed Place of Rendez-vous, before the Transport Boats; that by the Time the latter arrived at the destined Place of Debarkment, the former might have pointed their Guns to the best and most Commanding Positions, for the intended Purpose of covering the Troops during the Act of making their Landing. According to this Method, we dispose the Rangers, as follow.

The Grand-Division upon the Right on the Water between the Villages Chatalilon and Les Roches; the first Platoon of that Grand-Division pointing their Guns to flank the Right of Les Roches; the three other Platoons to flank the Rear of Chatalilon and the Shore towards the Water, B. the eight six Pounders of this Grand-Division (as soon as the Landing is made) are taken out of the Boats and erected to the best Advantage on the rising Ground between the first and second Platoon of the first Grand-Division, which is the second and third Platoon of the Regiment: Such a commanding Eminence being to be taken Possession of, as early as may be with Safety. The first Platoon of the second Grand-Division is in the Mouth of the Water C to the left of Chatalilon, pointing their Guns much the same as the three left Platoons of the first Grand-Division; only bearing them a little more to the right; the three left hand Platoons are stationed at the Point of Land before the Village Chatalilon, pointing their Guns by the right of that Village, in the same Direction, as their right Platoon does to the left of it. The two left

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left Platoons of the fourth Grand-Division, are planted at the Mouth of the Water A, pointing their Guns in such a Manner as to defend the Ground between the Villages Le Pointe la Pierre, and Angoulin. The second Platoon of this Grand-Division, with the left hand Boat of the first Platoon, defends the Ground between the left of Angoulin and the Water B, whilst the right hand Boat is pushed as far as it can go up that Water, inclining its Gun a little to the Right. The third Grand Division is ranged in an entire Line on the right of this Boat, having their Guns in the same Direction, to defend the Center of the Bay, and the whole Debarkation of the Subdivision Boats. By this Disposition, there are the speckled Rangers with the Platoon-Boats of Grenadiers, like two grand Guards, the most advanced towards the Enemy, to Command the great Road from Rochelle to Rochfort: And the cross Fire of the Grand-Divisions on the Right and on the left of all to defend the whole debarkment. There are the second and third Grand-Divisions stationed upon the Right and Left of the Hollow of the Bay inclining their Guns a little towards the Center.

As it is intended here to debark all the Troops between the second and third Grand-Division of Rangers; those Divisions must be disposed at a Distance from each other, large enough to admit the Boats to row into Shore between them, as many a Breast, as shall happen to be, according to the Disposition the Commander shall chuse to throw them in, for the Debarkation of the Troops. We have here drawn up for the making the Descent each Regiment a different Way; for no other Purpose but to shew, without crowding the Work with Plates, that the whole Brigade might be drawn up on Occasion either of these Ways; the three Regiments a Breast, or in the Rear of one another: to shew in short that the Regiments on the Water by the Means of these Boats are capable of performing any Evolution, that they can by Subdivisions on Land. The three Regiments of Subdivision Boats in this Plan, are a Breast; the Blue on the right are ranged in two equal Divisions, or Wings, the one in the Rear of the other. The Red on the left are disposed to make their landing by Subdivisions; the White in the Center by Grand-Divisions.

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They that have the Management of the Rudders, must be very exact in keeping a proper Distance from the neighbouring Boats; that when those in the Front shall have debarked their Troops, they might have Room to make their Evolution and row off without interrupting the succeeding Boats. By observing this strictly, there is no Room to Doubt, but the Troops would form from this Debarkment with as much Ease, and as free from Confusion, (when required) as from a March; where the Grounds and Country or any other Reason oblige them to contract their Front. The same Causes may subsist, when they draw towards the Shore, as we will suppose in this Case, though not out at Sea: There may not be a convenient Space wide enough for three Regiments, besides a Regiment of Artillery Rangers to be debarked all at once with a full Front. Which though they all touched, would cover an Extent of Coast of 2502 Feet; wherefore when the Evolutions necessary to be made and the Distances to be observed are considered, it may very well be said 5000.

By these Methods the Brigade is debarked under the immediate Cover of a Battery of eight twenty-four Pounders on each Side of it; with two other grand Divisions of Rangers loaded with heavy Artillery, besides all the small Artillery and Speckled Rangers, disposed on their right and left also, only at greater Distances in order to take every Advantage the Irregularity of the Shore affords. Besides this Artillery, every Subdivision-Boat has a two Pounder Gun at each End, as a particular Defence to that Boat.

Should all this not be sufficient, to procure a safe Debarkation, there is still Liberty left to all the Bomb-Ketches of the Fleet, to throw as many Shells as they please, from behind the Transport Boats and Artillery Rangers, to as good an Effect, as though they were in the Front of them. Should this still not be sufficient, which is hardly possible to suppose, we are to remember the Manner the Troops are seated in their Boats, which when drawn up with a broad Side to the Shore, will give every individual Soldier, the same Power of making Use of his Firelock, whilst he is in the Boat, as he can, when on the Land.

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To carry the littoral War to any Perfection it will frequently be necessary to make a Shew of landing a few Troops by Way of a Feint, where the real Descent is not intended to be made ; for there can be no Reason, why Feints are not to be used in this War, as well as any other. Wherefore what with Feints, and real Debarkations, it may be supposed in the Course of an Expedition, that full Employment will be found for the Troops ; which Employment, it becomes the Commander (to have them all go through the Whole the better) to divide as equally as possible among them. Whoever considers this, will see the Absurdity of picking out particular Corps to make always the first Debarkation, under the Notion of a Post of Honour ; which at this Rate will soon be converted into a Post of Fatigue. For this Reason, as well as to preserve the Regiments from being broke and separated as much as may be. We have in this Plate, debarked and re-imbarked the Companies of Grenadiers with their own Regiments, though detached from them. In this Sort of War, the making sham Debarkments, is what in the Course of a Summer must frequently happen ; therefore (as in all probability there may be other more particular Grenadier Duties) such as has been already shewn ; we shall not look upon the Act of making the first Debarkment, or always to close the re-imbarkment to concern them more than any other Soldier. By disregarding then this phantom Notion of Honor, which has been so strictly adhered to during these last Descents on the Coast of France ; though we believe at the Affair in St. Cass's Bay, it was pretty well beat out even of those, who respected it the most. By quitting this shadow we gain these solid Advantages ; we preserve for the generality our Regiments whole and entire ; no particular Companies nor particular Regiments are harrassed and fatigued more than their Share. Nor shall it be the Fate of the tallest stoutest and perhaps the best Troops, to be exposed to every ordinary and extraordinary Danger, as well as labour, because it is their Fortune to be the tallest and stoutest Men. In this respect then, we suppose the Whole to Share alike : And had it been thought right, to have supposed the same before the Action at St. Cass ; the loss of about 300
Men

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Men killed, and as many taken Prisoners would not have been thought an Affair of Consequence enough to have been echoed over Europe, as it has since been. However not to flatter ourselves too much, we must take Notice of one unfavourable Circumstance.

We are to observe that during this first Debarkment, we shall not have one single Horse on Shore; and it will frequently happen, that the Shore either by Sand Banks, Rocks, or one Thing or other, will rise immediately so high, as to obstruct, if not entirely take away the Use of some of our twenty-four Pounder Guns; and then having no Horses to draw them on Shore, we might as well in these Circumstances have had no Guns. In these Situations the great Use of the six Pounder at the narrow End of the Ranger appears. For when this is the Case, the Boat must be turned round as soon as possible till the little Gun points towards the Shore, which must be drawn out by the Men of the Boat, and planted immediately as conveniently as the Place and Time will admit on the Eminence. As is done in the Ground between Les Roches and Water C, which is there made to rise a little higher than the rest of the Shore, for no other Reason but to shew this Operation. This may frequently be required to be performed on other Occasions; as when the Ground is too soft to bear so great a Weight as the twenty-four Pounder. However when we have proceeded so far, as to have got our Rangers to the Brink of the Shore; as occasion and opportunity offer, we are to debark the Guns as well as the Men of the Transport-Boats. If indeed the great Gun should be so placed in the Boat, as to command as much Ground in that Situation, as when on the Land; the little Gun then only might be landed. According to our System, we do not intend to render useless a single Musket, much less any Part of the Artillery. The large Artillery Ranger being thus armed with a great and small Gun; in all probability the Case will oftener exist, in which both Guns may be employed, than that neither can; but should it happen for the above Reasons that the great Gun was rendered useless, those Reasons will not hold good with the little one. Should it also ever fall out that the Enemy fired at too great a Distance for the little one to answer the

the End ; it is a great Chance at such a Time but the great one might be brought to bear. We have mentioned these Particulars in a Debarkation, to show the Necessity of having Guns of such a very different Caliber. The Necessity will appear in all the several Operations of this War. They mutually assist each other, and when they Range about together whether on the Land or Water, almost every thing that comes within their reach must fall their Victim. In soft, hilly, or rocky odd Places the little Gun is brought to bear, but at the more distant and stouter Object, we Fire the great one : we are to remember, when it should so come to pass, that neither of these Guns can be of Use, we have still in Reserve the Speckled Ranger's nine Pounders, as a Medium. As the System we are upon is sufficiently known ; we will finish this Chapter with a few Remarks on the Debarkation described, and on the Landing of Troops in general. The Number of fighting Men that are to make the first Descent in this Bay are 3000 ; yet the three Regiments of Transport Boats, we have supposed, make only 2340 Soldiers. The rest are accounted for, in the following Manner.

The Artillery Men in the Rangers will be entirely taken up with the Management of their Guns ; however though this is the Case with them, it is not with the Rowers ; who when they have reached their appointed Stations, will have nothing that can employ them all in their Boats. The Rowers to the whole Regiment of Artillery Rangers, being twenty-four to every Boat, make eight-hundred and sixty-four. Wherefore when the Rangers are stationed and the Guns properly pointed ; should six Rowers be left in every Boat, they will make in the whole 216 ; which in those six Situations will be sufficient. By this Method the remaining 648, may be added to our 2340 Soldiers ; which make what may be called 3000 Men, as they want but twelve of that Number. In these Circumstances the Rowers are to take the Artillery Mens Muskets, and may join the Regiments, or do whatever Service the commander in chief of the first Debarkation requires. The Rowers of every grand Division of Rangers, may form a little regular Body, in the same Manner, as any regular Troops ; or may Act the Part
of

of Irregulars, to this first Debarkation. By our Method of Debarking the Subdivisions will march out with a full Front; therefore it will be done so instantaneously, it can hardly be supposed, an Enemy can be near enough to attack them in the very Act: but should we be mistaken as to this Particular; and it was perceived, their Intention was to take us in this disadvantageous Manner; as the Enemy must consequently be near the Edge of the Water, the best way at such a Crisis as this, would be for the Commander to order the three whole Regiments of Transport Boats to front the Enemy, and begin their Fire from the Boats; for as every Man can use his Musket in the Boat, there will be no Fire lost. And should the Enemy be able to keep their Ground, notwithstanding the Fire, of 2340 Muskets, besides 32, twenty four-Pounders, eight nine-Pounders, and sixty two-Pounders, all which we will suppose, at such a Crisis as this, to be loaded with Cartridge Shot; should the Enemy (we say) notwithstanding this Fire, keep their Ground, which is impossible for them to do, unless they were very numerous, or their Situation very advantageous; however should this happen, it would be Prudent, not to Debark here, but draw off either to some other Place, or to their Ships. We have supposed here, what can very seldom (if ever) happen.

However it is to be remembered, that as soon as the Shore is taken possession of by the Invaders, the Number of fighting Men is considerably encreased, by the Addition of Rowers. Should the Enemy mean to attack the first Body of Troops which are now 3000, they would in all Probability stay, till the Transport Boats were returned to the Ships for more Men; for it must not be forgot these Boats carry away with them sixty two Pounder-Guns. To Balance this loss of small Artillery in this Interval of Time; thirty two six-Pounders may be brought to supply their Places, which should be debarked as soon as possible: and should the Enemy be at a very small Distance and in a very Watchful Situation, it might be prudent to debark (at least) some of the six Pounders, before any of the Troops; because they might be landed under the cover of the Fire of the Troops as they Sat in their Boats; and under the Cover
also

also of some of the twenty-four Pounders; this is not to be done in deep Water with an Enemy having much Artillery and in a Situation capable of playing it; however to oppose a first Debarkment in all probability there would not be much Artillery: otherwise should a Subdivision only of every grand Division of six Pounders, be landed at a Time; they would be defended by the other Subdivision of twenty-four Pounders, which during this Act would be pointed for that Purpose towards the Enemy. When one Subdivision had debarked their six Pounders, they are to turn the broad End of their Boats immediately to the Enemy to defend in their turn with their great Guns the other Subdivision, whilst they were putting on Shore, in like Manner their little ones.

By these Methods the different Parts of the Debar-kation mutually defend each other during their Act of Debarkment. When the little Guns are got on Shore, we are to suppose them planted as advantageously as the Nature of the Ground will admit, as well as the Genius of the Commander can invent. On this Supposition we will now Judge, whether there is a probability that the Enemy would attempt to attack a Body of Troops in these Circumstances, before they were joined by a second Debarkment. Not to flatter ourselves too much, we will imagine the Enemy to have got together a double Number of Regiments, to this first Debarkment; we will suppose also that these Regiments are in every Particular well appointed; each having two Field-Pieces, making twelve in the whole: we will suppose farther they have four Squadrons: which we will say in Number make six hundred Horse. The Enemy then have now 4680 Foot, with 600 Horse and twelve Field-Pieces, which we will call eight Pounders. Now the Question is whether they could venture to engage 3000 Muskets, with thirty two twenty-four-Pounders, as many six Pounders, and eight nine-Pounders seventy two in the Whole, loaded with Ball and Grapeshot, and planted so as to Flank every Way in the most destructive Manner. For our Parts we do not think the Enemy would venture it; nor, if they did, they would Succeed. We are to remember, the Troops landed, will be drawn up with
their

their backs to the Edge of the Water, or at least in such a Manner as to prevent the Enemy from flanking them, or getting in their rear, or surrounding them; therefore their Cavalry in this Situation will be of little or no Service. Besides should there be any Waters running up the Country or jetting inwards, as there almost always are, they would give the Rangers an opportunity of flanking with their great Guns, without the possibility of being seized by the Enemy. We are to add to this the continual Expectations the Troops on the Shore would be in, of being supported by a second Debarkation, which would encourage them, as much as the same Expectations would discourage the Enemy. Wherefore when every thing is considered on both Sides, it must be allowed, should the Enemy attack, they must meet with a very hot and bloody Reception, with great probability to very little Purpose: as there is good Reason to imagine that 3000 Men with 72 Pieces of Artillery, and many of a very large Caliber, having their backs covered by Water, would never suffer 4680 Foot with 600 Horse and twelve Field-Pieces to force them; especially when they were in continual Expectations of being supported by a second Debarkment.

In this first Descent, it cannot be said, we have flattered ourselves in the least; as we have supposed the Advantages to be chiefly on the Side of the Enemy. We have given them a double Number of Regiments of Infantry to those debarked, and all compleat in every particular besides four Squadrons; which is a Strength more than may reasonably be expected in a Place that is surprized. We have supposed on our Side, the Man of War, Frigate and Bombketch all incapable of being used; when as to the latter it will very rarely happen, but it may be brought some how or other, near enough to throw Shells to a very good Purpose. However we had a mind not to deceive ourselves in our first Debarkation.

It might frequently be found necessary, when the Wind did not serve well, or when the Distance between the Fleet and Shore was great, to have more Rowers. For this Purpose, the upper Edge of the Sides of the Transport Boat, that are made to let down,


Fig. 1. (a) A View of a Subdivision-Boat of the White Regiment, the Irregulars not described.




(b) The Section of a Transport Boat of the Blue Regiment, showing a Division of the Irregulars, to the method the Platoon or Regulars are seated.



(c) A Plan of a Subdivision Boat with the Steps let down for the Troops to march out on.




(d) The same of a Platoon Boat.



(e) A View of a Debarkment of the Regulars from a Platoon Boat of the Red Regiment.




(f) A View of a large Artillery Ranger Boat of the Black Regiment, the Artillery Men not described.



(g) A View of the Debarking of one of the Nine pound or guns from a speckled Ranger of the Black Artillery Regiment.



All these Letters & Figures are supposed to be on the Streamers & Sides of the Boats, in the same Manner as (a) Fig. 1.



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III.

down, must be made also with niches to receive, as Occasion may require, Oars : should each contain three Oars, a Subdivision Boat gains by it, twelve; and the Platoon Boat, six. These Rowers must be taken from the Irregulars in every Boat; who when they approach within Gun-shot of the Shore, are to fall into their proper Places again as Irregulars, to leave the Platoons full Liberty to Fire.

Should the Place where a Debarkment was to be made, be so hilly, and rocky, as to absolutely take away the Use of the great Guns during their continuance in the Boats, it might be Right in the first Debarkment, to leave the great Gun of every Ranger in the Ship, and make up the Weight with Troops. This would encrease much the Number of Men, in the first Descent, who, in such a Situation might be of more Service with the little Guns only, than the great Guns without them. The great Guns might be brought, when Matters were prepared properly to receive them; when also there were draught Horses landed to get them out of the Boats.

The Method of making a Descent being reduced to such exact Order and Regularity, and so well attended with great and large Artillery; it is not very probable, there would be frequent Occasions to make Feints, when a real Descent was intended. However should a Feint ever be thought Necessary. We must take for that Purpose some of the regimented Boats; should it be made wholly with the ordinary Boats of the Fleet; the Enemy would naturally conclude, the real Descent was to be put in Execution by the Boats calculated entirely for it. To deceive them in this Point, we would take two Subdivision Boats from each Regiment, with a Platoon of Artillery Rangers to attend them, on the Side most conspicuous to the Enemy. The grand Divisions of the Regiments intended for the real Descent, who have lent their Boats to make the false one, are to be rowed in their proper Regimental Places in the ordinary Boats of the Fleet. For this Purpose the left grand Division of the Blue, the right of the Red, and a Center one of the White, would suit as well, if not better than any. Because when they came to the destined Spot, though they were not in that regular Order

as the Men in the other Boats ; as soon as they got upon Land, they would recover their proper Places by the Order and Fire of the grand Divisions on each Side of them, which would not have had the like Reason to have broke their Regularity. There can be no great Difficulty in this ; as it is required of little more than a fifth Part of each Regiment ; therefore such a Proportion only will run any risk of being disconcerted.

CHAPTER VI.

THE nice Operation of making a Descent in an Enemy's Country from a Fleet of Ships, required so much to be said upon, it may be presumed, the System we would establish, by this time is thoroughly evinced. In the present Chapter, we shall shew some other interesting Operations relative to the littoral War, greatly facilitated by the same System.

It very rarely happens, that a Town can be taken, without first silencing some Forts and Batteries. It may be observed also, it as seldom falls out, that a Fort of any Consequence should be constructed on a Spot to defend a Water ; where no Ship of War can approach within Gun shot of it. It may reasonably be supposed, where no Enemy can annoy, there is no want of a Defence. It would be a Kind of Madness, for a Man to be holding up a Shield, against another, that can't possibly come near enough, to strike him. However should this be granted, it does not take away the Utility of the Artillery Ranger Boat, in the assisting, if not absolutely taking, any Fort constructed in a like Situation. Though there may be some deep Waters, in all Probability there are shallow Waters also, which cannot afford a Berth to a great Ship, yet may be a very convenient Station for a Regiment of Rangers ; besides should a Man of War approach near enough to hurt a Fort, it is very possible the Ranger may advance much nearer, to do more serious Execution ; for a twenty-four Pounder Gun from a Ranger, will send a
Ball

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Ball as far and as hard, as from a Man of War. It is besides a Rule in Fortification to construct that Face the strongest, which by its Situation invites the Enemy most.

Upon the same Principle, it is natural to suppose, the Face of a Fort that Fronts a Water deep enough for large Ships to batter from; should have the chief of its Guns pointed that Way; it was observed of Fort Fouras, that it was stronger towards the Sea, than towards the Land; for the above Reason too, had its chief Guns pointed that Way. This general Principle then in Fortification, which is to make every Part equally defensible, gives at present, and in all likelihood may continue to do so a good while longer, a great Advantage to the Artillery Ranger, in its attack on a Fort or Battery; as the Ranger may be rowed close into Shore to Fire on some oblique Part, where perhaps there might not be scarce a Gun to answer it. This must frequently be the Case; there is the same Reason, not to mount any Guns on that Part of a Fortification, from whence it is esteemed an Impossibility to have any thing to Fire at; as to erect Forts in those Places only where it is to be presumed the Enemy can approach to annoy. To illustrate farther our System, we will batter a Fort situated like Fouras with a Regiment of Artillery Rangers. It is given in Plate the 3^d. with rising Grounds near it, as in Admiral Knowles's Plans; wherefore by taking the Advantage of those Heights, we shall shew the System the better. We shall not harangue here, whether Ships can approach to batter it, or not. The Reader must see, by the Embasures, where the chief Guns of the Fort and Battery are directed; and there is a Vacuum left for them to Fire at. We will dispose the Rangers in the following Manner; the two grand Divisions on the right, face the left of the Fort and Battery with an oblique Line. The two grand Divisions on the left Face the right of the Fort in the same Manner. The sixteen small Guns of the grand Divisions on the right, are detached with a Body of Troops on the Hill on the left of the Fort, should that Hill be near enough to Fire into the Fort from, with six Pounders. The two Platoons of Speckled Rangers, we would send with a good Escort,

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to the other Side of this Land that runs thus into the Sea, and there debark the Guns and Men, to plant them as advantageously as the Village and Grounds will admit, to batter the back Part of the Fort. After a sufficient Time has been given for the four several Batteries to be in perfect Readiness to pour their Shot in all together ; an appointed Signal should be made from that Battery, which by its Situation will require the longest Time for its Preparations. The two great Batteries from the Rangers, might keep at a farther Distance than the Water they are to batter from, till the Signal was given for the whole to begin ; by this, they would be out of the reach of the Fort, during the Time the other Batteries were forming, and would nevertheless by their Appearance amuse the Fort, sufficiently to divide the Attention of those who were to defend it, from interrupting too much the Artillery that were advancing on the Hill, and in their Rear. When things were thus adjusted, it is scarce to be supposed, that such a Kind of Fort would make a long Resistance ; when it is considered, the Difficulty they would meet with, in bringing their Guns which Point chiefly forward, to Fire on the two oblique Lines of Rangers. To deceive the Enemy in this particular the more ; the Rangers might take their first distant Berth in one intire Line, exactly opposite the Front of the Fort. (See O) Upon the Signal being given, they might divide in the Center and Row off to the Right and Left by Platoons ; inclining to take their appointed Station as in the Plate. The Cannonading should not begin, till a certain given Time after the Signal ; that no Part might be exposed, a Moment, before the Fire from the four opposite Quarters began. Whatever the Signal was, should the Situation of the several Divisions of Artillery be such, as for any one, not to be able to discern it ; it should be repeated by the Division next to it ; so on, till it has gone quite round. As it is the System of the Rangers that is here principally to be shewn, we shall not mention the Land-Operations, more than observing, that the Artillery debarked, must have such a Body of Troops with them as not to fear a suddain Surprise from the Fort or elsewhere, with proper Implements to make the most of the Ground they chose to batter from
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for their own Security. Upon the first Determination to attack a Fort thus situated; the Height upon the Left of it, if possible, should be immediately, seized; whoever was in Possession of that rising Ground, might be supposed to have such a commanding View of the Country, as to form a Disposition for the several Attacks that was judged the most proper. It may be observed also, should it be found necessary, to have on Shore any small Artillery, on the other Side of the Fort opposite this Hill; the two Grand-Divisions of Rangers that are on the Right of the Fort can furnish for that Purpose sixteen small Guns. The different Movements of the Rangers rowing to the Shore to Debark their small Guns; then drawing off to form a Line in Front; after that inclining to the Right and Left, and advancing all at once to the Attack, would facilitate the Enterprize much more than impede it. A Variety of Evolutions on the Water will serve to conceal the real Design, as much as on the Land; then it must not be forgot, that they are made with much more Safety on the former, than the latter: for an Enemy inferior in Shipping cannot Surprize a Number of Boats on the Water out of the reach of Guns-shot, during the Execution of them.

Wherefore when all things are considered, it does not seem improbable, but a Fort, thus surrounded with Artillery, when the whole was perceived in motion, would be so distracted, as to be under a Necessity of surrendering before the Experiment of the Cannonade was made. It would not be a little terrifying, to behold sixteen six Pounders appearing on the Hill on their Left; eight nine Pounders, from the Village and rising Grounds in their Rear; sixteen other six Pounders (should they be thought necessary) on the Grounds on the Right; and thirty two twenty-four Pounders in the Rangers firing obliquely upon the whole Front. They who were to defend a Fort of no greater Strength than this, in such Circumstances, would find themselves in much the like Difficulties, as the Goths who besieged Rimini, in the Days of the Emperor Justinian. The Relation of which shall finish this Part of the Chapter, relative to the Attack of Forts, by a Regiment of Artillery Rangers.

^t Echard's
Rom. Hist. vol.
4. Ch. 2.

The Towns of Rimini and Auximum stand on the Italian Shore towards the Adriatick Sea ; the first Westward, the latter more to the East ; if we may compare great things to small, like the two Forts of Aigle and Fouras to the Ocean, only indeed the former here is rather to the West and the latter to the East. During the Wars between the Romans and Goths, Rimini held out for the Emperor Justinian, and was besieged by Vitiges the King of the Goths in the Year 540. Auximum, a strong well fortified Town, was also garrisoned by the Goths, who were in a Situation capable of falling upon the Rear of the Imperialists, and harrassing the Country inhabited by the Romans, should they remove from Firmum where they then were assembled to the Relief of Rimini. Belisarius ^t the Roman General was unwilling to lose Rimini, and also to leave the Country about Auximum to the mercy of the Goths. To provide the best he could against both Inconveniencies, he left a thousand Men under the Command of Aratius by the Sea-Side, to awe the Garrison of Auximum ; and sent some Forces by Sea with Orders to Sail directly to Rimini, and to Land near the Foot : Martinus was directed to conduct them along the Shore : When they approached the Enemy they were ordered to make great Fires, to terrifie the Goths the more with a false Apprehension of their Numbers. Belisarius with the rest of the Army marched at a Distance from the Sea by the Way of the Mountains, with a Resolution not to hazard a Battle, both because the Enemy were superior in Number, and rendered desperate by some late Misfortunes. This Division of his Forces and his Stratagems, for which he was famous, had the desired Effect : for some of the Goths that were straggling a broad, fell by Chance upon a Party of his Men, and observing the main Body appear upon the Mountains, they hastened back to their Camp, where they reported the Romans were marching with an innumerable Army to the Relief of the City. Vitiges prepared for a Battle, apprehending no Danger but from the North, and the tops of the Mountains : but when the Night following, he observed the Fires kindled by Martinus to the East of the City, he immediately concluded he should be unavoidably surrounded by the
Enemy ;



The Village Fouras stands in respect to the Fort, in the View given by M^r Knowls, as here described.

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concluded he should be unavoidably surrounded by the
Enemy ;

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Enemy ; especially in the Morning when he beheld the Fleet, which was bearing down directly towards him ; this struck him with so much Consternation, that he grew incapable of Counsel, and his whole Army was seized with so much Terror, that, regardless of all Command every one grew intent upon his own Safety, and thought of nothing but securing himself in Ravenna.

Having finished the Attack of a Fort situated at the Edge of a Shore, or at the Mouth of a River ; on a Supposition chiefly, that no Ship of War can be brought against it : we will proceed next to the Attack of a Battery up a River, on the same Supposition. For this Purpose, we shall keep to the same River, which is the Charente ; and for the following Experiment, have made Choice of the Battery of Vergeron. These Plates being only to shew particular Enterprizes ; we are not to take notice of the other Forts, which are described, merely to give a true View of the River ; they are supposed all to be silenced, and that we have no Impediment in our Passage up the River, till we come to the Battery of Vergeron. Which is now to be taken by the Regiment of Rangers. (Plate 4th.)

By seizing the Hill on the Left of Fort Fouras ; we Command not only the Country Westward, towards the Fort ; but the Country Eastward also, and great Part of the River Charente. Whoever then stands on the Eastern Side of that Height, will be able, in all Probability, to form a Disposition for the Attack of Vergeron ; as much as they who reconnoitred from the Western Side, could the Attack of Fouras.

The Battery will be discovered, to Face in a good measure an Elbow of the River ; to batter in all likelihood the better any Enemy's Ship, during the Operation of making that Turn, or perhaps to be more concealed. It frequently will happen, that these Situations are thought the most Eligible to erect Batteries on, on a Supposition that any Vessel of the Enemy is exposed to the Guns of the whole Battery, when the Ship or whatever the Vessel is, can only Fire her End Guns *.

* As we are not writing a Naval History, or the Art of War by Sea, we hope any term relating to Shipping, if not rightly expressed, will be passed over.

by not being able in a River to bring her Broadside towards it. As much as this is a Disadvantage to a Ship, it is an Advantage to a Regiment of Rangers, according to the Disposition we shall make of them for this Purpose. In the Land-Service no Musketry-Fire is reckoned so terrible, as what is called Street-Fire, which is a Succession of Divisions of Troops, one behind the other; as soon as that in the Front has fired, it opens from the Center, and wheels off to the Right and Left, to form again in the Rear; the second Division immediately advances into its Place, gives their Fire, then wheels off in the like Manner; so on with the rest, which makes a continual Succession of Fire. If a Fire well conducted of this Sort (even though of Musketry) is thought irresistible; What must it be; when in the Place of Muskets, we bring twenty-four-Pounders, which we are now going to do. It is called in the Land-Service, Street-Firing; in the littoral War, it must go under a more respectable Denomination; wherefore we will term it, the River-Cannonade. It may be performed either by Platoons, or Subdivisions, according to the Breadth of the Water; we will suppose here, the River will admit of the Cannonade to be made only by Platoons, which will be a continual Succession of two Shot at a Time with twenty-four-Pounders. The Regiment give us sixteen Platoons, besides the Subdivision of Speckled Rangers, which are reserved here for another Use. The Platoons are to observe such a Distance between each other, as to give Time to that which Fires, to open from the Center and Row off to the Right and Left, as was remarked in the Street-Firing. As all the great Rangers and their Guns will be made alike, they will be capable of being pointed exactly to the same Elevation. Wherefore the Commander of the Regiment after having well reconnoitred the Battery, and fixed on the Spot to Fire from, is to order his Regiment to raise the Muzzles of their Guns to a particular Elevation, as he shall judge right before the Cannonade begins. Notwithstanding this first general Order, should any Commanding Officer of a Platoon, after he has given one Fire, chuse to alter the Elevation, he should be at Liberty to do it. As the Waters, where the Rangers will

will be chiefly used will generally be shallow, especially in Rivers ; their Motion will be very trifling ; nothing sufficient to prevent taking a good Aim at the Mark pointed at, during the Cannonade. A large Boat on the Thames, is as steady almost as on Land ; the Difference of Rivers in this respect will be but small. The great and little Guns pointing to the opposite Ends of the Boat ; by the Time a Platoon have discharged their great Guns, and turned round to Row off, to give room to the succeeding Platoon to fill up their Places ; their little Guns will be opposite the Battery : and are to Fire with the great Guns of the second Platoon ; by this Means after the first Platoon have fired, every Fire will consist of four Pieces of Artillery ; two large, and two small : and though the latter are not supposed to do much Damage to the Battery, they add greatly to the Multiplicity of Shot ; and consequently not a little to the driving away the Men who work the Guns at the Battery. Every Gun should have a little buoy fastened to it, by which Means, they would very seldom be irrecoverably lost. It is to be observed from the Hill, from whence we formed this Disposition ; that upon the Right of the Battery of Vergeron, there are two lesser Waters running from the Country. Wherefore at the Time the great Rangers are disposed for the River Cannonade ; the lesser or Speckled Rangers with at least two Platoon Boats of Grenadiers should be ready on their Left Flank, to take Possession of the Water most to the North, as soon as ever they perceived the Attention of the Battery, engaged with the great Rangers, which would certainly be when the first Fire was given. The Speckled Rangers should push so far up that Stream, as to be in a Position capable of raking, (if possible,) the whole Battery.


Should the Water be too low for this Purpose, or the Banks too high to Fire over ; those nine-Pounders might be drawn upon the Bank, to answer better such a Design. The Platoon Boats of Grenadiers, are chiefly to assist and to defend them from being seized, or interrupted in their Business. Should the River Cannonade, and the Fire of the eight nine-Pounders on the Flank of the Battery be well conducted ; it is scarce to be supposed, such a Kind of Battery would hold out

any long Time : It will generally happen from the irregular Situation and Windings of the Banks of Rivers, and Shores ; that it may be contrived for the Rangers, which are low Built to be in a great Measure skreened from the Enemy's Fire. In this very Place, we would shew no more than the Mouths of the Guns at the Instant they were going to give Fire. This is done here, only by determining the Spot every Division Fires from, to be at the Elbow opposite the Battery ; they need discover no more than the Front of every Division of Rangers at that Point, just enough to take a good Aim at the Battery ; the remainder of the Boats will be in a great Measure covered by the Bank of the River, on their Right. It will frequently be found, that there are rising Grounds, Woods, Inclosures, and Hedges, near the Sides of Rivers, all which serve to facilitate an Operation of this Sort ; when Care is taken first to have those diversified Situations well scowered.

A Man of War of the first Rate in a River where it can't bring its Broad Side to front the Stream, would certainly be tore to Pieces by a River Cannonade, with as much Ease as a Fort or Battery. The Stern Guns could never contend with a Regiment of Rangers. The former in all probability would Fire too high to do any Mischief to such low built Vessels ; whilst the latter by directing their Guns just above the Water, would be successively repeating the Blow betwixt Wind and Water. It is not unlikely, but this would have been the Fate with the seventy Gun Ship, that pushed up the Charente, in the Rochfort Expedition had the Rangers been there, whether its Guns were thrown over Board or not. A Man of War beat in this Manner by little Boats, would not be so surprizing as a Ship at Sea taken by a Troop of Horse ; yet such a Thing once happened, for the Rarity, we will mention it. During the Troubles of Charles the first, some of the King's Party in Wales, were got a Board a Ship near the Welch Shore. The Tide being at Ebb, made a convenient Passage for Cavalry. This being observed by Captain Pophams's Troop^a then on the Coast ; they Rode into the Sea, and attacked the Men on Board with a brisk Fire from their Carbines ; which did such Execution among the Welch Gentry, they endeavoured

^a Life of Admiral Blake. By a Gentleman bred in his Family.





as much as they could, to Weigh and begone; but Popham's Troopers plyed them so thick with their Shot, that to save their Lives, they surrendered the Ship and themselves. Whether there were any Guns mounted, or not, we don't determine; but certainly there were few or none in a Capacity of being used, therefore it reduces the Ship to much the like Circumstance, as that we just now supposed up a River. It would be more agreeable, without Doubt, could any Military Undertaking be carried into Execution without Danger; but as that is incompatible with a Soldier's Employment, his chief Art is to render it as little, as possible. The same is to be observed in all Operations relative to the Transport-Boat and Artillery Ranger; this has been already mentioned; however we will here briefly repeat it, as to the River Cannonade. To this Purpose, all the Boats of the Fleet should be in perfect Readiness, with all Kind of Tackle proper to assist, when any Accidents happen to the Rangers, which must sometimes be the Case. They should be disposed in the most suitable Manner according to the Situation of the Water, Bank, Battery, &c. They should be divided in equal Numbers to the Subdivisions, and are to watch and follow them, but in such a Manner as not to be any Hindrance in any of their Movements. When the Rangers drew near the Spot, appointed to Fire from, these ordinary Boats might draw a little off to the Right and Left; they should have Ropes and grappling Irons; that should a Ranger receive any great Shot, they might Tow it out of the Way of the other Rangers; they are also to save as many Men as possible should a Boat be sunk: When they were arrived to any Dexterity, they would be able to facilitate very much, the Wheelings of the Rangers after they had fired, by throwing Ropes out to them to bring them round quick, and then to assist in clearing them from the succeeding Divisions, as fast as the Nature of the Thing will admit.

It is right, without Doubt, to take every Precaution that can be thought of, to lessen the Difficulty and Danger of these Services; though we believe, they appear greater than they would really be found.

In

x James the
first's Reign.

In 1620, seven armed Boats with three Brigantines were sent to burn the Shipping in the Mole of Algiers; they returned with the loss of six Men. * In 1654, Admiral Blake ordered every Captain to Man his long Boat, and burn the Ships in the Harbour of Tunis. They executed the Business with the loss of 25 killed, and forty-eight wounded. The Admiral in the mean Time covered them from the Castle with his Fleet. Sir Edward Spragge * in 1671, ordered two or three Pinnaces and Boats Crews to cut the Boom the Algerines raised to prevent their entering the Harbour of Bugia; they performed the Service with great Resolution, and so effectually that the Fire-Ship went in, and burnt all the Ships in the Harbour. The Damage Sir Edward sustained was the loss of 17 killed, and 41 wounded. In 1675, Sir John Narborough, manned all his Boats and sent them into the Harbour of Tripoli, under Lieutenant Shovel; who after burning every Ship in the Harbour, returned safely to the Fleet without the Loss of one Man.

By these Instances it may be judged, that the Danger in the Execution of the Services our Boats are to be sent upon, would not be so alarming, as might at first be imagined. For as the Transport Boats will be always accompanied by the Rangers, there will not only be great Quantity of Musketry, but variety of Artillery.†
Thus

* Sir Edward Spragge's Instructions are dated at Richmond the 14th of June, 1670. His own Letter published by Authority of his Success and Victory, is dated May 11, 1671. Campbel's Nav. Hist. Mem. of Sir Edward Spragge.

† The Intent of publishing this Work, being to give as many Lights as possible, to facilitate the Operations of those who shall be employed in future Expeditions. We here offer to the Publick the Sentiments of some well disposed Person on the present Head; viz. to prevent the Soldiers (as much as may be) being exposed to the Fire of the Enemy during their Continuance in the Boats. It is here related, just as we found it. However it is not to be supposed, that this Method can be practiced conveniently, according to our System: Nor indeed is the Necessity very urging, to have it practiced, as we have so much and so great a Variety of Artillery, no Enemy will scarce ever dare approach near enough to the Boats, to do mischief with their Musketry. But be this, as it will; we will give it as we found it, and leave others to improve upon it. It begins thus: "In some Accounts of the late desperate Skirmish at the Bay of St. Cas, it is observed, that many of our Forces were killed and wounded in the Boats in coming off. Several, it is said, were also killed in the

" Boats

Thus then we have ventured to offer to our Country a new Method of applying Artillery. In all probability it will be as lightly regarded, as Renaud's Bomb-Vessel was at first by the French. He withstood the Raillery of his Country about it; and was at last indulged, in having the Experiment made even old Duquene ^a one of the most eminent and experienced of the French Seamen, did not expect any Success from it. But he and the Algerines were astonished at the Effect of the Bombs. And the Art of throwing Shells from a moving Vessel with as much Certainty as from the solid Ground, is, what the French to this Day Claim as their Invention. The Art of River Canonading then, should it ever be tried, is to be claimed by the English.

^a Voltaire's
Age of Lewis
XIV. Vol. I.

Whether we shall ever live to see our Theory put in Practice, as Bernard Renaud did, we don't pretend to determine. But we can't help being as stiff to our Opinion; that a River Cannonade might be performed from moving Vessels, with near as much Certainty, as a

“ Boats at Cape Breton before our Troops could gain the Shore. * Such
“ Misfortunes might be prevented for the future by using Mantelets of
“ the following Construction: Let some Boards of a convenient length.
“ and about an Inch in thickness, be joined together to make a Frame
“ three or four Feet broad: Cover the outside of this with Tin-Plates,
“ and over these lay a Stratum of Quires of Brown Paper, which ought
“ also to be covered with Tin-Plates, the Nails being driven through all
“ the three Folds into the Boards. These Mantelets might be fast-
“ ened to the Edge of the Boat in the same Manner as the Rudder of
“ small Boats is hung to the Stern-Post; so that they could be put on or
“ taken off with the greatest Ease and Dispatch. On the Inside they
“ might have several Handles, by which the Soldiers in the Boat might
“ hold them upright. It would be no inconveniency if the whole Boat
“ were surrounded with them, as Spaces might be left on their lower
“ Edge not to interrupt the Playing of the Oars, and several Spying-
“ Holes might be cut through them, by which the Sailors might see to
“ guide the Boat; and when it were proper for the Men to Land, the
“ Mantelets could all be unhinged in a Moment, and laid in the Bottom
“ of the Boat.” Something of the above Contrivance might certainly
be invented, and found very useful for the Rangers, especially when
they went up Rivers. For it might not be always in the Power of the
Commander to afford Troops sufficient to scour the Banks on each Side.
When perhaps the Rout, the Army takes is a considerable Way from
the River, as is supposed in (Plate 5th.) It might also be useful in some
Degree to the Transport Boats, as for Instance to cover the several Di-
visions of Rowers, by which the Boat would seldom be impeded, by any
Accident happening to them. This is of great Consequence, as the Pla-
toons would defend themselves; besides the latter should be left at full
Liberty to debark in an Instant, when the Order was given.

* In 1758.

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Street-Firing on the solid Ground. Should we be laughed at for this, we shall only say, it is much easier to laugh, than to disprove; little Renaud was derided once on a same Account; we value it as little, as he did. It is Experience only, not the Words even of a Duquene, shall convince us, that this new Application of Artillery is incapable of being brought to as high, and as terrible a Perfection as the Bomb-Vessel, is, at this Day.

The Subject of Invention having been touched upon again; we will close this Part of the Chapter with observing; that the Contrivances of two Kind of Transport Boats, the one to hold a Subdivision, the other a Platoon; and also two Kind of Artillery Boats, the one to contain a great and small Gun, the other, two Guns of a middling Size, and then throwing all the Boats into a Military Regimental Order, give us the following Advantages. The Use of the First, is elucidated, by rendring us capable of making as many Evolutions with Infantry on the Water as on Land, of forming any Kind of Figure that Musketry is capable of being thrown in: It gives us a Power (by the Help of Irregulars) of doing any Thing required to be done in the Boat, without breaking in upon the Military Order of the Platoons: and by the Means of the Intervals being not crowded, between the Divisions of Right and Left Hand, or (in the Sea Term) the Starboard and Larboard Rowers, a free Liberty is given to shift the Sails as the Winds require. This is of more Consequence, than may at first appear; it has been observed, in the L'Orient Expedition, that some of the Boats in their Passage from the Cutter to the Place of Debarkment, were much behind the Rest; there being a brisk Gale, and their Boats so crowded, the Sailors could not set any Sail.

The Utility of Regimenting the Ranger, must be seen in an higher Degree. There are few Evolutions to be made on the Ground, even with small Field-Pieces, much less with large Artillery. But in the Ranger Boat on the Water; the Heavy as well as Light, are capable of being fired any Way, of making any Evolution, and of forming any necessary Figure. They have already been described, in Platoons,

Sub-

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Subdivisions, Grand-Divisions, Wings intire Line, and Columns. To illustrate farther our System, we will shew one more Operation. The two first, were with the Transport and Ranger Boat jointly ; the two next with the Rangers, almost wholly ; the last is to be a joint Affair again.

Having it now in our Power to take almost any Fort or Battery, on the Edge of a Shore, at the Mouth, or up a River. We gain an approach to every Town built on a River : on such that have not a Depth of Water to admit of Ships of War, a Passage the least expected ; and in all Probability not much prepared for such a Visit. We have been told what an Effect it had at the River Var ^b, where a few Marines and Sailers by passing unexpectedly up in Boats, surprized the Enemy out of their Lines. A few Batteries there might be in such Kind of Rivers to keep off Boats of armed Men, which would not impede greatly a Regiment of Artillery Rangers. This gives then a great Advantage ; it obliges a Garrison to lend their Attention, to a Part of a Town perhaps slenderly provided for Defence ; as having been esteemed unapproachable by an Enemy. It puts in our Power, a Method of making an Impression on some weak Place ; consequently facilitates very much every Enterprize on the Land-Side, that is to co-operate with it. A great Latitude is gained by this, for the carrying into Execution Conjunct Expeditions ; many Towns being built on Rivers, though few are deep enough for a Ship of War to ride in.

In 1589, the Impracticability of going up the River of Lisbon with the Ships of War, proved a very great Prejudice to that Expedition. It occasioned also a quarrel between the Commanders. Sir John Norris charging Sir Francis Drake with Breach of his Promise, and Sir Francis accusing him of expecting Service impracticable from the Fleet ^c.

What a puzzling Work was made in searching after the Channel, leading to the Mouth of the Charente, in the Rochfort Expedition, and at last not found. What time was mispent in fathoming ; how much it tended towards frustrating the Enterprize ! Whoever considers it will discover the Utility, of the Ranger that carries

^b The Attempt
against Toulon

^c Stowe's Annals, p. 757.
Holingshed,
Speed, Camden,
Rapin. Sir Will.
Monson's Nav.
Tracts, 174.

carries the Battering Cannon in shallow Waters ; not an hour here need be lost in plumbing the different Depths, much less whole Days ; nor are we confined, perhaps to one Station only, for the Arrangement of our Boats. All Places are nearly alike, every Water improper for Ships, whether at the Mouth, or up a River ; the latter of which we are now to treat of. It having been shewn in the two preceeding Plates, in what Manner a River may have every Fort and Battery silenced, from the Mouth upwards, whether the Ship of War can reach them, or not ; we shall keep, for this Purpose, to the same River, that is the Charente, only to a Part higher up. (Plate 5th.)

Whoever has Abilities capable of conducting the Defence of a besieged Town ; cannot be ignorant of the Methods also of Attack. There is such an Analogy between them, that providing the Application and Capacity are equal ; it is impossible to be cunning at the one, and dull at the other. Whoever rubs the Edges of two Weapons equally thick and tempered against each other will not find one blunt and the other sharp. In both the Attack and Defence there is acting and counteracting ; mining and countermining ; making Sallies, and Storming. There are few things useful to the one, utterly disserviceable to the other. The Defence of a Town with a Wet-Ditch, or that has a Part of it washed by any Water, is much benefited, by stationing Boats with Guns upon them, on those Waters, as they form so many moving Batteries *. The Dunkirkers practiced this Method in 1695 to a very good Purpose. Among the great Preparations that were made for their Defence they brought out Pontons,

on which they had placed Artillery ^d.
 As this is esteemed an Utility in the Defence of a Town ; conformable to what has been said, we shall shew there is no small Advantage to be reaped from it in the Offence. And as it is not to be supposed any Town will have their Guns on Boats in that Number, or complete Regimental Order, as the Rangers ; the

^d Gazette, No. 3102. Burchet's Memoirs. Hist. Militaire, Journal Historique de Louis XIV.

* Avoir des Barques, où il y ait de petites pièces courtes, pour la battre à revers. Mem. de Montecuculi. Liv. 1. Chap. v. Art. 3. de la Defence.

dexterous.

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dexterous Management of which will be a Science of itself; the greater Advantage will be on the besieging Part.

We will suppose then, that in an Enterprize against a Town standing on a River; it is thought necessary to facilitate the Land-Operations, to send some Troops and Battering Cannon up the Water, to see what Impression might be made on that Side. The River Charente, and Town of Rochfort to shew a thing of this Sort will do as well as any. For this Business we will detach from the main Army three Regiments; and from the Regiment of Rangers two Grand-Divisions with their great Guns only; and the two Platoons of Speckled Rangers. When the small Guns are taken out of the Rangers, the Shot and other weighty things are to be placed more towards the narrow End, to balance the Boat. The main Army then will have to attend them for the Land Operation, whatever it is, the sixteen great Guns of the other two Grand-Divisions, for a Battery or any other Purpose; and the thirty two six-Pounders for a Battle, should the Enemy approach to attack them, before they had finished. This Quantity of Artillery both large and small, will render a proportionable Body of Troops well disposed, secure to themselves and formidable to the Enemy. What remains to be shewn here, is the Disposition of both Troops and Artillery detached up the River. To vary the Plan as much as possible; we are to suppose for the Conveniency and Expedition of the March to the Town, that is to be attacked; the Army don't coast the River, but takes the shortest Rout from the Place of Debarkation, which is some Miles off. Therefore notwithstanding all scouting Parties which may be detached on every Side of the Army; the three Regiments are to go up the River in order of Battle, on a Supposition, they might be molested from either Bank; for though the Army marches on one Side, it was observed, the Rout they took is several Miles from the River.


The View to be given requiring a great Extent of the River, obliges us to describe the foremost Boat, almost as far as Rochfort and even then there is not sufficient space, for all the Boats to keep their proper Distances

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Distances from each other necessary to make their Evolutions. Wherefore that Part of the Town which faces the River, and communicates with the Country by a Bridge ; must be supposed here not to command the River : as there is a large Space of Ground intervenes, we are not sure, that it does. But lest it should, for the sake of shewing the present Operation ; we will imagine that whole Side of the Town, to have been by our own Guns, or Land-Operations, rendered incapable of annoying the Progress of the Boats.

The three Regiments and remaining Artillery we shall dispose on the Water in the following Manner. A Platoon of Speckled Rangers goes first of all ; the two Blue Platoon Boats, follow close after them Side by Side. This is the Reconnoitering Party, and for that Purpose, frequently separates to go up lesser Streams, or any such like Business. (a) Then follows at some little Distance the Van Guard, consisting of the other Platoon of Speckled Rangers ; and the Platoon Boats of Red, and White, follow them in the same Manner also. After the Van-Guard, proceed two Platoons of large Rangers, then the Subdivision Boats of the Blue Regiment, two a Breast ; then two Platoons of Rangers. After these the White Subdivision-Boats follow in like Manner, having two Platoons of Rangers in their Rear. Next comes the Red Regiment, which with two Platoons of Rangers, finishes this River Cavalcade, or Order of Battle. However to shew this Order the plainer, we will mention some Particulars necessary to be observed. The River here is supposed to be broad ; whether the Charente is, or not, is of no signification, in regard to the System. The Men in the Boats that have the Bank on their Right, are faced to the Right ; those that have the Bank on their Left, face to the Left. The small Guns at the End of the Boats (should there be any) are pointed to the Bank before them. The Reconnoitering Party, and Van-Guard observe the same. By this Disposition, should the Enemy be on both Sides of the River, they are equally prepared for either. But as it will much oftner happen, that the Enemy is on one Side only ; care must be taken that the Men in the Boats near the opposite Bank are not rendered useless, by having their own Troops be-
tween





tween them and the Enemy, in which Situation, the Fire of half the Troops would be lost. To obviate this Inconvenience, great Attention must be had to the Distances to be observed between every two Boats, or Division ; that should the Enemy appear on the Right, the Boats on the Left might by making an Evolution form between the Boats on their Right, and face the Enemy with those Boats, in exact Regimental Order, or Order of Battle. This is very easily done ; as for Instance, the Blue Regiment Rows up the River in the following Manner : The first, third, fifth, and seventh Subdivision-Boats have the Bank to their Right. The second, fourth, sixth, and eighth, to their Left. At the Appearance of the Enemy near the Bank on their Right ; the four first mentioned Boats keep gently rowing on, the four last mentioned in the mean Time make an Evolution to the Right to face the Enemy ; by the Time they have made this Evolution, and front properly the Enemy, the others on their Right, which were moving on, will be got enough out of their Way, to give those that make this short Wheel, time to form in their Places. By which means, the second will face the Enemy between the first and third, the fourth between the third and fifth, the sixth between the fifth and seventh ; and the eighth falls in after the seventh. Should the Enemy be discovered on the left Bank, the Boats on the Left, hold Water ; whilst they on the Right, make the Evolution to the Left, as before it was made to the Right. The only Difference is this : when the Boats on the Right make the Wheel, each forms at the head of that opposite to it on the Left, instead of forming in its Rear. By which the whole will face the Left Bank in the same Order as they did before the Right. (See the Dots) The Distances to be observed between each Division of Boats, must be the length of a Boat and half at least ; because Evolutions can't be made on standing, much less running Waters, with the same Exactness, as on Land. We have given in this Plan no Rear Guard. However it will perhaps be thought best to have a Platoon of Speckled Rangers bring up the Rear ; because should the Enemy from any concealed Place, Fire on the Rear only, after the rest of the Boats are passed ; the great

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Rangers would take a considerable Time in turning on the Water, to Point their Guns properly ; when the Platoon of little Rangers may Row with their Guns ready pointed to each Bank ; those in the Ranger on the Right, to the Right ; those on the Left, to the Left. Should the River be too narrow to admit two Boats a breast, they must go one after another in their Regimental Order. The Rangers may be disposed between the Regiments, in a Manner the most suitable. Should they in this Position be attacked by an Enemy in Front and Rear, that is, from each Side of the River ; the two Front Ranks of the Platoons of the Subdivision-Boats may Fire to the Front ; the Rear Rank and Irregulars to the Rear. The whole Platoon of the Platoon Boat to the Front, and Irregulars to the Rear. Should the Rear only be attacked, the Rear Rank of Regulars are faced ready ; the Center Rank must stand up, and go to the Right about ; and the Irregulars will face to the Enemy of Course ; consequently in these Circumstances there will be only the Fire of the Front Rank of Regulars lost, providing they cannot be employed at such a Time among the Irregulars.

The Manner in which the Troops and Artillery may be employed, when they arrive at the Town, depends on the particular Situation of the Town, Ditch, fortified Works, and Grounds adjoining. Therefore every different Place, in all Probability, would require in this respect to be treated of differently: This would be a tedious and unnecessary Business ; as our System may be fully discovered without it : wherefore we shall say no more here, than what tends to its farther Illustration. This Passage up a River, may be found necessary on several Occasions. It was proposed in the last Attempt against St. Maloes that the Troops should advance five Leagues up that River, pass the Bridge at Dinant, and march down the other Side, in order to attack the Town from the St. Servan Side. A Passage of this Sort opens a Way for a Corps of Troops and Artillery, to every Town situated on its Banks : should it be surrounded by a wet Ditch, as such Towns are almost sure to be ; it facilitates a nearer approach. Should the Ditch be dry, it still gives us the Opportunity of landing any Force on the Side of the Town, opposite to that, where the main Army

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is, which is cut off from that Part of the Country by its Waters ; consequently let the Ditch be wet or dry, we have it in our Power, of making Use of the Advantage, of attacking the Town, in the most efficacious Manner ; that is, not only by Troops, but large Artillery, in as many Places, as are thought most proper. There is also a farther Advantage, which is of the greatest Consequence. The littoral War is carried on, on the Principle of a Coup-de-main, a Scalade, or of making some sudden vigorous Impression. With this View the Conjunct Armament Sails ; should it be asked to what Place ; it would be answered to some Town on the Enemy's Coast. Wherefore it is to be observed, almost all fortified Towns washed by the Sea, or a River, have a wet Ditch ; which is the greatest Impediment to a Coup-de-main, a Scalade, or any sudden Impression to be made against it. A Town so surrounded is secure (except from Bombs) whilst the Enemy can be kept on the exterior Side of the Ditch ; as it very ill suits with the sound of an Expedition, to attempt to starve a Town into a surrender. There are three Ways, to get the better of this Obstacle ; either to draw the Water off, to fill it up, or to pass over it. The first would take as much Time, and infinitely more Labour than to starve a Town ; therefore in this Sort of War, is not more to be attempted. The second is to be done, and in a short Time ; should every proper Material be in readiness. At the Siege of Turin, the Duke de Feuillade * had 15000 Bags of Earth. Where an Attempt of this Sort, is intended, the Number should not be less than 10000 ; and then the Size of them is to be considered. Empty Bags (it is true) weigh but little, and may be filled on the Spot. However when they are filled, they cannot be thrown in the Ditch even of a Town thinly garrisoned, but under the Cover of one Battery if not two ; to have these Batteries made proper and with Expedition ; several of the Materials must be carried in Transports, as well as the Sand-Bags ; such as Planks, Saucissons, Gabions, Fascines &c. Besides all the working Implements. It is not every Spot of Ground that produces these Necessaries ; even when it does, there is much time wasted in the procuring them. It has been shewn in this Book, that

e Age of Lewis
XIV. Voltaire.

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Expeditions have miscarried for the Want of them. However these Remarks are to be applied chiefly to Enterprizes, which, we are to suppose, must be finished before the arrival of the Enemy to interrupt them.

To pass then a wet Ditch, by drawing the Water off, or filling it up, with Troops circumstanced in regard to Time, and every other Particular, like those employed in a Conjunct Expedition, will be found no easy Business; though they should be favoured in many respects relative to the Place: such as being not in good Repair, and thinly garrisoned. Wherefore we must try the third Method. It is to be observed whatever the Method is, it is only prefatory to another Operation as difficult; that is, to mount the Works of the Place whatever they are, when the Ditch is passed. To do this before any Breach is made, must be by Scalade. What is to be shewn then, is the Passage of the Ditch full of Water, and afterwards the Scaling of the Town.

It has been seen in what Manner three Regiments of Soldiers, and great Part of a Regiment of Artillery Rangers can go up a River in the face of an Enemy; we will say, to the Water, that is contiguous to the Ditch of the Town standing on its Banks. As the Boats are made to Row in very shallow Waters, it may be supposed, they can go on the Water in the Ditch, as well as on the River leading to it. The Disposition of the Boats for the Scalade, which is to be done by the Assistance of both the Ranger and Transport-Boat, must be changed, when they are arrived near the Town; and be made in a Manner the most suitable to the particular Place, as well as the Business to be performed. There is no describing absolutely, how every thing is to be disposed for the Scalade; unless we knew the exact Situation of the Town and its Works. As that is not the Case, it can't be expected of us, to speak in any other terms, but general. The Rangers then, against the appointed hour for the Scaling, must be brought to the head of the Transport-Boats; except perhaps one Left to secure the Rear, of the whole Number on the River. When they are thus advanced, they are to be disposed, in the most suitable Manner, for silencing the Guns on the Works: as soon as they have entered the Ditch, they are

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to divide themselves so as not to be any hinderance to the Transport-Boats, which are to follow; and under the Protection of their Fire to perform the last Business, that of the Scalade, which is to be made from the Boats. In a Conjunct Expedition every thing is to be converted to as many Uses as possible. The Soldier in some Degree acts the Part of a Sailor, as the latter does that of the former. Employed in these Affairs they may be said to be amphibious; they are both Watermen and Landmen. However it is not only the Soldier or Sailor that is to serve in a double Capacity; for more Uses than what have already been shewn, are designed for the Transport-Boat and Ranger. The former is fifteen Feet in Breadth, the latter, seventeen. Wherefore should the Fore-Part of every Transport-Boat be made to receive three Ladders, which will give five Feet to each; there will be ninety Ladders to the three Regiments of Boats. The Ladders should be made according to the length that should be judged most proper by the ablest Engineers: however it would not be amiss to have some longer than the others, to suit different Occasions: as it is to be remembred, the longer they are, the more Places they Command; the shorter they are, the easier they are managed. The three Ladders allotted to every Boat, are to be fixt at equal Distances towards the Prow of the Boat. For this Purpose there should be round iron Pins drove into the Wood of the Boat, like that which we see in Gate-Posts for the Gate to swing upon. There should be a like Kind of Iron fastened to the lower End of each Side of the Ladder, to embrace the Pins as is on the Top and Bottom of the Gate. When the Ladder is in this Situation, a Nail must be thrust through the End of the Pin, to keep it from slipping off; However in such a Manner, as to be instantly taken out, should it be found necessary to alter the Position of the Ladder. The Ladder thus having its lower Part confined to the Boat, may be moved upwards to and fro without a possibility of getting out of its Place, with near the same ease, as a Gate swings backwards and forwards; consequently as soon as the head of the Boat touches the Work, the Ladder is to be fixt against; the Bottom of the Ladder being already settled, there is nothing to do but swing the Top Part against the Place to be scaled.

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f His Reflec-
tions Military
and Political.
Chap. 9. Of
Surprizes.

The Marquis de Santa Cruz ^f recommends a Groove to fix the Bottom of the Ladder in. But as the Transport-Boat is much longer and larger than what he speaks of, the Ladder may be longer also; wherefore when the Foot of it is firmly fixt, it is much easier raised. However several Grooves might be made besides at different Distances, to suit different Heights of the Work. Care must be taken to have the iron Pin at such a Distance from the head of the Boat, that when the Prow is pushed hard against the Work, the Ladder may be neither too upright nor too sloping. Should the Ladder which occasionally closes its two Sides together, be thought the most proper, as such certainly will take the less Room in the Boat, it must have the End of one Side only fixt to the Floor of the Boat. The Soldiers in the Boats should be divided as at other Times, into Regulars and Irregulars; but it will be impossible for them to sit down, and be in any Readiness to mount the Ladders; therefore it is best on these Occasions to have the Seats in the Boats taken away. The Regulars should stand in Platoons with their Firelocks on their Shoulders; the Irregulars may carry theirs over their Left Arms, which will keep up the Distinction between them. The Front Division of Irregulars, are to remove as much as they can all obstructions on the Water towards the head of the Boat, and are also to Fire at any Enemy they see on the Works ready to oppose the Scaling. The Center Division of Irregulars are to raise the Ladders against the Work, and hold them in that Position. In the Platoon Transport a few Irregulars of the two Divisions should be set a part, for this Purpose. The Rear Division are to Fire on any Enemy on the Right or Left, and are also to assist the Rowers with long and strong Poles to keep the Boat close to the Work; this is a very necessary Precaution, for should the Boat be suffered to give back, it would of Course draw the Ladders from the Work. When the Irregulars are employed in these last Offices, they are not supposed to have their Firelocks over their Left Arms, but to place them where it is most convenient. The Rowers will be engaged chiefly with their Oars, in keeping the Boat steady, and to its Place. Should the

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the Ladders be of the Sort just mentioned; it would be best to keep them standing upright as the Boat moved forward; unless it was thought the Surprise might succeed the better by concealing them. In the first Position they would take little more Room than so many Poles; and as their Weight would be bore by the Boat, though they were of a very considerable Height, they would be easily managed.

When every thing was thus adjusted, the two Platoons of Regulars are the first to mount, which they are to do by filing off by Ranks, consequently there is a Ladder to the Front, Center, and Rear. The commanding Officer of the Boat should lead one of the Ranks; the other Officer might follow at the Head of the other Platoon, or at a greater Distance, to regulate the Order of mounting the Ladders. The exterior Side of the two exterior Ladders, which we will suppose have their Bottoms fixt to the Boat; should have also a Chain or Rope with a Loop hole in it fastened to the Top; and a Man of the Front and Rear Rank that shall be thought the most proper, must have each a Mallet and strong Pin, which as soon as they have got upon the Work, they are to drive through the Chain or Rope into the Work, by which Means the Ladder will be fastened at Top as well as at the Bottom, and consequently prevent the Boat from going backwards and drawing it away. Whilst this is doing, the other Platoon may mount, as those who Pin the Rope, will be on the exterior Side of the exterior Ladders, therefore not in their Way. As soon as the Platoons have got upon the Work, the Irregulars are to follow.

We have not here mentioned which Platoon mounts first, nor which Division of Irregulars; as this depends in a great Measure, on what Part of the Boat, the Ladder is fastened to; that Platoon being to go up first, that stands the most convenient for it; the same is to be observed with the Irregulars. Should it be a high Wall, that is to be scaled; from whence they are to get down, on the Town Side: they who mount first, must take each a Rope Ladder with him; which he is to fix to the Top of the Wooden Ladder, and then throw the Rope one down on the Town Side; by which Means there is a Ladder to ascend and

K 4

descend;

descend; and whilst this is doing the two Ladders hold fast one another.

This is on a Supposition, that it is judged proper to proceed on a sudden by Scalade; and that an Attempt to beat the Wall down by the Artillery Rangers would alarm that Quarter of the Town too much. As the Boats are all regimented, it is to be observed, they may be disposed according to the Breadth of the Water; whether by single, two, or more a-breast. Should the Place admit the thirty Transport-Boats to be brought up against the Work a-breast, it might be scaled by ninety Men in Front. The Subdivision Boat which is the longest, not being more than eleven Toises in length; there are few Ditches, but what will be wide enough to admit a great Number to be ranged in a Line with their Prows close to the Body of the Place. Every Boat should have proper Anchors to hold it steady, as well as a Chain both at the Prow and Stern, which has already been observed at the Debar-kation. However we propose another Use for these Chains; which is to fasten one Boat close behind the other, in order to form a Bridge; when they should be employed in Scaling a Place perhaps that does not admit of more than one or two a-breast; the linking the Boats is to be done by some of the Front and Rear Divisions of Irregulars. By this Method, though the Place was narrow, should there be little or no defence, it might be scaled by ever so great a Number of Troops, by their passing successively out of one Boat into another, till they came to that at the Head of them which contained the Ladders. In an Affair of this Sort, and indeed in all Scalades, there should be a Reserve of Ladders. The Ladder that has just room for one Man to mount at a Time is the most proper for this Business. Because they may be placed close to one another, and we are not confined to Numbers; and when they are small they are consequently light, therefore easily managed. Besides a Cannon-shot will break a Ladder that admits of three or four Men to go up a-breast, with as much ease as the above-mentioned little one. And the probability of hitting the large Sort as well also as the Obstruction it occasions to the Scalade, when broke, is three Times as great, as what may be expected from

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from the small one. According to the Disposition made of the Artillery Rangers on the River, and with the Artillery with the Army supposed to be on the Land; there remain sixteen Rangers without any Guns in them: these Boats might be employed in bringing all Kind of Necessaries by Water from the Fleet to the Army on the Land; and from the Army to the Troops that are debarked perhaps, on the opposite Side of the River from the Transport-Boats. In the preparations for a Scalade they might be filled with a great Body of Troops to support those in the Transport-Boats. A Scalade is an Operation of great Nicety, even made from the Land, much more from Boats; to treat of it fully would take up too much room in a Work of this Sort. Wherefore we shall content ourselves in making some general Remarks.

Ditches full of Water, not frozen are an Hindrance to the Scaling of Walls, (says the Marquis de Santa Cruz.) A false Bray is as great an Obstacle as the Ditch; because after the Men are got upon it by the Assistance of Ladders, the Ladders must be drawn up on the false Bray, in order to be applied to the Body of the Place. During this Delay the Garrison has time to get together; and Surprizes never succeed, but when few Men are found under Arms. Different Preparations must be made for a Surprise, according to the different Obstacles, that are to be surmounted. Amongst the usual Obstructions, de Ville & reckons the Ditch and Wall: the former, that is fortified with a strong Palissado, may be looked upon as a great Impediment. To take a Town by Scaling, a large Front should be chosen, where there are few Outworks, short Flanks, badly furnished with Artillery, and weak in Parapets. It is from these Works that an Attempt of this Sort suffers. The Method the Marquis de Santa Cruz shews, for surprizing a Town with a wet Ditch, is very different, and much more difficult than what we have described here, because his Boats are supposed to be carried on Carts within half a League of the Town, and then by Soldiers or Horses; therefore must be very small, and consequently very unsteady to bear a Ladder. Besides these Boats, he says, lesser Boats made of waxed Cloth, are used to pass to and fro,

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g He wrote a
Book of the Of-
fice of Gover-
nors.

h See more fully
The Marquis de
Santa Cruz, his
reflections Mili-
tary and Politi-
cal, of Surprizes.

cross the Ditch, in order to supply the Boats that contain the Ladders with a continual Succession of Troops. He observes, the whole is a very troublesome Work, and storming with Ladders after this Manner would be so faint, that such a Kind of Surprize is not to be attempted, but against a small Garrison, and that is not very Watchful^h. Indeed all Scaling from a wet Ditch must be a difficult Operation. Therefore though it is made from several Regiments of Transport-Boats, which being of so great a Size, as not to be liable to be overfet; it should be facilitated as much as possible, not only by a good Disposition of the Rangers that accompany them, but also by every Method that can be thought of by the Army on the Land Side, to draw the Attention of the Garrison that Way. Towards bringing these Enterprizes nearer to Perfection; whilst the Rangers were employed against the Batteries, some of the Irregulars should have Grenado Shells to throw upon the Work that was to be scaled, as soon as they approached near enough. The Front Rank that first mounted the Ladders, should have in their Right Hands a double Barrel Pistol, and a good cutting Sword hanging by a Chain round their Right Wrists with another also in their Left Hands. Their Firelocks (which during the Time, they were getting up the Ladders would be an Incumbrance to them) should be slung upon the Backs of the Rear Rank, and given to them afterwards. Should the Men mount the Ladders by half Files, (as is here supposed,) they should be slung on the Backs of the third half File.

By these Methods, the Front Rank or half File, would have two Fires to give from their Pistols, as they were mounting; and when mounted the Center and Rear Rank, or third half File would be ready with their Firelocks to give at least one Fire. The Front Rank or half File should in some Degree be armed defensively; they should have a Skull Cap, a light Breast Plate, with a Kind of net Chain on their Hands and Arms. When every thing of this Sort was well regulated, a Scalade would be much less terrible to those who were employed in it, and much more so to those it was employed against.

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These Preparatory Matters relative both to the Offence and Defence of those who are engaged in so Critical an Undertaking, seem as conformable as any to Reason. However to corroborate this the more, we will shew two Instances nearly resembling the above Method of Arming for a Scalade, or climbing up any nearly Perpendicular Eminence, to attack an Enemy; that have succeeded as fully as could be wished. The first is a Transaction of Pierre le Grand a Native of Diep in Normandy. Pierre rendered himself famous for taking the Vice-Admiral of the Spanish Flota near the Cape of Tiburon upon the Western Side of Hispaniola ⁱ. This Exploit was performed with only one Boat, and twenty eight Men. Pierre and his Companions being drove to the last Necessity, spied this great Ship belonging to the Spanish Flota separated from the rest, and resolved to take it, or die in the Attempt. In the Dusk of the Evening this Action was performed. But before it was begun they ordered holes to be bored in the Sides of their Boat, that they might be compelled when they found it sinking under them, to mount the Ship with the greater haste, and attack with the more Vigor. This they did accordingly with a Pistol in one Hand, and a Sword in the other. They climbed up the Sides of the Ship, and ran altogether into the great Cabin; where they found the Captain with several of his Companions playing at Cards. The Spaniards seeing the Pirates aboard their Ship, without scarce having seen them at Sea, cried out, Jesus bless us! Are these Devils, or what are they? They seized on the Arms, and Military Chests, killed those that made Opposition, clapt a Pistol to the Captain's Breast and obliged him to surrender the Ship.

ⁱ Bucaniers of America written originally in Dutch by John Esquemeling, who served among them. Part 1. Ch. 6.

The other Instance we are to give, is a famous Exploit of Sir Henry Morgan ^k. He was the Son of a rich Yeoman in Wales; but his Inclination leading him to a Sea Life, he became a great Captain among the Bucaniers of America *. Among the extraordinary

^k Ibid. Part. 2. Ch. 6.

* A People of different Nations that assembled together in Hispaniola and lived by hunting of wild Bulls. When they had destroyed all their Game, they took to other Employments, some to Tillage, and a great many to Piracy; the latter retained their old Name of Buccaniers: their

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nary Feats that he did ; that to our Purpose was the sacking of Puerto Velo. This City is seated in the Province of Costa Rica, at the Distance of fourteen Leagues from the Gulf of Darien. It was ranked among the strong Places, that are under the Crown of Spain in the West-Indies. This City had two strong Castles to defend it, situated at the entry of the Port, in such a Manner as to prevent any Vessel passing without Permission. Morgan arrived with a Fleet of nine Sail between Ships and great Boats, and 460 Military Men in the Dusk of the Evening at a Place called Puerto de Naos, ten Leagues to the West of Puerto Velo.

Being come to this Place they sailed up the River in their Ships, to another Harbour called Puerto Pontin, where they came to an Anchor. Here they debarked into Boats and Canows, leaving in their Ships only a few Men to guard them, and conduct them the next Day unto the Port. About Midnight they came to a Place called Estera longa Lemos, where they all went a Shore, and marched by Land to the advanced Posts of the City. They had a certain Englishman among them, that had formerly been Prisoner in those Parts who served them for a Guide. This Man with three or four more seized the Centry without making the least Noise, from whom they got their Intelligence of the Strength of the Place. They then advanced towards the City making the Centry go bound before them. Having marched a quarter of a League they came to a Castle near the City. This Castle after an obstinate Defence surrendered. They afterwards entred the City, where a Party of the Pirates, assigned for the Purpose, went immediately to the Cloisters, and seized all the Religious Men and Women they could find. The Governor of the City not being able to rally the Citizens, in the Confusion retired to another Castle, which made an obstinate Defence, and killed many of the Pirates ; who finding they could make but little Impression, determined by throwing Fire-Balls with

their Numbers were afterwards encreased by other People who chose that Kind of Life. They were governed by Laws Military as well as Civil, at their own making, and were very strict in observing them,

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their Hands to burn the Doors of the Castle. The Spaniards obliged them to desist from this Design, by throwing Stones and Pots full of Powder and combustible Matter among them. However Morgan at last ordered ten or twelve Ladders to be made, each Broad enough for three or four Men to ascend at once: and obliged the Religious Men and Women they had taken Prisoners to fix them against the Walls of the Castle; which was done notwithstanding their Cries, with the loss of many of their Lives. The Ladders being fixed, the Pirates mounted them in great Numbers, and with no less Valor, having Fire-Balls in their Hands, and earthen Pots full of Powder. All which when they had gained the Top of the Wall, they set Fire, and threw among the Spaniards. This Effort of the Pirates was so great, that in spite of the Defence, the Castle was entred.

These Instances serve to shew the Sort of Preparations necessary for an Attempt of this Sort, as well as the Resolution required to put it in Execution. For though Plunder was the great Motive to these Buccaneers, we find Pierre le Grand ordering holes to be bored in the Boat, as it were by general Consent, to add to their natural Intrepidity, by putting Death close at their Heels, whilst Riches and the Prospect of future Enjoyments, were just before their Nose. Morgan too forces the Religious People of the Country, Women as well as Men, to fix the Ladders to the Wall. He saw where the great Danger was, and hoped by such a Stratagem to have prevented the Garrison from firing. We have been told at the Carthage Expedition, the American Soldiers threw away the Scaling Ladders, and took up Firelocks in their Room, nor was it in the Power of the Officers to make them do otherwise. It is not then those only who mount first the Ladders that require something of a defensive armour, but they also whose Business it is to fix them. A Soldier's Head is no harder than a Fire Man's, who covers his with a great Iron Hat during the Execution of his Office; when in short he expects Bricks, Tiles, and Stones to fall upon him. We thought it proper just to hint these Matters; to give People to understand,
that

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that a Scalade made by Soldiers, and performed in a Manner likely to succeed, is of a very formidable Nature; and not to be done with the same Facility as a Cat runs up a Wall, perhaps too, with Prey in View. It requires great Preparation, nice Calculation, a wise Disposition, determined Resolution, and quick Execution. The Difficulty of having so many necessary Qualifications, concur at a Time; is one Reason, there are so few Instances to be found in History of the Experiment being made, especially since the modern Art of Fortification. These are the most material things necessary to be said in this Work, relative to the Scaling a fortified Place, surrounded with a wet Ditch; as well also as the farther very important Service during the Operations of a Conjunct Expedition, the Transport-Boat and Ranger may be converted to. The after Operations when the Place is entered belong to War in general.

We are now to take Cavalry a little into Consideration. Whoever peruses this Book, will easily perceive that a great Point has been made to gain a large Quantity of Artillery: not a little, with a View, of balancing the Majority, it is natural to suppose the Enemy will have in Cavalry. By the Methods contrived, there seems a Quantity sufficient to give us such a Power as this, provided they can be moved expeditiously about. The small six-Pounders, which should be made as light as possible, upon some Occasions might be drawn a little Way by Men; though this may be done, it will be in such a Manner, as a prudent General would lay no great Strefs upon. When this is the Case with a small Field-Piece, it is easy to guess, the Difficulty that will arise in moving a twenty-four Pounder.

In the Attempt on L'Orient a third Part of the Sailors of the Fleet, and a great Body of Marines were employed in dragging two Iron Guns ten Miles from the Place of Debarkment, to the Camp. Such an undertaking, squares finely with the word, Expedition; an Expedition made too on the Coast of France. where in these respects, a wide difference is to be observed between that, and Islands, or in short, most other Coasts. However the Inconveniency of having no Cavalry, so glaringly manifested itself, in that Expedition;

dition ; it was thought right in the Descents that have been made on the same Coast in the present War to have some Light Troops and Draught-Horses. In the last, there were nine Light Troops, and a considerable Number of Draught-Horses. It is to be observed then, that the latter Kind of Horse, is fit for no other Use, but to draw ; at the same time, he consumes as much Forage, takes up as much room in the Ship, gives the same trouble in his Debarking and Re-embarking, as a Trooper's or Dragoon-Horse. De Ville, like an Officer of much Experience, and with a great deal of Reason observes, (says the Marquiss de Santa Cruz ¹,) that in Surprizes good Preparations are extremely useful for succeeding and lessening the loss. So, where other Carriages are wanting, some Trooper's must be dismounted, in order that their Horses may be used in transporting whatever was necessary. We have already seen the double Kind of Services, both the Foot Soldier and Sailor have been employed in ; nor can there be any Reason to spare the Horse, more than the Man ; or to imagine a Dragoon-Horse with a very little Practice will not draw, as well as a Cart-Horse. De Ville in the Execution of a Surprise makes the Trooper's Horse carry Burthens ; the Marquiss de Santa Cruz highly commends him for it. We propose, therefore making them draw whatever is required : whether it is judged right, or not, there is as much Reason for us to approve of it in these Days, as formerly. We are to remind the Reader again, the whole is a Conjunct Affair. The good of the Service is to Weigh down every other Consideration. By this Method the Commander gains a considerable Body of Cavalry, at his Option to be employed, as the most pressing Occasion requires, whether to draw Artillery, or be formed in Squadrons. Should it so happen, (as it frequently will) that the Situation of the Place renders the Squadron useless, the Horses then, may be all employed in the other Work ; and vice versâ, they may be all equipt properly for the Battle. We shall shew presently, we get three Stout Squadrons by this Practice, without encreasing either the Fleet, expence, or trouble. This is a great gain in a War of this Sort.

¹ Chap. 4.
Of Surprizes,

As it is now known how to Debark, in the face of a very respectable Enemy; and we may add, to Re-embark, for it will presently be shewn; the many Operations of a Conjunct Armament are rendred much safer; consequently the Success of these Expeditions will become less dependent on a Coup-de-main. The Addition of Strength or quantity of Artillery, the invading Army is upon all Occasions attended with, by the System here laid down, gives the littoral War without any Ways impairing the Qualities peculiar to itself, in a good Measure the Firmness, and Stability known only to the established Continental War.

We may greatly improve this Advantage, by reducing it still nearer to the last mentioned War; being at Liberty under the Protection of so much Artillery, to make a considerable Alteration in the present System of the Cavalry employed in these Enterprizes. Instead of nine Troops of Light-Horse, we would have but three; their chief Use being to give early Intelligence, hitherto chiefly of the approach of the Enemy, for no other Purpose but that the Army might have time to retreat as fast as possible. Had the two Armies been drawn intire up in Order of Battle in St. Cas's Bay, our nine Troops of Light-Horse, without any other, would have helped but little in the Engagement. They would have been regarded by the French, when they knew their Cavalry and Infantry could support each other, no more than any other Light Kind of Horse, any Hunter or Hussar. Therefore as the System in general is here greatly changed to what it was, in St. Cas's Bay: that of the Cavalry may be changed also: though even now, to seek the Battle is not more the Point in View, than formerly: Yet we do not intend, to be alarmed at every news of the Enemy's approach; wherefore three Troops will be sufficient to keep a Watch out and to serve as Messengers of such Kind of News; full enough, with the heavy Cavalry, which may occasionally be employed in the same Services. Besides these three Troops, we would have in an Expedition against any powerful Country (which is where we mean) eight hundred as Stout Cavalry as any in the British Service; which will make the whole Number
between

between nine hundred and a thousand ; they might be debarked and re-imbarked in the Subdivision and Platoon-Boats, and upon Occasion in the Rangers ; it would be only taking out the Seats of the Former and adding to them, the Bridge of the latter ; and they would become as convenient for these Purposes as any other. These eight hundred, before they were embarked, should be for some Months practiced in drawing Carriages ; and should have for this End early notice, of the Service they were to go upon. It may be supposed then, that 800 Horse, will give us upon Occasion six stout Squadrons. When the Business is to march with the small Artillery, with the eight nine-Pounders, and thirty two six-Pounders ; Should we allow six Horses to draw each nine-Pounder, and as many to the Ammunition-Cart ; four Horses to each six-Pounder, and the same Number to the Ammunition-Cart, there will be employed in this Business 352 Horses ; consequently we shall be able in this Manner to march expeditiously about with forty Pieces of Artillery ; and shall have of the Cavalry the three Troops of Light Horse and the remaining three good Squadrons ; besides allowing a proportionable Number to be sick and unfit for Service. We will here observe what will be a farther very material Use in the prosecution of this War ; where there is frequently no Carriage for such Soldiers, that are wounded on the march, or by sudden illness rendered incapable to keep up with the Army, and consequently liable to be killed by the Peasants ; which is, that each Artillery Carriage and Ammunition-Cart should be so constructed, as on these urging Necessities to be capable of holding two Men. Consequently on very pressing Occasions, many lives might be saved by this Means. We have spoke first of the Light Artillery because they will be more frequently in Motion than the heavy. However when both are required to be moved from one Place to another, more Horses must be employed ; and some of the six-Pounders at such Times might be drawn by Men. We hope the Gentlemen of the Cavalry will not think, that a greater Liberty is taken with them, than with any other People, which make a Part of a Conjunct Armament. The best Excuse for it, is, that without some few strong Cavalry, we may as well lay aside all

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thoughts of making Conjunct Expeditions against any powerful Country : for by being without Cavalry of this Sort, we are in effect without Artillery. It has been shewn, what ridiculous figures our Armaments have made, upon the like Occasions. It was the Opinion of some in the last Year's first Enterprize against St. Maloe ; that the Place was not impregnable, though the Attempt to take it might have required too much time according to that Plan ; especially (as it was remarked) they were not provided with Horses sufficient to draw their heavy Artillery. In the following Enterprize against Cherburgh, it is said again, the Army was retarded several Hours, by their waiting for Cannon. Whenever we venture to undertake these Sort of Enterprizes, no better armed for them, than (as hitherto) has been customary : their Success depends wholly on the Kind of Man, that Commands the Place, they go against.

Should he be discerning, and equal to the Office of Governor of a Town fortified ; he will soon recover his own Surprise, as well as that of the Inhabitants, which the first Appearance of any Armament might Occasion among them ; by explaining to them, that three or four Field-Pieces, will operate but little against the Works, though perhaps not remarkably defensible. The Enterprize against Port L'Orient is a strong Instance of this. However should this Observation not have Weight enough to recompence the proposing what carries with it the Air of Degradation among the Gentlemen of the Horse : a Douceur might be thought of to soften the harsh sound of occasionally converting the War-Horse into a Draught-Horse, and the Rider into a Driver, without any Expence to the Publick ; by giving the Money allowed by the Government for Draught-Horses and Drivers on these Occasions to the Regiments of Cavalry employed upon this Service : a Part should be allotted to the Regimental Stock-Purse, and the rest to the Owners of the Horses, who are also in their Turns to be Drivers. A Method also might be found out, to make the Practicing of the Horses for a Carriage during the Time they are in Quarters, not the least disagreeable to the Owners. The Regiments of Cavalry mark't out for this Service, should have several Months notice. As soon as this notice has been
given

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given to them, the Captain of every Troop should be at Liberty, to get what Business he can for his Horses in the Draught-Way, only the same Horses should not be suffered to work more than two Hours at a Time. As for Instance we will suppose, he is hired by a Farmer for a Day, to draw Manure into his Ground, or to plough. By employing six fresh Horses every two Hours, from six in the Morning to six in the Evening, thirty six of his Troop-Horses will have had each a gentle Exercise, just enough to get them a Stomach, and do them a great deal of good. With every fresh set of Horses, three Troopers should attend at least, as Drivers, and to take care of them. This might be done three Days in the Week, without interrupting the Military Exercise, which might be, on one or two of the other Days. The Money that was earned by this Means, should be divided equally through the whole Troop. There is no more Reason to imagine that this Kind of moderate Draught, would spoil the Troop Horse for the Military Employ, more than the Coach-Horse that goes to Plough and Cart, for a Journey with a Coach. Many Gentlemen in this Kingdom that use their Horses in this double Capacity, would prefer the latter to the intire Coach-Horse for a long and hard Journey, both for Expedition and enduring better the fatigue. Should the Horse be well fashioned and fed, the being thus moderately exercised in drawing, will not make him, when out of the Cart, ere the more a Cart-Horse. Nor will the Trooper, when he finds by this Means Money coming into his Pocket, think himself any Ways degraded; more than Soldiers who for a little Addition of Pay are glad to be hired as Bawmen; whose Business is to look after their Officers Horses. The Advantage that would be gained by this Practice is so great, it will not admit of any Dispute. A Conjunct Armament thus equipt with Cavalry, would be free from the Lumber of mere Draught-Horses, their Drivers and Forage, consequently the Addition of Ships and Expence to the Government, of time and trouble in the landing and re-imbarking; nevertheless would be able to move formidably about with Cavalry and Artillery in Abundance; Provided an Attention is paid to another Consideration, which is to finish this Chapter.

According to the Appearance of our Conjunct Armament as it is at present prepared, methinks one hears the Reader say, what can there be now, to hinder its moving forward? Was the March indeed of the Troops to be continued in one direct Line before them, and then in the same Line back again, the Probability is not so great, that their Journey would be impeded by what we shall make appear a great Obstacle. The littoral War is waged on the Shores, but a few Miles from the Sea; therefore when we are debarked, the Chance is much greater, that our Motions are directed to some Place bearing to the Right or Left, than straight before us. Whilst we make this Remark, another may be made also, which is, as all flowing Waters empty themselves in the Sea, every Shore must be full of Streams either great or small, besides little Guts of the Sea that run into Land. Therefore when the variety of Waters on Shores in general are considered, all of which being so near the Sea more or less receive the Tide and are consequently at stated Times deep, it must necessarily happen that an Army whose motions are directed as above described, will have almost upon every March one or more of these Waters to get over; we don't mean great Rivers, known to all the World; but Streams sufficient to stop the March of any Army, which might frequently have no Bridges, or such only that are capable of being demolished in a Quarter of an Hour by the Inhabitants of the Country, when they saw it their Interest. Whoever considers this, will find (till a Remedy is thought of by way of Prevention) every little Water incapable of being passed to be as great an Impediment to the Army as a Rhine or a Danube. It is a Consideration of great Importance; as things are at present, the Troops must frequently have wading as well as marching, wet Cloaths when they reach their Camp instead of dry. They must consult the motions of the Tides, as much as those of the Enemy, between which there can be no Analogy: the Consequence of this will be, when they should most be flying they will frequently be halting. We have heard what happened at Guildo^m, the Troops were to have passed that Water at six o'clock in the Morning, and by mistaking the hour of Tide, the Army could not get over it, till four in the Afternoon: the Enemy

^m See the Affair at St. Cas.

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nemy all this Time were close after them. We have seen then the Difficulty and the Danger; there is but one Way to obviate them; *viz.* to have (in a Country where dispatch is required in all our Motions) at the Head of the Army about four Pontoon-Boats, with every Kind of Implement proper to make a temporary Bridge, over little Waters; Guildo indeed was too wide for a Work of this Sort, tho' it serves to shew what is here to be understood. They would not add greatly to the Trouble and Expence of Carriage; and might be made to serve in a double Capacity; to be a Kind of Carriage on the Land for Invalides, &c. and also as well as a Bridge Boat, a Boat to be punted on the Water. Frequent Occasions might arise, in the course of a Summer to render it necessary for a small Party to pass a River, when it was not the Intention of the Army to follow; perhaps to reconnoitre or gain Intelligence, or some such like thing. A few Pontoon-Boats would be a small Addition of Trouble, but a very great one of Conveniency and Safety to the Army in general.

CHAPTER VII.

IN the two preceeding Chapters it has been shewn in what Manner an Entrance may be forced into an Enemy's Country, in the face of the Enemy without the Protection of the Fleet; in what Manner also several other interesting Operations relative to a Con-junct Armament, and which may be called the Principal Branches of it, may be performed, without too, the help of the Fleet. As the Armament then, is thus enabled to make this certain Progress; we are now to look a little towards home; to find out by what Method without the Assistance of the Ships of War, the In-vading Army is to retire to their Transport Ships though the Enemy should be close at their heels. To this Purpose, is to be observed, when all the Troops that compose the whole Armament are landed, (for we are now to set the Reader down at the Place of Debarkment) the after Inland proceedings during their continuance in the Enemy's Country, do not fall properly under the

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Art of a littoral War ; wherefore we shall only make some general Remarks, on such critical Movements which may naturally be supposed will come to pass in the Interval of Time between Landing and Re-imbarking, and which more immediately concern the present Subject *. After this we shall give a Description of the Act of a Re-imbarkment in the face of a Formidable Enemy. As such an Operation may be looked upon as the last of a Conjunct Expedition, we have reserved it, as such, in this Treatise.

In Invasions, in cursory Enterprizes, whether the Plan of Operation is to march any considerable Distance from the Place of Debarkment, or not ; we are to take no heavy Baggage, but be particularly careful to be well provided with several Days Provisions. Of what Nature soever the Country is, it is to be supposed stripped of all living Cattle as well as every other Sort of Provision. Whilst we are supposing this ; it is not to be forgot, that our chief Magazines are out at Sea, at the Mercy of the Winds ; and that an Army † (as the famous French Admiral de Coligni used to say) was a Monster always to be formed first by the Belly ; from which we are to expect no Service, but according to the Nourishment it has been before provided with.

Besides these Difficulties and distressing Circumstances, which are the sure Consequences even of an happy and well effected Debarkation ; there are others which require a serious Consideration Preparatory to the Act of Re-imbarking. It must be remembred, from the Moment the Commander has determined to quit the Enemy's Country ; the War, whatever it was before, becomes Defensive. The Retreat then is the only thing in View. To Retreat (says Folard) is to fly ⁿ, but it is to fly with Art, with the greatest Art †. He

n Tom. 5.
p 14. lib. 4.
p 261. Off. 5.

* To have given every Proceeding in the Order of Time, in which it is transacted ; there are some that should have been related immediately after the Landing, antecedent to the detached Enterprizes in Chapter 6. But we thought it would be clearer to the Reader to mention those Enterprizes in a Chapter by themselves ; and after that, to set him down again with the whole Army at the Place where he was landed ; In Order that they might continue together, till the whole was re-imbarked.

† Quelle sublimité de génie ! quelle étendue de Connoissances de qualités acquises & naturelles ne faut-il pas avoir, & quelle grandeur de Courage ! Que de ruses & d'artifices ne faut-il pas employer dans ces sortes d'actions !

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He speaks here of a Land War. But in the littoral, the difficulties and dangers double upon us, and to fly with Art on the Land only is not sufficient: for after we have retreated to the Shore, we are to retire to our Ships; the Art of flying (which is the term given it) is to be preserved on the Water as well as on the Shore. The Author above quoted, observes there are three delicate and learned Branches in the Art of War^o, that have never been treated in a Manner at all to be depended on. He says, Military Writers have been so short, and have so abridged these Subjects, that there is little to be learnt from them. And these Subjects are, an Army acting upon the Defence, making a Retreat, and passing Rivers. How similar the Re-imbarkation of an Army pushed by an Enemy is to the above three delicate Parts of the Science of Arms, is easy to be conceived; how can an Army be more upon the Defence than in the above Circumstance? How more upon the Retreat? And though they have not a River to pass, they have a Water perhaps ten Times as broad and more dangerous. We see then the Difficulties we have to cope with, in these critical Parts of an Expedition: Difficulties frequently increased by Situation and Circumstances. The above ingenious Author very justly observes^p; that the Art of War is not the same in a Country mountainous, rude, full of steep declivities, deep vallies, and interspersed with Defiles; we may add here Rocks and Marshes, as in an open Champain Country, where Numbers give the Advantage. In the first the Success depends on the superiority of Genius and the knowledge of the Places. But in a Country which affords no variety of Grounds a midling Genius may hope for Success, providing that by as much as we are weaker in Numbers, we are superior in Courage and Address; but says Folard, as to the diversified Country we must Reason otherwise. We have mentioned this, because the Places of our Debarkation and Re-imbarkation will

^o Ibid. p. 139.
^{Obs.} 1st.

^p Ibid. Tom. 2.
^{Liv.} I. Ch. 18.
^{Obs.} p. 378.

d'actions! Car l'on peut dire que les Retraites d'Armées renferment toutes les Parties les plus sublimes des Armes, une profonde Tactique, les Marches, les Passages des Rivières, en un mot toutes les Connoissances qui font les grands Capitaines & les Guerriers du premier Ordre. Folard Tom. 5. Ch. 14. Liv. 4. p. 261. Obs. 5.

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in all probability be as frequently (if not more so) in this latter Sort of Country than in the former. Thus then we find our Debarkations and Re-imbarkations must be made (according to the Order and Course of things) frequently in Places, which to make the most Advantage of require us to exert all our Abilities; where the Success of the Operations between the contending Armies will depend principally on the superiority of Génius in the Commanders, and the Knowledge of the particular Places. As to the latter, it is but reasonable to suppose, the Inhabitants of the Country invaded, know their own Country better than the Invaders: as to the former, at a Time of Re-imbarkation, when we stand most in need of superior Talents, we have the least chance of being blessed with them. At the Time we are preparing to take our leave of the Enemy's Territory, with the Enemy also pressing at our backs; at such a Juncture as this, should we make any Effort or Struggle at all, it is not so much with a View of hurting the Enemy, as of preventing ourselves from being hurt by them; it is only to amuse; to draw off the Enemy from applying their Attention too closely in their endeavours to impede the Re-imbarkment. The whole Aim of the Invaders then is to get away from the Enemy; the whole Aim of an active Enemy, who may be said now to become the real Invaders, perhaps would be as much to hinder them. When we are arrived to this Crisis, our Plan is intirely reversed: from having been Assailants, we are reduced to the Necessity of being Defendants. In these distressfull Circumstances, in this defensive War, the Probability of gaining Advantages over the adverse Party sufficient to extricate themselves from such a Situation, through dint of abler Abilities, among the Generality of Commanders, is but small.

q Folard's
Poly. Tom. 5.
Liv. 4. Ch. 2.
p. 9.

It is remarked, and very justly ^q that a defensive War is so far from exciting the Genius, that it turns some People's Heads; they become like Men in a Trance: they neglect a thousand Opportunities, they even furnish the Enemy with them; in the Offensive every thing is the reverse; they invent and hatch Opportunities here, should they not offer of themselves: all their undertakings succeed, every thing carries a smile upon it.

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In the other, they sink under the Weight; the least Mishap changes them into quite different Men, and frequently when there is not much Reason.

Should we then sum up the Disadvantages attending an Army that are to make their Re-imbarkment (in the Military Phrase) with the Bayonet pressing at their Backs; we shall find them as follow. The uncertainty of Winds and Tides. The almost certainty of finding through Irregularity and Variety the Situation of the Grounds against them: their Leaders having a Kind of Cloud spread over their Senses, (the frequent Consequence of a Multiplicity of Difficulties,) and full enough to obscure their Sight, and render them incapable of turning any Grounds to their Advantage. We may add to all this, according to former and present Practice, little or no Artillery, as well as little or no Cavalry, with scarce a Possibility also of Re-imbarking more than 2000 Soldiers at a Time. What is done, may be said, to be executed, in a rude, ill digested Method, so obvious to the common Soldiers, that the 2000 which are to close the rear of the Re-imbarkment are esteemed little better than a Sacrifice; though it would be no easy task to keep them to that destined Station, and prevent them plunging before their turn through the Water to the Boats, with the old Proverb of the Devil take the hindmost. When we change the Constitution of the War, which is done the Instant the Retreat begins, it is changed with the Enemy also. When our Spirits and Wits begin to fail us, their's begin to quicken. The thousand Advantages we lose, they are sure to win; nay, we have just been told, People in their Circumstances will even hatch Occasions, should none offer. Whilst our Numbers are mouldering away, it is the very reverse with them. Whilst we shall be embarking our few Cavalry, and perhaps some of our few Artillery; they are entertaining us, as quick as they can with a nearer View of their Cavalry; and are preparing as fast as they are able to give us a Salvo with their Artillery. Should they not chuse to attack our whole Strength together; they know as well as we, that in the several Re-imbarkments necessary to be made before the whole is got on board, there must be a last, as well as a first:

they

they know as well as ourselves that our last will consist of about 2000 Men. What then have these 2000 Men to do, in their miserable Circumstances against an Enemy at least five Times their Number, high in Spirits, perfect in the Knowledge of the Country, compleat in Cavalry, Artillery, and every thing else, and full of Revenge. To those who do not know, we will tell; Should they wish to live, they have but one Choice left; which is like a Flock of Larks to crouch together, whilst the Kite is soaring nearer and nearer over their Heads, not daring to move, through the fear of leaving their Lives in Air. The unhappy Remnant of our Armament, in this Situation, (perhaps from having a little before acted like proud Conquerors) must now turn poor Suppliants and ask their Lives of the invaded, become their sarcaistical Invaders. This we are sensible must be the Case, whenever we have an active Enemy to contend with; we all know how near the Affair in St. Cas's Bay resembled it, it is but too fresh in our Memory.

It was an Observation made on that Action, (therefore may be said from late and severe Experience) that "to lose both Officers and Men when there is an
" Enemy to oppose our Landing or our Re-imbarking
" must always be the Consequence". We fear there is too much foundation for such an Assertion, to doubt the Truth of it. It is no more than what has always happened, no more than what they who were concerned there had just experienced; [no more than what they had learnt by that Experience, will be morally certain to happen again: that is, providing we go with our Armaments upon the old ruinous Plan. For our Parts, we are entirely of this Opinion, we were so before that Combat; and had it not ended as it did, intended to have declared as much; though then, our Prophecies would have been as little regarded as poor Cassandra's were by her Country *.

* Virg. *Æneid*. L. 3. L. 183.

Sola mihi tales casus Cassandra canebat.
Nunc repeto hæc generi portendere debita nostro,
Et sæpe Hesperiam, sæpe Italia regna vocare.
Sed quis ad Hesperiae venturos littora Teucros.
Cederet? Aut quem tum Vates Cassandra moveret?
Cedamus Phæbo, & moniti meliora sequamur.

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We see then what a Dilemma we are sure to be plunged in, in our Re-imbarkments according to the present Practice. We have not mentioned the Use of the Fleet for two Reasons; though already told, we will repeat them. Because we would not confine our Expeditions to too few Places; nor deceive ourselves in putting a Trust, in what it must frequently happen according to the Course and Nature of things, can be brought but a little, and sometimes not at all to our Assistance. It was thought, the latter would have been the Case in the last Attempt against St. Maloes, had the Fleet continued in the Bay of St. Lunar, where the Troops were landed. In what Manner the difficulties and dangers of making a Descent in the face of an Enemy, may in a great Measure be obviated, has been related: in what Manner our Debarkments may be facilitated without running the risk of being *Tal-mashed*, for that was the term given it in former Days, by those who had sense sufficient to see what a Forlorn Hope was made of these Kind of Enterprizes *. It remains to be demonstrated how the much greater Difficulties, as well as dangers of getting our Armaments in the presence of the Enemy safe out of their Territories may be obviated also. In short how we may facilitate our Re-imbarkments without running the risk of being *Duryed*. As the term first mentioned was applied in former Times to the rude Method of putting in execution the premiere Part of a Conjunct Enterprize; so the Term last mentioned with as much

* In the year 1702, there was a Pamphlet published intituled the present Condition of the English Navy, p. 24. from which the following passage is taken: "I foresee, that the War will be now at Sea, and we have but a very ill Omen of Success from the last Summer's Expedition of our Fleet. Our modern Whigs in their Legion-Letters, and Kentish Petitions, exclaimed against the Parliament, because they raised no more Money; but I hope these folk if they have any Brains, or honesty, are now sensible of their groundless Complaint, when they find how little has been done; for what was there raised? They gave 1, 500, 000 pounds for the Fleet, for this Expedition; and, what has been the Effect? The whole Fleet went to convoy Benbow in his Way to the West-Indies; and, while they were gone, our modern Whigs boasted of their Conduct, and built Castles in the Air, to hold the Money they should bring home in the Spanish Galleons, but in a short Time, we found them all at Spithead, except a few Ships that proceeded with Benbow to the West-Indies, where, should they not be *Tal-mashed*, they have good Fortune".

Propriety may be applied in these present Times to the derniere, to the last Act of our Conjunct Armaments, according to the Practice used equally as ruinous as the first; nay, more so, as the danger is more. We would not be understood to sport with the above Names; it is with great respect and concern we mention them; we could wish to avoid it, could we without them paint these Calamities in the most striking Colors. We have just been told, how good Cassandra prophesied, how true her Prophecies were and how vain: our only wish is to be more attended to; that sensible Britains (not like obstinate Trojans) before it is too late, before some heavier Mischief befalls their Armaments, may with a chearful and unanimous Voice cry,

Moniti Meliora Sequamur.

In Order then to pursue the *Meliora*, or better Methods in our Re-imbarkments as well as our Debarkments; we must not forget, what we have just heard; that the Difficulties in the Defensive War are double to those of the Offensive: that they are still more so in a War that from Offensive is changed into a Defensive. In the latter we are told our Senses frequently die away, whilst in the former they are daily quickening. As this is the Case, when we make our Debarkment, when we are acting offensively, in short whilst we have our Wits about us, we should be preparing in our Sunshine Hours against the Stormy Season. To facilitate the conclusive Operation of a Conjunct Armament, no fixt and determined Rule can be given; it will depend in a great Measure on the Sort of Ground resolved on for the Re-imbarkment; after that, on the Capacity of the Commanders and Engineers, towards the converting that Ground to the most Advantage for the above Purpose. What they will have to do, when seriously considered, will be no small Difficulty. They are to render an inferior Army equal to a Superior, we call it greatly Superior, as it certainly will be, at the Time the last Re-imbarkment is made, whatever it was before; equal in Strength and Courage, so as to keep the Enemy in their Front, at a respectful Distance whilst in their Rear Preparations are going forward towards the

the executing one of the nicest of Military Operations ; which is for the last Body of Troops that close the Re-imbarkment to retreat all at once to their Boats ; but as it is in the face of a Superior Enemy, they are to retire to the Water Side step by step in the exactest Order, as loath to quit the Field ; to give the Enemy to understand that though they fly, it is with the greatest Regularity and nicest Art ; to make the Enemy sensible, when they enter their Boats, though they are to swim, it is with the greatest Regularity and nicest Art. That our last Armament may sportingly quit the Shore, as though the Sea was only for them to take their Pastime upon.

To put it more in our Power to bring this to pass, it is to be remarked, every different Ground, requires a different Disposition, whether the Part to be acted, is Offensive or Defensive. To treat of the several Dispositions necessary to be made on different Kinds of Grounds, does not fall within the Compass of a Littoral, more than an Inland War. What we are to say here is preparatory to a Re-imbarkment ; and though it is at the same time relative to the Disposition rather of Grounds than Troops, it is what will frequently occur to those who are concerned in these Enterprizes. Should the Re-imbarkment be made from the Identical Place of Debarkment ; as soon as the latter was completed ; the Eminences and Hills within a moderate Distance, especially those that Command the Shore should be occupied by such a Number of Troops and Artillery as should be thought full sufficient to maintain them. Should there be any Villages, inclosed Grounds or hollow Ways in the intermediate space between the Heights and the Water or upon our Flanks, these should be seized likewise, and made Defensible as fast as possible. By proceeding in this Manner we secure our Flanks and prevent our Communication with the Fleet being interrupted ; we conceal all our Operations from the Enemy ; we keep the Enemy at a Distance ; and should they have a mind to attack us, it must be at a great Disadvantage, as by being above them we should observe all their Movements. And we shall show presently, when we make our last Embarkment, they will find it very difficult to gain these Heights soon
enough,

enough, to have their Artillery in readiness to command the Shore and Fire upon the Boats. However here is a nice Judgment required; for should these Heights be at too great a Distance from the Water for their Artillery to Fire on the Boats; in all Probability they might be at too great a Distance for us to occupy. To judge of this, we must be sure not to seize Grounds so far from the Water, that should the Enemy by any Means force themselves between us and the Water, they would be still out of reach of the Fire from our Rangers; because then our Communication is cut off, and it might prove of the most dangerous Consequence; And we may be certain, that our Re-imbarkation need not fear, any Enemy at such a Distance. Wherefore in these Circumstances we are to retire nearer to the Shore, still having an Eye to rising Grounds, and observing so great a Distance, that should the Enemy seize it as soon as we quit it, it might be too far for their Artillery even then to hurt our Boats; observing at the same time so little a Distance, that should the Enemy Force themselves by any Means between us and the Water, they should be sure to have forced themselves between two Fires; that is, they should be within the reach of the Artillery in the Rangers and perhaps the Fleet, and our Army. This may easily be conceived, as the Grounds we should take possession of in all Probability would be as far again from the Shore, as those the Enemy would be upon, when they were got between our Army and the Water.

There is a difference to be observed in regard to Distances, when the Re-imbarkment is made on a Flat Country; for as here will be no Commanding Eminences for the Enemy to seize; the Troops to be embarked should possess the Ground as near, as is convenient, to the Water; because then they will be covered by the Fire of the Rangers and perhaps the Fleet. By this we save ourselves the trouble of debarking and re-imbarking many of the Rangers large Guns; and are under no apprehensions from the Enemy, as it is not to be supposed, they can venture with a few Field-Pieces near enough to intercept or even to molest us when covered by such a Number of large Artillery.

Artillery. This plainly proves a Flat Shore to be the most eligible to make a Debarkation on, as the Troops can be protected in a great Measure by the Artillery on the Water, consequently by Batteries incapable of being seized by the Enemy. It has been said, that Sir George Ayscue in 1651, obliged the Island of Barbadoes to submit to the Authority of the Parliament. He did it in a great Measure by the following Accident. The Governor, Lord Willoughby was a Man of good Sense, and well beloved; and had assembled a Body of near 5000 Men to oppose him. Sir George had some small Advantages, but being inferior, in Number to the King's Party, could not bring them to submit; till Colonel Muddiford who commanded a Regiment in the Island, declared for the Parliament. Many of his Friends, following his Example, did the like, and in Conjunction with him encamped under the Protection of Sir George's Fleet. Lord Willoughby intended to have charged the Parliaments Forces, with his Body of Horse, which was greatly superior to theirs; but a Cannon Ball fired at random, beat open the Door of the Room where he and his Council of War were sitting; and taking off the Head of the Centinel who was placed at the Door, so alarmed them all, that he changed his Design, and retreated to a Place two Miles distant from the Harbour^r. We have mentioned this Instance to shew the Advantage of a Camp that can^{r Ludlow's Memoires.} be thus chosen.

It is observed in the Affair at St. Cas, the sand Hills along the Shore formed an Objection to any thing that would be made in the Way of Defence; for the English Troops having scarce any Artillery on Shore, they served for cover to the Enemy against that of the Fleet; which was giving them an Advantage sufficient to over Balance any that might be expected from a Commanding Eminence by Troops no better provided with the Necessaries proper for making the most of such a Situation. This Reason was given against the Design of embarking the Troops from that Place; and a Proposal was made that the Re-imbarkation should be performed from an open Fair Beach not far from Guildo: this Advice however was neglected.

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In Enterprizes of this Sort, as well as any other, we are not to flatter ourselves so much, as to imagine all the Cunning is of our Side only. Should we mean not to deceive ourselves, we ought to fancy the Enemy will act the Part of Defence with as much Prudence and Foresight, as we the Act of Invasion. It must be remembered the Difference will be very great in regard to the Strength of the Enemy, at our Time of Debarkation and Re-imbarkation. We are almost sure at the latter to find the Enemy in every respect more powerful and strong than when the first Landing was made. As these Enterprizes are to surprise some weak Place; though the Country to be surprised have formed a Kind of regular Defence all along the Coast; it is not to be supposed, besides being able to do this, it can have any very formidable Force at any particular Place; at least at the very identical Spot, where we make our Descent. But as soon as it is made, the Troops disposed at different Districts to guard the Whole, keep rolling on like a Snow Ball, and gathering together till they all assemble within sight of the Invaders; who when once found, are easily kept in View; therefore there needs no Argument to prove how much more probable it is, that there will be a Stouter and more formidable Enemy to contend with in going off than in coming on. To those who are not sensible of this, it is referred to look back on the late Descents on the Coast of France, to be thoroughly convinced of it. Besides the Disadvantage of having a more numerous Enemy to cope with at a Re-imbarkation; there is also another against us, more than at a Landing. For when the latter is made, it may be supposed to have been planned and formed before hand, therefore it may be supposed to be made by People who know exactly what they have to do, against a Country surprised, and in all Probability against a People, at first that know little or nothing what they are about. But at the Time of Re-imbarkation, it may be presumed, the Enemy will be recovered from their Astonishment and will be as much in their Element as ourselves, by having a regular and settled Plan to go upon.

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The Difficulty then to be got over is to know how not only to invade with Success ; but likewise to retreat with Safety. Not to flatter ourselves in this last Act more than in the first ; we shall imagine, the Man of War, Frigate, and Bomb-Ketch to be as useless here as they were there. Besides the other Advantages above mentioned which now attend the Enemy ; it must not be forgot, their Numbers are encreased ; instead of six, they have twelve Regiments of Infantry : instead of four, eight Squadrons : Instead of twelve, twenty-four Field-Pieces. The whole Strength of the Enemy then are 9360 Foot, with 1200 Horse, and 24 small Pieces of Artillery, which is a double Force to what might be reasonably expected to be in readiness to oppose a first Debarkment. This is our Method of calculating, and whoever calculates in a more favourable Manner for themselves ; who commands an Expedition against such a Nation as France, will frequently be deceived.

We will now turn to our own Situation, which will be as follows. As we are to suppose the Enemy foiled in their Attack upon the first Debarkation ; it is to be presumed they would not venture to do it after a second, or a third. Therefore the whole Debarkment must consequently be made safely on the Enemy's Shore. When this is the Case, we look upon ourselves to be more numerous in Infantry than the Enemy, not so strong in Cavalry, but infinitely stronger in Artillery. In short we should esteem ourselves considerably more than a Match for the Enemy. The Enemy who we are to imagine as knowing as ourselves, would soon find this out ; therefore in all Probability would have these different Views. To obstruct (as much as they can) our Proceedings relative to the principal Business, for which the Expedition was made. To avoid at first a Battle ; but cut off (if possible) our Communication with the Fleet. Should they be not able to effect this, to interrupt as much as may be, our Operations towards a Re-imbarkment, so as to keep us as long as they could in their Country ; as they would be sensible the longer we staid, the more we should decrease, the longer they staid, the more their Number would encrease. Should this last not be their Aim ; their Meaning must be, to content themselves with letting us begin the

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Re-imbarkation, to make though (perhaps not so great) a sure Victory, by attacking the Rear Guard. As to interrupting or cutting off our Communication with the Fleet, when we should have so much and such large Artillery; some of which we should in all Probability, keep on the Water on board their own Boats, according to the Form of the Waters against the Shore; and as the twenty four Pounders would send their Shot so much farther than the Enemy's Field-Pieces, some of which either on the Land or Water might certainly be brought to Flank and scower any Enemy that dared Edge round on the Flanks of our Army; when these Considerations are duly weighed, it must appear a difficult Attempt to endeavour to cut off, or interrupt any such Communication; at least when there is common Prudence observed, in keeping this Communication free.

We will say then, the Enemy's View has been to make a Fabian War of it; to follow us wherever we go, at a respectful Distance, till we come to the destined Place of Re-imbarkment; then (if possible) to fall upon the Rear during the Act of getting into the Boats. In this Situation, not to lessen ourselves too much, we must now be as cunning as the Enemy; for it will be bad for us, should we be not. It is to be remembered they are more than 10000 strong, and daily encreasing; that the most we debarked at a Time were 3000 and some of them not Soldiers. We are to suppose further, that our Country which fits out this Conjunct Armament, makes Frugality the Basis of her Actions; that we have a Cato for a Treasurer, who does not think so largely as a Scipio; therefore with much Difficulty we are to imagine, the Commander of this Expedition could obtain three Regiments of Transport-Boats and one of Artillery-Rangers, but not one more; perhaps more Transport-Boats will require more Transport-Ships, and more Transport-Ships more Transport Money.

Necessity then which has no Law, tells us, we must make the most of a little. And as it has been already shewn, how many we could Debark at a time; it must be allowed, should we be able to Re-imbark the Whole by different Re-imbarkments, in the face
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of near 11000 well appointed Troops ; should we be able to get the Army safely out of the Enemy's Country without leaving any Part behind, it must be granted we make the most of a little. In a frequent Practice of this War, this will often be the Case : therefore it is what (should we wish to render it safe and perfect) ought to be attended to very critically. It should be understood also, the more expert we should be by constant Practice in this littoral War ; the more so by frequent Practice in their own Defence ; will the Enemy be in subverting, counteracting, and disappointing our Schemes in this Kind of War also : this Proves it to be our Interest, to carry it always in fresh Places.

In every Kind of War, to make a safe Retreat in the Sight of a powerful Enemy, has at all Times been esteemed, one of the most shining Qualities in a General. For as Glory in Military Operations for the generality, is esteemed and proportioned according to the Difficulty and Danger that give it Birth ; the Retreat in the above Circumstances is one of the most Glorious. We are speaking now of an established War on the Continent, where in every Kind of Retreat, there are either Lines, Rivers, fortified Towns, or some friendly Country to retire to. It would be supposing a General to act much beneath his Character, not to have secured a Communication with this Place of Safety : yet notwithstanding this, it has been ever esteemed one of the most shining Acts *.

This being the real Truth in regard to an Established War ; in what Light is a Retreat to be looked upon in a Temporary or littoral War ? Where in all Probability there are neither Lines, River, fortified Town nor friendly Country to retire to. It requires a small Discernment to see how infinitely more dangerous is the Retreat of this last War.

* On peut acquérir le titre pompeux de grand homme, de Capitaine excellent à fort bon marché dans une offensive ouverte ; mais c'est autre chose dans une défensive, il en coûte, infiniment plus, cette nature de guerre est si difficile, si profonde, & si délicate, qu'il n'est permis qu'à des demi Dieux, ou à des génies extraordinaires, qui lèvent un peu la tête au dessus des natures mortelles de s'en bien démêler. Folard's Polybius, Tom. 2. Preface.

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The only Place of Safety we have left us here, is our Fleet ; the Fleet is our fortified Town, our friendly Country, in short our every thing, at such a Crisis ; which though we exert all the Prudence and Care that human Foresight is capable of to get at, perhaps is out of our Reach. We must attend to this essential Part, for it cannot be considered too much. The first thing to remember then, when we have made our landing, is, that the same Troops, the same every thing is to be embarked again. To facilitate the first great Operation we have contrived four Sorts of Artillery, to suit all Kind of Waters, and all Kind of Grounds.

The same are in our Power to be made Use of in the after Services, and especially in the last important Business of a Re-imbarkment. As we are never to forget, that the Fleet is our only Place of Refuge in Case of any Disaster, which perhaps we cannot arrive at ; we should as soon as we have got the Troops on Shore, study and employ our thoughts to contrive some other which at all Times we may fly to ; a Place out of the Reach of Winds and Waves ; that should we be so unfortunate as to have our Fleet be the Sport of Winds at Sea, we may not add to our Distresses by having the Army, the Sport of our Enemies on Land. To this Purpose, whatever the destined Object of our Enterprize is, whatever may be the settled Plan of Operation, or how great soever the Necessity is for a Number of Artillery ; at all hazards and at all Events, we must be sure to leave a sufficient Quantity of both great and small, to erect on the Spots that command best the Shore, this our first and last Asylum ; which should be secured and pointed as well as the Situation of the Grounds will admit, and the Art of the ablest Engineers can contrive.

Nicias the Athenian General when he set out for the Sicilian Expedition, spoke thus to his Countrymen :
 “ We must keep it in View, that we go to inhabit
 “ some City in that foreign and hostile Country ; and
 “ either the first Day we come there, to make ourselves Masters of the Field, or failing, to be sure to
 “ find all in Arms against us ; which fearing, and
 “ knowing the Business requires much good Advice
 “ and

“ and more good Fortune (which is a hard Matter
 “ considering we are but Men) I would set out in
 “ such a Manner, as would commit me the least to
 “ Fortune; and would take with me an Army, that
 “ in most likelihood should be secure. This I conceive
 “ to be the surest course for the City in general, and
 “ for us who make the Voyage. If any Man is of
 “ a contrary Opinion, I resign him my Command”^s. s Thucydides.
 The Sicilian
 War. Lib. 6.

Thus spoke Nicias, rightly judging it to be a chief
 Art in War, to learn to be safe in the midst of Dan-
 gers. When therefore there is no Inland Safety, nor
 out at Sea; it is the Art of a littoral War to know
 how to be secure on the Shore. We are not to act
 the Part with a British Conjunct Armament, of an
 Agathocles, a Timarchus, a William the Conqueror,
 or an Hernan Cortez; who burnt each his Fleet as
 soon as he had debarked his Troops; to make the
 Men bold and desperate, by letting them see they had
 no hope left in Retrospection. Sould we by some Ac-
 cident be incapacitated for a while from getting at our
 Ships; it may be taken for granted, they are not de-
 signedly, with the above View, put out of our Reach*.
 It should then be thoroughly understood, by those who
 think of annoying their Enemies on their own Terri-
 tories: that their first prudent Step, is to prevent (as
 much as possible) being annoyed themselves in an hos-
 tile Land. They should keep in their Memory, how
 alert the *Gallus* is, on his own Dunghill.

As to the Methods to be taken, and the Works to
 be thrown up to render the Grounds we occupy
 fit to answer the Purposes intended for them,
 one principal Rule is to be observed; which is, to be
 sure to leave ourselves as free to make our Movements,
 as the Enemy shall be to make theirs; that should they
 think to fight us, they might not find us entangled

* Una salus victis nullam sperare salutem. Virg. *Æneid.* 2.
 Agathocles acted this Part on the Coast of Africa. Justin.
 Timarchus an Etolian General. Polienus.
 William the Conqueror burnt his Fleet on the Coast of Suffex.
 Eng. Hist.
 And Hernan Cortes at Vera Cruz. Solis's Hist. of Mexico.
 Should we credit Prontinus, more than the Silence of Plutarch,
 Quintus Fabius Maximus affords another Instance.

with Lines and Entrenchments, in such a Manner, as to be deprived of the Liberty, the Enemy enjoy who attack us; that our Entrenchments might not become instead of an Advantage an Incumbrance. The Army constrained in all its Motions, is always inferior to that which is at full Liberty to move about, even though imprudently, without fear of being made to smart for it. We shall shew presently the strength of Lines is more imaginary than real, when proper Dispositions are made to force them with a well prepared Army; we will shew also the Disadvantages of waiting to receive an Enemy behind them, unless particular Attention is had, in allotting a sufficient Space of Ground for the Troops that are to defend them to make every necessary Evolution; and also upon Occasion to pass them as well as repass. But should we with the notion of having strong Lines to cover us, cramp and confine the Army in all its Motions, it gives even an inferior Enemy a Power of beating us: because the Enemy being at full Liberty can make their principal Efforts where and in what Manner they please; they can make also as many false Attacks as they have a Mind, consequently have it in their Power to divide our Attention equally through the whole Entrenchments, and by that Means the real may the better succeed; to add Strength to the real they are under no fear, to take from the other Parts. The Attacks formed in Columns which succeed are sure in entering the Lines to divide our Troops and to throw them entirely into Confusion, as they will not have room to put themselves in a Position to repulse the Enemy, or to rejoin again. Should the Troops behind the Lines gain an Advantage they can't follow it, to any great Purpose, through the Difficulty of passing their own Lines.

What is to be understood by these Remarks, is, that should the Enemy attack us, they might find, though we had disposed our Situation and Ground as advantageously as possible, by making the most, of Eminences, Villages, Enclosures, Hollow-ways, &c. By having at different distances well erected and well defended Batteries; they should nevertheless be sensible that we were at as much Liberty both in Front and Rear as themselves

selves to make every necessary Evolution with our Troops; that should we be superior through the Means perhaps of our well entrenched Batteries; we could turn our defensive War into an offensive, by passing without the least impediment between our Batteries to pursue any Advantage. By this Method we have it in our Power to change at Pleasure the Constitution of the War. The offensive Part (says Folard) is rather an Employment for a middling General;^t but the defensive demands not a Man, but something more than Man. As a Man (says he) I should chuse to follow the Method of Barcas;^u which was a defensive War that could be turned according to Time, Place, and Circumstances into the Offensive.

^t Fol. Poly.
Tom. 2. Lib. 1.
p. 380. Obs.

^u Amilcar Barcas employed against the Rebels in Africk.

At this critical Time then, in these Conjunct Enterprizes, the General will have two Things (according to our System) principally to be kept in his Memory. He is not to forget, his Advantage, is in Artillery, therefore he can't be too assiduous in having Batteries of large Artillery disposed in the most commanding Position, well entrenched and supported, lest the Enemy whose Interest it is should endeavour to seize that Advantage, by seizing his Batteries. The little Field-Pieces might be distributed equally through the Regiments, to move about occasionally as the respective Regiments moved. As he will be inferior in Cavalry, the few he had, should be strengthened by mixing with them Platoons of Infantry, to cover with them the Wing of his Army, that was most exposed by the Situation of the Country. Should any line of Defence be drawn, it might be a slight one to cover the Wing of the Army that had no Cavalry, in short to be a Defence rather against the Enemy's Cavalry than Infantry; the former of which he is to keep a watchful Eye upon, as well as upon his own Flanks, lest the Enemy should make such an Advantage of their Superiority in this respect, as to over-Balance his in Artillery. In what Manner the Infantry are to be disposed, depends on many Circumstances, but as it concerns this War, no more than any other, we shall only add, that what ever the Disposition is, it would not be amiss, especially for an adroit General, as it is not to be supposed these Armies are very large, to keep in some Convenient,

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perhaps central Place, a Regiment or select Body of Troops, for him to make Use of, as Occasion may offer. This was a Method pursued sometimes by the famous Duke d'Enguien, than whom in a Day of Battle no one was greater.

It not belonging to this Subject to speak of Disposition in general, what has been related as well as what we shall say further on that Head, is to be understood to have a particular Relation, to the Peculiarity of the Constitution of these Kind of Armaments.

In fixing upon the Spot of Ground to fortify and secure in the Manner mentioned, to facilitate the Re-imbarkment; could it be contrived, it should be such as could be defended as much as possible by the Artillery on the Water; because then in the Absence of the Army, the Enemy would find it infinitely more difficult to seize our Batteries; or to impede any of our Motions and Operations preparatory to the Act of Re-imbarking.

In securing our Retreat by the Means of some of our great Artillery disposed on the Water, or on the Land at proper Distances for reciprocally defending each other like so many little Bastions, we save the immense Trouble of drawing Lines to cover the whole Army; we preserve also the Courage of our Troops, as it is very well known, the Assaultants of an entrenched Army, have much more undauntedness than the * Defendants. However that it might not be thought, what we have declared, relating to entrenched Armies, is spoke at random; we will give some Instances by which a Judgement may be formed of the Dependence that is to be had in this Kind of Defence.

x Ramsay
Hist of Turenne.
Lib. 2.

In the Year 1644 the famous Duke d'Enguien * afterwards Prince of Conde and the Viscount de Turenne forced the Camp at Fribourg of Count Merci

* Malgré tous les Avantages des Armées retranchées, on ne peut s'empêcher d'être surpris, de les voir forcées en fort peu de tems, lorsqu'elles sont vigoureusement attaquées. Selon les regles de guerre, cela ne devoit pas arriver, pour peu de fermeté que l'on ait à se défendre. Ce qui me surprend encore plus dans tout ceci, & l'expérience ne nous le démontre que trop c'est que le soldat est moins brave & moins résolu derrière un retranchement qu'en rase campagne, & dans un avantage égal, sans sçavoir pourquoi, & sans que personne se soit avisé de lui expliquer ces avantages contre l'assaillant, & ces avantages sont infinis. Folard. Tom. 3. lib. 2. p. 404. Obs. 5.

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the Bavarian General, who besides other great Talents, had in an eminent Degree the Arts of securing himself against Surprise, of penetrating into the Designs of the Enemy, and of making up for want of Numbers by encamping to Advantage. The Bavarian Army amounted to above 15000 Veteran Troops, and was incamped in a Place almost inaccessible; it had all the Advantages of Situation, it was fortified besides with a strong Entrenchment, and with a Fort pallisaded, and well defended by Men and Artillery; he also erected little Redouts at 200 Paces distant from each other; and felled great numbers of Trees which were disposed in such a Manner as to answer the End of Chevaux de Frise. Notwithstanding all these Difficulties, Condé and Turenne by attacking this Camp in two different Places with about 20000 Men, forced the Bavarians after an obstinate Defence to retire; the Night favoured their Retreat, which was to a level Piece of Ground one third Way up the black Mountain near Fribourg, about a League's Distance from their old Camp.

Ten Years after this, we find another Instance of forcing a Camp covered with very strong Lines. It was at Arras ^a. The Duke d'Enguien now Prince of Condé, and Turenne were here against each other. The Spaniards were pressing the Siege of Arras, and to prevent being interrupted, their Lines of Circumvallation were twelve Foot broad and ten deep, with an advanced Ditch nine Foot in breadth and six in depth; they had built Redoubts and little Forts at certain Distances; they had planted Artillery in all Parts, and raised Epaulments to cover themselves from the Cannon. In the space between the Circumvallation and its advance Ditch, they had dug twelve Rows of Holes or little Wells four Feet deep, and a Foot and an half over, disposed Chequer-Wise; in the intervals they had fixed Palisades a Foot and half high to stop and hamper the Horses. In short they had fortified their Camp with all Kind of Works, even such as were least in Use. Turenne having well reconnoitred the Lines, determined to attack them, notwithstanding the greatest Part of the other Generals represented this Enterprize as rash. However he told them, by going
heartily

^a Ibid. Lib. 4.

heartily to work with several Battalions in a Front, they would certainly find some Part weaker than the rest, by which those who were repulsed in other Places might enter; that should the Attack be made in the Night the Troops in no one of the Enemy's quarters would dare to quit their Post, in Order to succour those of another, before Day-Light; because they would be in pain for themselves; or should they give any Assistance, it would be to those only who were the nearest to them. The 24th of August, the Eve of St. Louis, was fixt for the Attack, the Chief of which was resolved to be made in the weakest Quarter; and to have at the same time three false Attacks. The Soldiers were provided with Fascines, Hurdles, and all the Tools necessary for such an Enterprize.

It turned out much as Turenne had said, for though they were repulsed in one Place, they got in at another, and those who entered assisted their Friends who had not succeeded so well, till at last they obliged the Enemy to abandon their Lines.

In 1693, was fought the Battle of Nerwinde. Which great Day (says Feuquiere ^b) serves to show, that an Army howsoever well entrenched in its Front, with its Wings ever so well covered, may be attacked and beat by an Army equal; because the Movements of that which Attacks are free, their Front is without Embarrassment; when it often happens, the Army entrenched have not depth enough to contain a Body of Troops, sufficient to oppose the Number of the Assailants.

In 1674, ^c the Prince of Orange formed the Siege of Oudenarde, he inclosed his Army with Lines badly drawn. The French who had no mind the Place should be taken marched to relieve it. M. le Prince arrived within a little Distance of the Lines without seeing his Enemy. However he thought the Prince of Orange knew he had not carried his Line of Circumvallation up as far as some Heights; he imagined, he reserved them to have it in his Power to put his Army in Order of Battle, on the outside of his Lines. As he thought at first, the Prince would have met him and fought him on the March. However these were not his Intentions. The whole French Army arrived at Night

^b His Memoirs
T. 3. Ch. 80.

^c Ibid. Ch. 86.

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Night and seized to their great Surprise the Heights, with a full Design then of attacking their Enemy with all the Advantages they had put in their Power by shutting themselves up in the Manner mentioned. But the Prince of Orange did not chuse to waite the Event, for as soon as the Night came on, he raised the Siege.

In 1683, ^d the Turks had their Lines forced before Vienna. The Grand Visir had inclosed his Army in some Lines in a Place bordered with some Heights which had a considerable space of Plain between the Line and the Hills; which from the side of the upper Danube had a Plain between the Hills and the River. The General neglected to seize the Heights, but kept within his Lines when the Christian Army approached. This gave Sobieski King of Poland an opportunity to extend all his Cavalry in the Plain and also upon the Heights; and to attack the Front of their Line, whilst the Duke of Lorrain attacked their Right with all the German Infantry by the Head of the upper Danube. By these Methods the Turks had their Line of Circumvallation forced, and their Army beaten with the loss of all their Artillery and Baggage.

d Ibid.

In 1706, ^e Prince Eugene forced the French Lines in much the same Manner at Turin. When the Prince arrived with his Army at the Tanaro, he found the Duke of Orleans at the other Side, with a Design to fight him at the Passage of that River, or the Po.

e Ibid.

However Marshal Marfin and the other Generals ordered it otherwise, for Prince Eugene was permitted to pass the Tanaro, and when he approached the Po the French Army was ordered to enter their Lines, except a Body of Infantry that were left to keep Possession of some Heights. Prince Eugene soon found out, that one Part of their Lines was weaker than the rest; whereupon he attacked it, with all his Army, his Infantry in three Columns, sustained by all the Cavalry. The Consequence was, this Quarter was forced, the Place succoured, the Siege raised with the utmost Confusion, with the loss of all their Artillery.

Feuquiere to prove stronger his Maxim ^f, never to wait for an Enemy behind Lines of Circumvallation, but to fight them without the Line, gives us an Instance the reverse to the others.

f Ibid.

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CONJUNCT EXPEDITIONS. Part 2.

When Prince Eugene formed the Siege of Lisle, in 1708, he shortened the Extent of his Lines, as much as he possibly could, not being willing to take up more Ground than the Troops destined for that Enterprize could occupy : he did not trouble himself with taking in some Heights that bordered on his Lines ; because he was not willing to confine his Army, in Case the French should draw near to fight him ; he seized those advantageous Heights and kept them for his Field of Battle. And the Duke of Burgundy when he marched to the succour of the Place, found Prince Eugene posted and fortified upon these Heights without his Line of Circumvallation ; facing the French Army with a Front of as great an Extent, as that with which they could attack him, with his Flanks also well covered.

Thus then we are told, the Entrenchments of Merci, the Lines of Arras, of Nerwinde, Oudenarde, Vienna, and Turin, were all forced. We are told also Prince Eugene and the Duke of Marlborough at Lisle followed a contrary Method, by which the Enemy did not dare to attack them ; and as our Accounts say, when they perceived, the French had no Intention to fight them in that Situation, they drew a slight Trench, to prevent any suddain Surprise. Prince Eugene went on with the Siege, whilst the Duke of Marlborough covered it.

We have given these several Instances of Lines and entrenched Camps, to be able to form some Judgement of the Dependance we may put in them.

To give us to understand, notwithstanding they may be of the greatest Use, when properly drawn ; when also the strictest Attention is given in regard to the not confining the Troops that are to defend them in any of their Movements and Evolutions, as well as their free Egress and Regress ; should these Difficulties not have been duly considered and obviated, the above Instances will serve to teach us, that Entrenchments and Lines instead of being an Advantage, might serve only to invite an Enemy that did not stand in such awe of them, to give us a total Overthrow ; for this has been generally the Consequence when they have been forced, for the several solid Reasons already mentioned.

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We should not have dwelt so long on fortified Camps, had they not a close Connection to the present Subject. For though it is absolutely necessary to set out with constructing some Place of Security, through the Means of well entrenched and well disposed Batteries; there is a great Nicety, Art, and many weighty Considerations to be had in the Method with which they are to be formed. We are to remember also it is necessary to be so Expeditions both in our Consultations, as well as the Works themselves, as not to retard the Progress of the Expedition. We have mentioned this, to show how careful we must be, in being well furnished with every Kind of necessary Tool, as Spades, Pick-Axes, Hand-Bills, Hatchets, &c; that whilst a considerable Body of Troops are employed in securing the Retreat; a Number answerable to the Object of our Enterprize may be employed at the same in forwarding the Business of our Journey. Many Hands properly applied make quick Dispatch; and Success (we may say the Life and Soul of these Enterprizes) depends on Dispatch. We are to observe at the same time, that many Hands without Tools in a Day of Labor will signify as little, as without Weapons in a Day of Battle. There cannot be a stronger Instance of a thing of this Sort, than what manifested itself in the Bay of St. Cas; the Coldstream Regiment of Guards was detached from the rest of the Army the Evening before the Action, and took Possession of this Ground; where it was judged proper to convert an Entrenchment, the French had made to prevent a Landing, against the Enemy. How great soever the Necessity of such a Work might appear according to their Circumstances they had no Tools for any such Business. Had it been in their Power to have vigorously and skilfully managed it, there is no judging of the Effect it might have had in the following Day. As we look upon this to be a Circumstance of the utmost Consequence, we have reserved it for the last of our Remarks preparatory to the Act of Re-imbarkation, which we shall now relate.

To this Purpose, it shall be supposed, we have shewn ourselves such Masters in the Art of War, as to have finished what we were sent about; to have done the
Enemy

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Enemy some heavy Mischief, and are arrived safely at our Asylum ; there preparing Matters, so as to make our Retreat from this Hostile Land, without having a Mischief done to us ; notwithstanding the Enemy like the Roman Fabius have followed us at a small Distance, and are still keeping us in View, in Order to take first their Revenge of those, whose fate it happens to be to take last their Leave of them.

In this Situation, on a Supposition, we can have only three Regiments of Transport-Boats, and one of Artillery Rangers, we are to form a Calculation, of what Number of Soldiers is the greatest, all these Boats can take off the Shore at one Time, properly attended with Artillery ; that we may know for certain the Strength of the Army, which in all Probability might have the greatest Chance (should there be any) of fighting. For we are to observe, in a Day of Battle, an Army can be reckoned no stronger than by the Number of Troops that can be brought some how or other to lend their Assistance in that Day's Action. We have now reduced our System to that Regularity, as to render a Calculation of this Sort no Ways difficult. At Rochfort we are told no Calculation was made. Had there been an Attempt towards it, we believe it must have been a Difficult as well as an imperfect one, through the variety of different sized Boats. The same may be supposed of all former Expeditions. However it is otherwise here.

We are to remember then, according to the Calculation made at our first Debarkation from the Ships into the Boats, on a Supposition the Enemy was waiting to receive us on the Shore ; the Boats contained 2340 Men, all in a Capacity of firing, during their Continuance there, and under the Protection of 60, two Pounder-Guns, 8 nine-Pounders, and 32 twenty-four-Pounders. It was observed, that should the Enemy suffer this first Body of Men to be landed, we encreased the Number by the Means of the Rowers of the Rangers to 3000 ; getting in lieu of the 60 two-Pounder-Guns, 32 six-Pounders. This was the utmost Number we could bring in the first Debarkment, being under a Necessity of not crowding the Men in a Manner as to render useless their Arms at such a critical Juncture.

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The Enemy we supposed had a double Number of Regiments making 4680 Foot, with 600 Horse and twelve Field-Pieces. This Number of the Enemy at our Re-imbarkation we will say are doubled, being now 9360 Foot, with 1200 Horse, and 24 small Pieces of Artillery. The present Business then is to contrive by what Method we can make the last Re-imbarkment equal to this great Force.

According to Calculation it is found, that six thousand and four Men may be left to go off all together with the last Re-imbarkment, under the cover of the Speckled Rangers eight nine-Pounders, the 32 six-Pounders, and sixty-two-Pounders. It is to be supposed, before we quit our strong Post, or divide any of our Force in Order to Re-imbark, every thing is prepared for that Purpose, and more particularly to render it safe for the last 6004 Men.

When our Matters are thus far advanced, it may be observed, the Difference is very great, between the Transportation of Troops from a Fleet to a Shore lined with an Enemy, and from an Hostile Shore to a Fleet of Friends. In both however the Soldiers pass from one extreme to another. In the first (at least according to our System) they are taken out of Darknes and Confusion, and placed in their Boats in the exactest Order and Regularity, to meet perhaps immediately an Enemy ranged in no less Order and Regularity than themselves. In the latter they quit an Enemy's Country, where their own Preservation obliged them to observe the above Order, to rush immediately to their Ships, and be plunged again among their Friends into their old Darknes and Confusion. For a Debarkment is a quick Transition from Darknes to Light, Confusion to Order, Water to Land and from Friends to Enemies: the Re-imbarkment is, vice versa. The Difficulty and Danger during the critical Performance of each of these Parts of a Conjunct Enterprize, must appear to a very common discernment to lie between the Boats and the Land, not the Boats and the Fleet; the former containing the Enemy, the latter the Friend. The Inference we would draw from this, is, when we
make

make the Descent, it is upon a strange Land, prepared by the Enemy to receive us; but when we re-imbark, it is from a Place we ourselves have, or ought to have been assiduous in rendering capable to defend and cover such an Operation; for though we come Strangers to it, we do not return so from it. Wherefore notwithstanding it may be necessary for the Troops in every Boat that make the first Landing, to be at as full Liberty for all Military Operations, as the Enemy on the Shore; yet when the same Troops are to return to their Ships, the Case is altered; then the Necessity is not so great to be anxious about preserving that exact Order, or Liberty of fighting from their Boats, their Dependence being of another Sort, chiefly on the Works they had thrown up to render safe their Retreat into their Boats. Upon this Principle we crowd them with Troops in the Retreat as much as possible, in Order to quicken the Business, as well as to enable us to have on the Shore for the last Re-imbarkment, a Body of Troops sufficient to keep the Enemy at the same respectful Distance, they observed, before it was begun.

To this Purpose by the following Method, we preserve for the last going off 6000 and odd Men. In the Calculation we are going to make, the two Platoons of Speckled Rangers are not included; as their Guns can be brought to Fire the same Way, and the Boats pushed nearer to the Shore than the large Rangers; they are reserved intirely to cover the whole Re-imbarkation.

The Methods contrived to enable the Boats, to hold the above great Number; and the Dispositions, to render secure the whole Re-imbarkation, are as follow: It is to be supposed, every Thing is re-imbarked, except the 6004 Men, and thirty two six Pounder-Guns. We are also to imagine the thirty-two large Rangers, the twenty-four Subdivision Transport-Boats, and the six Platoon Transports are at the Edge of the Water, quite clear of every incumbrance; such as the great Guns, Carriages, Shot, Platoon-Benches, Masts, &c. The Boats returning in this light Manner from the Ships, we allow but half the Number of Rowers to every Subdivision Transport-Boat and every large Ranger, to the Platoon Transport at this last return we allow

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allow only ten Rowers. These Rowers are to divide themselves as equally as they can through the whole Boat, that when they go off with the last Body of Troops, Soldiers may sit between them to Row: the real Rowers being thus disposed, can instruct the Soldiers in their new Employ when it is necessary. The Troops in this Situation not being expected to Fire with any Regularity; we may now place almost a double Number of Rowers from one end of the Boat to the other: Therefore they must be sure to be prepared at this last return, with Oars and Seats in proportion. Masts and Sails, may be done with, as is judged most proper.

By this Method we get in every Subdivision Transport twelve Men; in every Platoon Boat fourteen; in every large Ranger, twelve. Besides these, as they are now to stand as thick as they can in the Transport-Boats; To every Subdivision-Boat we shall squeeze in thirty-one extraordinary Men. To every Platoon-Boat twenty four. The Weight taken out of every great Ranger for the large Gun, Carriage and Shot, being equal to 7440 Pounds, which added to a 1000 more for other Things taken away, will be a Weight equal to forty-three Men, who all together weigh but 8428 Pounds. To these forty-three Men which every great Ranger gains in this Manner, we are to add fourteen more, to supply the Place of the Artillery Men, which attended the great Gun, and were left with it, six only being with the little one, on the Land.

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We will now cast up the Account.

The original Number of Soldiers at the first Debarkation was.	2340
Gained by the Rowers, and extraordinary Men to the twenty-four Subdivision Transport-Boats ; to each Boat forty-three ; in the Whole.	1032
Gained by the same Means to the six Platoon-Boats ; to each Boat thirty-eight Men ; in the Whole.	228
Gained in each Artillery Ranger ; for Gun, Carriage, Shot, &c. for Artillery Men, and Rowers, sixty-nine Men, therefore to the thirty-two.	2208
To the thirty-two little Guns on Land allowing six Men to each.	196
Total	6004

Thus then it is found, upwards of 6000 Men may be re-embarked at one Time. Which considering they will have the Assistance of eight nine-pounders, thirty two six-Pounders, and sixty two-Pounders, may very well be esteemed a Body considerable enough to make a safe Retreat to their Ships; though in the Presence of an Enemy, consisting of 9360 Foot, with 1200 Horse, and twenty four small Pieces of Artillery ; providing proper precautions have been taken, to make the most of every Advantage the Situation of the Grounds and Waters in the Rear afford ; providing also what is done, is done with Spirit, Care, Foresight, and in a Soldier-like Manner. We will observe, should this Nation be at Liberty to carry this War to the highest Perfection, and grant a double Number of Boats regimented as these are ; by the Rule of Proportion, we could re-imbark at one Time upwards of 12000 Men, under the cover of a double Quantity of Artillery. Nor is it required to have so great a Space of the Shore for the Boats, to take off the Troops from, as to debark ; because the Soldiers not being under the Necessity of firing from their Boats, it is not expected they should be brought to the Shore for a Re-imbarkation with a broad Front, as in a Debarkation ; where it is not certain whether there might not be a Battle before they got out of their Boats ; however a Re-imbarkment

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ment may be made (should it be necessary,) by Grandivision or Subdivision, just as easy as a Debarkment.

Having shewn in what Manner the Boats are made capable of holding this great Number : the next Business is to find out by what Method this great Number are to get at their Boats ; the Order they are to retire in, from their strong Post to the Water-Side. It has been supposed, the whole Army not to let the Enemy seize a Situation that would command their Re-imbarkation, are encamped on some Heights at a moderate Distance from the Shore. The Difficulty then is to know in what Manner the Troops that make the first Embarkments can safely quit these Heights, these strong Holds, without leaving it dangerous to the Body of Men. That are to maintain their Ground in their absence : and who are afterwards. To make their own Departure and Embarkment though incapable of being supported by the rest of the Army. These critical and nice Undertakings which are to follow immediately one another, are not to be begun, till the whole Plan has been thoroughly considered, and well adjusted. The Army is to remain entire till every thing is in perfect readiness, for its Separation, towards the first Re-imbarkment. Every Fault, committed here, should a Watchful Enemy take an Advantage of it, in all Probability, would be Capital. The Constitution of the War has been changed some time ; the Army however though now is carrying on the defensive Part ; during its Continuance in its strong Camp, it is a Defensive capable of being converted into the Offensive : what is to be most wished, by the Army is to keep this Kind of Prerogative, as it may be called, as long as they can (was it possible) even till they reach their Ships. This however, is a very difficult thing to manage : it requires the greatest Prudence and Capacity ; here the Superiority of Genius in the contending Generals in all Probability will show itself.

Wherefore before they set out, they must know what they have to trust to ; in digesting their Plans, several things are principally to be considered. There is the Situation of the Shore ; the Disposition of the Boats to suit the same Situation. A regard is to be had to Time, whether Night, or Day, as well as the hours of Tide. Besides this the intervening Country between

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the Camp and Shore, is to be made the most of, whether inclosed, or open; whilst we are looking behind us in this Manner, we are to look before us as much, to watch the Enemy in all their Motions.

When every thing of this Sort has been fully weighed and considered; they may venture to quit their strong Post. Which we will suppose done in the following Manner. Notwithstanding what has been said should the Country in the Rear be inclosed and irregular, so much the better for the Army that has not far to retreat to, but is to do it in the face of an Enemy consisting of Cavalry as well as Infantry; as it may then be imagined, they had well reconnoitred a small tract of Country, and consequently could take Advantage of every Inclosure, Village, Wood, Hollow-Way, in short of every Irregularity it afforded, to retard the Enemy whether Cavalry or Infantry: besides all the Motions of the Troops would be more concealed from them. However to make it more difficult we will say here, it is an open Country; and for the sake of not crowding the Book with too many Plans; we will show a Method for a Re-imbarkment in the Bay of Chatalilon, between the Water B in the Center of the Bay, and the Water C of Chatalilon. We shall form the Disposition according to the Chart as it appears to the Eye. By making the Re-imbarkment between these two Waters, the Boats will not be so widely extended as at the Debarkment, nor would it be proper to have them so; as the Enemy now will have drawn their whole Strength together, to make the greater Effort, should an Engagement ensue.

In this Part of the Shore, the Objects to be made to cover the Re-imbarkment are, those two Waters, and the Abbey de Sechebon, in the Center between them. In this last Place, we would mount twelve six-Pounders masked and well entrenched, so as to command a strait, as well as a flanking Fire towards the Water on the Right and Left. In each of those Waters, a Platoon of Speckled Rangers should be stationed, to Fire either in the Rear of them, or to Flank reciprocally, the Battery in the Center. By this Method, the whole extent of Shore intended for the Re-imbarkation would be covered by twenty Pieces of Artillery, well disposed

posed in three Batteries at proper Distances from each other as well as from the Sea Side; and in Situations very difficult for the Enemy to take Advantage of; especially when they were assisted by all the other small Artillery. These Precautions having been taken on the Water-Side; the chief Danger will be in the retiring from one strong Hold to another. As yet the Army is intire, in Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery: because it is as well to suppose, the twelve six-Pounders were placed and entrenched on the Edge of the Shore, as soon as the Resolution was taken to make the Re-imbarkment between those Waters, which might have been at the Time of Debarkment.

It being determined at a Council of War, we will say, that the Re-imbarkation shall begin at the dusk of the Evening: to facilitate the many Operations towards it, it would not be imprudent, to contrive before Hand some Stratagem to draw the Enemy's Attention some other Way; making them at least doubtfull, by some Detachments, or Evolutions in the Day Time, or in the Night by Lights or beat of Drums differently posted, whether or no, our Design might not be to fall upon them. Whilst this Farce is carrying on; the proper Divisions and Separations, according to Calculations, for the several Re-imbarkments being made; the great Guns at the hour appointed are to be taken out of their entrenched Posts; and are to have their vacant Places supplied immediately with the six-Pounders. The first Re-imbarkment will consist of the great Guns and Cavalry; the latter will be embarked in the Transport-Boats. A Description having already been given of the Manner the Boats are to hold the Men, there is no Occasion to be repeating it with the embarking of every different Division: wherefore we shall only observe that the great Artillery, (which in all Probability might not be many,) Invalids, Cavalry, and Baggage of every Sort, are the first to be transported to the Ships; that we may keep as long as possible as many Troops we can together. When this is done, we send off the first Division of Troops, and after that at the return of the Boats another; reserving for the last, as has been already said, 6000 and odd Men with all the small Artillery. By these Methods, unless

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the Fleet was farther from the Shore, than it ought to be, or the Winds or Tides very unfavourable; a Re-imbarkment of a very considerable Army might be near compleated by break of Day. For supposing the two first Loadings consisted only of Artillery, Cavalry, and Baggage: In the two next we could take off upwards of twelve thousand Men; in three, eighteen thousand. The re-embarking of Infantry do not take a Quarter the Time, as Cavalry, Artillery, and Baggage; however whilst these Matters are going forward, the Army in regard to Infantry and small Artillery is as compleat as ever.

As the embarking Artillery takes up a considerable Time; the Body of Men which make the last Re-imbarkment having so many Field-Pieces with them, though they are small, will not be able to make the like Dispatch either in their Retreat to the Water-Side, or in the Act of getting into the Boats; as the Divisions that were embarked before them without Artillery. Here we will make two Remarks, chiefly for the Military Reader. The first is, it is of the utmost Consequence, to have all the Artillery, great and small with their Carriages, made as light as possible; but more particularly the six-Pounders; that upon a Necessity they might be drawn by Men. There will be remaining with the last 6000 Men, twenty six-Pounders, besides the twelve on the Edge of the Water. Wherefore, could these be drawn easily by Men, there need not be a single Horse left with the last Re-imbarkment, consequently it would be so much the quicker. The other Remark to be observed, is also directed particularly to the Military Reader. It has been shewn, how clear from Confusion, how distinct every thing is set before the Soldiers Eyes; in short how much the whole Operation of a Debarkment is facilitated by having all the Boats regimented in the Manner as has been described. But a Debarkation is not more facilitated by it, than a Re-imbarkation; nay, we can hardly think so much. In the latter as well as the former, some Vessel of the Fleet should be stationed between the Fleet and Shore; and considerably nearer the Shore for all the Boats to assemble at, at their Return from the Fleet from having unloaded their

their first Freight. It was remarked at St. Cas, that after the Embarkation was begun, the Transport-Boats did not return with the Punctuality, or Regularity which was requisite. In this Vessel there should be an Officer to regulate the Order of the Boats ; that they might arrive at the Shore again in the same Military Order they left it. As for Instance, such a Regiment to the Right, such to the Left ; such a Grand-Division of Rangers upon the Right of such a Regiment, such to the Left, so on. According to the Disposition made of the Boats on the Edge of the Water, the Disposition of the Troops on Land, is to be regulated for every Embarkation. As to the Guns and Carriages, they are all, coloured, marked, and lettered, the same as the Boats they came out of ; therefore are to be disposed as near as may be, according to the Disposition of those Boats ; they are to be directed, to the Part of the Shore where their respective Boats are. In regard to the Men, there is a greater Nicety to be observed. It is almost sure to happen, that the Disposition for the Re-imbarkation will be very different, to that of their Debarkation ; consequently every Man might return in a different Boat, and differently stationed, to what he was landed from : besides they are now to be more crowded. To prevent Confusion at such Times, a note should be given to every Commanding Officer of a Platoon, specifying what Boat, of what Grand-Division and Regiment it belonged to, and where stationed, that his Platoon was to be embarked in. By this Method as they marched, they would know, unless it was in the Night, a considerable Time before they reached the Shore or saw the Boat itself, the Place exactly where it was stationed : first by seeing the Color of the Streamers, they would learn where the Regiment was ; and as they approached nearer, by reading the Letters on it, they would find out also where the very Boat was. Here again is the great Use of the Streamers being colored and lettered the same as the Boat.

All these Minute things tend to clear us from Confusion. How different was it at St. Cas, where the new invented flat bottomed Boats, which were looked upon to be such a Conjunction, being all alike ; made

it impossible for the Soldiers to tell which Boat, they were to get into. Consequently some Boats were not loaded enough, whilst others were too much; consequently every one seized as he could the Boat nearest him. And had they not been put in Disorder by the Enemy first; it could not well happen otherwise but they must have confounded one another; so as to impede very much their Re-imbarkation. It is well known, nothing breeds Confusion sooner, than Matters of Importance to be executed with Dispatch by a Multitude of People of different Capacities, that have no distinction of Order, no regular System, or certainty to go upon. According to the Method here laid down; every Soldier being told before Hand, the Boat he is to be embarked in; and seeing it at the same time, and knowing it from every other Boat on the Shore by being marked differently, has no pretence to break the Order and Plan of Embarkation; should he be maimed, or killed in getting into a wrong Boat, he has no Body to blame but himself. According to the present Practice, when Accidents of this Sort happen, the sufferers are to be doubly pitied. When poor Soldiers are to have their Hands hammered and maimed, for hanging to save their Lives on some overloaded Boat; because through the unsystematical Method of proceeding, that Life can't be saved but at the hazard of destroying sixty or seventy more; which was the miserable Case at St. Cas; where by not knowing how to assist our Friends, we were under the Necessity of negatively assisting the Enemy*.

We have dwelt longer on this Remark to show the great Consequence, of having all the Boats coloured, lettered, and regimented in the Manner described. We will now return to finish the last Embarkment of an Army situated as has been already mentioned.

In the Circumstances the retiring Army is now in, it would be of the utmost Importance to conceal as much as possible the several Re-imbarkments; this is

* Je crois que les Anglois trouveront ici le *ne plus ultra* de leur Descentes. Relation de la nouvelle Descende des Anglois à Saint Malo 1758.

not a very difficult thing to do for an Army encamped on Heights that Command the whole Shore ; because the Body of Troops that compose the last Re-embarkment is considerable enough to keep an extended Front towards the Enemy during the Operation of the first Embarkments : besides these Embarkments would probably be made in the Night ; therefore should the whole be well conducted, the Enemy could not be certain, they were begun, till they were almost finished, by the last six thousand Men that faced them, perhaps towards the Break of Day disappearing all at once. By acting in this Manner, the Army upon the Retreat would get the Start of the Enemy, at least of their Infantry : as all the Boats, we are to suppose, are at the Edge of the Water in exact Order and readiness to receive them. However should the Enemy act the Part they ought, and keep their Cavalry constantly upon the Watch, to pursue immediately the retiring Army, to fall upon their Rear, and retard as much as possible their March ; unless great Care was taken in the Dispositions the last Body of Men were formed in, for a quick and secure Retreat ; it would be far from improbable but the Enemy might succeed so well, as to impede by their Cavalry the retiring Army, full enough to give Time to their Infantry to seize the Heights they had quitted, which command the Embarkation. Should this be the Case, they might leave a sufficient quantity of Mortars and other Artillery upon some particular Places of these Heights to annoy both the Boats and Army ; whilst their whole Force with the remainder of their Artillery marched down to the Attack : what would be the Event, the Reader may easily guess ; as the retiring Army will have quitted one strong Post, and will not perhaps have reached their other on the Edge of the Water : it is to be observed also, at this critical Time, they have not one single Squadron of Horse. In frequent Expeditions this will often be the Case ; wherefore it is proper in a Treatise of this Sort, to show the most difficult Parts of the several Operations, that they may be obviated the better.

g Thucydides.
Lib. 6. The Si-
cilian War.

Nicias & the Athenian General in his Sicilian Expedition seemed sensible of these Difficulties. Before the Battle fought near Syracuse, he spoke to his Army in the following Manner : “ My Exhortation to you, “ I am certain, is contrary to that of the Enemy. “ They say to their Troops, you are to fight for your “ Country : I say to you, you are to fight, out of your “ Country ; where you must gain the Victory, or not “ easily get away ; for numbers of Horse will be upon “ us. Let every one then remember his own Worth, “ and charge valiantly. Let him think the present “ Necessity and Streights we are in, to be more formidable than the Enemy”. The Athenians got the Victory, and the Experience of this Battle, determined them to send to Athens for Cavalry.

The Position then in which the Body of Infantry is to be formed in, to make the last March with the greater Safety, Speed, and Conveniency, for getting into their Boats, is now to be considered. To this Purpose, before we quit the strong Camp, we would form each Battalion into a Target * ; which would give eight Targets being about 700 Men in each, and there would remain 400 to be employed, with the twenty six-pounder-Guns that attended them ; and also with the Battery of twelve more at the Water-Side.

What is here said, relating to these Positions, is directed wholly to those who have read that Book, and considered it ; as others can be no Judge. The Target has a Body in the form of a Bastion, with a Platoon in the Center to strengthen it ; with two Wings to act by the Sides of it, and two Flanks attending to assist the whole. When only a single Target is formed, the Wings and Flanks are of the same Service to the Body, as lesser Works would be to a single Bastion standing by itself in Fortification ; but when several Bastions are constructed at proper Distances they form a reciprocal Defence to one another. In the same Manner would the Bodies of several Targets

* See the Target, a Book I published under that Appellation in the Year 1756, containing Positions for small Bodies of Infantry to resist the Force of Cavalry, or the united Force of Cavalry and Infantry in a Champain Country.

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when open, Act without their Wings and Flanks in regard to one another *. (See Plate 2^d. Fig. 3.)

Wherefore when eight Targets are ranged in a Line; though they are all at the forming made compleat with Wings and Flanks; as the six Center ones are now in a great Measure become Flanks to one another; it is best to take their real Flanks and form them together into a separate Body, to act as the Commander shall think proper; by this Method he will have twelve Platoons of Grenadiers, as a Corps de Reserve (See g.) For the same Reason, that is, the Necessity not being so great for the Wings to remain in their proper Stations, he can also strengthen this detached Body, when Occasion requires with the greatest Facility and Safety, by ordering the right Wings of the same Targets to hold themselves in readiness to support the Grenadiers; which will add eighteen more Platoons: He can still aggrandize this occasional Body of Troops by doing the same with the left Wings.

By these Methods forty eight Platoons may be detached for any particular Service; to support any Part the Enemy makes their chief Effort against; which out of eight Battalions are equal to three wanting six Platoons (See *a, b, c.*) There are no Positions whatever that we have heard of, afford the like Advantages: Because the Commander has it in his Power to have (whenever he pleases) a very extraordinary occasional Strength, without weakening too much any material Part. For the Target on the Right and Left of all, is compleat in every Particular, each having their interior Flank added to the exterior; their interior Wings being protected greatly by the Targets next to them, can easily spare those Flanks to help protect and defend their exterior Wings. Should then the Enemy's Cavalry make a principal Effort on either the Right or Left of the Army, retreating in this Manner; the exterior Target might form its Rear to the Enemy, and would have besides its own Wings and Flanks the great Body above-mentioned, which in the whole would make very near four Regiments. By having so great

* In this Plan they stand too close to one another.

a Front towards the Enemy's Cavalry, which to make the Retreat more difficult, we are supposing, are bent towards the Right or Left of the Army, the Progress of the Targets need not be impeded by altering their Positions; for should these Wings and Flanks be beat, they would retire to their own Bodies; but the Probability would be small of their being worsted, as attacking them, would be nearly the same as fighting Troops that had several Bastions to retire to. However should the Enemy's Cavalry break this Line of Infantry, they would find it then very dangerous to push their Advantage; as all the Bodies would be opened, in compleat Order to receive them both with their Fire and Bayonet. This would stop the Cavalry and force them to retire, and give at the same Time the routed Infantry, an opportunity under their Protection to recover from their Disorder, and form again into their first Positions; consequently the Army would be little or nothing retarded in their March, which the Targets are to pursue (as in the Plan) with their Bodies shut. Those Positions being short, compact, and strong, are well adapted for an expeditious, safe Retreat in these Circumstances; and when they arrive at the proper Ground, with the least Change, are rendered convenient for the embarking into the Boats, as we shall see.

The Contrivances we have been obliged to have recourse to, to enable us to keep on the Shore a large Body of Troops for the last Embarkation, has been related. It is sufficiently known in what Manner the Boats contain such a much greater Number at a Re-imbarkation than a De-barkation. The Reader is to observe, the Difference is so small, whether every Boat carries a few Men more, or a few less; that we do not intend to break any Platoons, to square exactly with a Calculation so nicely made, as to regulate the Number in each Boat to a single Man. Eight Subdivision-Boats and two Platoon-Boats are intended to hold a Regiment in perfect Order of Battle. The Subdivision-Boat then, carries two Platoons; the Platoon-Boat, one. But when they are to be fully loaded, as at such a critical Time as a last Re-imbarkment; the Subdivision-Boat must be made to contain, three; and the

the Platoon-Boat, two. The large Artillery Ranger prepared as has been described, must also be contrived to hold as many as the Platoon-Boat. This may be done with Battalions consisting of about 700 Men, their Platoons then having about thirty-nine Men to each. What is now going to be shewn relating to a last Re-imbarkment is of a very great Importance to this Sort of War; it tends, to clear from Confusion, and perhaps from Destruction, a multitude of People, during their performance of a nice Operation; and at so critical a Time, that without the exactest Order, and most regular System; Confusion and Tumult, will be the almost certain Consequence, especially when an Enemy is near at Hand. As the Debarkation in the Bay of Chatalilon, is made by three Regiments, each making their Landing in a different Manner for a Reason already mention'd; We shall for the like Reason Re-imbark from the same Bay a double Number of Regiments into the Boats differently disposed also.

As the Subdivision-Boat is now to contain three Platoons, six will hold a Battalion. The large Artillery Ranger containing two Platoons, a grand Division will sixteen; therefore by adding a Platoon Transport-Boat, (which also carries two Platoons) to every grand Division of Rangers, another Regiment is provided with Boats for their embarkation.

As it is now known, how many Subdivision-Boats are required for a Battalion, also how many Rangers: It remains to be found out in what Manner, the whole Number of Boats are to be disposed, to take off the Shore the eight Regiments together.

There are twenty four Subdivision-Boats, six Platoon-Boats, and thirty two large Rangers. This is the whole Number for the Embarkation. As six Subdivision-Boats only are now to hold a Regiment; the seventh and eighth Boat, of the three Regiments of Boats, being drawn up together will hold a Regiment likewise; consequently the four and twenty Subdivision-Boats, without their Platoon-Boats will now carry four Regiments. And the four grand Divisions of large Rangers, each having a Platoon Transport-Boat with it, will also hold four more Regiments; there will remain of the whole, two Platoon Boats empty.

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The Business now, then is to dispose them properly for the embarking the eight Regiments, which are formed into eight Targets. To every Target are allotted two field Pieces, planted upon the exterior Points of the Wings; the Target on the Right and Left have each three field Pieces, two being placed on the Right and Left of the whole. The Flanks of the six Center Targets, which form the Body of Observation have also two Field Pieces with them. This is the Disposition of the twenty Field Pieces, that attend the Troops in their last March. There are twelve more small Pieces of Artillery in the Battery of Sechebon, which make the thirty-two. By this Disposition the Artillery are disposed equally through the Whole, to defend the whole the Better. For this Reason also must the Grand Divisions of Rangers on the Edge of the Water be divided equally through that Part of the Coast, the Troops are to embark from; by this Method, the Guns when they arrive on the Shore will be nearer their own Boats, consequently may be sooner embarked.

As the four Targets on the Right are to be embarked between the Abbey de Sechebon and the Water of Chatalilon; and the four on the Left between the said Abbey and the Water in the Center of the Bay. The twelve Pieces of Artillery, that form the Battery at that Abbey which is in the Center of the Whole, should belong to the twelve Center Ranger-Boats; which will be six from each of the Center grand Divisions. When the Targets have retreated so far, as to be defended by the Battery at Sechebon and the Platoon of Speckled Rangers in the Waters on the Right and Left; they are then arrived to their last strong Post; having twenty more Pieces of Artillery to protect them, situated in such a Manner as to reciprocally flank each other; eight of which are also nine Pounders. During the Army's continuance in this Situation, the Probability is but small, that the Enemy will venture to fight them on the Beach; as they would be protected, by eight nine-Pounders, thirty two six-Pounders, and sixty two-Pounders, making in the whole an hundred Pieces of Artillery. Wherefore the Enemy's chief Aim would be to seize the Heights, in Order to

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Fire from thence, to sink (if possible) the Boats. There are two Ways to obviate this Danger ; the one is to conceal by some Stratagem the Departure of the Army from the Heights ; the other is to make such Expedition in the March and Re-imbarkation ; as not to give an Enemy Time, to seize them and get their Artillery in proper Order to take the Advantages they afford by commanding the Shore. To do this, (as it has been shewn in what Manner the Army retreats to the Water-Side) we are to describe the Disposition the Boats are to be in, that are there ranged in perfect Readiness to receive them. It is much best, when the Shore admits of it, to Land the Whole in one entire Line ; as we are now going to make the Re-imbarkment from. For this Purpose, on the Right of all near Chatalilon, we range in a Line with their narrow Ends close to the Shore the first grand Division of Rangers, which are eight Boats ; close to the Left of them, the six first Subdivision-Boats of the Blue Regiment, with their Platoon-Boats on each Side. Next to these, the second grand Division of Rangers ; then the six first Subdivision, and Platoon-Boats of the White. Next to them, the third grand Division of Rangers, then the same Number of the Transport-Boats of the Red Regiment ; after these comes the fourth grand Division of Rangers. And upon the Left of all, we have placed the seventh and eighth Subdivision-Boat of the three Regiments, the Blue on the Right, Red on the Left, and White in the Center. But it is not to be understood, that the Left is to be always the Place for these Boats more than any other. This is so plain and easy, we did not think it necessary, to crowd the Book with another Plate to show it. The Boats being thus disposed ; the Target on the Right * embarks in the first grand Division of Rangers and in the Blue Platoon-Boat on the Right of the Blue Regiment. The second Target embarks in the six Blue Subdivision-Boats. The third in the second grand Division of Rangers and Left Blue Platoon-Boat. The fourth in the

* We have called here the Target that is to enter the grand Division of Rangers on the Right, the Target on the Right ; though according to the Method of forming the Target, it is more properly the Left, as their Rear faces the Enemy, and their Front the Boats.

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fix White Subdivision-Boats. The fifth in the third grand Division of Rangers and the Right Red Platoon-Boat. The sixth in the six Red Subdivision-Boats. The seventh in the fourth grand Division of Rangers and Left Red Platoon-Boat. The eighth in the seventh and eighth Subdivision-Boat of the three Regiments. This is the Disposition of the Boats allotted to receive each Regiment, by which Distribution they will be all filled except the two Platoon-Boats of the White Regiment in the Center opposite the Battery of Sechebon; which are there ready to receive the extraordinary Men of that Battery or elsewhere; in short to clear the Coast of whatever remains of the Armament.

The Disposition of Men, Artillery, and Boats being thus determined; we are to see next in what Manner the Regiments or Targets (as they are here) with the Field Pieces are to be re-imbarked. The Targets when they have retreated within a very small Distance of the Water are to halt, and open immediately so wide as to form almost a strait Line; their Wings are to be all expanded; and the Body of Grenadiers, are to separate and March between the Troops and the Water, 'till they are opposite their respective Targets; and then are to advance to their proper Places to form Flanks as usual; the Artillery are to be drawn also on this Interval 'till each Gun is opposite its respective Ranger. The four Targets that are to fill the four grand Divisions of Rangers, are the first to embark; then the Field Pieces, except those at the Battery. The Irregulars are supposed now, as at the Debarkation, to be on the Flanks of the Platoons, and to separate, when their Assistance is required.

The Reason for the Rangers receiving their Freight first, is because, they will take more Time, on account of the lifting into their Places the little Guns. It is to be observed, all the Artillery are to be made to take off and put on their Carriages, as occasion may require. The Targets march by half Files into the Boats; two Platoons into each Boat beginning with the Front, then the left and right Side; left and right Wing; left and right Flank; and the Rear face, must get into the Ranger that has but one Platoon of the Front face. Whilst this is doing, the four Targets that are to em-
bark

bark in the Subdivision-Boats keep their Rear opposite the Enemy; which is the fighting Position of the Target. The Rangers being filled, and Field Pieces mounted properly on their Carriages; the remaining Targets begin their Embarkation, as follow. The Subdivision-Boats holding now three Platoons each, suit exactly the Faces and Wings of the Target, every Face and Wing being formed with three Platoons; the Flanks and Rear face together make three Platoons also. Should the Front then enter a third Subdivision-Boat, the Left face a second; the Right a fifth; the left Wing a first; the Right a sixth; the Flanks and Rear a fourth; every Platoon (Grenadiers excepted) would be on the Water in their exact regimental Order, notwithstanding there were three Platoons in each Boat. This is to be done, though the Regiments were formed in Battallions, or any other Position. Whilst they are in Targets, as here described; the Wings, Flanks, and Rear faces, being the last to embark, defend their respective Bodies during that Operation; as the Flanks and Rear faces do their Wings; consequently they compose the Rear Guard to the last Embarkation; which will be no inconsiderable Body, being the Grenadiers of the six Regiments, with six other Platoons; the whole equal in Number to a Regiment. When the Troops are thus embarked, the Artillery that form the Battery are to be drawn off; and the Speckled Rangers are to row as fast as they can, to get clear of the Waters they are stationed in, and join the Embarkation. The Battery at Sechebon with the Speckled Rangers covering the whole Embarkation so well; it is much better to run the Risk of losing some of the Field Pieces on that Battery, than by drawing the Guns away before the Embarkation is completed; consequently leaving a great opening to the Enemy perhaps to penetrate, and attack the last Embarkment at such a disadvantage, when half the Men are in the Boats, and half on the Shore, which in all probability would be attended with very bad Consequences.

It is to be observed, when the Beach from whence the Embarkation is made, is wide enough, to give
O room

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room to all the Transport-Boats to bring their Broad-sides to the Shore, so much the better; as we gain thirty two-pounder Guns by it, and the Men have more Room on the Shore to be disposed, without being crowded, opposite the very Boats they are to enter: But it will frequently happen, that the Embarkation is deprived of this Advantage, by the narrowness of the Place or some other local Impediment. When this is the Case, every Boat must be drawn up at the Edge of the Water, with its narrow End to the Land; as it then takes up much less Extent of Shore.

In this Situation the Transport-Boat has but one Gun pointing to the Enemy: This is an Inconvenience, we must overlook: What is to be remedied, is not to be neglected. To this Purpose every Transport-Boat and Ranger is to be so constructed, as to give the Rowers a Power of sitting to Row either backwards or forwards; the Rudder must be made to take off and hung on at either End, as occasion may require, and as it will have a Gun close over it, it must have two little short handles that can move under the Gun, the one inclining its Point towards the Right of the Boat, the other towards the Left. Should the Boats when they approach the Shore to receive their Freight, be under the Necessity of turning about, before they can row off; it is easy to be conceived, by any who considers how much longer the Boat is, than wide; that such an Evolution with a Number of Boats will require much more Time, as well as extent of Shore: The one is sure to breed Delay, the other very likely Confusion.

To steer clear of the latter no Precaution is to be neglected: To preserve ourselves free in this Respect, the System here laid down must on no Account be broke in upon; wherefore should the Subdivision Boat shortened as has been described to fifty-one Feet in Length be still thought too long and cumbersome to be transported on a Ship; it must be more curtailed. To do this we must reduce further the Length of the Regulars or Platoons, by taking of two more half Files from each; this will shorten the Boat six Feet more, a few Inches excepted, and make it now instead of sixty-six Feet

Feet its original Length, only forty-five. As by this Method, the Boat is not so long as it was at first, by more than twenty Feet; the Necessity is not so great, to have it continue of its original Breadth, wherefore we will reduce it in this respect eighteen Inches. Should we trespass the least on the System of our Boats, confusion (as at the Springing of a Plank) would overwhelm us immediately. Wherefore, when a nice Operation is to be performed, should the Platoons be found too large for the Boats thus lessened, they must be lessened also, and be made to suit. Under these circumstances, it is safest to take from every Platoon a few Men, and form them into a Body by themselves in order to Re-imbark them in the common Boats of the Fleet, disposed by themselves also into as good a Regimental Order as the Nature of them will admit, between two Regiments of Transport-Boats. By this Method as it was remarked (when we spoke of making Feints) they would be protected in a great Measure both from confusion and danger, by the Regimental Transport-Boats and Rangers on their Right and Left: By this Method also, we might occasionally encrease the Number of Troops, either at a Debarkment or Reimbarkment. To every Transport-Boat and Ranger, a careful Man should be appointed Master, whose principal Business should be to take Charge of every Thing belonging to the Boat; to have it all in readiness whenever he was called upon.

The remaining Boats of the whole Fleet that could be spared, should be equally divided through the whole Armament during these Operations, to lend as much as possible their Assistance; there should also be a Boat or two, to attend the Commanding Officer.

Should other Positions be thought more eligible than the Target, for the Body of Infantry that are to make the last Embarkment, to retreat in to the Water Side on an open Coast, whatever they were, it might easily be contrived to adapt the Boats on the Edge of the Water to them. For our Parts we know none, that are so secure against the Enemy's Cavalry, and at the same time

command so much Fire against their Infantry, which are Considerations we thought sufficient to authorize us the Liberty of introducing them here, even though we had been silent as to giving the Sentiments of so many famous Generals relative to entrenched Camps: All which more or less tend to prove the Validity and Force of the Principles the Target is founded on; especially the last Instance at Lisle.

Should a Re-imbarkment be made in the Night, it would not be amiss to have guide Boats to every Regiment with Lights in them. The Ship also station'd to mark the Place of Rendezvous for the Boats should be distinguished by Lights. It does not belong to this Subject to speak of Signals; wherefore we shall only say, such as relate to the Army, the Officers should be made well acquainted with. And we do not doubt, when the Littoral War shall be more perfected, but Signals might be invented to be serviceable to a large Number of Boats, as well as Ships. For it is a Remark, whoever once gets the Command, having the Genius requisite in his Art, will pass with Rapidity, and without Difficulty from the most inconsiderable to the greatest Things. The Duke of York ^h afterwards James the Second, was the first who invented for the French the various Movements of Flags. Before that time they did not know how to draw up a Fleet in Order of Battle. The Whole of their Experience consisted in Fighting one Ship against another: They were unskilled to make many move in Concert, and imitate at Sea the Evolution of Land-Armies, whose several Divisions mutually Support and Succour each other.

^h Voltaire's
Age of Lewis
XIV. Vol. I.
Ch. 10, & 12.

The several principal Operations which make the material Distinction between the littoral and established continental War having been fully discussed; and the Difficulties in a great Measure obviated: Before we quit entirely the Subject, it may not be amiss, to endeavour to obviate one Objection that will be made against our System.

It will be asked perhaps, in what Manner, the Transport-Boats, Artillery Rangers, Cavalry, and every

every other Necessary that our System requires is to be transported.

To answer this Question we will see how much in these Respects we exceed other Conjoint Armaments. For this Purpose we will draw a Comparison between Plan the 2d. and the first Expedition to St. Maloes, under the Duke of Marlborough; because this was the largest and best provided. For it consisted of 15 Battalions, 400 Artillery Men, 540 Light Horse; in all about 13,000 fighting Men. They were also provided with 60 Pieces of Cannon, 15 of which were twenty four-pounders, and 50 Pieces of the Mortar Kind. Besides these, there were 30 flat bottom'd Boats, scaling Ladders, Chevaux-de-Frise, draught Horses and Carters.

We will suppose then we have the same Number of fighting Men, attended with every Thing our System requires; that we have three Regiments of Transport-Boats, and one of Artillery Rangers. By which we should be obliged to carry 36 more Boats which are the Rangers, and about 250 more Horses. We should have 72 Cannon, 32 of them twenty four-pounders the rest Field-Pieces, with 60 two-pounders and about four Pontoon Boats. To balance our Superiority in Cannon. The first Expedition to St. Maloes had 50 of the Mortar Kind. To balance our superiour Weight in Boats and Horses; they had draught Horses, Carters, and Chevaux de Frise; for whether we should take any of the Latter, or not, we are not determined. Upon an Average then we don't think, there is much difference in Point of Weight; Nay, it is so small, it is not worth thinking about. We will now find out the more important Difference, relative to the Manner these several Necessaries can be employed in. As the Strength of an Army in a Day of Battle can be reckoned only from the Number of Forces that can be brought some how or other to lend their Assistance: So ought we to Form our Calculations relative to Artillery and other Implements as well as Troops, necessary for Military Operations. Sixty Pieces of Cannon they had at St. Maloes, of which ten six-pounders only were landed, and

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and these were more than a double Number, to what were debarked at the last Visit to this Place, through the vast Difficulty and Inconvenience of getting them to the Shore and moving them about afterwards; for we are told in the first Enterprize here, they wanted Horses to draw the Cannon. They had also fifty of the Mortar Kind; if the Intention was to have landed some of them, it was as vain as that of debarking the Guns; by keeping them on Board the Fleet, seems as though it was thought so. According to the Methods practiced, they would have required too much Time. Scaling Ladders ('tis true) were no farther off than the Fleet, but the Probability of using them, was very distant indeed. We may venture to say, prepared as the Troops were on Shore, there was scarce a Possibility. Four hundred Artillery Men attended the Parade; but of what Use could the Men be without their Guns? Without doubt, more than 300 were like their Artillery, a useless Lumber.

Five hundred and forty Light Horse, made also a Part of this Armament; light indeed they would have been found, had a Trial been made, for a Battle requires the Weight of Cavalry. At such a Time (like a Feather in a Cap) they would have carried with them more Shew and Smartness, than Gravity and real Use. The new invented Boats preserved neither the Order of the Platoon among the Men in the Boat, nor of the Regiment among the Boats on the Water. Wherefore had this Armament (though esteemed the most formidable of any) met with any serious Resistance, whether at a Landing, Siege, Battle, or Re-embarkment; it must have had good Fortune had it not failed in either, unless well assisted by the Fleet; being no Ways adapted of itself for any of these Services.

An Army of France, is too well appointed in this Age, for equal Numbers, much less inferior to contend with, attended with only a few Field Pieces and no Cavalry proper for the Charge. Their Towns (though not like those on their Barrier) are too strongly fortified for Armaments as above described, to make an Impression against.

This

This proves another Deficiency in our Armament, for when it was so little prepared to Act the offensive War, a small Opposition would have converted it to the Defensive. In that Case, prepared (we will say again) as it was, though there were some few Chevaux-de-Frise, certainly there was not half enough. The Burning of an 100 Ships and doing a great deal of Mischief in an Enemy's Country, where there was little Resistance, does not confute any Thing here asserted. We are told it was the Opinion of some, that St. Maloes was not impregnable, though the Attempt to have taken it, might have required too much Time according to their Plan.

What we are endeavouring at by this Discourse, is to prove, that an Armament fitted out according to the System in the second Plan, would be ten Times more formidable to the Enemy, and secure to the Invaders, than that sent first to St. Maloes; notwithstanding there would be so small a disproportion in the Tonnage, each carried. According to Plan the second, every Thing might have been debarked, moved afterwards about and re-embarked, in the most regular and easy Manner. What manifests this, brings our Insufficiency in the Methods of prosecuting this Kind of War, down to the present Times; which we set out to prove at the beginning of this Work. For what can shew it more, than the Undertaking of an Enterprize with an Armament so unskillfully prepared for it, as when it arrived at the destined Place, it was not thought worth the Labour to attempt to make Use of a sixth Part of the Implements and Necessaries that were on Board the Fleet, and intended when they were embarked to have been landed: Notwithstanding they who were employed stood in need of such Implements at the same Time.

We have gone then from the the First to the Last, with our Conjunct Armaments (in the Christian Language) like the Foolish who took their Lamps, but took no Oil with them. And in the Words of the Heathen, (like the Roman Nobility) who (says Marius) ⁱ after they are made Consuls, begin to read the Actions

ⁱ Sallust de
Bell. Jugurth.

of

of their Ancestors, when they should be practising what they had read: Preposterous Men! Thus to make Practice (should they Act at all) go before Theory, which should be its Consequence*; and so they betray their Insufficiency, by busying themselves out of Season, in what, at a proper Time would have been their best Employ.

Thus shall we go again, should we stand with our Arms a-crofs, despairing of ever learning better, though so strongly urged and stimulated by past Errors, and past Misfortunes.

We are to pull our Hands out of our Bosoms, and like our great King Alfred of Old, not despair of improving our little Skill and Knowledge in these Matters. "A Man diligent in his Business shall stand before Kings," (says Solomon.) "It is a Royal Thing to Labour," (said Alexander.)^k

^k Βασιλεὺς
καὶ πολὺν χρόνον
Plut. in Alex.
pag. 1262.

We see then what we have to do. We are to spare no Cost, nor Pains to have a right Comprehension, a true Judgement about Things that are of the highest Importance to us. We are to labour earnestly to acquire Knowledge; doubly to toil, when our Country, Interest, and Employment tell us, it is expected of us.

^l Barrow on
Industry.

The Attainment of the Perfection of every Art, is the Prize of Industry, and not to be gained without it. Nature conferreth little thereto, Fortune contributeth less; it cannot be bought at any Rate; it cannot be purchased for the Gold of Ophir, for the precious Onyx, or the Sapphire: It is the Offspring of watchful Observation and Experience, of serious Meditation and Study; of careful Reflexion on Things; marking, comparing, and weighing their Nature, their Worth, their Tendencies, and Consequences: These are needful to the getting of Knowledge: ^l because Truth which it seeketh, seldom lies on the Surface, obvious to a superficial Glance, not depending on a simple Consideration of few Things; but is lodged in the Bowels of

"* At Ego scio, Quirites, qui, postquam Consules facti sunt, acta
" Majorum, & Græcorum Militaria Præcepta legere cæperint: Homines
" Preposter! Nam legere quam fieri, tempore Posterius, re, atque usu
" prius est."

Things

Things, under a knotty Complication of various Matters; the Diamond is deep in the Mine, and encrusted over, so that we must dig to come at it, and labour in unfolding it; notwithstanding the Difficulties to shun the Prejudices springing from Inclination or Temper, from Education or Custom, from Passion and Interest, which cloud the Mind, and obstruct the Attainment of Knowledge.

What we would infer from this Discourse, we will now apply to the Conclusion of this Work. Our Defeats and Disgraces in the Littoral War, speak plainly, we have no right understanding there; Nay, our Management in these Affairs, is far distant from the Seat of Knowledge. It can scarce be called common Prudence or common Sense; who will be surprized? When we are just told, Knowledge or Wisdom is the Prize of Industry and not to be gained without it; * it is the Offspring of watchful Observation. The latter implies the Labour of the Mind, the former rather of the Body. It is a palpable Demonstration, from the Number of Conjunct Armaments these Kingdoms have fitted out, and the many fruitless Attempts that have been the Issue of them; that there has been no right Industry, no Skill or watchful Observation. That is, we have never employed our Minds in the Study of this War, 'till we have been called upon to make Use of our Bodies also: Thus when it is too late, by knowing nothing beforehand, we doubly fatigue our mental Faculties, with the vain Hopes of retrieving lost Opportunities; the Consequence of this is, we flounder and flounce about, and by going the wrong Way to Work, we doubly harass those of our Body also, with the fruitless endeavours of repairing Time that is past. There is nothing more evident than this; otherwise we should make ourselves simpler than we really are, by having never struck out something to obviate common Difficulties.

* Ego nec Studium sine divite venâ

Nec rude quid profit video Ingenium:

Hor. Art. Poetica.

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in Hor. Ar.
Poc.

No Art or Science whatever can be thoroughly attained, but by dint of Industry. It is true, we are told, Study without Parts is of no great Profit; ^m but the following Line says, Parts uncultivated, is of as little.

No noble Edifice ever reared its Head, but by cunning Contrivance and laborious Hands; by the mutual Assistance of Genius and Industry. The former indeed, is the gift of Nature, therefore not like the latter in every ones Reach.


What has been in Ours with great Pleasure, we give our Country. Should there be any Benefit reaped from it, by those who give their Thoughts a turn this Way; may the Profit be Their's, as the Labour has been Ours. We will take leave of the Candid Reader with this Remark.

As Custom cannot privilege Error; so Novelty cannot prejudice Truth. Our other Readers are desired, not to forget the following Lines.

Hippolitus obiit, quia Novercæ creditum est;
Cassandræ quia non creditum, ruit Ilium;
Ergo exploranda est Veritas multum prius,
Quam stulta prave indicet Sententia.

PHÆ.

F I N I S.



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